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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an examination of Sudanese conflict, specifically that between 
the central government and the southern region, using a comparative analysis 
of the peace agreements of 1972 and 2005. This area of conflict resolution 
has not been fully explored, in part because of the complexity of the region’s 
wars and in part because of the recent conclusion of the latter agreement, 
which initiated an interim period that is still ongoing as of the publication of 
this thesis. A successful comparative analysis of these agreements will 
provide a meaningful addition to the body of conflict resolution literature 
generally and that of post-colonial African conflict in particular.
While this work concentrates on the two civil wars in which the south hosted 
the primary insurgency, it will seek to place the wars, and the agreements 
which ended them, within the greater context of Sudanese political history. 
This is in order to determine what features of the Sudanese state have 
contributed to both the conflicts and their resolution. However, detailed 
discussion of Sudan’s other internal conflicts -  the uprising in Darfur in the 
early 2000s, for example -  is not immediately relevant to the topic and will 
not be included in the thesis.
Throughout the body of the thesis, different lenses are used to analyze 
Sudan’s history of conflict. Issues of identity, which lay at the foundation of 
war in Sudan are examined at length. The neo-patrimonial nature of the 
state and its contribution to both conflict and conflict resolution, are also 
reviewed. The impact which the intertwining realms of security, 
development and the use of natural resources have is examined, as is the 
effect of regional and international actors on Sudan’s conflict and 
peacemaking efforts.
The work concludes that the 1972 agreement was indicative of the 
nationalist temperament of the government at that time, and of the insurgent 
movement’s lack of shared, long-term objectives. The 2005 agreement was 
successful because of the government’s lack of nationalist objectives, and 
because the insurgent movement at that time agreed to discontinue its own 
nationalist vision for the whole of Sudan. Consequently this thesis argues 
that, based on an examination of these two agreements, Sudanese 
nationalism is no longer a potent political force.
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1INTRODUCTION
PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the course of post-colonial Sudanese history, tensions between the northern and 
southern portions of the state have led to two protracted civil wars, the first lasting 
from 1955 to 1972 and the second from 1983 to 2005. The successfully concluded 
peace agreements to these wars, the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) of 1972 and the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, are the landmark moments in 
Sudanese conflict resolution. A comparative examination of these treaties -  both the 
measures they stipulate and the environment in which they were negotiated -  will 
provide important insights into Sudan’s progress as a state. Despite a significant 
amount of material chronicling the causes of these wars and their resolution, there 
remains a scarcity of comparative analysis regarding the resolutions of these 
conflicts: specifically, of what the two warring sides demanded from the other, how 
these demands evolved over the course of several decades, and how the political 
environment in Sudan and regionally had changed in the interim to create differences 
between the two agreements. As Sudan’s history of independence since 1956 has 
seen only eleven years of peace, to understand the motives for these wars and their 
endings is, in a large part, to understand the political history of post-colonial Sudan.
In addition, the fact that both conflicts erupted along the same north/south fault line 
within the state, yet revolved around different insurgent objectives, also begs further 
analysis of the evolution of Sudanese identity as reflected in the peace agreements: 
specifically, how the conception of national and regional identity changed between 
the 1970s and the 2000s. Therefore, this thesis is not a pure analysis of the 
mechanics of conflict resolution. Instead, it is an analysis of a particular state, almost 
perpetually engaged in domestic conflict, through the prisms of its two most 
significant peace agreements.
The study seeks to bring a fresh approach to understanding insurgent motivations in 
the two conflicts. The first insurgency had a separatist objective, while the second 
sought a broader national revolution involving marginalized peoples from areas
2outside the south. This evolution of southern objectives has rarely been specifically 
examined, much less in terms of resolution of the conflicts. The contradiction that 
the first insurgency would settle for regional autonomy in the AAA and the second 
for the option of southern secession in the CPA -  both arrangements antithetical to 
each movement’s respective cause -  has also rarely been explored. The insurgent 
retreat to these positions, when viewed conjunctively with the trends of northern 
nationalism, seems to support a hypothesis that nationalism generally in Sudan is on 
the wane, and has been steadily throughout the course of Sudan’s post-colonial 
history.
AIM
The goal of this study is to trace the evolution of southern and northern objectives in 
Sudan’s conflicts, within the context of their two successful attempts at conflict 
resolution. Ultimately the aim is to determine what the two sides wanted, and the 
process of fighting and negotiations by which they were able to reconcile these goals. 
El Obeid, in his study of the Addis Ababa Agreement, highlights the tension between 
an historical analysis and a legal analysis of the agreement, explaining that ‘a strictly 
legal analysis tends to be misleading, since it does not tell us much about how the 
Southern Problem developed. On the other hand, the historical background would 
not show how the Agreement was legally formulated.’1 Emulating his ‘middle way’ 
compromise, the bulk of analytical work in this thesis will consist of explaining the 
historical foundation for the legal concepts that would eventually become codified in 
each of the two agreements.
Consequently, while the various conferences and initiatives throughout the history of 
both wars will be explored, the study will examine them in the context of the two 
lasting peace agreements. The scope of the work will be limited generally by 
confining historical analysis to within the conceptual perimeters of the events which 
led up to these agreements. There will accordingly be little discussion of events 
occurring during the CPA interim period following 2005. This degree of scope also
1 Abu Baker El Obeid. Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Stockholm: Liber Tryck, 1980, 
15.
3limits analysis to the dominant north/south division of Sudanese wars and excludes 
the recent conflict in Darfur, as well as other northern Sudanese conflicts and related 
peace agreements. In addition, periods of Sudanese history not directly related to 
either conflict, the colonial era and the immediate post-AAA period in the 1970s, for 
example, will be examined primarily in terms of their relevance to the agreements or 
-  more commonly -  to substantiate broader themes in Sudanese history which are 
also addressed in the agreements.
While this approach requires some amount of comparative analysis, the thesis cannot 
be limited to a strict comparison between the agreements. Both treaties occurred at 
different periods within the same state’s history, and therefore must be viewed as part 
of an historical process to avoid distortion of their significance. The CPA was, in 
many instances, a response to the perceived failures of the AAA, especially in the 
realms of security and wealth sharing. As a result, some of the concepts covered in 
the study can only be viewed as evolutionary processes. The significance of many 
issues addressed in the text of the agreements simply cannot be analyzed 
satisfactorily without a full understanding of the history of the debate and conflict 
they have inspired: southern demands for self-determination, or the status of the 
northern nationalist movement, for example.
In addition, an understanding of events leading up to these agreements can clarify 
how both sides visualized such concepts as federalism or the role of Islam in politics, 
both examples of concepts whose meaning changed drastically during the period 
between agreements. This is especially relevant in the early analytical chapters, 
which focus less on the technical detail of conflict resolution and more on dissection 
of the historical trends which have dominated Sudanese conflict, and which would 
therefore have to be confronted in the agreements.
RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL APPROACHES
Researching the topic revealed an absence of directly comparative studies of the 
AAA and the CPA, hardly leaving any real body of comparative literature upon 
which to expand. This dearth can be explained in part by the relatively recent
4conclusion of the latter agreement and the fact that, as of the publication of this thesis, 
the six-year interim period initiated by the CPA has not come to an end, making it 
impossible to accurately evaluate the ultimate success of the agreement. Even a 
search for studies which seek to contrast the process of negotiations which produced 
the two agreements -  as well as the environment in which they were concluded -  
reveal a paucity of material. This may be due to the fact that the initial insurgency of 
the second war, as well as the CPA concluding that war, were correctly viewed as 
responses to the failure of the AAA. The assumption, however, that this should 
detract from the relevance of any direct comparison between the treaties is erroneous. 
The AAA was concluded in a specific environment and addressed specific desires 
held by both the government and insurgents at that time. Many of its provisions were 
later altered in the CPA process because they were ignored in the years following the 
AAA, but also because of the changing nature of relations between insurgents and the 
state.
As a result, the tendency of literature to consider the earlier agreement as little else 
but a stepping stone towards the second Sudanese Civil War and its subsequent 
conclusion under the CPA may clarify areas of history as they relate to the current 
agreement, but does little to examine the evolving roles of the two dominant warring 
parties -  the government and southern insurgents -  over the course of Sudanese post­
colonial history. A more comparative examination of the process by which these two 
treaties were concluded would fill gaps in the knowledge of Sudanese political 
history and the dynamics of African nationalist movements. This thesis would stake 
out a relatively unexplored area between isolated studies of the resolution of these 
two conflicts and a broader examination of Sudanese political history in which these 
conflicts, and the treaties which concluded them, play such a significant role.
Because of the varied lenses through which these conflicts and agreements will be 
analyzed, the discussion of relevant literature is included primarily in the analytical 
chapters. The range of literature on nationalism, neo-patrimonialism, resources and 
their role in conflict, the merits of mediation efforts made by state actors versus 
attempts made by non-state actors and other pertinent topics is simply too broad to
5consolidate into an unwieldy single chapter. As a result of these constraints, and 
because the comparative core argument of this thesis is the first published at any 
significant length, a classic review of literature is inappropriate. Instead, a review of 
the theoretical approaches of key authors discussed within the body of the text is 
warranted. The merits of theoretical approaches in the context of Sudanese conflict 
are included where suitable.
In the second chapter, an examination of the roots of Sudan’s nationalist movements, 
Jeffrey Herbst’s work concerning nationalism and the weak power of the state in 
African nations is cited in particular. Herbst discusses the nature of insurgencies 
which face weak states and explains that African nationalism has sought to mimic the 
state-building experience of Europe, but failed because states were given more 
sovereignty over their borders than they could enforce, a phenomenon which rarely 
occurred in Europe. Herbst explains that the religious and ethnic differences between 
Sudanese have just exaggerated tensions between the areas of strong and weak state 
control, tensions that exist throughout African countries. He writes of the irony that 
post-colonial states were unwilling to look to pre-colonial African societies at 
foundational levels as the determined how to organize their state. Herbst and 
William Reno both note that the tendency of international organizations to bestow 
legitimacy upon unwieldy states such as Sudan has complicated efforts to solve the 
problem and legitimized weak states, a tradition which has been questioned more 
recently.* 3
In the discussion of Sudanese neo-patrimonialism in the third chapter Stefan 
Lindemann describes how the patronage arm of the state could become stronger 
under the Bashir regime in the 1990s, especially through its privatization of public 
services.4 In addition they examine the difficulties of sustaining a separatist
'  Jeffrey Herbst. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, New
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 97, 100.
3 Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 100-101. William Reno. “Sovereign Predators and Non-State Armed Group 
Protectors?” Curbing Human Rights Violations o f Armed Groups. UBC Center of International Relations. 13-15 
November 2003, 9-10.
4 Stefan Lindemann. “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes 
of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Development Studies Institute. London School of Economics and Political 
Science. Discussion Paper 15 (February 2008), 14-15, 19.
6movement in Africa.5 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle also discuss the 
tools and forms of neo-patrimonial regimes, providing a theoretical foundation upon 
which Sudan’s patronage politics can be analyzed.6 78
Chapter Four examines the specifics of how conflict relates to resources and then 
attempts to evaluate Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler’s theories of economic 
determinism as they relate specifically to Sudan. Their model makes a case that 
economic opportunism is the incentive for most separatist rebellion, a case that the 
Sudanese experience seems to complicate. This chapter also examines what 
differentiates the neo-patrimonialism of Sudan from that of a typical rentier state, as
o
defined by Giacomo Luciani. Ulf Engel and Gero Erdmann’s work is useful in this 
capacity, and material laid out earlier in the chapter illustrates how this distinction is 
crucial to understanding fundamental dynamics in Sudan’s patterns of conflict and 
conflict resolution.9
Chapter Five looks at the theory behind international efforts to mediate conflict as 
applied to the Sudanese experience. In a prescient 1997 article about conflict 
resolution, Stephen John Stedman writes of methods to thwart spoilers in a peace 
process. These involve tactics such as including their patrons in negotiations at some 
point or attempting to ‘internationalize’ the process, starting with the involvement of 
other countries in the region.10 Louis Kriesberg writes of the difficulty of
5 Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn. “African Guerrilla Politics: Raging Against the Machine?” African 
Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine. Eds. Boas, Morten and Kevin C. Dunn. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner, 2007, 9.
6 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, 65.
7 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. “The Political Economy of Secession.” World Bank -  Development Research 
Group. 23 December 2002, 2-3. Paul Collier. “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for 
Policy.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen 
Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 160.
8 Giacomo Luciani and Hazem Beblawi. “The Rentier State”. Nation, State and Integration in the Arab World, 
Volume 2. Eds. Luciani, Giacomo and Hazem Beblawi. London: Croom Helm, 1987, 70. Giacomo Luciani. 
“Allocation vs Production States: A Theoretical Framework.” The Arab State. Ed. Luciani, Giacomo. London, 
Routledge, 1990, 72.
9 Gero Erdmann and Ulf Engel. “Neopatrimonialism Revisited -  Beyond a Catch-All Concept.” German Institute 
o f Global and Area Studies. Working Paper 16, February 2006, 106. ‘After independence, with the Africanisation 
of the bureaucracy and the establishment of authoritarian rule, the bureaucracy was extended and at the same time 
challenged and invaded from above and below by informal relationships. Thus, the state in Africa has always 
been a hybrid one, a mixture of patrimonial and legal-rational domination.’
10 Stephen John Stedman. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security 22:2 (Autumn 1997),
16, 51.
7coordinating mediation efforts.11 Peter Dixon and Mark Simmons describe the
ambiguity between state and non-state mediators, and how this can actually be of use 
• • 1 2in complicated negotiations. " Barbara F. Walter also writes of the ambiguity of 
‘impartial’ mediation, and of the ambiguity of the need for mediation at all. Other 
analysis of conflict resolution with regard to Sudan is scrutinized, such as Laurie 
Nathan’s assertion that mediation should not involve elements of coercion, citing the 
specific instance of the IGAD negotiations.14 John Young is also critical of the CPA, 
but because he believes it lowered its objective with the 2002 Machakos Protocol 
after earlier agreeing to a broader-based peace settlement in the 1994 Declaration of 
Principles.15
In addition to the review of a significant amount of secondary material for this 
project, gathered from libraries in Australia, the United Kingdom and the United 
States, as well as from sources available online, interviews have been conducted with 
a diverse array of academics, technical specialists, and Sudanese journalists and 
political commentators. Douglas Johnson and Peter Woodward, two of the most 
preeminent and widely published scholars on Sudanese history, have been consulted. 
Also contributing to this work are R.S. O’Fahey and A.S. Al-Shahi, two authorities 
on northern Sudanese political history and society. Badie Badawi Muhammed, a 
scholar of Sudanese anthropology and folklore provided insight into the perspective 
of the central, riverine Sudanese.
Additional authorities on southern Sudan cited in this thesis include Cherry Leonardi, 
a professor of history who has traveled extensively throughout the south since the 
beginning of the Machakos peace process. An interview with Benaiah Yongo-Bure, 
who has conducted some of the most detailed studies of development in modem
11 Louis Kriesberg. “The Growth of the Conflict Resolution Field.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f 
Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003419. Crocker, Hampson, Aall 2003, 507.
12 Peter Dixon and Mark Simmons. “The Role of Track Two Initiatives.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan ’s 
Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 60-61.
13 Barbara F. Walter. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International Organization 51:3 (1997), 
361-362.
14 Laurie Nathan. “When Push Comes To Shove: The failure of international mediation in African Civil Wars.” 
Track Two 8:2 (November 1999), 17.
15 John Young. “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation.” Institute o f Governance Studies, Simon Fraser 
University, Vancouver. 30 May 2007, 12.
8southern Sudan, contributed significantly to the understanding of the region’s 
political and economic history. Richard Lobban, head of the Sudanese Studies 
Association in the United States and a former employee of the Ministry for Southern 
Sudan Affairs during the Nimeiri regime in the 1970s, has also been interviewed.
This work has benefited substantially from conversations with sources familiar with 
the technical details of the CPA. These sources include Richard Barltrop, a scholar 
who specializes in Sudan and has written on the Naivasha process, especially the 
series of events which facilitated the conclusion of the Security Agreement signed in 
2003. Significantly, an interview was conducted with Sydney-based property lawyer 
Patricia Lane, who helped the two parties arbitrate and was herself involved in 
drafting the wealth-sharing agreement of 2004. She has only on one other occasion 
been interviewed about her role in the negotiations.
In interviewing Sudanese ex-patriots in Australia, a qualitative rather than 
quantitative approach was adhered to, with interviewees chosen based on their 
familiarity with the relevant political history. Sudanese consulted in this work are 
Mohamed Ibrahim and Monawar Sharif, former members of the National Democratic 
Alliance exile group, from eastern and central Sudan respectively. Kazim Omer and 
Ghanim Atara, political activists from the north, were interviewed. Finally, Alex 
Donato, of the UN High Commission on Refugees, who is originally from the 
Equatoria region in southern Sudan, has contributed to this thesis.
Additional primary material used in this thesis includes Anya Nya and SPLM/A 
literature, as well as literature sympathetic to both Khartoum regimes which presided 
over the eventual agreements. This material often takes the form of propaganda, as 
well as transcribed speeches and interviews. Concerning official documents such as 
peace agreements, declarations, and constitutions, primary sources directly wherever 
possible and relevant.
9CHAPTER SUMMARY
In keeping with the framework of the aim stated above, the study begins with a short 
historical chapter. The first half of this chapter covers Sudanese political history 
from the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium period, through independence, and 
continuing until the signing of the Addis Ababa Agreement. The second half covers 
from this point until the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement of 2005.
This chapter outlines the creation of the ‘Southern problem’ and elements of 
Sudanese society relevant to the conflict such as nationalism and Islamism. In 
addition, a review of concepts such as the Southern policy, and Native Administration 
are meant to underscore the lack of integration of the Sudanese state, how this would 
define future conflict, and how conflict resolution efforts tried to address problems.
The study of the region’s history in this chapter primarily serves the purpose of 
supporting the analytical chapters, and is not intended as a comprehensive history of 
Sudan. The brief review of colonial history is meant to outline specific elements 
necessary to understanding the dynamics of conflict and conflict resolution in Sudan: 
in particular, the fractured nature of the unintegrated Sudanese state, the origins of the 
patron-client relationships which define Sudanese politics, the patterns of Sudanese 
development, and the origins of both northern and southern Sudanese nationalism. A 
short review of the colonial era is necessary to outline the degree to which northern 
Sudanese political society evolved, leaving the south behind. After all, there would 
be no such understanding of the southern movements as ‘guerrilla warfare’ were it 
not for the advent of a modem Sudanese military under the Condominium. In pre­
colonial times, the disparity between African forces was not so great that the term 
‘guerrilla’ would have any meaning.16 Because of this focus on the conditions which 
created the structural foundations for warfare in post-colonial Sudan, other important 
events in colonial Sudanese history, such as the ‘care and maintenance’ period of 
administration of the south in the 1930s, the Nile Valley Unity movement, and the 
significant role of the Sudanese Communist Party in the northern nationalist 
movement are not examined in detail. Instead, the focus is on the foundations of
16 Christopher Clapham. “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies.” African Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher 
Clapham. Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998, 3.
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issues which would define the relationship of the warring parties in the post-colonial 
hostilities.
The coverage of events after the beginning of the first war in 1955 and Sudanese 
independence provides a chronology to be analyzed in successive chapters, and 
grounds theory in an historical basis. In addition, it introduces the dominant 
movements, parties, and individuals relevant to both conflicts and their resolution. 
Finally, this chapter will describe the patterns of attempts at conflict resolution 
throughout the history of both conflicts, laying out the basic issues of contention to be 
evaluated in subsequent chapters.
The historical material is followed by four analytical chapters that explore the 
historical information presented in the first chapter in greater detail and allow for 
broader theorization. These chapters seek to explain elements of each agreement in 
terms of the dynamics of the conflicts they ended, thereby placing specific aspects of 
the agreements in a broader political context. The second and third chapters establish 
the larger themes of Sudanese history, providing a bridge between the historical 
chapter and the fourth and fifth chapters, which deal with the more technical elements 
of the agreements. For the sake of narrative, and because these chapters often chart 
evolutionary processes, events discussed will usually follow a chronological pattern. 
While this may lead to repetition of some points, particularly those touched on in the 
earlier historical chapter, the weight applied to individual concepts and events, as 
well as the angle at which they are examined, will be different in each instance.
Chapter Two examines northern and southern concepts of national identity, and how 
these have been addressed by efforts to end the two wars. The chapter lays out the 
fundamental issues of identity and ideology as they apply in the Sudanese context. 
The first part of the chapter discusses the evolution of these processes, while the latter 
portion more specifically describes how they were addressed within the agreements.
In addition, the chapter seeks to clarify the priorities of both parties in both 
agreements by examining concessions made regarding issues of identity in the 
agreements.
1 1
Emphasis is made on determining competing visions of national identity -  not 
regional, religious, or tribal identity -  because both the peace agreements were of a 
national nature and did not seek to address issues of Christian or Arab identity. Islam 
is a complex, multi-faceted element of Sudanese society, but in this thesis its 
influence is addressed primarily in terms of its use as a tool of the state. This focus 
serves to highlight an often-overlooked distinction in the role political Islam played in 
the conduct of both wars and its interaction with conceptions of Sudanese 
nationalism. Successive regimes in the first war, whether leftist or conservative, 
utilized Arab-Islamic culture, but primarily as a nation-building tool to compensate 
for a lack of national integration at the time of independence. By contrast, in the 
second war, Islam increasingly became a political weapon used irrespective of 
nationalist principles. The decoupling of Islam as a tool of the northern nationalist 
movement allowed for concessions regarding the integrity of the Sudanese state in the 
CPA which the government was not willing to make in the AAA.
This chapter makes the most important distinctions between the governments which 
concluded the treaties, as well as between the rebel movements which they 
successfully negotiated with. It aims to differentiate between the nationalist vision of 
successive governments in the first war and of the post-nationalist conduct of the 
Bashir regime in the second. Similarly, the chapter details the evolution of Sudanese 
nationalism, and the contrast between the nationalist visions of the two dominant 
insurgent groups in each war.
Chapter Three observes the process by which institutions break down, as reflected in 
the AAA and CPA. The chapter gives issues of identity discussed in Chapter Two a 
more concrete political foundation, discussing Sudanese patronage politics and 
coalition building. These characteristics have defined Sudanese governance since 
independence, and both agreements were designed to be an extension of them. 
Because both peace agreements were implemented nationally, the chapter will 
concentrate on national patronage politics, with less emphasis placed on similar 
networks which exist at sectarian and regional levels. In addition, the national nature
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of the agreements, and their role in attempting to induct the rebel movement into a 
coalition with the state, also prescribes that greater attention be paid to the 
government’s neo-patrimonial tendencies rather than the internal patronage of the 
various rebel movements.
The chapter explains how exclusivist coalitions formed under the patrimonial state 
during the colonial period helped prevent broad-based nationalist movements that had 
appeal to both the north and the south from emerging. The national government’s 
resulting fragile base of legitimacy has led to a series of weak coalitions and strong 
neo-patrimonial hierarchies. The dynamics of patronage politics have also 
destabilized and disrupted attempts at mediation of the conflict, as demonstrated by 
the failed attempts of parliamentary governments during the 1980s to negotiate an 
end to the war. Most importantly, these dynamics have broken down the norms of 
post-colonial Sudanese politics, both destroying the foundations of northern 
nationalism and making SPLM/A insurgent leader John Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ 
alternative equally unworkable.
Chapter Four examines how these political dynamics, in addition to Sudan’s multiple 
security dilemmas, have been affected by development and natural resources, in 
effect discussing the practical implications of neo-patrimonial structures on conflict 
resolution. The chapter establishes the close connection between security, 
development and resources, as demonstrated by incidents such as the controversial 
construction of a service road to the oil regions during the final years of the second 
war, as well as the pattern by which cease fires would be concluded or violated in 
both conflicts. The role international oil companies played in the second war, and the 
significance of their interactions with both Khartoum and the insurgency, is also 
evaluated.
The chapter addresses the well-known greed/grievance approach to conflict resolution 
in the context of these treaties, and evaluates this method of examining conflict 
resolution both in terms of the treaties themselves and unsuccessful attempts at 
resolving the conflict. Here the benefits of analyzing the two treaties comparatively
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with regards to natural resources is especially useful, as these resources were a 
dominant issue of contention in the second war but played only a limited role in the 
first. In addition, larger patterns of socioeconomic development will be examined to 
determine the motivations of actors in the wars. In this chapter, the role the army and 
insurgent movements had in implementing cease fires, troop quotas and other 
elements of the negotiation process and final agreement will also be discussed.
Chapter Five explains why the resolution of Sudan’s wars cannot be analyzed in 
terms of the demands of internal parties alone, but must be observed in the broader 
context of Sudan’s domestic and foreign circumstances. In addition, an analysis of 
the role outside actors have played in Sudan’s conflicts and their resolution is a 
barometer by which to gauge the influence of nationalism, political Islam, and 
broader Arab/African questions of identity. Especially in a politically weak state 
such as Sudan, these broader relationships are particularly obvious indicators of the 
capabilities, limitations, and motivations of both regimes and rebel movements.
The involvement of other states in the mediation of Sudan’s conflicts will be 
reviewed in this chapter, especially in relation to the sovereignty of the Sudanese 
state. It will be shown that the degree to which Khartoum has allowed other states to 
play a role in the mediation of its domestic conflict is a constant and legitimate 
indicator of the erosion of nationalism as an organizing principle of administration in 
post-colonial Sudan.
The conclusion reaffirms and harmonizes the findings reached in the body of work, 
and further outlines the relevance of the information gained from analyzing Sudan’s 
attempts at conflict resolution towards the broader dynamics of Sudanese political 
history.
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CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL REVIEW
In order to analyze the Addis Ababa Agreement (AAA) and the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement (CPA), certain historical trends must be identified which have 
traditionally contributed to conflict. In Sudan, the dynamic of a weak central state 
seeking to expand itself via unstable coalitions and exploitation of the hinterland 
defines both agreements and has been a constant, predating even the Turco-Egyptian 
conquest of the early 1800s. The aggressive nature of state-building, projecting 
outwards from the central Nilotic areas, commonly met resistance in remote regions 
such as Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and southern Sudan.17
Islam came to be a strong cultural element which distinguished northern political 
cultures from those of the south. The Islamic faith was initially uncoupled with the 
early state-building process, spreading peacefully from Arab lands throughout the belt
1 o
of northern Sudan. While the religion retained an orthodox flavor in urban, riverine 
regions, as it spread to the countryside it mixed with African mysticism, creating the 
Sufi traditions which would typify Sudanese Islam throughout the twentieth 
century.19 These traditions grew to dominate Sudanese culture, becoming the primary 
sub-national forms of identity in the north as they gradually pushed tribal affiliations 
to the background.20
Obstacles of climate posed a natural barrier to the spread of Islam, as the marshes and
• 21jungles of the south were not conducive to the religion’s traditional dissemination.
17 Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan 's Civil Wars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 7. 
Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers; London: L. 
Crook Academic Pub, 1990, 25.
18 Woodward, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 23. Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim. Imperialism and Nationalism in the 
Sudan. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1969. 6. Scopas S. Poggo. “General Ibrahim Abboud’s Military 
Administration in the Sudan, 1958-1964: Implementation of the Programs of Islamization and Arabisation in the 
Southern Sudan.” Northeast African Studies 9:1 (2002), 67.
19 Francis Mading Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan. Washington, Brookings Institute, 
1995,41,44.
20 Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, “Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the Sudan.” The Southern Sudan: 
The Problem o f National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 33-34.
21 Poggo, “General Ibrahim Abboud’s Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958-1964,” 68. Charles Gurdon. 
Sudan at the Crossroads. Cambridgeshire: Menas Press Ltd, 1984, 32. The vast Sudd swamp from which the 
White Nile emerged in southern Sudan was almost impervious to indigenous transport and communication 
methods until the Turkish arrival in the early-1800s. Francis Mading Deng, “Green is the Color of the Masters: 
The Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modem Sudan.” Gilder Lehrman Center for the
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As a result, before the Turco-Egyptian expedition into the upper Nile region in the 
early 1800s, there had been no political alliance or national unity of any kind between 
northern and southern Sudan.““ The arrival of the Turks to the south began southern 
identification of Islam with the violent, expansionist process that defined state­
building in the region. As the south’s climate made it a uniquely difficult territory to 
incorporate into the Turco-Egyptian state, it served generally as an unorganizable 
hinterland beneficial primarily for its commercial potential: specifically in ivory, 
cattle and slaves.23
The fragile Turco-Egyptian state in Sudan was finally overpowered by an Islamic 
revivalist movement in the 1880s, led by a charismatic religious figure known as the 
Mahdi, who died soon after his forces took Khartoum from the Turco-Egyptian forces 
in 18 8 5.24 His successor, Khalifa Abdullahi, would spend thirteen years building an 
Islamic state before being overthrown by a combined British-Egyptian force in 1898. 
While their rule saw the further disintegration of tribal bonds throughout northern 
Sudan, the Mahdist state was too weak to penetrate the south permanently.25 This 
failure of the central state to assert control over the southern region would become a 
constant theme of Sudanese history. Large swaths of the south were not significantly 
administered by outside rule until the 1920s.26
Study o f Slavery, Resistance and Abolition, Yale University. New Haven, Connecticut. 23 October 2004, 15. Al- 
Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 7. The swampland was especially incompatible with the 
desert-oriented, migratory culture of the Arabs who spread Islam through the region.
22 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 69. Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question.” The 
Southern Sudan: The Problem o f National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 11-12. 
Martin Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil 
war.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 
1993, 3.
23 Woodward, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 22. Poggo, “General Ibrahim Abboud’s Military Administration in 
the Sudan, 1958-1964,” 70. Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” 12. Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, 
“Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the Sudan.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National 
Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 33. The Turco-Egyptian regime had organized the 
north into four distinctly administered provinces, but did not extend significant administration into the hinterlands 
of the south. Jeffrey Herbst. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 20-21, 42-43. This model adheres to the traditional 
pattern of state-building in pre-colonial Africa, where people and resources were the objective to be captured, not 
territory.
24 P.M. Holt. A Modern History o f the Sudan. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961, 86. Abu Baker El Obeid, 
Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement. Stockholm: Liber Tryck, 1980, 28.
25 Holt. A Modern History o f the Sudan, 102.
26 Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” 13. Francis Mading Deng, “Green is the Color of the Masters: The 
Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modem Sudan.” Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study o f 
Slavery, Resistance and Abolition, Yale University. New Haven, Connecticut. 23 October 2004, 31. Woodward, 
1898-1989: the Unstable State, 26, 33.
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THE ANGLO-EGYPTIAN CONDOMINIUM UNTIL 1924
The colonial era exacerbated the earlier center-periphery dynamics of the state, and 
defined the perimeters of the Sudanese nationalist movement which was so prominent 
in the first war. By 1898, the push to control the Nile headwaters before other 
imperial powers did so finally compelled the British to overthrow the Mahdist state in 
the name of Egyptian reconquest.27 To quell opposition from both Egyptians and 
Britain’s imperial European rivals over the reconquest, Lord Kitchener’s force raised 
both the British and Egyptian flags when Khartoum fell, beginning the Condominium 
rule in which Egypt would play little more than a token role, initially providing only 
mid-level staff and administrators.28
An early reason for the unity of such a diverse, indeed unwieldy, state was Britain’s 
need to administer Sudan in accordance with its legal obligation to Egypt, preventing 
any division of the vast territory. The entirety of Sudan was to be governed as a 
whole, with no portion of the south transferred to British East Africa, regardless of 
whether that was a more feasible option from an administrative perspective. The 
result of these considerations was the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement, signed January 
1899 in Cairo. The agreement was based on a slender legal pretext, maintainable
91only while the British had control of both Egypt and the Sudan.
When the Anglo-Egyptian regime was established there was neither a Sudanese 
aristocracy nor a power elite, the Mahdist structures had been demolished, and the 
tribal and sectarian structures from before its existence had been severely weakened. 
As a result the British relied heavily on military order, while seeking to enhance the 
status of religious and tribal notables where they could be found. In towns
27 Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil war,” 5. 
Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 52.
28 Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil war,” 5. 
Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 27, 33. Britain claimed to be reconquering the territory 
in the name of Egypt, which by 1882 it effectively controlled. The claims of the Ottoman Empire, which were 
vague even before the Mahdist insurrection, were ignored.
29 Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 19, 37. Telephone interview by the author with R. S. 
O’Fahey, Oslo, 2009.
30 Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 32. Paul Goldsmith, Lydia A. Abura and Jason Switzer. 
“Oil and Water in Sudan.” Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology o f Africa ’s Conflicts. Eds Jeremy Lind and Kathryn 
Sturman. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2002, 190.
31 Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 37, 28. Holt, A Modern History o f the Sudan, 111-112.
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throughout northern Sudan, especially in the riverine area, the regime sought out and 
enhanced the standing of local esteemed merchants. Through these associations, the 
Condominium was able to administer the rest of the population: largely peasants or 
pastoralists, augmented by an insubstantial artisan sector. Tribal and sectarian 
patron-client relationships would only be formalized after the 1922 publication of 
Lugard’s The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, a book that made a creed of 
‘Native Administration’, or indirect rule, not just in Sudan but throughout the British 
Empire.33
The early Anglo-Egyptian state followed the traditional pattern of organizing from 
the center outwards, relying on patrons based in the riverine central and eastern areas, 
not the dominantly nomadic hinterland.34 Upon his replacement of Lord Kitchener as 
Sudan’s Governor General in 1899, Sir Reginald Wingate found he had few 
institutions to govern through. This situation was an early inducement towards 
exclusive coalitions in the Sudanese government, in which Wingate relied heavily on 
personal relationships with urban collaborators, who relied in turn on their personal 
relationships with him. This arrangement led to a key development during the early 
colonial administration, the ascent of neo-Mahdism as developed by the posthumous 
son of the original Mahdi. In a bargain with British authorities, the practical and 
ambitious Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman was allowed freedom to reassemble his Ansar, the 
militant followers of his father. The British feared that the Ottoman Sultan might call 
the Sudanese to a holy war against them and sought to bring the until-then marginal 
figure into the service of Khartoum, counteracting any religious propaganda. The
32 Abdel Salam M. Sidahmed. Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 
18. Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil war.” 
Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993, 
7.
33 Martin Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil 
war,” 5. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 5. Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in 
the Sudan, 51.
34 Interview by the author with Ahmed Al-Shahi, Oxford, 2007. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable 
State, 39. Salah El-Zain, “Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan.” Respect 1:2, 
(March 2006), 1.
35 Martin Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket,” 5. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 7. 
Peter Woodward “Islam and Politics.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael 
Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986,3. Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim, 
“Arabism, Africanism, and Self-Identification in the Sudan.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem o f National 
Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 36. The Mahdi aspired to abolish all Sufi orders, 
including the ones he had been a member of. However, under its British revival, Mahdism was in practice very 
much like a Sufi tariqa in behavior, albeit a militant one.
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resurrected Mahdi dynasty would play a key role in the sectarian patronage politics of 
Sudan throughout the twentieth century.
However, such personal relationships were of limited usefulness in an area as vast
t z :  # #
and lightly administered as the south. By the time they launched their campaign to 
suppress southern resistance in the late 1910s and early 1920s, the British felt 
compelled to use harsh measures against these Nilotic peoples. This was in part 
because of the early difficulty of finding collaborators. Neither the Dinka nor the 
Nuer, the two dominant Nilotic peoples, had a very hierarchical culture, leaving few 
pliable tribal elites with any authority on whom the British could rely to administer in 
the Governor General’s name. It was not until these peoples had been pacified by 
coercion and force that any degree of tribal administration could be implemented with 
relative success.38
After initial pacification, British interest in peripheral regions of the territory waned. 
Kitchener and Wingate simply wanted southern tribes to remain peaceful, and 
therefore affordable to govern. Khartoum tended to view the spending of money in 
the south as a drain of scarce resources. Dinka began to like the ‘benign neglect’ of 
the British and to cooperate with them, partly because they noticed that, in contrast 
with the administration of their predecessors, cattle raids and slave raids from the 
north were beginning to decrease.40 Neither the British nor southerners had any 
interest in further uniting the south with the rest of Sudan. As a result, the Sudanese 
state would remain less integrated than most others in colonial Africa.
36 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 38. Robert O. Collins, Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the 
Southern Sudan, 1918-1956. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983, 12. By 1919, there were only 
seventeen British administrators in the provinces of Bahr Al-Ghazal and Mongalla, an area encompassing most of 
the south that was ‘twice the size of Britain’.
37 Collins, Shadows in the Grass, 2, 17. Herbst, States and Power in Africa, 39. Herbst quotes Thomas J. 
Barfield’s observation that the powers of Dinka chiefs were weak in part because of the vastness of the region: 
dissenting factions could always move away.
38 Collins, Shadows in the Grass, 31. The Dinka’s lack of rigid structures of authority made it difficult to conquer 
them easily with a small force. However, once pacified, the same lack of hierarchy made them highly compatible 
with the light administration under the Condominium government. Francis Mading Deng, Africans o f Two 
Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1978, 157-158.
39 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 15.
40 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 83.
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NATIONALISM IN NORTHERN SUDAN AND THE SOUTHERN POLICY
It was specifically the British desire for a modem bureaucracy to administer Sudan 
which created the first northern nationalist movement. The young nationalists saw 
the traditional tribal and Sufi elites as too deferential to British rule, and as obstacles 
to Sudan’s emergence as a modem nation-state. The White Flag League, a movement 
led by Military School graduates and formed in May 1924 by a Sudanese officer of 
Dinka origin named Ali Abd Al-Latif, became the apex of Sudanese nationalism.41 
The organization initially advocated self-determination for Sudan, but became more 
militantly nationalist after early government suppression, turning to Egypt for help 
against Britain.42 Al-Latif was arrested in July 1924, setting off waves of protests in 
Khartoum that culminated in the mutiny of Sudanese and Egyptian soldiers and the 
annihilation of a battalion of them by British troops.43
While nationalist opposition to British rule would ultimately culminate in the 
Khartoum uprising, Sudanese officers in the southern towns of Wau and Malakal 
began organizing demonstrations soon after. In the Wau demonstration, both 
Sudanese and Egyptian officers paraded through the town shouting slogans against 
British occupation. The Malakal demonstration came less than a month later and was 
considered so serious that the provincial governor called in British forces.44
Al-Latif s southern and slave heritage were representative of the halting steps the 
British had been taking towards meritocracy in the ‘Sudanization’ of the army and 
government. Former slaves and their descendants, a cast with traditionally few 
prospects in Sudan, benefited disproportionately from education and government 
employment, particularly in the military.45 As a result of the mutiny, that was to end. 
The Dinka’s reputation among the British was damaged in particular as they were
41 Telephone interview by the author with Richard Lobban, Providence, 2009. Al-Rahim, Imperialism and 
Nationalism in the Sudan, 105. Hassan Abdel Ati. “Untapped potential: civil society and the search for peace.” 
Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan ’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 68.
42 Mohamed Omer Beshir. The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1975, 
136.
43 Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 106. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 
42. Holt, A Modern History o f the Sudan, 129.
44 Collins, Shadows in the Grass, 69. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 108.
45 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 56.
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implicated in resistance in both the north, through the movement of the Dinka-bom 
Al-Latif, and the continued instability in Dinka regions to the south.46 Educated 
Sudanese realized they could foment unrest but could not affect real change without 
the help of traditional sectarian leaders.47 The recognition of this quandary marked 
the end of the early nationalist challenge to Sudan’s patronage network.
The events of 1924 intensified British determination to enforce separate 
administration for northern and southern Sudan, and to withhold education and 
development in areas inhabited by the southern Nilotic tribes, the Dinka especially. 
This deprivation would later form a basis for southern grievances, especially in the 
first war. After 1924, the lack of integration in the south moved from a loose 
arrangement of convenience to an enforced policy. While this “Southern Policy” -  
the British plan to keep southern Sudan both administratively and culturally distinct 
from the north -  was not formalized until 1930, it had been an unofficial arrangement 
for years. The Closed Districts Order of 1922 allowed the British to introduce the 
English language and ban the use of the Arabic language from schools and offices in 
the south.49 A 1922 memorandum stated a further reason for a separate regional 
devolution scheme: the south might eventually be considered part of Britain’s East 
African possessions, possibly being included in a federation with those territories.50 
Military administrators remained in the south throughout the period of the Southern
46 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 109.
47 John Voll and Sarah Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985, 58. Al-Shahi, interview.
48 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 137.
49 Telephone interview by the author with Baqie Muhammed, Bloomington, 2009. Gurdon, Sudan at the 
Crossroads, 12. Luka Biong Deng, “Education in Southern Sudan: War, Status and challenges of achieving 
Education for All Goals.” Respect 4 (November 2006), 3. Deng, “Green is the Color of the Masters: The Legacy 
of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modem Sudan,” 30. Atta El-Battahani, “A complex web: politics 
and conflict in Sudan.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan ’s Conflicts. London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 11. 
Amir Idris. Conflict and Politics o f Identity in Sudan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 38. Collins 1983, 
59. The Passports and Permits Ordinance of 1922 cordioned off unrestricted travel by Sudanese between northern 
and southern districts.
50 Idris, Conflict and Politics o f Identity in Sudan, 36. By 1920, as southern tribes continued to resist 
administration, a government report issued by a task force called the Milner Mission outlined the first steps 
towards decentralization in the region. Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, 11. Al-Rahim, Imperialism and 
Nationalism in the Sudan, 74. The report made no formal recommendations about Sudan’s future, but it did 
recommend recognizing the distinctness between African and Arab. It was thereby decided that the governors of 
the three southern provinces should not attend the annual meetings of Governors in Khartoum unless absolutely 
necessary, but should arrange periodic gatherings between and keep in touch with their opposite numbers in 
Kenya and Uganda.
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Policy, given little instruction from Khartoum as long as they kept the area pacified 
on a modest budget.51
Condominium economic policy towards the south passed through two main phases.
In the first phase from 1899 to 1919, the policy of the Sudanese government towards 
the southern provinces consisted of little apart from maintaining law and basing with 
the various missionary orders. In the second phase, after Egypt’s 1922 independence 
and the 1924 uprisings led by an officer of Dinka origin, the government became 
active and interventionist. " Dependence on centralized control via quasi-military 
administration would remain in practice in the south throughout the Anglo-Egyptian 
period. Native Administration was only practiced in remote southern areas, not the 
towns.53
From the 1920s on, the colonial machinations which divided the north from the south 
became more obviously self-serving. Southern administration might have benefited 
from some elements of Native Administration, which involved separating one ethnic 
group from another with an emphasis on tribal law. This concept had the potential to 
work well in the south to avoid conflict, but southern administration could not afford 
to be as indirect as that in the north since it required authorization from both Cairo 
and London.54 The Southern Policy was the most pronounced example of the British 
preference for the least amount of national integration possible to better administer 
the territory. The goal of administering the south according to distinct ethnic groups 
was further facilitated by an increased reliance on missionaries to provide education. 
The missionaries assisted the process by dividing the south up into spheres of 
influence for various missionary orders. Christian missionary activity and poor 
communications deepened the divide between north and south. Islam was to be kept 
out of the region, even to the exclusion of capable Muslim administrators.55 The
51 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 85.
Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 71.
53 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 77-78. By 1949, when the British finally began focusing on 
creating modem local government institutions in the south, they did not even have a Native Administration 
template in some areas upon which to build.
54 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 47.
55 Lobban, interview. Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 73. After the 1924 mutiny, the 
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definitive statement on the Southern Policy was prepared on the request of the 
Governor General by the Civil Secretary, Harold MacMichael, and sent to the three 
Southern governors in January 1930.56 The purposeful neglect of the south by the 
colonial regime led to insubstantial relations between state and society in the region. 
This, combined with a dearth of economic and social development, led to a lack of an 
early formation of political parties in the south, which slowed modem political 
identity.57
THE SECOND WAVE OF NORTHERN NATIONALISM AND PRE­
INDEPENDENCE INTEGRATION EFFORTS
The resurgence of northern nationalism in the late 1940s began the push towards 
independence and the launching of the first civil war. Northern nationalism had been 
kept at bay in the years following the 1924 mutiny, manifesting itself primarily in 
non-political literary societies and publications. However, the increasingly obvious 
need for education and development led the still-active northern intelligentsia to 
dismay over how Khartoum promoted what they saw as tribalism and ignorance 
instead of modernity'. Nationalists thought southern provinces in particular had been 
kept backwards to satisfy what they considered British fascination for the ‘noble 
savage’.58
Early British attempts to accommodate northern nationalism sought to retain the 
north-south division but only exacerbated northern suspicions. The first incarnation 
of any government-intelligentsia coalition was the 1943 formation of the Advisory 
Council of North Sudan, the most forward step yet taken towards self-government in 
Sudan.59 As the name implied, the council excluded the south, arousing the age-old
could not be avoided, Coptics were preferred to Muslims. Sunday, not Friday, would be the day of rest as it was 
elsewhere in Sudan.
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suspicion among northerners that the government was planning to sever the 
territory.60
With the end of World War Two, the need for a re-examination of Southern Policy 
became more apparent to Condominium officials. Even before it was officially 
discontinued in 1947, the Southern Policy was already unravelling, a product of the 
small but growing business class in the north. British administrators typically 
discouraged commercialization of culture, fearing it might erode ‘traditional’ society, 
but foreign banks and export houses encouraged trade to a degree that the government 
was unable to thwart.61 Khartoum would reluctantly accept the post-war explosion of 
commerce as the best way to fight communism and keep Sudan under Western 
influence. Northern traders were slowly infiltrating the south, along with a few 
Greek and Syrian merchants. However, it did not become an intention of either the 
colonial or independent government to encourage widespread southern commerce 
until the Nimeiri regime.
The movement towards independence in the late 1940s was the primary reason for 
British efforts to integrate the state during that period. The Governor General 
convened the Sudan Administrative Conference on 22 April 1946, an event that 
marked the beginning of the end of the Southern Policy.64 Its termination was based
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on government recognition that when the British left, the south would have to be 
integrated with the north as no other solution seemed evident. While it was never in 
doubt among northern nationalists, this may be one of the most explicit signs that the 
Southern Policy was used more as a convenience for the British rather than a 
necessary administrative tool for the benefit of southerners.
In the south, the significance of the Sudan Administrative Conference was widely 
debated as the proposed legislative body it would create was to extend over the entire 
territory including the south, rescinding the isolationist Southern Policy.65 The Umma 
Party specifically demanded the inclusion of the south in the proposed Legislative 
Assembly, which alarmed British officials in southern provinces.66 More than ever, 
northerners feared the British planned to create a separate state in the south, or 
administer the region through Uganda.67
The potential for Sudanese integration had been contemplated for years, but never 
fully investigated. In August 1943, the Governor of Equatoria had suggested that 
there was probably no political compatibility between north and south, but that it
z: o
should not be ruled out as an option. No southerners had been present at the Sudan 
Administrative Conference, which was itself a result of Southern Policy. A 
conference held on 12 and 13 June 1947 in the southern city of Juba was assembled 
to address the oversight. The Civil Secretary, governors of the three southern 
provinces, seventeen southern chiefs and six northerners attended.69 Southern 
members were selected not based on their political consciousness or experience, but 
because they represented different regions of the south. The purpose of the 
conference was to orientate southerners towards the idea of their participating in the 
Legislative Assembly.71
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SOUTHERN NATIONALISM AND THE BEGINNING OF THE FIRST CIVIL 
WAR
The unravelling of the Anglo-Egyptian regime would also stoke new tensions in the 
increasingly confrontational relationship between north and south Sudan. The 
Egyptian-Sudanese relationship was a dynamic one from 1952 to 1954. During this 
period, the political debate over unification with Egypt was revealed to be little more 
than a distraction to northern nationalists from more serious internal divisions. First, 
the deposition of King Faruq by the Free Officers in Cairo ended the claims of the 
Egyptian crown over Sudan. By 12 October 1952 both the Egyptian government and 
the Umma Party -  the primary advocates of Sudanese independence separate from 
Egypt -  had signed an agreement stating that Sudan should be free from outside 
intervention. Egypt’s relinquishing of its traditional claim to Sudan complicated the 
British mandate over the territory and hastened the arrival of Sudanese self- 
government in 1953, the first step to independence.
While the Mahdists who dominated the Umma Party could make tactical alliances 
with Cairo, it soon became obvious that they remained intent on keeping Sudan free 
of Egyptian control. Ansar violence in Khartoum during the opening of parliament 
on 1 March 1954 effectively ended any chance of union with Egypt.74 It could not be 
achieved without risking civil war. By April 1955, the Nasser regime had grown 
hostile to Sudanese Prime Minister Ismail Al-Azhari, a former staunch ally. The 
Egyptian press began a campaign against Azhari, declaring that he had neglected the 
south, which would only be pacified in a federal arrangement with Egypt and 
northern Sudan. This propaganda was translated into most southern dialects to arouse 
political anger towards Azhari in the region, in the unwarranted hope that this anger
colonial legislative assembly, and that northern conjecture that this formed the basis for the permanent unity of 
north and south Sudan is unfounded.
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would somehow transform into support for Egypt. A southern delegation invited to 
Egypt was given a warm reception, and subsequently voiced its support for union 
between Sudan and Egypt, to the ire of both northern and southern Sudanese.75 These 
tensions would contribute to the end of union prospects, as Sudanese generally began 
to resent what they saw as Egyptian exploitation of the southern question.
Politically, discontent was growing in the south as Sudan pushed towards 
independence. Southerners believed Sudan was not ready for independence in 1956, 
as it had not been ready in October 1954 for ‘Sudanization’, the rushed 
decolonization process which gave southerners less than ten of 800 senior 
government posts when British officials left. The tiny coterie of southern 
intellectuals was dismayed at their virtual shutout from these positions; they had 
anticipated that they would be filling administrative posts as they had filled political 
ones in the Legislative Assembly. The intense pace of the Sudanization process saw 
increasing numbers of northern officers filling the ranks of the southern regional 
army group, the Equatoria Corps. A telegram allegedly signed by Azhari urging 
northern administrators to deal firmly with southern lawlessness unleashed even more
70
protest demonstrations and strikes.
On 7 August 1955 a conspiracy to mutiny was discovered in the Equatoria Corps. 
Authorities were too weak to make any military arrests immediately, but two civilians 
suspected of involvement were arrested in Juba.79 During the course of a 
demonstration in protest of the arrests, the District Commissioner was assaulted and 
tear gas was used to disperse the mob. Khartoum reluctantly dispatched a company 
to quell the instability, but the unit arrived ahead of its equipment and support. The
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army command in Equatoria then persisted in ordering the Southern Corps’ Second 
Company to move to Khartoum even when it had become quite clear that the
o n
company would refuse the order and mutiny, which it did on 18 August 1955.
By 23 August the mutineers controlled almost the entire Equatoria province except 
Juba. Prime Minister Azhari ordered the rebels to surrender, but was ignored. 
Governor General Knox-Helm had been summoned back to the Sudan from the 
United Kingdom, where he was making preparations for Britain’s withdrawal from 
Sudan before its independence. He ordered the rebels to surrender, assuring them that 
they would be treated fairly and only then would their grievances be listened to 
objectively. However, the majority of those mutineers who turned themselves in 
were executed by a vengeful northern army disinclined to keep a promise made by
O 1
the departing British authorities. The disorder in the south was finally stopped, but 
only after more than 300 northerners were killed. Army retaliatory killings of 
southerners would reach an even higher body count, contributing further to what 
would become the first casualties of Sudan’s first civil war.
POST INDEPENDENCE: 1956-1964
Thus, new tensions were introduced at independence that had not existed for most of 
the Condominium, and the British were no longer present to either resolve or 
suppress them. Khartoum’s rushed, uncontrolled post-independence attempts at 
integration with the north increased southern resentment of the new independent 
government. Once barriers between north and south were gone at independence 
many southerners flocked to northern towns and cities to escape the instability of the 
south after the Torit rebellion and to find better paying jobs. With this new contact
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between fellow countrymen who had been forcibly separated for so long, the disparity 
of wealth between Arab and non-Arab became noticeable. Educated southerners 
working for the government were paid less than their northern counterparts. Many 
were transferred north but paid at the same rate even thought the northern standard of 
living made it hard to subsist on such wages.84 Southern discontent over their status 
in independent Sudan led to parliamentary turmoil which further increased national 
instability. Subsequent strikes led to Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil’s decision to
o r
step down, allowing the military to take power.
Sudan’s first military dictatorship had replaced an unpopular parliamentary regime, 
but still required the endorsement of at least one sectarian faction. In fact, both the 
major sectarian factions announced support for General Abboud immediately after his 
November 1958 coup, as the short era of parliamentary politics Sudan had
o z
experienced since independence seemed by that period to have reached an impasse. 
Their support did not last long. By 1960, most political party members had begun to 
lose patience with the junta’s ‘housekeeping’ mission, and began coalescing in 
opposition.87
By September 1963, the southern mutineers and affiliates regrouped under the name 
Anya Nya.88 Khartoum blamed the instability in the south on bandits, refusing to 
admit that there was an organized, growing insurrection in the region. However, by 
the mid-1960s the crippling costs of constant military operations in the south were
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consuming up to 30% of the national budget.89 Abboud realized he had to search for 
non-military avenues to address the quandary, which entailed looking for solutions 
from outside a predominantly military government. In September 1964 the regime 
appointed a commission of inquiry into the cause of the southern problem.90 The 
committee would hold hearings open to the public, thereby beginning what amounted 
to a national dialogue concerning the war.
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION OF 1964 AND THE ROUND TABLE 
CONFERENCE OF 1965
The war in the south was beginning to have an impact on the stability of successive 
national regimes. Abboud’s attempt to allow the public into a controlled debate on 
the southern question backfired severely, and was the first step towards the downfall 
of his regime. It was the second time northern debate over the war in the south would 
bring down a post-colonial Sudanese government. The commission of inquiry’s 
hearings at the University of Khartoum soon became a platform for more general 
anti-government speeches. Activists would argue that state failure in the south was 
inseparable from state failure throughout Sudan, particularly in keeping regime 
promises to restore democracy 91 Groups of all political stripes banded together in 
common cause against the junta. The coup de grace that signalled the regime’s end 
was a crippling nationwide strike, organized by the Sudanese Communist Party and 
various trade union members and academics. “ Abboud resigned his office on 21 
October 1964.93
It was hoped the experience of the caretaker premier, Sirr Al-Khatim Al-Khalifa, who 
had done ministerial work in the south, could end the current impasse.94 His 
government was dependent on the radicals who had spearheaded the movement to 
overthrow the junta, and as a result it quickly became committed to radical causes
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throughout Asia and Africa.95 The reckless vigor with which the regime pursued its 
revolutionary objectives actually ended up strengthening the southern insurgency. By 
1965, the Anya Nya rebels had captured a major stockpile of weapons, inadvertently 
delivered to them by the Sudanese government itself, which had been part of an 
operation to supply the Simba insurgency in the Congo. With the defeat of the Simba 
rebels, even more weapons became available as former insurgents sold them to the 
Anya Nya or bartered for food. The Anya Nya were also receiving assistance from 
the Congolese (Zairian) government.96
By early 1965, it became apparent that more direct action needed to be taken to 
address the political elements of the southern problem. As southern parliamentarians 
had confounded Abdullah Khalifa’s attempts to sidestep southern grievances and 
southern guerrillas had succeeded in draining the legitimacy of the Abboud junta, it 
became apparent that the south had the capacity to destroy the longevity of any 
regime, whether parliamentary or military. Therefore, the caretaker government 
proposed a conference to be held in Khartoum between the government and southern 
opposition groups that would become known as the Round Table Conference. Al- 
Khahfa’s past experience with the south gave him a credibility no post-independence 
leader yet had earned there, and East African governments such as Kenya urged the 
exiled political groups to overcome their suspicions and attend the conference in 
March 1965.97
Most of the debate at the conference concerned various models of federalism and 
southern autonomy. The two sides made a secret agreement to exclude the two
98extremes of separation and the status quo, but there was still little common ground. 
The Anya Nya, whose forces had not been directly involved in the negotiations, 
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their own presence there. Hamid’s apt assessment is that ‘as Anya Nya gained 
strength, moderate politicians lost it.’99 Lagu writes that the recently formed Anya 
Nya did not take the conference seriously, particularly after the substantial amount of 
weaponry it had received from the Congo rebels.100 Additionally, the end of spring 
1965 had ushered in a conservative coalition bent on pursuing a military solution.101 
Consequently if the goal of the Round Table Conference was to reach a peace 
settlement, it was a failure. Sidahmed believes the reasons for this were two-fold in 
that first, ‘northerners and southerners were still too far apart in their ideas of what a 
solution should be’, and second, ‘no southern party had sufficient control over the 
Anya Nya -  the forces on the ground’.102
THE SECOND PARLIAMENTARY PERIOD: 1964-1969
The second parliamentary era was the height of conservative northern nationalism 
and saw a subsequent escalation of the war against southern insurgents. Umma’s 
Mohammed Ahmed Maghoub won the premiership in June 1965 and immediately 
gave southern rebels fifteen days to surrender. After that time the army was ordered 
to ‘deal firmly’ with resistance, which inaugurated one of the bloodiest periods of the 
war. Maghoub also called off any reconvening of the Round Table Conference 
until there was peace in the south.104
The government’s attitude became somewhat more moderate in mid-1966 with the 
ascension to the premiership of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, a Western-educated grandson of 
neo-Mahdist Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman. When the twelve-man committee released its
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report in September 1966, he described it as ‘the only serious task done during the 
last eight months that deserves being proud o f .105 The committee reported that a 
centralized unitary government would not serve Sudan’s national interests. The 
recommendations were welcome in the south, but nationalist pressure was on the 
government to shelve these recommendations even after their endorsement by all 
Sudanese political parties. In 1967, the drive for an Islamic constitution in the north 
was strong, and not conducive to southern accommodation. Likewise, the drive for 
separation among southerners grew louder after the 1965 conference had stalled.106 
Mass killings in the south followed, making a peaceful solution unrealistic until the 
May Revolution of 1969.107
In any case, the government’s top priority was the drafting of a permanent 
constitution -  a long-time northern nationalist objective that Sudan still had not 
implemented. As a result the government decided to hold elections, including in the 
36 southern constituencies where elections had not been held in 1965. While SANU 
participated, the Southern Front boycotted the elections on the grounds that it was 
impossible to hold them while the state of emergency existed. They argued that 
elections should be held after an agreement had been reached regarding a new 
constitution.108 Al-Mahdi was defeated by Maghoub, who became Prime Minister 
again in May 1967.109 A draft constitution was presented in January 1968 that had 
heavy Islamist overtones and allowed for a strong presidency, a development many 
critics branded as having the potential for an elected dictatorship.110 The document 
would remain a point of contention until the May Revolution of 1969.
105 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 17.
106 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 146. El-Zain, “Articulation of Cultural Discourses and 
Political Dominance in Sudan,” 3. Oluwadare Aguda. “Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics.” The 
Journal o f Modern African Studies 11:2(1973), 187-188.
107 Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 155. Eprile, War and Peace in the 
Sudan 1955-1972, 49. A 1967 report quoted southern fatalities from the war between 1963 and 1966 at more than 
half a million. A UN report concurred in early 1971.
108 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 31.
109 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 32. Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 66. 
Hamid and Howell “Sudan and the Outside World, 1964-1968,” 309. Deng, “Green is the Color of the Masters: 
The Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modem Sudan,” 36.
110 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 115-116. Ali Suliman Fadlalla. “The Search for a 
Constitution.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and 
Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986,44-45. Interview by the author with Douglas Johnson, 
Oxford, 16 December 2007. Abdelmoula, “An Ideology of Domination and the Domination of an Ideology.” The 
constitution also insisted on Arabic as the official state language.
33
By 1969, Sudan was in an economically devastated position. Foreign aid had dried 
up after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, and the foreign debt from the mid-1960s on had 
doubled.111 In May 1969, a group of middle-ranking officers staged Sudan’s second 
coup d ’etat.
EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE MAY REGIME: 1969-1971
Prior to its attempts at negotiation with the Anya Nya, the May Revolution sought to 
establish itself as a nationalist regime. The objective was to unite the early 
nationalism of the post-independence era with the revolutionary atmosphere that had 
surrounded the 1964 October Revolution. The leftist-military alliance that had 
defined the movement was based not on a shared set of socialist principles, but was 
instead a marriage of convenience. The new military leader, Colonel Jaafar Al- 
Nimeiri, had recently served a year in Equatoria and was familiar with the southern 
situation.113 On 9 June 1969, after many meetings of the new regime’s Revolutionary 
Command Council and the Council of Ministers, a policy for the south was 
announced. The statement recognized the existence of a southern problem, the 
cultural and historical differences of the north and south, the rights o f southerners to 
develop their own cultures and traditions and, most importantly, their rights to 
regional self-government. The council laid down a six-point program for revitalizing 
the south.114
As the government in Khartoum began consolidating itself, so too did the southern 
rebel movement. In 1970 most southern rebel factions dissolved and reformed as the 
Southern Sudan Liberation Movement, with the Anya Nya as its military wing,
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creating the region’s most effective insurgent organization to date.115 This union 
allowed the militias to improve administration and security in rural areas, and soon 
Anya Nya affiliates began attending to aspects of life that had up to then been 
neglected during the war, especially services such as education.116
The first challenge to the May Regime came from a sectarian faction: the regime was 
the first yet to exist in post-colonial Sudan with no sectarian support. To counter the 
threat the traditional factions posed, Nimeiri launched a March 1970 campaign 
against the Ansar, the warrior caste of the Mahdiyya, still Sudan’s most powerful 
sectarian faction, as well as the Imam then heading that movement.117 Communists 
affiliated with the regime opposed what they viewed as Nimeiri’s quick resort to 
violence in suppressing the uneducated peasants who made up that religious order, 
but blamed conservatives and traditional figures for obstructing the possibility of a
i i o
peace proposal. By the end of 1970, new schisms were starting to appear in the 
leftist-military alliance. The Sudan Communist Party’s Central Committee, part of 
which had refused Nimeiri’s request that it dissolve itself and join the May Regime, 
accused the government of attempting to slow down the fulfillment of its promises.1 19 
In October-November 1970, Nimeiri dismissed three communist affiliates in the 
Revolutionary Council of Ministers, announcing they had ‘stabbed (the regime) in the 
back’. By February 1971, open hostilities appeared between the May Regime and 
all factions of the Sudanese Communist Party, which Nimeiri vowed to ‘crush and
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1 7 1destroy’. By April 1971 most communist leaders had been dismissed, and some
i
imprisoned.
An attempted coup against Nimeiri came in July 1971, organized by army officers 
with connections to the Communist Party. After armed forces loyal to Nimeiri 
launched a counterattack three days later, the president was restored to power.124 By 
August, Nimeiri had launched a massive purge of communists in Sudan, arresting 
hundreds. The Communist Party would never again have such influence in Sudan 
as it did in the early May Regime.
SETTING THE STAGE FOR A PEACE SETTLEMENT
Resolution of the first civil war was a product of regime insecurity. By August 1971, 
Nimeiri was in a radically different position than he had been at any time since taking 
control of the government away from the politicians. His regime had no factional 
base of power left without the small but well-organized Communist Party, yet he was 
riding a wave of enormous popular support after putting down an extremely 
unpopular coup and ending traditional party bickering. He was elected president in a 
plebiscite on 12 October 1971 and soon after appointed three southerners as 
commissioners of the three southern provinces, increasing his popularity greatly 
throughout that region. With no communists to accommodate in his cabinet, he had 
fewer obstacles towards crafting a mutual peace initiative with the southern rebels.
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The ‘breakthrough’ that would pave the way for a peace settlement came in July 1971 
with the appointment of Abel Alier as Minister for Southern Affairs. Unlike his 
predecessor, Joseph Garang (whom Nimeiri had arrested and later executed for his 
association with the July 1971 coup leaders), Alier had a good reputation in the south, 
having been a member of the Southern Front during the parliamentary regime of the 
1960s.128
Alier’s appointment had been preceded by a series of smaller initiatives that would 
later instill confidence in both sides. In January 1971, a conference on southern 
economic and social development held in Juba and attended by leading cabinet 
ministers and civil servants was a successful first step in bringing together northern 
and southern Sudanese intellectuals. On 7 March 1971, ‘secret diplomatic 
exchanges’ were reported in London between Sudanese government officials and 
Anya Nya contacts. In April 1971, Sudan’s new United Nations ambassador, 
Mansour Khalid, told a UN press conference that Sudan was on the verge of starting a 
dialogue with the dominant southern insurgent group. Progress towards that goal 
was stalled during the attempted coup d ’etat and its aftermath, but talks resumed in 
August 1971 and by the end of the year the dialogue was ready to enter a formal 
stage.131
Nimeiri’s break with the communists allowed him to solidify relations between the 
institutions which would become crucial to the success of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement: the World Council of Churches/All Africa Council of Churches and the 
Emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie. A joint mission of the WCC and the AACC 
had visited Sudan in May 1971 to petition the government to allow WCC/AACC aid
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to the south to pass through Khartoum. It was during this trip that the organization 
offered to mediate between the parties to the conflict. In October 1971, the 
WCC/AACC informed Khartoum that the SSLM had accepted that a peace treaty be 
framed along the government’s non-negotiable condition that it take place within the 
context of a united Sudan.134
Relations between Ethiopia and post-colonial Sudan had traditionally been 
contentious, mainly over a disputed border and support for each other’s respective 
separatist movements. In 1971, Khartoum and Addis Ababa began to resolve their 
grievances with each other. An agreement signed in March 1971 by the Sudanese 
and Ethiopian Ministers of Foreign Affairs to cease supporting each other’s separatist
1 T f
factions was a turning point in the bilateral relationship between the states. At the 
start of November 1971, new groundwork was laid for peace negotiations during 
Nimeiri’s first state visit to Ethiopia. After Nimeiri departed Addis Ababa, secret
i  ^  z:
talks continued between a delegation led by Alier and an Anya Nya representative.
The agreement was signed and formally ratified one month after its conclusion, on 27 
March 1972 by Anya Nya leader Joseph Lagu and Sudanese Foreign Minister 
Mansour Khalid. The formal law, The Southern Provinces Regional Self-Government 
Act, came into force on 3 March 1972.
THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT
Under the agreement, the provinces of Bahr Al-Ghazal, the Upper Nile and Equatoria 
constituted a self-governing unit within the republic, referred to collectively as the
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1 7 8Southern Region. ‘ The three provinces remained part of the whole Sudan: 
accordingly, the term of ‘federalism’ was removed, the fears of separatism were 
allayed. 139 The wishes of southerners were met by giving them their own executive 
and legislative agencies, the High Executive Council and the People’s Regional 
Assembly. The entire agreement became a law that could not be amended except by 
a three-quarters majority of the People’s National Assembly and a two-thirds 
majority in a referendum held in the south. 140 The People’s Regional Assembly was 
given the power to legislate for the preservation of public order, internal security, 
administration and the development of the Southern Region. 141 Parents under the 
Addis Ababa Agreement were assured a right to choose the manner of their children’s 
education, allaying the fears of church groups. 142
The Addis Ababa Agreement stipulated that southern representation in the national 
army would be in proportion to the population of the south. Use of the armed forces 
fell under the domain of the President of the Republic. 143 On the occasion of the 
promulgation of the law, Nimeiri highlighted sections concerning the armed forces 
and language, both areas in which he stressed his advocacy for northern concerns that 
the primacy of Arabic as a national language should in some way be recognized and 
the integrity of the military should not be compromised. 144
Nimeiri’s own role in the crafting of the Addis Ababa Agreement was limited, but he 
relied on capable mediators such as Aber and Khalid. Nimeiri now had strong
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support from the south, a third of Sudan’s population, giving him a backing no 
Sudanese leader had enjoyed since independence.145 After the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, the May Regime looked more secure and stable than any government 
Sudan had had in the past, with southerners for the first time since independence 
expressing a level of confidence in the national government. In discussions with 
Cecil Eprile in early 1972, Lagu and other southerners said they would rather have 
dealings with Colonel Nimeiri than any other northern leader.146 In 1973, the Addis 
Ababa Agreement was enshrined in the first permanent constitution as Article Eight, 
stipulating regional autonomy for the south within a united Sudan. By the end of 
June 1972, administration of the Southern Region was fully in the hands of the 
southerners.147
THE SOUTHERN REGION: 1972-1974
In a sense, the constant patron-client relationship that had historically defined 
Sudanese politics reasserted itself in the 1970s, as there was no way the Addis Ababa 
Agreement could be mistaken for a ‘bottom up’ solution involving all elements of 
Sudanese society. Instead the AAA was an accommodation made by an authoritarian 
government with a narrow power base towards a faction which could not be subdued 
by conquest. Nimeiri’s unprecedented acquiescence to southern self-government was 
novel enough to seem a break away from the patron-client pattern which defined 
Sudan in colonial times, but the next decade would reveal that the agreement was 
simply a further progression of this relationship.
In April 1972 Abel Alier was made president of the High Executive Council, running 
regional affairs for 18 months before the November 1973 elections scheduled for the 
Regional Assembly. Nimeiri renominated Alier before the elections, ensuring that
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is candidate would run unopposed even before the assembly had made its choice.149 
This incident was the first of an increasing amount of unauthorized interventions by 
Nimeiri into the politics of the Southern Region. However, because of Alier’s critical 
role in bringing peace to the south the choice was initially, if often grudgingly, 
tolerated by most parties.150
The limits of autonomy under the AAA soon became apparent, as the regional 
government had no authority over foreign policy, defense or development.151 Even in 
areas where it had authority to act, such as to ensure law and order in the south, the 
regional legislature fell short. ~ Despite its imperfections, regional government 
became extremely popular in the south, with some leading southern politicians even 
seeking to stand for regional assembly elections in Juba rather than for the national 
assembly in Khartoum. ' Yet the south would come to Nimeiri’s support throughout 
the 1970s when he was feeling pressured by more conservative northern factions, 
becoming to some degree a safeguard of his regime. The AAA was not popular with 
the northern sectarian elements Nimeiri had upstaged in 1969, who subsequently 
formed an opposition exile group called the National Front.
THE 1975 AND 1976 COUP ATTEMPTS AND THE 1977 NATIONAL 
RECONCILIATION
The first major post-Addis Ababa challenge to Nimeiri’s rule occurred on 5 
September 1975, when the army headquarters and radio stations were taken over by 
rebels, with possible Muslim Brothers backing.154 While the attempted coup d ’etat
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was unsuccessful, Nimeiri passed amendments to enhance executive power to prevent 
the success of similar efforts in the future.155
The attempted military takeover of 1975 may have been an impetus for Nimeiri’s 
further autocracy and devolution, but the 1976 coup attempt was almost certainly a 
motivating factor in Nimeiri’s reconciliation with conservative and radical Islamist 
factions. Exiled sectarians Sharif Hussein Al-Hindi and former Prime Minister Sadiq 
Al-Mahdi of the National Front backed the 2 July 1976 effort.156 Ethiopia, Libya, the 
Soviet Union and the Muslim Brothers were also involved. However, a crucial 
weakness in the conspirators’ plan was their underestimation of the reliability of the 
south, which supported Nimeiri yet again.158 It was during the chaos o f this attempted 
putsch, an attack on the president’s plane, that broadcasts from radio stations in Juba 
alerted the rest of Sudan and the world that Nimeiri had escaped an assassination 
attempt and, critically, had the backing of both the Sudanese army and Egypt.159
Despite having survived two coup attempts, Nimeiri now realized that the National 
Front had enough backing and commitment that it would be almost impossible to 
completely destroy. Instead, he opted to negotiate with it in 1977. In the National 
Reconciliation that year, some Sudanese opposition leaders agreed to accept the basic 
achievements of the revolution, and Nimeiri in return promised them a role in the 
national government. Nimeiri was able to form a brief but vital alliance with Sadiq 
Al-Mahdi, even coaxing an agreement from the former Prime Minister that Sudan 
was not yet ready for multi-party democracy, as factionalism opened the door to 
foreign intrigue in Sudan.160
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Under the terms of National Reconciliation, the Muslim Brothers were allowed to 
return to active participation in national politics, yet could not operate publicly 
under their own name, or as a separate political party.16' Sudan’s leading 
revolutionary Islamist, Hassan Al-Turabi, accordingly disbanded his organization and 
vowed that the Islamist movement would from then on work within the context of the 
Sudan Socialist Union, the only legal party under the May Regime. Through their 
transformation from exiles to public servants, small cadres of Islamists were able to 
set up an underground infrastructure without drawing attention from normally wary 
elements of Sudanese society. They began a slow process of infiltrating crucial 
positions in the military, the security apparatus, and the police force.163
NATIONAL REGIONALIZATION AND THE REDIVISION OF THE SOUTH
The neglect paid by the national government to the Southern Region constrained its 
effectiveness. The years following the AAA did not see an increasingly strident 
southern nationalism, but instead a reversion to factionalism. To implement 
autonomy in an area as large as southern Sudan -  an area almost bereft of education, 
infrastructure, or any economic activity -  required some level of national stability and 
commitment. Economic instability in the south only heightened southern discontent; 
by the mid-1970s, the labels SANU and Southern Front had been resurrected and 
southern enlisted men were occasionally rioting and deserting the army.164 National 
economic woes and ethnic tensions in the region were by 1980 leading to repeated 
army mutinies and general lawlessness.165
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As the Southern Region grew less stable, eventually its very viability was called into 
credit by national critics. Opponents of regional ‘devolution’ -  the process by which 
Khartoum handed an increasing number of responsibilities to the southern 
administrators -  said the area was already too regionalized, and smaller southern 
cities were already remote enough from the regional capital of Juba. Southern critics 
worried that too much regionalization nationally would dilute the power of a united 
south, and Nimeiri was already under pressure from his new northern partners after 
the National Reconciliation to dissolve the Southern Region.166 He resolved instead 
by the late 1970s, to balance southern power by pushing for regionalization for the 
rest of the Sudan, replacing HEC president Abel Alier with Joseph Lagu in 1978.167
The southern autonomy had been so envied in other areas of Sudan that further 
regionalization efforts were inevitable. From 1978, the government began drawing 
up plans for the eventual Regional Government Act of 1980, which established five 
new regions in the north: Northern, Eastern, Central, Kordofan and Darfur.168 Central 
government ministries were to be dramatically devolved, with the regions eventually 
providing all services except foreign affairs, defense, foreign trade, national facilities 
and mineral and natural resources.169
The increased factionalization of the south found a political rallying cry in the cause 
of re-dividing the Southern Region into the original three provinces. This cause was 
also championed by Nimeiri, who on 23 February 1981 came out officially in support 
of redivision at a Central Committee meeting of the SSU in Khartoum. Opponents 
of redivision argued fruitlessly that this would negate the AAA, discrediting the 
constitution of which it was a part and destabilizing the national government.
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Nimeiri took control of the agenda again when in October 1981 he dissolved the 
Regional Assembly, finally dismissing Alier, a redivision opponent.171
The election went ahead as scheduled in April 1982 and ultimately gave the pro- 
divisionists, mainly small Equatorian tribes, a slight margin over the anti-divisionists, 
mainly the Dinka. " This development was to hasten the replacement of the Southern 
Region as established in 1972 with three regional governments on a par with those in 
the north. It was, therefore, the effective abrogation of the AAA. The three new 
regions were unveiled in June 1983, based on the three traditional provinces of the
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south. After abolishing the assembly and other remnants of the Southern Region’s 
political apparatus, Nimeiri declared that the area would be controlled temporarily 
from Khartoum, and then handed back to southerners after 18 months.174 However, 
the constant series of interventions by Khartoum in southern affairs had now 
destroyed the faith of many southern politicians in Nimeiri’s word. They no longer 
felt that the AAA was the basis of a relationship between them and the central 
government, even if Nimeiri continued to deny he had abrogated it.175
THE BOR MUTINY AND THE FORMATION OF THE SPLM/A
It was finally Nimeiri’s repudiation of the military provisions of the AAA that began 
the second civil war. Prior to redivision, southern mutinies consisted mainly of 
disorganized bands of enlisted men, but by the early 1980s, contacts had been
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established between this ‘Anya Nya 2’ confederation and southern army officers. 
This early coordination of efforts would form the basis for a more sustained, 
disciplined insurgency than the state had yet endured.
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In January 1983, Nimeiri decided to begin the rotation of units of southern soldiers in 
southern garrisons to the north, again in breach of the AAA.177 About 1,000-2,000 
soldiers at Bor, Pibor and Fashalla garrisons refused orders and began a concerted 
mutiny.178 After months of standoff, Nimeiri ordered the National Army in Juba to 
attack the mutineers in May 1983, beginning the hostilities which would evolve into 
the second war.179 By July 1983, about 2,500 soldiers had defected to a new guerrilla 
movement based just across the Ethiopian border, the Sudanese People’s Liberation 
Army (SPLA). The SPLA was under the command of a Dinka former officer who 
had recently joined in the recent mutinies, Lieutenant Colonel John Garang.180
The SPLA was an entirely different movement from previous southern insurgencies. 
Unlike Anya Nya groups, it was neither separatist nor preoccupied with regional 
identity. It was instead a nationalist movement claiming to represent the whole of 
Sudan and intent on destroying the traditional, reactionary powers in Sudan which it
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believed had constantly reasserted themselves in Khartoum by oppressing
1 O 1
marginalized peoples -  southerners in particular, but not exclusively. The Southern 
People’s Liberation Movement, the political wing of the SPLA, seemed determined 
to transcend its southern origins in part as a practical consideration.
THE 1983 ‘SEPTEMBER LAWS’ AND THE FALL OF NIME1RI
Shortly before the collapse of Nimeiri’s regime, political Islam saw its debut as a 
political weapon of the state. In September 1983, Nimeiri issued a new penal code 
which included the five canonical Islamic punishments as national law. He declared 
that this was the first step towards total Islamization of the Sudanese political and 
legal system, a move that ‘ensured the Bor mutiny became a full scale revolt’. To 
Nimeiri, southern stability was a necessary sacrifice for what he saw as a crucial 
move for power consolidation. However, while his rule became increasingly 
authoritarian, he had become increasingly irrelevant and incapable of controlling 
events in Sudan. Mismanagement of food production throughout the previous decade 
finally wrought devastation throughout 1984 and 1985, when the worst famine in a 
century hit Sudan.183 Nimeiri was powerless to stop it or the opposition to his rule 
that it fostered.
Nimeiri seemed oblivious to the growing hostility towards him, and felt secure 
enough in position as president to leave the country in March 1985 for a medical 
check-up in the United States and talks with the US government. In his absence, 
massive, broad-based demonstrations took place against the latest round of price 
hikes the government had implemented on basic commodities. Unlike during 
previous demonstrations in 1982, the army would not resort to violence this time in 
dispersing the crowds, which represented a broad array of Sudanese society. When
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the SSU counter-demonstrations turned out to be comparatively weak, the army 
stepped in and took over the government.185 Nimeiri’s rule ended on 6 April 1985.186
THE TRANSITIONAL MILITARY COUNCIL OF 1985-1986
The army’s role in removing Nimeiri from power stemmed not from a desire to end 
the burgeoning new conflict in the south, but at least partly from its instinct for self- 
preservation. Senior officers, led by Defense Minister Siwar Al-Dhahab, feared 
another ideological coup by their subordinates as had taken place in 1969 and decided 
to remove Nimeiri themselves.187 In 1985, much of the military establishment still 
retained some detachment from the political leadership in Sudan and as a result did 
not attach itself to any one ideological power center in Sudan. The military opted 
instead to serve as a stewardship back to civilian democratic rule, declaring that they
1 8Rwould only hand over power to an elected government.
The new regime was called the Transitional Military Council (TMC), and it appealed 
to the SPLM/A to join the government and seek a peaceful, democratic solution to the 
south’s problem. However, it was unwilling to accept the SPLM as a national party,
1 OQ
or to accept its agenda to reconstruct the entire state according to its secular ideal.
As a result, Garang described the post-Nimeiri government as no more than the old 
regime in disguise, noting that many TMC members had been in Nimeiri’s 
government. General Al-Dhahab himself had been in charge of military operations in 
the south.190 Garang urged the Sudanese people to demonstrate and riot until a 
civilian government free of military or Islamist influence had assumed power.191
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The fall of the May Regime led the SPLA to flourish. In spite of Libya’s withdrawal 
of support for the SPLA after Nimeiri’s exit, the organization was still able to recruit 
soldiers and fend off the TMC while advancing into new territory. Its numbers rose 
to between 20,000 and 40,000 throughout 1985 and 1986.192 However army defeats 
were viewed as setbacks for the TMC itself, which was a conservative junta 
composed partly of officers who until recently had been occupied primarily with 
fighting the insurgents. As a result, the stronger the SPLA became, the more 
difficult it was the government to negotiate with it.
After one year, the TMC did finally deliver free and fair elections in early 1986, 
resulting in a ruling coalition of parties with 70% of the electorate’s support.194 Small 
parties, often not strong enough to win seats, were tolerated. There was more respect 
for freedom of speech than at any time in recent history, and human rights were 
largely observed.195 However, because of the security situation, elections were only 
held for 37 of the 68 constituencies in the south.196 The only way the TMC was able 
to cope with the instability the south inflicted on the rest of Sudan was to isolate the 
region even further.
THE KOKA DAM DECLARATION AND THE PARLIAMENTARY ERA OF 
1986-1989
The Koka Dam Declaration, signed in Ethiopia on 24 March 1986, is often seen as a 
pivotal moment in Sudanese conflict resolution because of its recognition of and 
dialogue concerning the ‘Basic Problems of Sudan’. It was also significant since the 
northern cooperative which concluded the agreement with the SPLA was led by the 
National Alliance for National Salvation (NANS), an umbrella organization
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containing many political factions, including the conservative Umma Party.197 At 
Koka Dam, the SPLM/A and Umma reached common ground over their desire for the 
end of Sudan’s military pacts, particularly with the United States and Egypt. Sadiq 
Al-Mahdi, perhaps more than other northern leaders, sought a more neutral foreign 
policy. Another basic point of agreement was that, rather than one side surrendering 
or otherwise capitulating to the other, a cease fire should be negotiated and 
implemented. However, the two parties still disagreed over the need for a state of 
emergency in the south.199 Sharia, or the Islamic laws, led to the most serious hurdle, 
as Al-Mahdi was prepared to debate their application, but not to repeal them 
entirely.200 Personal suspicion and resentment also impeded progress: Garang felt the 
SPLM/A’s role in Nimeiri’s downfall was not appreciated, Al-Mahdi resented that 
Garang would not recognize him as a legitimate leader of Sudan, even after the 
election.201
Upon winning the 1986 election, Umma still needed a coalition to govern, and was 
forced to choose from among parties which opposed Koka Dam. Consequently, Al- 
Mahdi began discussing building a coalition with those who sought a solution outside 
the perimeters of Koka Dam. He needed a pretext to pull out of the agreement, and 
finally received one when the SPLA shot down a civilian aircraft near the city of 
Malakal on 16 August 1986. The outrage this incident provoked throughout the 
north towards the insurgency ended progress based on the Koka Dam Declaration.
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The parliamentary era created a new pattern of coalition governments in Khartoum 
that were too unstable to commit to negotiations with the SPLM/A. In the 1986 
election, Umma won about one third of the parliamentary seats and put together a 
coalition with the DUP to form a government, the first of five coalitions to be formed 
with Al-Mahdi as Prime Minister between April 1986 and June 1989.204 In order to 
appeal more to its conservative members and keep the DUP from leaving the 
government, Umma was forced to take less bold steps than it had campaigned on.
Not only did the party move away from Koka Dam, but also from abrogating 
Nimeiri’s Islamic laws. Al-Mahdi now insisted that a suitable alternative had to be 
found before they were revoked. He did not abolish the laws during his entire 
premiership.
The ferocity of the NIF-led opposition to negotiations with the SPLM/A led the 
government to become increasingly timid on that issue. NIF outspokenness finally 
yielded results for the Islamists: when the Umma-DUP coalition came undone in 
April-May 1988, Umma’s next coalition included the NIF. Most southern 
parliamentarians then formed an opposition under the banner of the Union of 
Sudanese African Parties (USAP).“ However, even before the NIF joined the 
government, southerners had been a generally ignored voice. Al-Mahdi included 
only southern leaders in his government who lacked any broad support in their
region. Consequently, most southern politicians believed it was only because of the
208SPLA’s success that the region’s interests were recognized at all.“
By late 1988 it became clear that the army could not satisfactorily route the 
insurgents. By November 1988, with elections nearing, DUP leaders finally resolved 
to meet with the SPLM.209 The DUP felt it had been pushed aside by Umma first,
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then by the new coalition partner, the NIF.“ DUP leader Mohammed Othman Al- 
Mirghani and Garang met in Addis Ababa and fashioned an agreement similar to 
Koka Dam in which the government would not need to dissolve itself and Sharia law 
would be suspended until a constitutional conference was convened. The lifting of 
the state of emergency in the south, the ending of all military pacts, and a cease fire 
were also called for. Al-Mirghani was welcomed by jubilant crowds upon his 
return to Khartoum airport from negotiations with the SPLM/A.213
Most political forces hailed the Sudanese Peace Initiative, but the NIF condemned it 
as ‘a surrender to the rebels’.214 The reservations of several Umma members and Al- 
Mahdi’s hesitancy to sign on without a broad consensus in his coalition led to a 
refusal of the council of ministers to endorse the accord. As a result, the DUP left the 
government coalition on 28 December 1988, leaving Umma with a strengthened NIF 
as its only real partner.215
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The NIF had argued for a military solution from the moment of its entry into the
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governing coalition. However, on 20 February 1989 the General Command of the 
Armed Forces submitted a memo addressing many concerns, some of which 
questioned the sustainability of war.217 It was as clear a message as the generals 
would give that unless steps to resolve the conflict were taken by the government
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soon, the army would intervene. Umma acquiesced to the army’s demands, 
prompting the NIF to leave the coalition. The National Assembly, led by a fifth 
coalition government which now excluded the NIF, endorsed the DUP/SPLA 
agreement on 2 April 1989 and began implementing some of its requisites. The 
delay between the endorsement and the implementation allowed the NIF and army 
cadres almost three months to organize the coup. It was launched 30 June 1989, one 
day before Al-Mahdi was able to suspend the Islamic laws as he had agreed to do in 
April.220
THE COUP OF 1989 AND THE 1991 SPLA SPLIT
By early 1989, a coup d ’etat against the unstable parliamentary government was 
expected, though not by any particular faction. Factional support was suspected, even 
more so when it was discovered that the soldiers who had instigated the coup were 
not top brass but fairly average middle-rank officers who would not be able to rely on 
their military stature alone to stabilize their regime. The SPLM/A was initially 
skeptical of the new regime, especially since a peace breakthrough had seemed at 
hand before the coup. Nevertheless, coup leader Omar Hassan al-Bashir vowed to
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work for peace in the south, saying he would talk to Garang ‘soldier to soldier’.
Bashir sought to convey a practical, no-nonsense approach to negotiations which 
would have had appeal to conservative northern Sudanese who were wary of previous 
politicians making peace from what they considered a position of weakness. The NIF 
cast its revolution in a populist light, claiming to defend Islamic values (as 
understood by the urban, central Sudanese) from the special interests of regionalism 
and sectarianism as well as from the African secularism of the SPLM/A. " The coup
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leaders included some trappings of democracy, appointing Islamist sympathizers to a 
new assembly that was essentially a rubber stamp for domestic policy.224 Strict 
Islamic codes were implemented as to how non-Islamic religious organizations could 
operate throughout the state."
Having promised that it held ending the war as a primary goal, the junta was soon 
forced to give the appearance of following through. In October 1989 the SPLA saved 
Khartoum from having to commit to peace by overrunning the northern town of 
Kurmuk." Bashir now called on the Arab world to help him defend Sudan from the 
SPLA, which he declared a front for Marxism and Zionism. Only Libya and Iraq 
responded with significant aid, but it was enough to take back the town and avoid a 
serious early threat to the regime. The aid also gave the regime an opportunity to 
launch into permanent ‘jihad’ footing, allowing it to charge that it was the SPLA, not
9 9 7Khartoum, which destroyed an early opportunity for peace.
The hawkish, Islamist nature of the new regime finally began to put an ideological 
strain on the southern insurgency. Francis Deng has remarked on how unusual it is 
that the SPLM/A, a southern insurgent movement dedicated to freeing the entirety of 
Sudan from exploitation and tyranny, had been able to grow so much more powerful 
than the various separatist militias that existed in both civil wars.228 Even separatist- 
oriented fighters with no real interest in national revolution became committed to this 
well-disciplined force. However, the SPLA had until the early 1990s been fortunate 
enough to have momentum on its side. The schizophrenic attitude of the north, which
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raced through three military regimes and five parliamentary governments during the 
1980s, had helped the well-funded insurgent outfit make gains against a confused and 
demoralized Sudanese army.
The overthrow of the SPLM/A-friendly Mengistu government of Ethiopia in May 
1991 led to the first serious turmoil Garang’s movement would face. The new regime 
in Addis Ababa was unsympathetic to the SPLA, which was forced to abandon its 
crucial bases in Ethiopia. “ Without easy access to food and a safe haven across the 
Sudanese border, Garang could no longer provide for the discontented Sudanese who 
made up his army. The hasty abandonment of his camps also disrupted the SPLA 
communication network, by which Garang could be made aware of, and therefore 
manage, internal dissent.230 A conspiracy to topple Garang from SPLM/A leadership 
had actually been forming since before Mengistu’s fall. Several of Garang’s deputies 
were unhappy with his autocratic style and hoped to replace him with a leader more 
willing to delegate power. The movement split in August 1991, with the defection 
of three of Garang’s top lieutenants.
Khartoum benefited enormously from the SPLA schism. The pattem of war had 
become routine throughout its first decade: the SPLA made its offensives in the rainy 
season, the government counterattacked in the dry season.“ Khartoum found out 
immediately that applying stress to the fault lines between SPLA factions allowed for 
great gains in the army’s dry season offensive in 1992.234 By 1994, the SPLA had 
been pushed out of much of the south, and most of its fighters had retreated across the
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9 ^  S •Ugandan and Kenyan borders. The split allowed for the government to continue 
developing the oil regions by 1992, and soon thereafter it was able to negotiate 
agreements with anti-SPLA southern factions, often Nuer, to actually have them 
guard those oil wells. This situation was formalized in 1997, when many of the 
anti-SPLA forces signed the Khartoum Peace Agreement, entering an official alliance 
with Khartoum.237
In March 1999 a major peace meeting between the two factions of SPLA 
commanders reconciled many differences. Internal SPLM/A reforms eased 
reconciliation processes and Garang’s previous position of absolute authority was 
weakened. By the end of November 2001, most southern separatists finally halted 
attacks on the SPLA, but the decade-long split wreaked havoc on the southern 
insurgency movement and bought the government time to turn its oil wealth into
THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS AND THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
While the government was reluctant to make concessions at two forums in Abuja, 
Nigeria, in 1992 and 1993, it accepted an offer of mediation by regional neighbors 
such as Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea assembled as the International 
Government Authority on Development (IGAD). The IGAD Declaration of 
Principles, drafted by Ethiopia and Eritrea, stated that democracy, secularism, and a 
fair distribution of wealth throughout Sudan were prerequisites to end the war.240 
Unity was championed, but southern self-determination had to be recognized and the
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south was to be permitted a referendum on self-determination if the government 
failed to live up to the above principles.241 The SPLM/A fully accepted this, but 
Khartoum would not and negotiations stalled for three more years. By 1997, after 
being isolated by its neighbors and in the wake of continued SPLA victories, 
Khartoum finally relented and conceded that the Declaration of Principles was a 
platform on which negotiations could be based." This concession was considered a 
major breakthrough, as the opposing sides had never agreed to even a basis for 
discussions in the past.
Just when it seemed that the IGAD process was finally on the right track, it began to 
stall again. The outbreak of the Ethiopian-Eritrean war in 1998 ended the pressure on 
a reluctant Sudan to submit to the mediation forum for about two years. Khartoum 
was able during that time to further distract advocates of the IGAD process by adding 
to their own internal problems, as demonstrated by Sudan’s eventual support for the 
Lord’s Resistance Army, a Ugandan insurgent group.244 Internal divisions between 
the Bashir and Turabi camps in the government also contributed to the slow process 
of negotiations during this period, and there was always the hope that by stalling long 
enough Khartoum could skip negotiations and aim for total victory through a 
petrodollar-financed army.
The government began ‘forum-shopping’, or searching for the negotiating process it 
considered most favorable of the varied ones that emerged in the 1990s. It was 
particularly loathe to resume talks under IGAD as it would then be forced to abide by 
the Declaration of Principles that it had only signed under great military and
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diplomatic pressure.245 Khartoum even contemplated possible withdrawal from IGAD 
mediation in early 2001, when a joint Egyptian-Libyan peace initiative was gaining 
momentum, but retained token IGAD participation to avoid political fallout.246
THE TURABI/BASHIR SPLIT AND THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE CPA
By the end of the 1990s, the military-Islamist coalition governing Sudan had begun to 
fracture. In 1999, Hassan Al-Turabi, civilian leader of the Islamist movement, had 
consolidated enough power as speaker of the assembly that he felt it was time to 
rescind certain privileges held by President Bashir. Turabi wrote a bill diminishing 
presidential power to appoint all governors, department heads and other key 
officials.247 Turabi proposed directly electing state governors and making himself an 
executive prime minister. Bashir counter-attacked by removing him as speaker and 
disbanding parliament in December 1999.248
In May 2000, Turabi was removed as Secretary General of the National Congress 
Party (NCP). To avoid a war between Islamist factions, Bashir allowed Turabi’s 
followers to regroup as the Popular National Congress (later the Popular Congress 
Party), while he retained control of the NCP.249 Turabi still had a large urban 
following that could have been an immediate threat to Bashir had he overreacted.250 
In February 2001, Turabi was arrested after he had signed an agreement earlier that 
month with the SPLM/A.251 Turabi stressed that the agreement was not a call to
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violence or rebellion, but he was charged nevertheless with conspiring with a state
252enemy.
The NIF split coincided with another shift of the war to the SPLM/A’s favor. In May 
and June 2001, the SPLA overwhelmed two government garrison towns in Western 
Bahr Al-Ghazal, Raga and Dem ZubeirA This resurgence shattered the government 
propaganda line that the army was winning the war and the SPLA was merely stalling 
for time. The government began to rapidly lose support among all sections of the 
population by 2001, and its attempts to placate its core of northern supporters only 
made opportunities for a peaceful settlement seem even more remote. Stiffer military 
resistance by reconciled Nuer and Dinka towards the Baggara Arabs who had 
comprised a large part of the government militias eventually led to tribal settlements 
between those groups, sapping still more energy from Khartoum’s war effort.254
Both sides by 2001 feared that in making gestures towards peace they could 
compromise their own positions. The Sudanese government feared both the 
consequences of southern self-determination and the pressure in the north for more 
democracy. It particularly feared that the former would lead to the latter. The SPLA 
feared that the series of humanitarian cease fires pressed for by NGOs would 
eventually become a conduit to a more general cease fire, which it rejected unless 
implemented in conjunction with a comprehensive peace.255 As a result neither side 
could seriously consider stopping the conflict immediately.
By 2001 it seemed the peace process needed revitalization that only vigorous effort 
by the international community, particularly the United States, could provide. In 
2001, US President George W. Bush deployed former Senator John Danforth to
252 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 42.
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mediate a cease fire in the Nuba Mountains. Bush requested Danforth assess the 
conflict in southern Sudan and complete a report detailing whether the US should 
help resolve the conflict. In March 2002, Danforth made his recommendations to the 
president. After making contacts with many of the states and organizations involved 
in the process, Danforth seemed to concur with the IGAD formula, which focused 
initially on narrowing participants to the SPLM/A and the government and avoiding 
northern regime opponents who aligned under the National Democratic Alliance 
umbrella exile group. Danforth did not support self-determination for the south, but 
he thought nevertheless that IGAD was a viable peace process and encouraged the US 
to throw its weight behind it rather than launch a separate initiative.257
THE MACHAKOS PROTOCOL AND SUBSEQUENT AGREEMENTS
In June 2002, talks reconvened with American, British, and Norwegian mediators 
assisting Lazarus Sumbeiywo, Kenya’s special envoy to Sudan and the chief IGAD 
mediator. The SPLM/A and the government agreed to allow both an Islamic system 
with Sharia law in the north and a secular system in the south. A referendum was to 
be held in the south after six years allowing southerners to determine that region’s 
status, to remain in federation with Sudan or to become independent.2'^ 9 Operating on 
the premise that the AAA failed in part because it had no international oversight 
mechanisms, Machakos allowed a variety of security monitoring procedures that
9 AOwould become more common as the peace process began its ‘second stage’.
The Machakos Protocol became the turning point in the peace process. It made 
reference to democratic governance and social, political and economic justice for all
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citizens of Sudan, building off the advocacy of the democratic ideal first drafted in 
the 1994 Declaration of Principles. The IGAD process devised a one-state, two- 
system construction, creating two confederate regions with their own banks, 
constitutions, armies and governments. It created three layers of government in the 
south: the Government of Southern Sudan, state governments and local 
government.
The first agreement to be concluded after the initial protocol was the Agreement of 
Security Arrangements during the interim period, which was signed on 25 September 
2003.“ It stipulated that the Sudanese Armed Forces of the national government and 
the SPLA-formed southern army would remain separate during the interim period and 
function as two distinct armies.264 The SPLA would also withdraw from areas outside 
the south, such as Eastern Sudan. The Sudanese Armed Forces of the north were to
9ASwithdraw from their garrisons in the south by mid-2007.
After security considerations throughout most of the state had been addressed, the 
parties turned to the crucial issues of wealth sharing in a post-war Sudan. Talks 
resumed on 4 January 2004 in Naivasha, Kenya and by 7 January 2004 the parties 
had reached a Wealth Sharing Agreement. This agreement covered the division of 
the oil and non-oil revenue, and how funds would be used to rehabilitate areas 
affected by the war, particularly in the south. It mandated the creation of a National 
Petroleum Commission to review contracts signed with foreign oil companies and to 
monitor the distribution of income from natural resources. It also stipulated that 
special funds should be set up to help areas most affected by the two decades of war,
9 ASsouthern Sudan first and foremost.
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The Power-Sharing Agreement was signed on 26 May 2004.“ The SPLM was 
conceded by far the most prominent position in the newly created Government of 
Southern Sudan (GOSS) and a larger representation than any faction but the National 
Congress Party (the NCP, now the party of Bashir and his government clique) in the 
national government. It would control 70% of the appointed positions in the GOSS 
until mid-interim period elections, with the NCP and other southern parties 
controlling the remaining 15% each. Nationally the NCP maintained 52% of 
appointed positions, the SPLM 28%, other northern parties 14%, and other southern 
parties 6%.271 The SPLM would also establish ten new state governments in the 
south.272
Also signed on 26 May 2004 at Naivasha were a protocol to resolve the conflict in 
Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile and a separate protocol to resolve the conflict in 
Abyei. The status of these areas was especially delicate due to both the mix of 
Arab/non-Arab demographics and the oil producing areas there. The parties agreed to 
share the positions in the Nuba Mountains region of Kordofan and the Southern Blue 
Nile on a 55/45 basis with the NCP receiving the larger portion.277 An Abyei 
Boundaries Commission was created to determine the land rights of the Dinka and 
arabized communities in that region, resulting in what was agreed would be a binding 
resolution.274
By late 2004, the primary remaining task was to gather all the protocols into one 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and set about a time frame for the implementation 
of the prescribed measures. Two final documents, the Agreement on Implementation
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Modalities of the Protocols and Agreements and an agreement on the final cease fire 
and security arrangements, were signed on 31 December 2004.~ A time frame was 
given for the various elements discussed in previous agreements. This arrangement 
was included in part to avoid the fate of the AAA, which observers believe was too 
easy to circumvent. These last two protocols, along with the six previous ones signed 
since 2002, make up the CPA, signed on 9 January 2005.276 Unlike the final AAA, 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was primarily a formalization and affirmation 
of the previous agreements that actually contained the heart of the peace process. The 
January signing also marked the beginning of a six-month pre-interim period meant 
to prepare Sudan for the interim period of six years beginning in July 2005. While 
both the government and the SPLM/A had an abundance of potential employees for 
the new Government of National Unity and the regional Government Of South 
Sudan, the interim period was needed to rebuild the infrastructure in the south that 
had been destroyed after decades of war.277 At the end of this period, in 2011, a 
referendum is to be held among southerners to determine if the south will remain a 
part of the Republic of Sudan or seek independence.
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CHAPTER TWO: FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY
This chapter is primarily concerned with the evolution of northern nationalism, 
southern nationalism as a response to it, and the eventual acceptance of the south’s 
anomaly status as best represented by the push for southern self-determination. The 
chapter will discuss both the foundations of northern and southern Sudanese 
conceptions of national identities, and how both peace agreements accommodated 
their evolution, especially with regards to the administrative status of the south and 
other regions. The agreements were indirect testaments to the difficulty Sudan has 
had transcending its regional identities, in part because of the uniquely unintegrated 
nature of the state at independence, of which the south is only the most extreme 
example. After independence, northern nationalism initially was unable to overcome 
its Arab-Isiamic foundation, even during parliamentary democratic periods.
Sudanese showed aspirations towards a literally nationalist movement under the early 
May Regime, and a truly nationalist insurgency in the SPLM/A, but neither of these 
movements could transcend their respective regional constraints.
A fundamental difference between the AAA and the CPA is the degree to which the 
latter recognizes southern demands for self-determination. The agreements form the 
two defining moments in a long evolution of southern demands for autonomy, 
beginning with federalism at independence, and gradually becoming more radical 
over the course of the two wars. The first war began before the south had achieved a 
cohesive identity as a region, and, due to political circumstances, ended as a truly 
region-wide southern liberation movement was only beginning to form. The inchoate 
nature of southern nationalism by the time of the signing of the AAA may have 
spared Sudan from several more years of separatist war, but also compromised 
national integration. Without a cohesive identity, regional politics devolved into 
patronage networks based on tribal divisions, exploited by the very national president 
who initially crafted the agreement. A lack of shared identity made it easier for 
various southern elites to be inducted into the national patronage network.
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With the AAA, Khartoum ceded to the south the primary shared concerns of the 
region up to that period: autonomous government, employment for insurgent elites 
and fighters, guarantees to defend indigenous culture and access to education tailored 
to the region’s identity. While protections of indigenous culture represented real 
concessions on the part of the national government, the goal of southern inclusion on 
a national level actually complemented northern Sudanese concerns about national 
integration. As such, the AAA was a landmark refutation of the colonial-era 
Southern Policy, allowing the potential for national integration -  had the national 
government been able to form a stronger base of legitimacy in the north.
The peace following the AAA allowed for a short period of national integration, but 
the larger legacy of that agreement was its contribution to the makeup of the next 
major insurgent movement, the SPLM/A. Some of the dividends of integration 
attempts during this period were seen in the mission of the later movement, whose 
demands were no longer for southern secession, but for a national revolution with 
more substantive powers for the regions than existed under the May Regime. 
However, the SPLM/A’s national vision coincided with the emergence of the post- 
nationalist Bashir regime, which was unwilling to share power except on a strictly 
regulated, regionally defined basis, forcing the SPLM/A to compromise its 
nationwide objectives and accept a role as the de facto southern liberation movement. 
Khartoum’s use of self-determination as a bargaining chip with southern militias to 
gain tactical advantage over the SPLM/A demonstrates the receding of the bedrock 
northern nationalist principle that Sudan must remain united. The government of 
Sudan facilitated southern self-determination by acknowledging the principle in 
agreements with the SPLA’s separatist rivals throughout the course of the second 
war. Khartoum’s acceptance of self-determination also confirms that while Islam 
was a nation-building tool for the nationalists in the first war, the Bashir regime saw 
it as primarily a tool to perpetuate its own rule. This shift towards using Islam as a 
political weapon first occurred in the final years of the Nimeiri regime and was 
responsible both for the abrogation of the AAA and the length of the second war.
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The impact of nationalism’s wane is one of the most significant trends evident when 
examining the two agreements comparatively. Despite being an improvement on the 
AAA concerning southern representation on the national level and representative 
government generally, the CPA is actually a weaker vessel for national integration of 
Sudan than the AAA had been. Rather, it further codifies distinct Sudanese identities 
nationally and on the north-south fault line, then after a six-year period in which those 
identities are further strengthened in contrast to each other, allows for regional 
secession.
THE UNINTEGRATED STATE AND NORTHERN NATIONALISM
As discussed in Chapter One, Sudan’s lack of national integration is partially 
attributable to the techniques relied on by the British to administer a vast territory 
with a small number of troops and personnel. Experiments with the creation of an 
educated class of Sudanese administrators showed early potential to threaten 
Condominium administration when they resulted in the 1924 mutiny. The mutiny 
was led by young officers with modem military training who had come from 
traditionally lowly backgrounds, such as slave status, and been promoted by colonial 
authorities.1 The genesis of national consciousness in Sudan is therefore attributed to 
the introduction of Western education, the paragons of which were the Gordon 
Memorial College and the Khartoum Military School, established in 1902 and 1905 
respectively.2
The British abolition of the open slave trade allowed more freedom for this class of 
non-Arab Sudanese, but egalitarianism was not the ultimate objective of the 
Condominium regime. The government would ultimately come to rely on the central,
1 Francis Mading Deng, “Green is the Color of the Masters: The Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National 
Identity in Modem Sudan.” Gilder Lehrman Center for the Study o f Slavery, Resistance and Abolition, Yale 
University. New Haven, Connecticut. 23 October 2004, 28. Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and 
Communism in a Traditional Society. London: Frank Cass & Company, 1978, 36. In the 1920s, the Sufi leader of 
the Khatmiyya sect, Sayyid Ali Mirghani, observed of the young Gordon University graduates, then forming a 
new elite, ‘The government’s best friends are the taxpayers and its worst enemies those who receive pay from it.’ 
Abdel Salam M. Sidahmed. Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 20. 
Sidahmed notes that nationalist movements are often bom from the very institutions colonialism creates.
2 Francis Mading Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan. Washington, Brookings Institute,
1995, 101, 108. Widespread resistance to British rule in the south during the 1920s was still in the process of 
being suppressed, and Francis Deng suggests it is possible the demonstration had ‘a catalytic effect on the young 
nationalist officers, especially those whose ethnic origins were southern’.
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riverine elites to form their new class of administrators. The British sought to 
advance arabized Sudanese by providing them the education necessary for 
administrative employment, a patronage tactic designed to minimize potential 
resistance from this class by making them the beneficiaries of Condominium rule. 
This program accelerated the process by which the central riverine area not only 
advanced as the center of wealth and power in Sudan, but of political consciousness. 
‘By favouring self-defined Arabs at the expense of everyone else, including not only 
Arabic-speaking former slaves or their descendants, but also non-Arab Muslims and 
non-Muslims (such as the Dinka), the British cultivated a group of men who had the 
literacy and the political know-how to develop and articulate nationalist ideologies.’3 4
The British were angered by the 1924 mutiny, viewing it as a betrayal by the very 
class the administrators had helped educate and provide opportunities for. Chastened 
by their reliance on the small, educated class of Sudanese, the British reverted back to 
a patronage structure in which traditional sectarian and provincial elites were to 
administer, bypassing tendencies towards modernity and education which might have 
served as a conduit towards a greater national identity after Sudan made the transition 
to independence. The wave of nationalism in the early 1920s convinced many 
administrators that the early reliance on and benefaction towards traditional leaders, 
as practiced by Governor General Wingate, was a superior administrative approach to 
Sudan than the nascent movement towards formal bureaucracies envisioned by 
Governor General Stack before his 1924 assassination.5 It was not until the decade
3 Heather J. Sharkey. “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race.” 
African Affairs 107:426 (2008), 29.
4 SharkeySharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 30. 
Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim. Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1969, 19, 
37. Telephone interview by the author with R. S. O’Fahey, Oslo, 2009. O’Fahey explains that this same class, 
educated up to the late 1910s and early 1920s to serve as clerks, railway workers and low level administrators. 
They were the class to whom the British handed power upon their exit from Sudan, and from whom most of the 
leading political figures derived in the post-colonial age. ‘The Black Book of Sudan’ released in Sudan by anti- 
government activists in Darfur, notes that Sudanese leadership has always emerged from the same 5% of the 
population. Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 42. 
Tn May 2000, an anonymously authored and distributed “Black Book” made the rounds in greater Khartoum, 
eluding government censorship: it purported to show “what everyone knew but never articulated: that the vast 
majority of government positions in Khartoum, from cabinet ministers to their drivers and all the bureaucracy in 
between, were held by members of three [Arab] tribes which represented only 5.4% of the population.’”
5 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 102. Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in 
a Traditional Society, 45. Warburg notes that even British administrators sympathetic to the modemist goals of 
the Sudanese were influenced by Wingate’s methods and preferred informal relationships with tribal leaders to 
dealings with educated, urban ‘middlemen’; an anti-educated bias was compatible with the anti-industrial bias 
many administrators felt in the 1930s and 1940s. Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 67. Stack
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preceding independence, the state would become a dominant provider of services and 
employment, with World War Two stimulating the public sector and creating a new 
atmosphere which encouraged nationalists to push for self-rule.* 6
The nationalists of the 1940s and 1950s sought a more secular form of politics, both 
to advance modernity in Sudan and because the sectarian rivalries took attention 
away from their primary goal -  ejecting the British. The northern backlash to the 
Southern Policy and the subsequent desire to incorporate the south into northern 
culture was ‘the only point on which the largely secularist Sudanese nationalist 
movement expressed Islamic viewpoints’.7 *Nationalism commonly assigns religion a 
second-tier status, recognizing its role in providing political stability but often
o
disdaining it as conservative and reactionary, and often an ally of the ancien regime. 
Sudanese nationalism was unusual in that, with the failure of the early nationalist 
push in the 1920s which did not have the support of sectarian elites, later generations 
of nationalists were forced to make common cause with conservative religious figures 
and seek their patronage to advance their objectives.9 This cooperation did not 
undermine the legitimacy of the northern nationalist cause as much as it might have 
in other African states, as the proto-nationalist movement of the Mahdi in the late 
1800s had set a precedent for Sudan’s mixture of religion and nationalism. This was 
demonstrated by the outcome of the government of Ismael Al-Azhari, Sudan’s first 
Prime Minister. Azhari was considered an ideal compromise candidate as he was 
from the smaller lsmaihyya sectarian faction, neither threatening the larger sectarian
had hoped to cultivate an educated elite to share the reigns of governance with the traditional tribal authorities. In
his mind, both would compliment each other’s education and experience. His assassination would see Native
Administration become an alternative, not a compliment, to the employment of educated Sudanese in government.
Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 102. The Graduate’s Club of Omdurman was formed
during this period, and served as an incubator for the northern Sudanese intelligentsia until its dissolution in the 
1940s.
6 Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers; London: L. 
Crook Academic Pub, 1990, 79.
7 Abdelwahab El-Affendi. “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa.” African Affairs 
89:356 (July 1990), 372, 373-374.
x Brendan O’Leary. “On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism.” 
British Journal o f Political Science 27 (1997), 192.
9 Martin Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil 
war.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 
1993,9.
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factions nor beholden to them.10 Azhari assumed the premiership following the 1953
elections, a role he would hold until after independence.* 11 However, he could not
transcend the traditional, reactionary forces of the two dominant sectarian leaders,
who eventually came together in July 1956 to confront Azhari and his secularists and
12throw their government out of power.
Native Administration came to symbolize to the second wave of educated nationalists 
the antithesis of a modem state, strengthening provincial and spiritual ties over 
allegiance to a united Sudan. Nationalists also believed this method of managing 
Sudan’s internal affairs was contrary to the state’s natural process of modernization, 
as tribalism had almost been completely destroyed in the north by the Mahdist 
regime. They considered local officials ultimately as beholden to British District 
Commissioners and Governors. Sudanese nationalist pride was also stoked by the 
fact that Egypt and Britain continued to negotiate treaties regarding the nature of Nile 
Waters and Egyptian emigration to Sudan without consulting the Sudanese 
themselves.14
The rising nationalist tensions in the north over the course of the early 1920s led the 
British to seek further isolation of the south from northern influence. It was therefore 
seen as pragmatic and cost effective to manage the south by removing northern and 
Egyptian officials stationed there and administering through tribal chiefs, who would 
coordinate directly with the few military officials remaining in the south.15 This 
British-enforced Southern Policy prevented national integration by alienated southern 
Sudanese from the nationalist concerns of northerners, inhibiting the natural cultural
10 Peter Woodward “Islam and Politics.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael 
Badal, Adland Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 4. Warburg, Islam, Nationalism 
and Communism in a Traditional Society, 64.
11 Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 64. Beshir Mohammed Said, The 
Sudan: Crossroads o f Africa. London: Bodley Head, 1965, 73.
12 Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket,” 5. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 12. John 
Voll and Sarah Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 1985, 70. Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 89. Dunstan M. Wai. 
“Political Trends in the Sudan and the Future of the South.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem o f National 
Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 147. The Torit Mutiny in August 1956 had been 
an earlier blow to Azhari’s prestige in the north.
13 Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 203.
14 Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 84-85. Peter Woodward, “Military-Civilian Relations.” 
Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter 
Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 54.
15 Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket,” 5. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 8.
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exchange so vital to an integrated nation-state. The kind of inter-tribal and religious 
alliances that were forged in other African revolutionary movements -  and would be 
sought after in the second Sudanese civil war -  were not developed between 
northerners and southerners in the 1940s and 1950s.16 Southerners’ isolation from the 
nationalist movement meant that rather than being viewed by northerners at 
independence as brothers-in-arms, they were instead an embarrassing reminder of the 
colonial past and the impotence of the first wave of northern nationalism in the face 
of British authority in the 1920s.17
The coercive tendency of the second wave of northern nationalists towards 
integrating the south was due to the very threat the Southern Policy posed to what 
was still a fragile nationalist movement. It was widely understood by northern 
intellectuals that the colonial isolation of the south from the rest of Sudan had been 
formalized in 1930 because the British considered Islam to be a religion on the 
decline: to allow its introduction to southerners was considered as unhelpful to their 
development and could potentially encourage fanaticism. For northern nationalists 
to allow such paternalist bigotry to go unchallenged was unconscionable. Islam was 
one of the few cultural elements shared by most northern Sudanese, and subsequently 
became a fundamental pillar of the nationalist movement. The urgency for national
16 Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan 's Civil Wars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 127. 
Voll and Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State, 150. ‘Early national poetry reflects the 
isolation of the south: it is always in Arabic and deals exclusively with themes of interest to the north.’ Amir Idris. 
Conßict and Politics o f Identity in Sudan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, 44. ‘The history of nationalism 
in Sudan is about competing claims over the post-colonial identity of the state, not about the struggle against 
European colonialism.’ Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 97. ‘The fact that pan-Islamism did 
not work in Sudan was more interesting because even though the end of the Ottomans meant the reemergence of 
an Arabian Kingdom across the Red Sea from Sudan, Sudanese religious figures did not greet Arabia with 
anything but politeness despite King Hussein’s vigorous attempts to court their sympathy.’
17 P.M. Holt. A Modern History o f the Sudan. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961, 129. There were severe 
limits to the southern influence over what would ultimately come to be seen as a northern-based nationalist 
movement. Across north Sudan, branches of the nationalist White Flag League were founded in regional towns, 
but ironically the south itself was considered too ‘isolated, divided and backward to be part of the nationalist 
movement’.
18 Robert O. Collins, Shadows in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956. New Haven & London: 
Yale University Press, 1983, 172. Civil Secretary Harold MacMillan, the author of the 1930 Memorandum on 
Southern Policy which prohibited the use of Arabic in southern Sudan, that same year wrote: ‘The religion of the 
Arab is the fruit of thirteen centuries of discipline and dogma, and it appears now to have reached a stage of 
world-wide stagnation, periodically rippled by political restlessness.’ Said, The Sudan: Crossroads o f Africa, 40. 
T.R.H. Owen, Deputy Governor of Bahr Al-Ghazal, writes that the northerners ‘could run Omdurman I believe. 
That they will soon be fit to govern the Rizeigat and the Hadendowa is possible. That they will in the next two 
decades be fit to be entrusted with the Zande and the Dinka is not even thinkable.... We, the British... are better 
qualified than any other race... to lead primitives up the path of civic progress. [We] are not going to see the 
South dominated by an Arab civilization in Khartoum which is more alien to them than our own.’ Owen did 
allow that ‘The underlying object is still to train the Southerner to run his own country. Provided that this object 
is not jeopardised, there should be no limitation to legitimate Northern activity or intrusion.’
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integration created by this psychology explains in part the counterproductive brutality 
of Khartoum’s early nation-building efforts in the south after independence, under 
both democratic and autocratic regimes. The thwarting of northern nationalism was 
therefore a key factor in the perpetuation of the first civil war, as it left early 
Sudanese leaders out of touch with the concerns of people’s in the remote areas and 
unaware of the dangers of relying on Islam as a state-building tool.19 Arab identity 
was also championed by the riverine elites, in part because of the contrast it presented 
with black Africa. The belief was that championing African identity would actually 
lead to a disintegration of national identity. In 1972, Egyptian scholar ’Abd Al-Majid 
‘Abidin stated that for the Sudanese, ‘embracing Africanism (tazannuj) would be 
divisive precisely because Africans (.zunuj) were so heterogeneous and, he claimed, 
lacked a basis in language or civilization. “The call to Africanism . . . would lead to a 
call for division, fragmentation, and tribalism in this country.’” The British 
occupation heightened the significance of the Arab component in northern 
nationalism: ‘Identification with the Arab East was as much a reaction against 
Western domination as it was an escape from the inferiority of the African
9 1background.’
As with other nationalist movements, northern Sudanese considered it paramount that 
the post-independence state hold together. The traditional ambivalence colonial 
officials had expressed about keeping Sudan united made suspect any notions of 
recognizing the uniqueness of the south during the pre-independence era. Imported 
western terms such as ‘federalism’ and ‘self-determination’ were therefore weighted 
in the Sudanese context, traceable back to fears of British intentions during colonial
19 Telephone interview by the author with Richard Lobban, Providence, 2009. As Lobban states, northern 
nationalists, whether of the DUP or Umma, or smaller parties, ‘were unabashedly Muslim... they just didn’t have 
enough experience governing to see that their religion might unify their immediate forces but it would send the 
periphery spinning off.’ Elisabeth Bakke. “How Voluntary is National Identity?” National Political Science 
Conference. University of Oslo, Tromso, Norway. 11-13 August 2000, 7. Bakke theorizes that as the national 
identity hardens, it becomes more difficult for excluded groups to be accommodated. Though written in the 
context of early European state-building, the theory is also applicable when studying early northern nationalism 
and its relationship with non-Arab, non-Muslim peoples.
20 Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 41.
21 Deng, “Green is the Color of the Masters: The Legacy of Slavery and the Crisis of National Identity in Modem 
Sudan,” 12.
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times. Northern nationalists were adamant that the British would not use self- 
determination as a ruse to attach the south to their East African possessions of 
Uganda and Kenya. In this regard, northern nationalists fell victim to the irony which 
Herbst notes became common in post-colonial African nationalist movements: in 
their endeavor to restore a pre-colonial identity, they were suspicious of creating any 
modem parallel to the network of semi-autonomous confederacies upon which the 
traditional, pre-colonial African state had often been established. Instead, these 
educated, Western-influenced nationalists sought to re-imagine the state along the 
lines of the European nation-building movements, which relied on a strong central 
state controlling territory within rigidly defined borders. Sudan faced an 
exaggerated case of the dilemma whereby the post-colonial state was trying to assert 
power over territory it had never historically been able to control, defined by the 
arbitrary borders agreed to by the departed imperial powers. By independence, some 
areas of the south had only been conquered and pacified by the British less than three 
decades prior, and were still only lightly administered.24
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While the dispute could be interpreted as a peripheral debate about terminology, for 
many northern nationalists, federalism represented the ultimate defeat of the goal of a 
united Sudan overcoming artificial divisions imposed on it by colonial rulers. That 
the emerging southern Sudanese interpretation of the past created in them a strong 
need for autonomy, only exacerbated after independence, was a difficult concept to 
consolidate easily within this worldview for reasons pertaining as much to the
25northern national identity as to the practical difficulties of such an arrangement. 
Moreover, this situation directly affected Sudanese democratic prospects. In 
describing the perils of democratising post-colonial states in Africa, Shephard phrases 
the dilemma succinctly: Tn a country without national consciousness, democracy is
22 Holt, A Modern History o f  the Sudan, 150. For example, a pamphlet published in 1947 by the colonial 
government referred to a ‘policy aiming to give the south the same chances of ultimate self-determination as have 
been promised to the north’.
23 Jeffrey Herbst. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 97, 100.
24 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 26, 33. The last major Dinka uprising was finally put down 
in 1927 after the British launched a punishing campaign involving torched villages, massacred cattle herds, and 
aerial bombing. Collins, Shadows in the Grass, 131, 146. There was no record of any British official even 
visiting western Nuerland until the mid-1920s, and sustained resistance in this area lasted until 1930.
25 Abel Alier. The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. Exeter, Devon, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991, 
99.
72
made very difficult, for force becomes necessary to achieve national ends.’
Northern identity at independence did not initially seem incompatible with the 
democratic process. The mechanics of free elections have been held without 
corruption during each of the parliamentary eras. However, Idris suggests that when 
parliamentary governments proved unable to impose the Arab Muslim identity upon 
the south, it was not unacceptable for a northern nationalist such as Abdullah Khalil 
to allow the military to intervene to try, as occurred in 1958.“ Similarly, the need to 
complete the national project regardless of the impact such policies would have on 
democracy and self-government became a primary issue in what would become the
98debate over a federalized government.
THE EVOLUTION OF SOUTHERN DEMANDS FOR AUTONOMY IN THE 
FIRST WAR
A discussion of southern identity is best preceded by a review of southern interaction 
with the various regimes in Khartoum during the first war. The long evolution of 
southern demands for some formal recognition of autonomous status began before 
independence, and faced opposition at virtually every step by the government. 
However, early southern calls for autonomy were not made to prepare the south for 
secession, but to seek some special protective status recognizing the region’s 
backwardness.29 In the years following the 1947 Juba Conference, which included 
southern MPs in the Legislative Assembly for the first time, southerners sought 
guarantees of a permanent recognition of their distinct status within Sudan. As plans 
for Sudanese self-government were being drafted in 1952, southern representatives 
pushed for the position of a Minister of the Southern Provinces to be included in the 
cabinet, and a special board to be set up for the region with members appointed to it 
by regional governors. These positions were a recommendation the Marshall Report,
26 George W. Shepherd. The Politics o f African Nationalism: Challenge to American Policy. New York: Praeger, 
1962,91.
27 Amir Idris, Sudan ’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and Formational Identities. New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 
2001, 109. Joseph Oduho and William Deng, The Problem o f Southern Sudan. London: Oxford University Press, 
1963, 36-37. The authors quote a statement made by former Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil three days after the 
coup which overthrew him in which he said ‘this country is not yet ready for democracy; I have therefore decided, 
at the suggestion of my advisers, to hand the reins of this country to the army’.
28 Abu Baker El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement. Stockholm: Liber Tryck, 1980, 
18, 84, 137. El Obeid cites Rafra Hassan Ahmed, who argues that Sudan needed to achieve security and national 
identity before federalism could be implemented.
29 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 73.
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a government document issued in 1949 detailing the most effective way to modernize 
Sudan’s administration, shared. Northerners objected that this would weaken the 
newly created office of Prime Minister, establishing dual cabinets and becoming a 
step backwards towards the Southern Policy.30
Advocacy of federalism became an early vehicle for the emerging southern political 
consciousness. During the elections of 1953, northerners made many promises to 
southerners concerning their status in an independent Sudan that they later proved 
unable to keep, especially promises concerning southern representation nationally. 
Southern resentment over ‘broken promises’ from northerners would remain a theme 
of the conflict, as soon after independence southerners felt northerners did not hold to 
their vow to consider a federation status for Sudan in the Constituent Assembly. 
Khartoum was unable to frustrate southern conferences in support of federalism in 
1954 and 1955, and so made statements promising southerners that their concerns 
would be taken into account. In December 1955 the southern members of 
parliament overcame their misgivings and voted for independence, but only after the 
other members of parliament passed a resolution saying a future constitution would 
be mindful of southern views. The subsequent rejection of a federal constitution by 
the constitutional committee in September 1956 and regional autonomy for the south 
in December 1957 were viewed by southerners as breaches of trust by the
3U Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 198-199. ‘Opponents [of a federal government] also 
claimed that the south was no more backward than the Nuba Mountains or the Beja area in eastern Sudan or 
Darfur.’ Instead, the south was to be guaranteed a ministerial position in the cabinet, later raised to three by the 
time the Transitional Constitutions was drafted.
31 Francis Mading Deng, Africans o f Two Worlds: The Dinka in Afro-Arab Sudan. New Haven, Connecticut: Yale 
University Press, 1978, 160. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed. Sudan: The Contemporary Middle 
East. London: Routledge, 2005, 38. Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 54.
32 Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972. London: David & Charles, 1974, 39. Sidahmed, Politics 
and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 54. Ann Mosely Lesch. The Sudan: Contested National Identities. 
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The Root Causes of Sudan ’s Civil Wars, 27. Oduho and Deng, The Problem o f Southern Sudan, 27, 31.
33 Said, The Sudan: Crossroads o f Africa, 82. “Nationalism, Federalism and Self-Determination in a Multi-Polar 
Sudan.” Committee o f the Civil Project. Issue Paper F-3, 3. Abdel-Rahman Abdalla and Robert Fancher. Sudan: 
Integration or Disintegration. Edison, New Jersey: Transaction, 2001, 88. Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in 
Contemporary Sudan, 82. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 23. Oliver Albino, 
The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint. London: Oxford University Press, 1970, 1970,39. Peter Nyot Kok. 
Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995: Analysis, Evaluation and Documentation. Berlin: Deutsches 
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Sudan.” Respect 1:2, (March 2006), 3. Ali Suliman Fadlalla. “The Search for a Constitution.” Sudan Since 
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Gower Publishing, 1986,43.
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government, and radicalized some by increasing the attractiveness of separatist
34causes.
Despite such resistance from Khartoum, after federalist candidates swept almost all 
southern seats in the 1957 elections, federalist momentum seemed poised to spread 
throughout other regions of Sudan. By 1958, interest in federalism was no longer 
confined only to the south; Khartoum was receiving similar pressure from remote 
northern areas such as Darfur, the Beja Regions and the Nuba Mountains. On the day 
of the Abboud coup, a large conference in Darfur was to be held in which it was 
expected the Fur leadership of that region would also endorse federation. This 
development would have marked a significant turning point: in the past the 
government had been effective at persuading parliamentary delegations from 
marginalized areas in the north to support anti-federalist initiatives by invoking
o /I
Islamic solidarity. The cause of federalism had therefore become a direct challenge 
to Islam as a state-building tool. Southern federalists were becoming more 
disciplined, and learning to cooperate with MPs from other regions. Under the new 
parliament in March 1958, the south was given 46 seats out of 173. Forty of these 
formed the Federation Bloc, an increasingly well-coordinated group of federation 
advocates. Abdullah Khalil formed a coalition government from his Umma and the 
Khatmiyya-ahgned PDP. Three southern ministers were appointed to minor positions
34 Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 105. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: 
The Contemporary Middle East, 38. Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 54. Lesch, The 
Sudan: Contested National Identities, 35, 37. Edgar O’Ballance. Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99. New 
York: St Martin’s Press, 2000, 11. Said, The Sudan: Crossroads o f Africa, 73, 92. Kok, Governance and Conflict 
in the Sudan 1985-1995, 133. “Nationalism, Federalism and Self-Determination in a Multi-Polar Sudan,” 3.
Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 137. Fadlalla, “The Search for a Constitution,” 43.
Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 120. Oduho and Deng, The Problem o f Southern Sudan, 
34. Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 29, 36. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, 74. In September 1956 the National Assembly appointed a committee to draft a national constitution. 
Only three of its 46 members were southerners, and when those members repeated the standard southern demand 
for a federal constitution, they were simply outvoted. In retaliation, they walked out of the committee and 
boycotted the remaining sessions. Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, 
Ethnicity, and Race,” 35. Separatism was not the only radical gesture taken by southerners during this period: 
more direct challenges to the Arab-Islamic nationalism of the north also became prevalent. In 1957 a ‘Southern 
Federal Party’ issued a manifesto calling for recognition of English along with Arabic as an official language; 
Christianity along with Islam as a state religion; and ‘the transfer of the Sudan from the Arab world to the 
African’. The central government responded to the manifesto by sentencing its author to seven years in prison for 
sedition.
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in the cabinet. However, they were not members of the Liberal Party, which at the 
time was by far the dominant coalition of southern politicians. This incident caused 
dismay among southern MPs, as the great majority had united in that party purposely 
to enhance southern power. In retaliation they were prepared to vote with the 
northern opposition groups, particularly on issues which concerned the south, thereby 
helping to render Abdullah Khalil’s government ineffective. A general strike 
organized in 1958 led to a collapse of faith in the government and its complete
• 0 0  # . . .
paralysis. Khalil, unable to govern and possibly fearing Egypt might find a way to 
take advantage of this parliamentary chaos, allowed the army to take the reigns of 
power away from politicians.39
The authoritarian nature of the dictatorship increased both the radical nature of 
southern demands and southern willingness to use violence to achieve them. Any 
possibility of a suspension of the nationalist nation-building project for the sake of 
federalism was halted in 1958 by the Abboud military coup. The new junta was 
disdainful of the idea of federation, which was the antithesis of its unitary, 
authoritarian vision for Sudan.40 However, the regime’s aggressive nation-building 
efforts would invigorate the debate over southern autonomy in a way southern 
politicians had been unable to do, primarily by radicalizing previously uninvolved 
southerners. Like many post-colonial African states, the very weakness of Sudan’s
37 Holt, A Modern History o f the Sudan, 177. Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket,” 5. Deng, War o f Visions: 
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state power has allowed marginalized peoples a degree of de facto autonomy.41 
Discussion of federalism began as an abstraction confined primarily to southern 
politicians and elites. Abboud, perhaps more than any other Sudanese leader, seemed 
completely oblivious to the dynamics of the south. In his narrowly authoritarian 
concentration on infrastructure and order, he committed avoidable indignities against 
the peoples of the region, needlessly solidifying opposition to the government there. 
For example, in 1961 his regime annexed the resource-rich Bahr el-Ghazal region of 
Hofrat el-Nahas to Darfur, the rationale being that to leave such a valuable area under 
administration of a southern province might actually encourage secession. The 
implementation of this policy was politically insensitive enough to enrage southerners 
across the region.42 Abboud’s regime was therefore characterized by the self-fulfilling 
prophecy of increased southern coordination of resistance, culminating in the 
formation of united political opposition in 1962 and the Anya Nya in 1963.43 By the 
time his junta collapsed, the entire south was in revolt, and it was not just hatred of 
Abboud but of northern administration generally that united southern insurgents.44 
Abboud attempted to centralize government in the south in the hopes that with more 
control would come stability, and therefore security.45 These simplistic efforts to 
quash separatism in the south inevitably targeted the most articulate and high profile 
champions of separatism -  the south’s small class of intellectuals. Educated
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southerners were viewed with suspicion, especially politicians. In December 1960, 
an alleged government plot to carry out mass arrests of southern politicians on 
Christmas Eve was discovered, which caused many of them to escape the country.46 
As refugees in the Congo they formed, in February 1962, the political exile group 
eventually known as the Sudan African National Union (SANU).47 Attempts to build 
a domestic Sudanese branch of SANU resulted in a rival organization, the Southern 
Front. The insurgents still fighting in the south remained ensconced in the remote 
areas of Equatoria and were unconnected to either party.
After the fall of Abboud in 1964, federalism entered the national conversation yet 
again. While little measurable progress was made at the 1965 Round Table 
discussions to resolve the war, the forum served as a valuable outlet for the 
articulation of concerns of the respective parties. In contrast to their dismissive 
attitude towards southern concerns immediately following independence, northerners 
were now obliged to articulate their own trepidations about federalism. Southern 
representatives at the conference started with their highest demands, which were 
scaled down with increasing frustration. Initially they advocated a plebiscite in the 
south allowing unity, federation or separation, but northerners rejected that proposal. 
Their next preference was for a confederate alternative with separate administration 
and armies for the north and south, but northerners dismissed this option as well. 
While southerners championed a loose version of federation, northerners said they 
would at most accept nationwide regional devolution.49 Khartoum rejected self- 
determination on principle, since the government argued that ‘no one section of the 
country had the right to self-determine itself into secession.’50 Federalism proper, 
involving several official tiers of government with full-time employees, was seen as a
46 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 21.
47 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 92. Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 45. Arou, 
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drain on Sudan’s scarce resources. Northerners did not believe that a state with such 
poor roads, communications and general infrastructure could support federalism.51 
The lack of national integration also led to concerns that it would foster excessive 
localism, distracting from Sudan’s national identity and cohesiveness.52 Finally 
William Deng, at that point a renegade from the exiled SANU group, proposed a 
weaker federal system, but other southerners objected to this compromise and the 
meeting broke down. In order to salvage something from the conference, it was 
agreed that a twelve-man committee should be put forth to examine options discussed 
and report back with their recommendations.
After almost a decade of war had radicalized the parties politically, southerners and 
northerners found they were negotiating from different ends of the spectrum of 
regional government. However, the twelve-man report issued in September 1966 as a 
follow-up to the Round Table meeting began to lay the template of principles which 
would later be adapted by the Addis Ababa Agreement, and included some early 
concessions from northern politicians such as the Islamist Hassan Al-Turabi. The 
report declared that a unitary national government was not appropriate for Sudan, but 
that committee members could not agree on any alternative.54 Most importantly, it 
stated that in order to solve the southern problem, the region would have to be treated 
differently from the other remote areas ‘where no such problem has arisen’, and
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might be entitled to different administrative arrangements as a result.55 This 
statement was the first indication of northern appreciation for the uniqueness of 
southern Sudan, and the delegates at Addis Ababa in 1972 would use the report as a 
template for their own agreement.56 However, in 1966, northern and southern 
committee members could not clarify the relationship between the document’s 
proposed regional and national governments, or determine whether the south should 
remain split into the three traditional provinces or become an enormous, united region 
as southerners preferred.57 Throughout the premiership of Sadiq Al-Mahdi from 1966 
to 1967, southerners pushed for their region to be represented as one unit, regardless 
of the composition of the national government. This was in order to pool resources 
and services, southerners argued. Northerners, on the other hand, argued that the 
south was too large to be one administrative region, and instead pushed for
58administration along the borders of the traditional three southern provinces.
There is evidence that the 1960s parliamentary government recognized the 
significance of the demands for autonomy for southerners, even if it was unable to 
resolve the problem. A draft constitution put forward in 1967 was disparaged in the 
south for its Islamic bent, but the document also laid out a regional system of 
government as part of an effort to settle unrest in the south over centralized rule, 
discontent which by then was complemented politically in remote northern regions by 
groups such as the Beja Congress and the General Union of Nuba.59 This solution
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was inadequate to southern insurgents by this point in the war in part because its 
nationwide scope did not allow the south to consolidate its strength in relation to 
other provinces by forming a united region. More importantly, the Maghoub 
government’s brutal suppression of revolt in the south alienated southerners to the 
effect that they opposed the measure outright. However, at the Addis Ababa talks in 
1972, the SSLM argued again for federation with four regions to be established in the 
north, south, east and west of Sudan. The May Regime negotiators refused, and by 
this time there was less vocal support for federation in Darfur, the Beja regions and 
other marginalized areas than there had been at independence.60 Eventually, southern 
negotiators were persuaded to abandon federalism proper in favor of an exclusively 
autonomous south. Once again, the unique status of the south was underscored, as it 
was the only region of Sudan which consistently sought some autonomy in 
administration. Jaafar Bakheit, a negotiator at Addis Ababa, had been the architect of 
the regional government component of the agreement and had hoped to duplicate this 
system in regions across the Sudan as a national reorganization of local 
government.61 However, the May Regime would not introduce such a program until 
1980, when it suited Nimeiri’s political objectives of devolution. At that point, many 
southerners would view it as a challenge to the recognition of southern uniqueness, a 
protection which they had relied on under the AAA to keep the Muslim-majority 
areas of Sudan from ‘ganging up’ on the south.
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The AAA compromise was a system of regional autonomy, a de facto federal system 
that avoided some aspects of federalism, partly by design and partly as a by-product 
of the autocratic nature of the May Regime. The label of federalism was also avoided 
because of its connotations to northerners, but the components of decentralization 
were to some degree addressed, at least initially. The ultimate task of the AAA was 
to reconcile the respective visions of northern and southern Sudanese as illustrated 
above. Once it had been accepted in the 1966 Twelve Man Committee memo by 
northern nationalists of all persuasions that unitary government was unacceptable for 
the state, northerners had to resolve a new conflict within their own vision of a united 
Sudan: should the south become part of a new federal structure, with other remote 
regions such as Darfur and the Nuba Mountains given a similar amount of regional 
autonomy, or would its uniqueness in Sudan be recognized, and its autonomous 
administration be withheld from other parts of the state?
Out of concern that it could be a launching point for future secessionist movements, 
both military and civilian regimes during the first war rejected the idea of a federal 
Sudanese government. Northerners also realized the precedent might mean 
bestowing similar rights to Darfur or the Nuba Mountains, both of which had 
periodically supported a decentralized national government. Nimeiri, like sectarian 
parties before him, also feared that acquiescing to such demands would cost the 
regime support in the central, riverine region. Therefore, it was best to frame the 
southern problem as ‘an imperialist remnant’, not as the platform for further 
government decentralization.64 Of course, there were drawbacks to accepting a 
unique status for the south. Northern nationalists had been wary of creating a north- 
south federation after independence specifically because they did not want to set up 
what could be seen as a permanent confrontation between the two regions. Northern 
nationalists feared not only the separatist potential of federalism, but also the 
formation of an autonomous Southern Region which some felt might ‘perpetuate the
62 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 47. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 158. El 
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sense of confrontation between North and South’.65 There were also reservations 
about formalizing the south’s unique status, which many northerners still regarded as 
a humiliating colonial remnant. May Regime negotiators ultimately opted for a 
unique status for the south as opposed to a federal system, both because of the cost of 
setting up various federal structures and because of the colonial history of the term 
‘federalism’, the implied antithesis of an integrated state. In addition, the autocratic 
May Regime also may have been loath to cede too much power to regions in the 
north while still establishing itself after its 1970 suppression of the sectarian 
movements which still retained support in those areas.66
The AAA recognition of the south’s uniqueness among the remote regions of Sudan 
was important in that it demonstrated that northern negotiators understood the 
aspirations of early southern nationalism, even if they did not recognize the 
legitimacy of that nationalist movement. However, relationships between the south 
and the rest of the state had deteriorated so rapidly that some level of recognition was 
essential to any agreement. During the early post-colonial years, while relations 
between northern factions were usually of a political dimension, relations between 
northern factions and the south increasingly assumed a military nature. ‘The 
difference between North-South and North-North counteraction to the encroaching 
cultural assimilation is one of a kind rather than one of degree’.67 The importance of 
resisting assimilation by force was a key element to understanding the foundations of 
southern identity. Northern understanding that southerners would take up arms to 
defend their autonomy in a capacity that other marginalized Sudanese would not was 
the reason that region alone received regional autonomy in 1972.
THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOUTHERN IDENTITY
Northern nationalism had no counterpart in the south, where the heightened drive 
towards state-building and the economic disparity with the north were of more 
immediate concern than the need for independence. What increasingly united
65 Report o f the 12 Man Committee 1966, The Relationship Between Central and Regional Authorities: The 
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southerners was discontent with their status compared to northerners and frustration 
at their inability to change it. Southern concerns over their near exclusion from the
Sudanization process by which Sudanese replaced British in administrative roles were
68greeted with indifference by both northerners and the British.
It was into this environment that southern political consciousness was borne. 
Woodward speculates that ‘an awareness of national politics in the south probably 
would not have emerged at all after World War Two if party developments had not 
been taking place in the north’ .69 The first war essentially forged the foundation of a 
shared southern identity in a way previous experiences had not been able to. Despite 
decades spent trying to insulate the region from Arab and Muslim influence, British 
moves to create a ‘southern’ identity had never been particularly successful. The 
British were careful not to upset traditions or interfere with religion in the north to the 
extent practical, but showed less deference to southern culture. In the south,
Christian missionaries attempted to introduced education, language and particularly 
religion to the southern Sudanese. It was hoped that allowing missionaries into the 
region would both civilize southerners and win their confidence, though British 
administration made sure to confine the Christian presence to the south so as not to 
antagonize northern Muslims into a renewed insurrection. The state sought to 
remain impartial to the areas in which missionary societies operated, as long as they 
were Christian and stayed in their own allotted ‘spheres’. In effect, the missionaries 
were to administer large portions of the south so the colonial government would not 
have to spend its own resources to do so.71 However, the few missionaries allowed 
into the region ultimately had an uneven impact on southern spirituality, and the 
region’s poor infrastructure prohibited them from travelling enough to compensate 
for their low numbers. Southerners originally resisted missionaries but, as with
68 Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 127. Najmal Abdin. “Administrative Reform, 1956-1981.” 
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British administration, their presence was eventually accepted. Most of the 
missionaries were not themselves British, but Americans, Italians, Australians and 
New Zealanders.73
The geographic nature of the south has played an enormous part in its unique political 
evolution. Many southern tribes were isolated from outside threats by swamps and 
forests, making the evolution of more centralized institutions among large peoples 
such as the Nuer and Dinka unnecessary.74 The links with the center were weaker 
than those in other peripheral areas like the Red Sea Hills, Nuba Mountains and 
Darfur.75 By the 1960s, the weak economic conditions in all these remote areas, in 
contrast to the growing commercial strength in urban areas such as Khartoum and 
Omdurman, gave rise to regional parties such as the General Union of the Nuba, the 
Darfur Development Front and the Beja Congress. Though southern equivalents 
such as SANU and the Southern Front also appeared, alienation in that region was 
severe enough that armed rebellion was seen as a legitimate alternative to the political 
process. The war itself was a benchmark in denoting the south’s unique status in any 
future Sudan. Despite the existence of several marginalized areas across the nation, 
none had felt so disenfranchised by the state that they had resorted to a sustained 
insurgency.
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Long-term integration at the most basic levels of interaction would have reduced 
mistrust between Sudanese but was not a priority for the colonial administration. The 
British ambivalence towards the integration process, at least in government and the 
military, ended southern ambivalence towards inclusion in Sudan, but did not spark 
any regional consciousness. Instead, while the British created southern Sudan as a 
distinct administrative unit, southern relations with the north created its common 
regional identity. Southern nationalism was a response to the second wave of 
northern nationalism, not colonial rule.77 The origins of the first civil war have much 
in common with ethnic tensions that would define other post-colonial conflicts where 
minorities or disenfranchised groups preferred colonial administration to that of rival
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ethnicities. British slights against southerners did not focus hatred against the 
Condominium. Even well-intentioned northern administrators in the south after 
independence could hardly compete with the British, who had better ties with 
missionaries, better knowledge of indigenous languages, and even the capability to 
play mediator between southern chiefs and southern politicians. The Sudanization 
process, by shutting out southerners from almost all administrative roles, was seen by 
southern nationalists as a ‘new, internal colonialism’.
While the small class of northern intellectuals - as opposed to traditional elites - 
usually championed nationalism in the north - just the reverse was the case with 
regards to southern nationalism. Following World War Two, it was the southern 
intellectuals who were most receptive to southern integration while the north and 
southern tribal elites were most suspicious. However, the nature of north-south
77 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 72. Telephone interview by the author with Peter 
Woodward, Reading, 2007. Voll and Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State, 7. Idris, 
Conflict and Politics o f Identity in Sudan, 47. In this context, southern resistance was viewed by northern 
nationalists as a byproduct, if not an extension, of colonialism. El-Affendi, “Discovering the South: Sudanese 
Dilemmas for Islam in Africa,” 372. El-Affendi notes what he sees as the southern perception of itself as being a 
negative one, ultimately southerners see themselves as nothing more than non-northerners. Deng, War o f Visions: 
Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 67. Deng points out that confrontation with the south may also have 
contributed to the unity and cohesion of northern Sudan, augmenting and revitalizing that older nationalist 
movement.
78 Shepherd, The Politics o f African Nationalism, 91. Shephard notes a similar situation in Ghana, the British 
transferral of authority in 1957 led Ashantis to threaten rebellion unless the British stayed, and members of the 
national opposition were also involved.
79 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 90.
80 Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 28. Albino, 
The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 4-5, 119. Albino characterizes the post-colonial subjugation of the south by 
the north as a form of colonialism, with northerners in the south behaving more like colonial officials than the 
British ever had. Albino also compares Sudanese policies towards the south to South Africa’s apartheid regime. 
He states that ‘Arab oppression in the south has only helped to give southerners a sense of oneness.’
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interaction during the late Condominium period reinforced southern suspicions of the 
integration process. At the 1947 Juba Conference in which the southerners debated 
the merits of joining the Legislative Assembly in Khartoum, the British southern 
governors and their deputies found one of the most prominent northerners, a judge 
named Mohammed Salah Al-Shingetti, to be an ‘antagonistic’ presence. They 
suspected him of cajoling or coercing the few educated southerners present at the 
conference into supporting participation in the Legislative Assembly, despite their
O 1
initial reservations. Notably, Shingetti could not persuade the tribal chiefs among 
the thirteen southerners. Though the matter was not put to a vote, many chiefs said 
they spoke for their people when they resisted joining the assembly and could not 
now change their minds. Abel Alier and Francis Deng would later accuse Civil 
Secretary James Robertson of deciding unilaterally that the entire Sudanese territory 
had to be unified through a legislative body, disregarding the will of most southerners 
present at the conference as it suited him.83 After the principle of unification was 
affirmed, the south was largely ignored, since at the dawn of the 1950s the 
government was preoccupied with the future of the Sudan Civil Service and the 
Sudanization of the government in preparation for British withdrawal.84 However, the 
sequence of events above demonstrates the domino effect set in motion after World
81 Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 26. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 90. 
Civil Secretary Robertson, who favored the unity policy at the time, also admitted that Al-Shingetti may have 
intimated to southerners that this would be the last chance they would have to determine the course of their future, 
and as a result they should seize the opportunity to participate, even if they did not believe they were prepared. It 
is possible this is a factor in the change of heart Clement Mboro and the other somewhat educated southerners had 
in choosing to go to Khartoum after previously saying they needed more time to acquaint themselves with 
governance and lawmaking. Said, The Sudan: Crossroads o f Africa, 61. A transcript of the Juba Conference 
included in Said’s book reveals that on the first day of the meeting, educated southerners such as Clement Mboro 
and Philomon Majok who had opposed southern inclusion in the Legislative Assembly on the grounds that 
southerners needed more time to be politically ready for modem democracy had changed their mind.
82 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 91. Deng, Africans o f Two Worlds, 177. The 
apprehension of southern tribal elites towards further integration with the north did not abate after the Addis 
Ababa Agreement was concluded. Deng, in his post-AAA conversations with Dinka chiefs concerning southern 
relations with the north, discovered much relief that the war was over but apprehension concerning the future.
One chief explained that he believed peace between north and south could only be maintained so long as 
northerners and southerners kept their distance from each other.
83 Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem o f National Integration. Ed. 
Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 17. Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 208. 
Robertson rejected the idea of an advisory capacity for southerners in the assembly, favoring instead provincial 
councils in each southern province, which were established in 1948. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities 
in the Sudan, 63. Deng argues that since no vote was taken at Juba, the ambiguity of the consensus should have 
been recognized before further action was taken. In 1964, Deng claims Robertson admitted that he by that point 
believed he should not have reversed the separatist policy since northerners and southerners were too different to 
form one nation-state.
84 Charles Gurdon. Sudan at the Crossroads. Cambridgeshire: Menas Press Ltd, 1984, 14. Al-Rahim, 
Imperialism arid Nationalism in the Sudan, 198. Collins, Shadows in the Grass, 12. The Sudan Political Service 
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War Two: northern nationalism begat the debate over independence, which led to the 
debate over retaining a unified Sudan, which fostered southern nationalism.
The pre-independence dalliance of educated southerners with further steps towards 
national integration indicates that southern political awareness was not bom of an 
innate animosity towards northerners. Deng ascertains that southerners were not 
necessarily resisting Islam or Arab culture, which they had already encountered 
throughout most southern territories, particularly in the urban centers; they were
o r
resisting the forced integration which northern nationalism advocated for the region. 
Educated southerners in particular were receptive to integration efforts if they ensured 
southerners would have input into how they were to be governed. The Torit mutiny 
came at a critical period when the patterns for behavior were being established 
between the south and the rest of the state. The way it first erupted and the way it 
was suppressed marked the beginning of the use of force to resolve problems in 
relations between the north and the south. In September 1955, a government 
commission was set up to examine the causes of the Torit mutiny producing what 
would be known as the Cotran Report. It declared that the ‘southern problem’ was 
fundamentally political, not religious. It counted neither the historic reality of the
00
slave trade nor tensions between various religions as factors in the disturbances. 
However, it did acknowledge a north-south dichotomy: ‘It is only in the last year or 
so that the average southerner is becoming politically conscious, but this political
• . . . .  . RQconsciousness, as it is bound to be initially, is regional and not national’. The
85 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 136.
86 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 49.
87 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 45. ‘The Cotran commission found the direct causes of the 
1955 disturbances were A) The forged telegram ordering persecution of Southerners alleged to have been written 
by Azhari around early July 1955. B) The interference of administrators in Equatoria political affairs. C) A loss 
of confidence after the trial of a southern politician which was widely regarded as a farce. D) The shooting of 
southerners in the town of Nzara on 26 July 1955. E) Early inaction on the part of the army when the conspiracy 
to mutiny was discovered. F) Southern disappointment when Sudanization almost completely shut them out. G) 
The spread of anti-northern rumors and the lack of government propaganda to counteract them.’ Said, The Sudan: 
Crossroads o f Africa, 74. Said notes that events such as a warning by the government from August 1954 which 
threatened southerners with force for working with the Umma opposition was intended primarily as a threat to 
those southern politicians working with Umma, but greatly offended the majority of southerners.
88 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 46. Arou, “Devolution and the Southern Problem in the 
Sudan,” 116-119.
89 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 26-27. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis 
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Cotran Report confirmed that one of the chief causes of the mutiny was the 
government’s disregard of its election promises to southerners.90
Nevertheless, for all these various incentives to revolt, the 1955 mutiny of the 
Equatoria Corps in Torit had not even ‘the beginnings of an articulated ideology’.91 
Therefore, the insurgency was not directly a response to attempts to integrate the 
south into the state. Instead, the brutal northern response to the mutiny, coupled with 
the disingenuous northern assurances to consider southern autonomy, created a 
relationship of hostility around which southern identity could coalesce. As a result, 
the early dynamics of the first war were northern attempts to integrate the south by 
force, and southern attempts to defend the region’s cultural distinctiveness. While 
southerners, especially elites, had felt alienated from the north during Sudanization, 
that process did not have the galvanizing potential that armed southern resistance, and 
what southerners perceived as northern overreaction in its wake, were able to achieve.
However, the south faced several hurdles to overcome in the first war towards the 
creation of a viable national consciousness. It took years for southern identity to 
transcend provincialism and tribalism enough to even coalesce behind a truly regional 
insurgency group, the South Sudan Liberation Movement. Southern resistance in the 
first war faced a difficult duel process by which it would be forced to make coherent 
demands from Khartoum while simultaneously seeking to create its own institutions 
and culture in the region. The first southern Sudanese political exile movement, the 
Sudan Christian Alliance, was founded in 1961. Its name was chosen to camouflage 
the separatist political objectives of the movement, of which its host, British- 
controlled Uganda, would not approve. In addition, if the Sudanese government were 
to discover there was a southern political organization in Uganda, it would seek to 
destroy it at birth. The SCA’s Christian orientation, and the leadership role of clergy 
figures such as Father Satumino Lohure, was hoped to attract attention and support 
from Christian organizations throughout the West, particularly to the religious
90 Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” 18. Paranoia about a secret cabal of northern merchants and 
bureaucrats bent on exploiting the south may have been another factor in the mutiny. Deng, War o f Visions: 
Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 63. Descriptions of the 1955 disturbances in the south mention close 
cooperation between northern administrators and traders, alienating many southerners and further eroding the 
legitimacy of government.
91 0 ‘Fahey, interview. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 490.
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persecution of the Abboud regime.92 Abboud’s aggressive Islamization campaign, 
which involved such measures as building Islamic schools across the south and 
interacting with southern chiefs only once they had taken on Arabic names, 
intensified southern resistance efforts. Customs southerners had always found 
insulting -  such as the practice by which northern men felt free to marry southern 
women but southern men, even Islamicized ones, were viewed unfavorably if they 
sought to marry an Arab woman -  became key elements of southern nationalist 
propaganda.94
By the late 1960s, dissident southern politicians began attempts at forming some 
political sense of a shared southern culture. However, all these efforts failed at 
transcending tribal allegiance.95 In fact, the only ideological indoctrination of the 
Anya Nya as a group would come one month before the AAA in January 1972, with 
the dissemination of a pamphlet by Joseph Lagu to the insurgents called ‘The Anya- 
Nya: What We Fight For’. The pamphlet was virulently anti-Arab and depicted 
northerners as ‘barbarians’ an historic enemy which could never be trusted or 
accommodated. It voiced the southern resentment of the imposition of Arab-Islamic 
culture.96 It was written to present the Anya "Nya as a nationalist movement, 
indistinguishable from other African liberation movements against colonialism. The 
pamphlet also stressed that the movement was region wide, and that troops should 
obey a superior even if he was from a different ethnic background, ‘because by so 
doing you strengthen the ties that bind our peoples together in our common 
struggle.’ It describes the Anya Nya as being ‘the only national institution that we
92 Wakoson, “The Southern Sudan: the Political Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement,” 95-96. Wakoson notes 
that the SCA went on to focus primarily on providing aid to refugees, and moved to the background of the 
southern political movement. A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinycwa. “The Border Implications of the Sudan Civil War: 
Possibilities for Intervention” The Southern Sudan: The Problem o f  National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. 
London: Frank Cass, 1973, 130. Attempts by insurgents and exiles to draw other African states into the conflict 
based on a shared Christian faith were unsuccessful.
93 Yongo-Bure, interview. Oduho and Deng, The Problem o f Southern Sudan, 56. Poggo, “General Ibrahim 
Abboud’s Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958-1964,” 83.
94 Oduho and Deng, The Problem o f  Southern Sudan, 54. Deng, Africans o f  Two Worlds, 212-222. In 1978, six 
years after the AAA, Deng spoke to Dinka chiefs who expressed reservations that integration would ever truly be 
possible because the religious and cultural differences between Dinka and Arab were so great that they impeded 
traditional aspects of social integration such as mixed marriage.
95 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 54. The Azania Liberation Front, for example, promoted 
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have in South Sudan’ .98 The goal of the movement was self-determination: whether 
that led to unity, autonomy, federalism or separation.99 It created a myth that the 
Anya Nya were defending the rest of black Africa from the menace of Arabs, as well 
as their Soviet sponsors. 100
TRIBAL IDENTITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR SOUTHERN 
NATIONALISM
The vague concepts o f ‘southern’ identity directly contributed to the difficulty in 
ending both wars. Neither of Sudan’s primary insurgent groups, the Anya Nya or the 
SPLA, fought to preserve any precise definition of southern cultural identity. The 
Anya Nya were a network of militias formed to combat the early state-building 
process of independent Sudan along Arab-Islamic lines. It was an ideologically loose 
organization, with some elements favoring secession and some favoring regional 
autonomy within Sudan. The SPLM/A’s objective was to transcend what it 
considered the dead-end of southern nationalism by uniting marginal people across 
Sudan to destroy the traditional center-periphery national power structure. Neither of 
these goals relied upon a well-defined conception of southern identity. As the 
factional and ethnic violence that has plagued the south for decades confirms, such an 
identity, even by the end of the second civil war, does not yet exist in any stable 
capacity. The lack of southern cohesion potentially precludes the region forming a 
stable and cohesive state that would not be easily manipulated by outside actors.
One theory of insurgency states that ideological coherence in an insurgency is more 
likely to originate in societies with a strong tradition of statehood, and that 
insurgencies without a background in such a tradition are more prone to factionalism 
and a lack of discipline. 101 In the Sudanese context, the nuances of this theory are 
complicated. The Anya Nya movement was not a disciplined, coherent force, but its 
reliance on tribal-based structures, grassroots support, and the authority of local 
commanders seemed to contribute to the inability of the government to find fault
98 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 498.
99Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 499.
100 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 505.
101 Christopher Clapham. “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies.” African Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher 
Clapham. Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998, 13.
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lines through which to exacerbate factionalism and disunity among fighters. On the 
other hand, the highly disciplined SPLM/A did contain such fault lines, as Khartoum 
was able to exploit after the 1991 split in that insurgency.102
While there is certainly the potential for an effective southern separatist movement to 
exist independent of a particular ethnic affiliation, in practice, such movements are 
unusual in the south. In theory, most southern separatists have championed 
separation for the south as a whole, but in both wars they have relied predominantly 
on one ethnic group or southern sub-region for their base of power. As a movement 
loses traction, its membership is often reduced to the ethnic group from which its 
leaders originate. As a result of the severity of tribal allegiances, individual separatist 
movements have not had appeal to large portions of the south, even though 
separatism generally is a popular cause. Tribal identity has not been transcended to 
form and sustain a revolutionary southern identity. The Anya Nya held the 
apparently contradictory goal of seeking to rise above tribalism while retaining its 
institutions. It was less concerned with destroying tribal authority than in uniting 
tribes in resistance to the government.103 While reliance on tribal systems limited the 
coherence of the Anya Nya as a military force, and complicated its ability to work for 
political objectives, it very likely increased its legitimacy at a local level, and 
therefore the morale of its soldiers. The Anya Nya were most active in Equatoria, the 
province with the largest number of small, non-Nilotic tribes. Tribal loyalty, 
combined with a vaguely anti-government objective, made it difficult for the 
government either to crush the movement or to turn factions against each other, as it 
would succeed in doing in the second war. Such excessive localism made it difficult 
to achieve anything resembling a southern identity, but by relying on such a time- 
honored system of administration the Anya Nya rarely had a shortage of
102 Douglas H. Johnson. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism.” African 
Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher Clapham. Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998, 56, 58. This is not to suggest that 
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103 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 503.
92
leadership.104 The Anya Nya were less reliant on outside sources for support than on 
the southern Sudanese themselves, upon whom they depended for food and 
supplies.105
The difficulty in transcending tribal division in the south is in part a result of tribal 
demographics. A common theme among the tribal divisions in the south has been the 
relationship between any given tribe and the Dinka, by far the largest people in the 
region and 40% of the southern population as a whole.106 There had been tension, if 
rarely outright conflict, between the Equatorians and Dinka since the colonial 
period. The small tribes of Equatoria were strong advocates of separatism in the 
first war, and had been more involved in the Anya Nya than residents of the other two 
southern provinces, particularly the Dinka. Nuer separatists, the dominant anti- 
Dinka, anti-SPLA faction in the second war, were not deeply involved in the Anya 
Nya until very late in the first war.109
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The radically different methods through which tribes traditionally governed 
themselves posed problems for administration in a modem heterogeneous state.
Tribes such as the Shilluk of the Upper Nile and the Zande of Equatoria retained of a 
rigid, authoritarian governing hierarchy. Tribes such as the Dinka and Nuer had very 
little hierarchy at all.110 These differences complicated any effort to coordinate tribal 
governing structures in a united south. The fact that the Anya Nya were more a 
network of militias than a united insurgency for most of its existence sometimes 
encouraged southerners to join in order to fight smaller-scale tribal conflicts. Many 
Ngok Dinka of the Abyei area joined between 1965 and 1972 often specifically to 
fight the Arab Misseriya tribes with whom renewed tensions had started in 1965.* 111
1 1 9The movement was poorly coordinated, with each unit remaining autonomous.
Tribal consciousness impeded freedom of movement: Lagu writes that tribal groups 
saw it as an insult if fighters from another region came to their area, an insinuation 
that the local group was too weak to fight. There had been much tension between the 
East and West bank in mid-1960s Equatoria over this issue, an early indicator that the 
mobility of Anya Nya fighters would be limited.113
The disparity between the educated southern intelligentsia and the vast majority of 
southerners also made it more difficult to form a national liberation movement in the 
south. This situation helped create a gap between the ideological fervor of the 
movement’s political leaders and the southern population at large, many of whom
110 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 91.
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were hostile to the north but not politically engaged enough to warm to various 
southern factions, except those based on ethnicity. As a result, political factions such 
as the Southern Sudan Provisional Government during the first war were too weak to 
provide their own administration and relied primarily on the management of tribal 
chieftains, especially in the rural areas.114 The disorganized nature of Anya Nya units 
and their lack of correspondence with high-profile southern politicians complicated 
peacemaking efforts. In 1968, during the second parliamentary period, government 
ministers Joseph Garang and Abel Alier attempted to contact southerners in exile and 
urge them to return to Sudan and take part in a regional autonomy arrangement.
When these attempts failed, Garang and Alier surmised that ‘the rebel leaders had no 
common platform’.115 The high-profile insurgents and exiled politicians had various 
garnishes of ideology, though they were simply too disunited to be effective. Some 
were ardent separatists, some were federalists, and others seemed to be politically 
disinclined, but willing to use separatist rhetoric to advance the southern cause.116 No 
political leadership came from inside Sudan, either. By the late 1960s, there was 
particular disdain among Anya Nya for southerners who participated in the 
parliamentary government, out of a feeling that they were legitimizing the process 
and undermining the resistance efforts. Despite measures to keep ideologically 
coherent, separatist dependence on the tribal chiefs, with their narrow political view 
and reluctance to relinquish their own power for the cause of ‘South Sudan’, 
contributed to the sapping of the ideological potential of these groups. The South 
Sudan Provisional Government collapsed in 1969, and was succeeded by the Nile
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114 Interview by the author with Douglas Johnson, Oxford, 16 December 2007. Beshir, The Southern Sudan: 
From Conflict to Peace, 60. Wai, “Political Trends in the Sudan and the Future of the South,” 165. Aside from 
the ethnic factionalism to which they are prone, tribally-organized political movements can be impeded by the 
ignorance of their elites, who are not usually integrated with larger ideological movements and seek to advance 
their own narrowly-defined interests. Collins, “Civil Wars in the Sudan,” 1781. ‘The failure of Anya-Nya units to 
cooperate was compounded by their failure to develop a political consciousness among the southern Sudanese 
whom they had frequently alienated by arbitrary plundering of cattle and crops.’
115 Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 158.
116 Russell and McCall. “Can Secession Be Justified? The Case of Southern Sudan,” 117. Abel Alier. “The 
Southern Sudan Question.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem o f National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. 
London: Frank Cass, 1973, 22.
117 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 95. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, 99. Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 62. Collins, “Civil Wars in the Sudan,” 
1781. Practices which were seen as synonymous with education, such as the speaking of English, were sometimes 
banned by Anya Nya commanders.
118 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 95. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, 99. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 41. Wakoson, “The Southern
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Ethnie ties remained much stronger than regional ones until the mid-1960s, and it was 
not until the end of the decade that a common consciousness was formed.119 Elites in 
the southern resistance movement of the mid-1960s were unable to unite, and were 
willing to casually exploit tribal divisions to enhance their own personal ambitions, 
most notably regarding the split in SANU during the 1960s.120 While political and 
military organizations were formed in coordination with tribal foundations out of a 
recognition of reality, the ease with which ethnic fault lines could be manipulated was 
another incentive to transcend tribalism. The South Sudan Provisional Government 
and the Azania Liberation Front are examples of this tendency, and it is revealing that 
one of the few groups which promoted adhering strictly to tribal mechanisms for 
administration in the south was the conservative Southern Unity Party, a small group 
with a northern base. “ A northern predilection to treat the early stages of the 
southern insurgency as tribal banditry unrelated to southern political grievances was 
also an incentive for southern nationalists to overcome tribal factionalism in favor a 
more cohesive, effective resistance.
Soon after the ascension of the new military-backed regime in May 1969, the so- 
called June Declaration, in which the autocratic president Nimeiri promised to 
consider regional autonomy for the south, led to the formation of a new school of 
thought among southerners. This new approach was based out of Makerere 
University in Uganda, and proposed that, while the Anya Nya should continue to 
engage the Sudanese Army, southern politicians should consolidate their factions 
under the same leadership and seek to open an avenue of dialogue with the new
Sudan: the Political Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement,” 100. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 
6. Madut-Arop posits that the Nile Provisional Government’s main flaw was that it was formed without a 
functioning military wing, which put it at a disadvantage when its supporters were forced to fight off an attack 
from the backers of southern politician Aggrey Jaden from June 1969 to June 1970. Heraclides, “Janus or 
Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan,” 219. Heraclides provides a concise list of the period during 
which the southern insurgents were disorganized and when they had a dominant organization to form under:
From 1962 to March 1965, SANU was the primary political resistance movement. From April 1965 to July 1967, 
parties such as Oduho’s and Father Satumino Lohure’s Azania Liberation Front were disorganized, until the SSPG 
became prominent in the period from August 1967 to March 1969. From then until July 1970 existed another 
period of disorganization, followed by the emergence of the SSLM under Joseph Lagu.
119 Woodward, interview. Badal, “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan,” 469. In 1976, Badal 
wrote that to southerners, tribal ties were still more important than a shared southern identity, though that was 
changing slowly. In fact, ‘common hostility towards the North and its predominantly Arab government was 
sufficient to forge a measure of unity of amongst the otherwise heterogenous tribes of the Southern Sudan.’
120 Wakoson, “The Southern Sudan: the Political Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement,” 98-100.
121 El Obeid, Political Consequences of the Addis Ababa Agreement, 96-97.
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regime in Khartoum.122 This school of thought may have given Lagu political cover 
during his ascent to Anya Nya leadership, and prevented his rise from appearing too 
authoritarian. However, it was not until 1970 that the various movements abandoned 
their individual causes and reformed as the South Sudan Liberation Movement, the 
first southern movement of any region-wide stature. The willingness of the leaders of 
the Nile Provisional Government to step down in July 1970 and defer to the 
leadership of Lagu’s new SSLM has been described as a key moment in the history of 
southern nationalism. The organization was more sophisticated than its Anya Nya 
forebears, consisting of both a political and a military wing.124 Lagu, because of his 
military experience in the Sudanese army prior to joining the insurgency in 1962, was 
initially responsible for training Anya Nya recruits. This exposure gave him a 
substantial base of support among the actual fighters of the movement which, coupled 
with the flow of foreign arms he acquired access to, led to his ascension over his 
military superiors and the politicians who until the late 1960s had sought to control 
the movement. In addition, Lagu’s background as the son of a prestigious family 
from the smaller Madi people of Equatoria made him a good consensus candidate 
since neither tribal elites nor smaller tribes would feel threatened by his leadership. 
Lagu had also been educated with many Dinka, giving him some knowledge of that 
people’s customs and language in addition to his knowledge of Juba Arabic and 
Acholi. Gradually, throughout 1970 and 1971, individuals and factions that did not 
accept Lagu’s leadership simply retired or left the Anya Nya.127
Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 146.
123 Wakoson, “The Southern Sudan: the Political Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement,” 107.
124 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 95. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements 
Dishonoured, 280. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 149. Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket,” 
5. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 16.
125 Wakoson, “The Southern Sudan: the Political Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement,” 107. Lagu, Sudan: 
Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 231. Yongo-Bure, interview. Other regional commanders would 
pledge allegiance to Lagu in exchange for arms. Clapham, “Introduction: Analysing African Insurgencies,” 16. 
Clapham notes that ‘successive movements in southern Sudan... have tended to remain united when a single 
leader could monopolize access to external aid, and to fragment when one could not’. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey 
Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 213. Lagu notes that many of these movements and power struggles 
happened in different areas of the south and left certain other areas unaffected. He cites in particular the 1968- 
1969 power struggle between Gordon Muortat’s Nile Provisional Government and its detractors which took place 
in Western Equatoria, while Lagu was able to consolidate his power, via his support from Israel, in Eastern 
Equatoria.
126 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 231. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State 
(From Ruin To Hope), 173, 194. Lagu lists the endorsement of Father Satumino Lohure, priest and Anya Nya 
organizer, as another factor in his consolidation of power.
127 Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 70. Nelson Kasfir. “Sudan’s Addis Ababa Treaty: 
Intraorganizational Factors in the Politics of Compromise.” Post-Independence Sudan. Ed. C. Allen. Edinburgh, 
University of Edinburgh, 1981, 145. Lagu became head of the military wing of the insurgency in May 1971. El
97
Upon uniting the Anya Nya under his leadership, Lagu sought to implement reforms 
that would convert it from a series of linked local militias to a region-wide prototype 
for a southern army. He considered each of the three provinces to be of equal 
significance, even though Equatorian forces were vastly larger than those of Bahr Al- 
Ghazal or the Upper Nile Province. This decision was made purposely to increase the 
attractiveness of his leadership to fighters from these other two provinces and to 
assure them that their interests would also be considered in the movement. The 
early tensions between the east and west Nile bank in Equatoria prepared him for 
further conciliatory moves to strengthen southern nationalism. Gestures such as the 
promotion of officers from the Upper Nile Province to Anya Nya leadership by 1971 
also improved the insurgency’s reputation as a pan-southern fighting force.129 By the 
time of the AAA, the Anya Nya were more ‘internally united’ than at any time 
before.130
The South Sudan Liberation Movement was the only effective, exclusively southern 
liberation movement in Sudan’s history, though it existed only a brief couple of years
Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 99. Arou, “Devolution and the Southern Problem 
in the Sudan,” 128-129. A precedent had been set before Lagu for the intervention of Anya Nya commanders into 
politics. In July 1969, Anya Nya commander General Emilio Taffeng took control of administration in the 
Equatorian region of Anyidi. Lagu spent much of late 1970 sapping away Taffeng’s authority over his deputies, 
and only declared himself the head of the military and political factions of the SSLM in August 1971. Collins, 
“Civil Wars in the Sudan,” 1782. ‘Bari Anya-Nya would remain in central Equatoria, Dinka Anya-Nya in the 
Bahr Al-Ghazal, and Nuer Anya-Nya in the Upper Nile where Lagu’s authority remained more nominal than real 
until he created an Annual Command Council and late in 1970 appointed Brigadier Joseph O. Akuon, a Nuer and 
Anya-Nya Regional Commander his Deputy-Commander-in-Chief to organize the Israeli arms shipments coming 
through Ethiopia to the Upper Nile.’
128 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 231.
129 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 238. Yongo-Bure, 2009, interview. Yongo- 
Bure notes that while there was less Anya Nya activity in the Upper Nile region than in Equatoria, Dinka and 
other Nilotics were represented in the movement’s leadership. He cites Anya Nya chief of staff Frederick 
Maggott, a Dinka present at the signing of the AAA, as a high-ranking example. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict 
in the Sudan, 157. Wai notes that the Dinka were also represented in the political leadership of the SSLM. The 
movements’s highest profile representatives in Europe, Lawrence Wol Wol and Madeng de Garang, were both 
Dinka. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 248. Lagu even claims to have attempted 
to appoint a former rival from Bahr Al-Ghazal, Gordon Mourtat, as a member of the negotiating team at the Addis 
Ababa talks in January 1972. Lagu claims Muortat declined, declaring that Lagu was only a military commander 
and did not have the political authority to appoint members of a peace delegation. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful 
Road to Peace, 19. Madut-Arop disputes this claim, writing that Anya Nya in Bahr Al-Ghazal, such as Gordon 
Muortat, were not consulted by the leadership during the Addis Ababa negotiations and were informed of the 
agreement after the fact. This partially explains the lack of enthusiasm for the agreement in parts of Bahr Al- 
Ghazal, as Muortat, John Garang and other commanders in that province initially rejected the agreement. Anya 
Nya members who opposed the agreement conspired to arrest Lagu and replace him, but were discovered by Anya 
Nya loyal to Lagu and were themselves arrested instead. Madut-Arop, Sudan 's Painful Road to Peace, 20. John 
Garang later said that he and the others eventually had to stop their agitation against the AAA because the 
majority of the south was not with them. Instead, they accepted absorption into the Sudanese army.
130 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 192.
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until the ratification of the AAA made it obsolete. Consequently, it did not have a 
chance to fully develop as a liberation movement. The war simply did not continue 
for long enough or revolve around a shared set of objectives by which a synthetic 
nationalism could have coalesced after years of comradeship in battle. It is possible, 
had a separatist movement remained sustainable and the first war continued past 
1972, that the makeshift institutions formed during the Anya Nya struggle might have 
become the basis for southern administration, and out of that, a southern state.
Perhaps because of this, many Anya Nya were hesitant after the AAA to dismantle 
the grassroots medical and educational facilities they had carefully built up, even 
though the post-AAA money then coming in for famine relief and development was
I T 1
intended to make these structures obsolete.
Englebert hypothesizes that African nationalism fosters local awareness of ethnicity 
through its use of the state as a resource, and the subsequent repression of the 
expression of identities that run contrary to the nationalist project: ‘This is why 
Africans express nationalist views while simultaneously complaining of their 
compatriot’s tribalism.’ This theory works on a national level in Sudan, but is also 
applicable when describing some of the tribal tensions which became manifest in the 
regional government of the south following the AAA, demonstrating that that 
agreement had been concluded before the young southern nationalist movement 
achieved broad enough legitimacy to rise above ethnicity. As Lagu notes, southern 
unity came from the shared fight against the north. The peace following the AAA 
revealed only ‘the peculiarity of each one of the three provinces’.133 Integration 
efforts of the Anya Nya with the Sudanese army after Addis Ababa showed the 
difficulty of transcending the provincially-orientated hierarchy of the insurgency.134
131 Mitchell, “Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972,” 26. Albino, 
The Sudan: A Southern VieM’point, 70. The Anya Nya were also forced to become dependent on their own minor 
first-aid capabilities for medical problems as civilians who went into the larger towns for medical aid were often 
arrested by the authorities as ‘outlaws’.
132 Pierre Englebert. “Whither the Separatist Motive?” African Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine. Eds. 
Boas, Morten and Kevin C. Dunn. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 2007, 67.
133 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 397.
134 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 162. For example, in 1974 a commander was 
nearly killed by his troops in part because he had not commanded them during the resistance, instead leading 
Anya Nya in a different area of Equatoria. Arou, “Devolution and the Southern Problem in the Sudan,” 138. In 
1978, an enormous fight broke out at Juba Commercial Senior Secondary School over the results of school 
elections, in which Dinkas felt they were underrepresented. Such fights also subsequently took place in Malakal
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Ethnie tensions in the southern government were further strained with the rise of 
‘redivision’ of the south as a political issue in the late 1970s. With the fall of Idi 
Amin’s regime in 1979 several of his backers from Equatorian tribes, who had 
crossed the border to enjoy employment in Uganda and that state’s higher standard of 
living, were returned to their native province in the south, changing the demographic 
balance versus the Dinka in the southern region. This led to Equatorians seeking for 
their newly increased population in the region to be represented in the regional 
government, and ire towards Dinka who had migrated to what the Equatorian tribes
1 TSsuch as the Bari considered to be their land.
In addition to a reversion to tribal politics following the AAA, southern elites often 
jockeyed to enhance their personal status, creating opportunities for division later 
exploited by Nimeiri. Lagu writes of several instances in which he or other southern 
political figures felt slighted by their position in the new government. By the late 
1970s, it became clear that the factions being formed in the regional government were 
not ideological so much as patronage networks in acquisition of the prestige that 
came with positions in the government. " By 1980, tensions between Dinka and 
other southerners were at a peak, even in the People’s Regional Assembly. 'Nimeiri 
also rededicated his efforts in the 1980s to take advantage of southern internal 
divisions. In February 1980, after Lagu had been touched by scandal and charges of 
authoritarianism, Nimeiri dissolved the Regional Assembly, removing Lagu as High 
Executive Council president after only two years and returned Alier to power. This 
act only goaded many southerners, particularly Equatorians, to clamor for the
and Rumbek. This incident indicates that neither education nor the ‘young generation’ of Sudanese would put 
tribal identity behind them.
135 El-Affendi, “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa,” 380. Kok, Governance and 
Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 74. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 36.
136 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 270, 297, 322. Lagu writes openly that he had 
great resentment for Alier, who took the presidency of the Southern Region’s High Executive Council, a position 
Lagu felt he had earned.
lj7 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 372-373. Lagu relates a corruption charge 
against his regional vice president which took place shortly after he assumed the HEC presidency in 1978. The 
resulting cabinet reshuffle offended some of his own ministers to the degree that they began to support Alier as 
HEC president. Lagu considered assembly Speaker Clement Mboro to be the source of much of the conflict. The 
disputes described in his book seem to be primarily ones of personality, and did not involve any ideological 
differences on vital issues such as development of the south. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin 
To Hope), 374. Tension grew between Lagu and Alier and Bona Malwal over a supposed Dinka/anti-Dinka rift.
138 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 387. Lagu quotes from a speech he alleges was 
made in the assembly by Dinka politician Justin Yac: ‘Look! The British ruled for 50 years, the northerners for 17 
years. We shall rule for 100 years whether you like it or not; we are the majority tribe.’
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redivision of the Southern Region.139 The push for redivision fell along ethnic lines.
It was seen as a way of countering the power of the Dinka, who had dominated 
politics in the Southern Region by virtue of their sheer numbers.140 An important ally 
of Nimeiri’s concerning redivision was Joseph Lagu himself, who speculated that 
since the rest of Sudan was now regionalized, the north could not apply the same 
amount of pressure to southerners and therefore no reason existed for keeping the 
region in one bloc as the Southern Region.141
While there was no broader consensus on what a ‘southern identity’ meant when not 
confronted with northern repression, currents of nascent southern militancy were to 
remain after the AAA signing. The widespread re-emergence of rebels would not 
occur until the early 1980s, but there remained latent mistrust of the regime. Johnson 
notes that on a visit to the Jonglei area of the Upper Nile Province in 1975, children 
of eight or nine were singing Anya Nya songs, though they would have been too 
young to remember the movement. ‘By the time 1983 came around these kids were 
much older... This is part of the reason why the second civil war took off much faster 
than the first one. People were primed by their experience in the first civil war. They 
knew what the issues were.’142 As the region became more divided along tribal lines, 
animosity between tribes would continue into the second war. As Yongo-Bure 
outlines, in the 1970s ‘there were divisions among the south, and it carried on, the 
SPLM/A inherited a divided south’.143
Inter-tribal relations in the south were much more strained following the CPA signing 
than they had been following the AAA. Anti-Dinka sentiment remained high in 
Equatoria following the second war, a result not only of the Dinka migration to the 
area, but of the Equatorian perception of their exclusion from the higher positions 
within the emerging Government of South Sudan structures. Contributing to the
139 Voll and Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State, 90. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the 
Unstable State, 159. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 386, 388.
140 Timothy Niblock. “Numayri’s Fall: The Economic Base.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, 
Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 39. Lagu, 
Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 390. Lagu stated frankly, in a 1980 speech on the 
Regional Assembly floor, that the ethnic insecurity felt by many non-Dinka in the south was the most obvious 
reason to divide the Southern Region into three provinces.
141 Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 133. Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan’s Civil Wars, 53.
142 Johnson, interview.
143 Yongo-Bure, interview.
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animosity was the fact that many Dinka felt that in the second war they had done 
most of the fighting while Equatorian peoples remained neutral or even aided the 
government via tribal militias.144 Additionally, an influx of Dinka settled in towns 
such as Yei and Yambio to escape the heavier fighting in other provinces.145 Disputes 
over how to use the land -  Dinka were generally pastoralist while Equatorian tribes, 
such as the Moro, preferred agriculture -  led to a disintegrating security situation in 
West Equatoria until 2004, when the SPLA ordered the Bor Dinka settlers in the 
region to return to their original territories now that a final treaty appeared 
imminent.146
Tribal relations were much better in the diaspora of the second war. During the first 
war, refugees often stayed in groups with others of the same ethnic or regional 
background.147 Particularly in the second war, the mixing of southerners in refugee 
camps has reinforced the southern identity over that of individual tribes. Donato, a 
southern Sudanese from the Madi people of Equatoria, agrees that the degree to 
which southerners have interacted with each other in the Sudanese diaspora will 
temper the tribal rivalries which might arise in an independent southern Sudan. He 
believes the overriding suspicion of Equatorian peoples is not of Dinka, but of 
northerners. Donato maintains that the south is actually more integrated culturally 
than it was after the AAA, and that southerners from the diaspora can help integrate 
the region even further, since many societies remain tribally based.149
144 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 139. Donato, interview. Lobban, interview. 
Leonardi, interview. ‘People only seem to be able to talk about it in terms of a further stage of war, you know that 
once the south gets independent we’ll have to sort out our own differences, and probably the only way to do that is 
to prove that we’re better fighters than the others. There’s a sense of having to prove things. Equatorians are very 
sensitive about this because others like the Dinka will accuse them of having run away during the war to refuge to 
Uganda... there’s that issue about who fought and who didn’t. I think Equatorians like to say that they’ll prove 
everybody wrong and they’ll fight.’
145 Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 214.
146 Paul Murphy. “Assisting the return of the displaced Dinka Bor.” Sudan: Prospects for Peace. Eds. Marion 
Couldrey and Tim Morris. Forced Migration Review 24 (November 2005), 36.
147 Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 214.
148 Catherine Jendia. The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969-1985. New York: Peter Lang, 2002, 164. Donato, 
interview.
149 Donato, interview.
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EDUCATION AND LANGUAGE IN THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT
The collective identity of a people is a multi-layered concept. The Volls note that it 
can be seen as a synthesis of arts, science, institutions and common beliefs, but that 
one of its most measurable elements is mass education, which can lead to a ‘national 
culture, a higher identity’.150 This is the dominant reason that the south’s control of its 
own educational system was one of the key demands of the SSLM and southern 
politicians during the first civil war.151 By 1972, southerners considered education in 
post-colonial Sudan, and especially since the Abboud era, as the more passive means 
Khartoum would use to assimilate them into Arab culture, a compliment to the more 
aggressive military methods also being employed. The curriculum of education had 
been a sensitive subject in the first war. The dominant Western presence in the 
region at the time, the missionary teachers, had their activities curtailed in 1962 and 
were finally thrown out of the country two years later. ~ Southerners resented the 
closing of missionary schools by the Abboud regime, not necessarily because of the 
quality of that education, but because for decades it had been the only education 
provided in many parts of the south, as the British had been unwilling to spend 
money on southern schools, seeing no real demand for them.154
150 Voll and Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State, 146. Beshir, The Southern Sudan: 
From Conflict to Peace, 142. Beshir argues that most southerners had little consciousness of being Sudanese or 
Southern Sudanese, identifying themselves only by tribe. The exceptions were the few southerners who were 
either educated or well-traveled throughout the country.
151 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Lav.' to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
of the Democratic Republic o f the Sudan, Appendix A, Article 4ii. Akolda M. Tier. “A Critical Comparative 
Analysis of the Processes of Resolving The Conflict in The Sudan.” United Nations Public Administrations 
Network. Addis Ababa, 2002, 8. This concession was included in the final text of the AAA, but not in the 
agreement’s implementing law, one of the first erosions of safeguards designed to protect ethnic identity.
152 Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 98.
153 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 72. Lobban, interview. El Obeid, Political 
Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 75. Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 47, 109. Madut- 
Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 2. Oduho and Deng, The Problem o f Southern Sudan, 56-57. El-Zain, 
“Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan,” 2. Poggo, “General Ibrahim Abboud’s 
Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958-1964,” 79, 86, 92. Amir Idris, Sudan’s Civil War: Slavery, Race and 
Formational Identities. New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001, 110. Abdelmoula, “An Ideology of Domination 
and the Domination of an Ideology.” El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 81. El 
Obeid writes that the Abboud regime based its decision for the government to absorb all private and missionary 
schools and replace English with Arabic as the language of education upon the finding of a 1954 international 
commission on secondary education in the Sudan, a commission which contained no Sudanese.
154 Collins, Shadows in the Grass, 204. Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 10, 84. Hartwig Euler. 
“Human Rights in Sudan: Islamic State and Cultural Diversity”. Missio. Pontifical Mission Society, 2005, 19. 
Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 150. Richard Owen, former governor of Bahr El-Ghazal 
during the Condiminium, believes Abboud was trying to exterminate the class of educated southerners.
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In keeping with the northern choice to recognize the south’s distinct status, provisions 
in the AAA indicate that northerners preferred to stress the peculiarity of the southern 
experience in order to limit the region’s impact on national education. Northern 
delegates ensured the institutions of the Southern Region were given no authority 
over matters of educational planning at a national level.155 However, the People’s 
Regional Assembly had the freedom to legislate for the administration of public 
schools in the south in accordance with national policy for education, economic 
development, and -  importantly -  for the promotion of local languages and culture.156 
Freedom of religion and the right of parents to choose the method of their children’s 
education were assured by the AAA. The tensions between regional and national 
authority concerning education were apparent in these articles: the agreement sought 
to mollify both sides, but did not address the possibility that an overbearing national 
government might eventually be inclined to broaden its education policy at the 
expense of the region. Employment opportunities were another reason for education 
demands. Remembering the near-total exclusion of southerners during the 
Sudanization process of the 1950s, the miniscule class of southern intelligentsia 
realized that to compete with northerners at something other than guerrilla warfare 
required training in law, agriculture, and other fields necessary for reconstructing the 
region. The subsequent encouragement of children to pursue higher education was 
seen as important to employment in the region, as educated southerners were rare 
enough to have a disproportionate amount of influence in a still largely illiterate 
land.159 Given the absolute destitution of these circumstances, any improvement at all 
following the AAA was to be hailed.
155 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
of the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Article 7ix.
156 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
of the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Article 1 lv and 1 lvi.
157 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Lav.' to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
of the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Appendix A, Article 4.
158 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 89.
159 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 273. Mahmoud, “Businessmen and Politics,” 12. In a country where 
only 30% of children finish secondary school and 5% finish university, parents urge education for their children 
since those with higher education have disproportionate opportunities in life. Oluwadare Aguda. “Arabism and 
Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics.” The Journal o f Modern African Studies 11:2 (1973), 196. Aguda argues that 
the educational isolation of the south was striking, not just relative to the north but to the entire continent: ‘It 
would be difficult to find elsewhere in black Africa a population of about 5 million, occupying over a quarter of a 
million square miles, who 15 years after independence could boast of only two secondary schools, and neither a 
permanent secretary nor a director of a department in the public services. Such was the case of the Southern 
Sudan up to 1971.’
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However, despite initial enthusiasm and the obvious importance of education access 
to SSLM negotiators in Addis Ababa, the post-AAA era did not bring a boon to 
education in the south. Hardly any schools were built. Instead, the Islamic schools 
Abboud had built in the south during his regime were converted to secular secondary 
schools. There were no teacher training colleges in the south either.160 Nor was there 
a regional academic curriculum, resulting in the teaching and administering of exams 
to people in languages they did not speak.161 In fact, during the period between wars, 
the south acquired no more than one-tenth the educational facilities as were available
i
in the north. By 1980-81, even a remote northern province such as Darfur had more 
primary, intermediate and secondary teachers than did the combined former three 
provinces which comprised the Southern Region. One of the few areas where 
education for southerners seems to have been a priority was in tertiary education 
abroad. In accordance with the AAA, the National Treasury was to provide grants to 
the southern region to increase university education, especially to foreign 
universities.164 Foreign support for southern education was also instrumental to some 
of the few successes of the region’s education, even if it could not compensate for the 
inadequacy of domestic expenditure. The World Bank was heavily involved in 
financing educational projects such as a secondary school in Juba, a vocational center 
in Wau, and rural education centers throughout Equatoria and Bahr Al-Ghazal.165
160 Yongo-Bure, interview. Benaiah Yongo-Bure. The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan. Lanham, 
Maryland: University Press of America, 2007, 153. A minor success of the AAA was in the establishing of a 
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161 Yongo-Bure, interview.
162 Luka Biong Deng, “Education in Southern Sudan: War, Status and challenges of achieving Education for All 
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Though the AAA did not live up to its promise on education, the growth of a small, 
educated class and its effect on southern Sudanese society -  and the next insurgent 
movement -  were apparent. With a combination of peace and time, more 
southerners, especially younger, educated ones, regarded themselves in terms of 
belonging to a wider dominion of the Sudan, not simply their tribe, or even ‘the 
south’ . 166 One of the reasons Anya Nya soldiers had difficulty integrating into the 
Sudanese army after the AAA was that few of them had the formal training required 
for positions of equivalent rank to that which they had fought under as insurgents. 
There was not a single medical doctor in the Anya Nya. By contrast, the SPLM/A 
leadership was particularly well educated: four officers had doctorates, several 
members were medical doctors and engineers, and most NCOs were literate. 167 In 
short, while there was not enough education to influence the south en masse, there 
was enough to influence the elites who would form the next insurgency. Education 
they received during the period before the second war would help ensure that the next 
insurgency was more sophisticated and disciplined than the tribally-based, quasi­
separatist movement of the first war.
As with education, the debate over the status of language in the AAA touched on the 
two larger concerns of many southern rebels: government employment and 
preservation of cultural identity. National identity is often formed as individuals 
realize that the language they communicate in, particularly their first language, not 
only determines their cultural identity but can determine other prospects in life such 
as employment opportunities. This process explains the priority the SSLM put on 
protecting southern language. A compromise over the status of language -  with 
Arabic being the nominal national language but English being the functional language 
of the south, supplemented by indigenous languages -  was a concession on the part of 
southerners to the deep-seated northern desire to be rid of the colonial Southern
Southern Sudan, 168. Development projects such as the Swiss effort to create a model village for 500 families in 
Sudan were never enacted.
166 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 159.
167 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 269.
168 James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin. “Violence and the Social Construction of Ethnic Identity.” 
International Organization 54:4 (Autumn 2000), 851.
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Policy once and for all.169 To northerners, allowing these other languages at all was a 
major concession, as they had come in the northern mind to symbolize imperialism, 
ignorance and illiteracy.170 SSLM advocacy for this principle was well received 
among southerners, and after the AAA, indigenous languages became common in
i n  i
local councils and even in the Regional Assembly.
Alier presents three reasons as to why the northern delegation submitted to English’s 
protected status in the AAA. First, the agreement itself was in English. Second, 
English was an international language. Third and most importantly, almost all 
southerners who were to run the machinery of government provided by the AAA 
spoke better English than Arabic.172 In this sense, northern allowances for languages 
other than Arabic were less a concession to southern nationalism than to southern 
reality. In order to implement other important areas of the AAA such as regional 
self-governance, it would be impossible to make Arabic the only language in which 
official business could be conducted. The compromise northerners made 
concerning language education in the AAA was difficult, as it went against the long­
standing objectives of northern nationalism that Arabic was to be the dominant 
language throughout Sudan. This goal preceded the Abboud regime, and even 
independence. The nationalist Abd Al- Rahman ‘Ali Taha, who became the first 
Sudanese Minister of Education, announced in 1949 that, ‘as the Sudan is one 
country sharing one set of political institutions it is of great importance that there 
should be one language which is understood by all its citizens. That language could 
only be Arabic, and Arabic must therefore be taught in all our schools.’174 With the 
end of the Southern Policy in the late 1940s, Arab culture slowly began to enter 
southern political consciousness, as in 1950 when Arabic was finally introduced in
169 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
o f the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Article 6. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 
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El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 131.
171 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 175. Classes would now be in English in 
southern schools, but Arabic was to remain a subject.
172 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 100-101. Voll and Voll, The Sudan: Unity 
and Diversity in a Multicultural State, 15. Many southerners also preferred English because they saw it as neutral, 
whereas Arabic or even Dinka would have unsettled smaller ethnic groups.
173 El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 47, 130. The only alternative would have 
been to allow ‘Juba Arabic’, a pidgin dialect common in the larger towns of the south, but which lacked the 
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southern schools as a subject.175 In April 1955 the Education Minister stated that he 
would seek a unified system of education across Sudan, so that by 1964 it would be
1 n  £
possible for southern boys to take the exam to enter intermediate school in Arabic.
In 1957, the Minister of Education announced that the government wanted to take 
direct and full charge of education in the south. The absorption of the missionary 
schools by the government, and the new Arab-Islamic curriculum, was one of the 
causes of southern resentment and helped contribute to the southern parliamentary
1 77revolt that precipitated the Abboud regime’s putsch.
Many southerners understood northern concerns over allowing English and native 
languages to thrive. As Alier explains, the Condominium’s prohibition of Arabic in 
the south had been ‘in no conceivable way for the benefit of its people, whether they 
were to become independent or join East Africa or the north.’ With the collapse of 
the Southern Policy in the late 1940s, Arabic soon regained its status as a practical 
language to learn in southern towns and might have continued to spread through 
peaceful commerce.179 However, the imposition of the language, especially under the 
Abboud and Maghoub governments, disaffected southerners who might otherwise 
have been receptive towards that element of integration. An example came in 1958, 
when Arabic was made the official, national language of Sudan. Southerners 
protested this move because it was culturally insensitive and because most southern 
officials, lacking a working knowledge of Arabic, were now considered unfit for
i  o  r\
much government employment. By contrast, language was not nearly as 
contentious an issue in the second war. This was partially a result of the less 
aggressive efforts on the part of the central government to force southerners to speak 
Arabic, but primarily because of the early nationalist vision of the SPLM/A, which
17:’ Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 29. Albino believes this was because the language would 
eventually be used for administration in place of English.
176 Arou, “Devolution and the Southern Problem in the Sudan,” 120.
177 Lobban, interview. Interview by author with Kazim Omer, Canberra, 2009. Poggo, “General Ibrahim 
Abboud’s Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958-1964,” 72. Holt, A Modern History o f the Sudan, 179. 
Oduho and Deng, The Problem o f Southern Sudan, 45.
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Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 15.
179 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 150. Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the 
Sudan, 5.
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did not prioritize making a distinction between Arab and African cultural identities. 
SPLM/A leader John Garang recognized the usefulness of Arabic as a national 
language, but warned northerners against cultural chauvinism with regards to its 
spread. Garang’s early desire to create a new vision of Sudanese nationalism -  
rather than continue the old, exclusively southern, anti-Arab objectives of the first 
insurgency -  demonstrated the degree to which education had changed the way 
insurgent elites thought about the problem of Sudan.
THE BLURRING OF IDENTITY DURING PEACE AND THE FORMATION 
OF THE SPLM/A
The AAA led to early unity in the south, but also the localism and provincialism 
northern nationalists had feared. A significant contribution of the agreement was 
psychological: the degree to which it fostered an understanding of Sudanese national 
unity in the south. This was contrary to the expectations of many northerners, who 
feared that southern regional autonomy was the first step towards separation.182 
Despite their preference for the machinery of regional government, southerners 
became more integrated in national politics than ever before. In fact, it was not the 
creation of the southern region, but its redivision into three provinces which would 
eventually lead to hostilities recommencing. With the signing of the AAA and the 
dissolution of the SSLM, southern Sudan’s nationalist movement began to wither.
The peace and stability in the post-AAA south led instead to two consecutive, 
contradictory phenomena: an increased tendency towards tribalism and localism on 
an administrative level and a broader vision for how to address disparity between the 
north and south on a national level. The former generally defined the characteristic of 
southern politics until the early 1980s. The latter defined the form the insurgency 
would take when the AAA collapsed in 1983.
In Sudan’s past, during periods of peace and stability, groups have shown a 
propensity to either blur the lines between each other or become more receptive to
181 Garang, John Garang Speaks, 129.
I8~ Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 157.
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1 8Tadopting new identities, or characteristics previously associated with other groups. 
While long periods of Sudan’s history since independence have seen northern and 
southern factions seeking to demarcate cultural identity with increasingly defined 
lines, identities are not inevitably distinct, permanent, or uniformly perceived by 
group members. For example, Fur and Beja are deeply Muslim communities, yet 
adhere to African traditions with no Arab origin. Southerners have for generations 
used Arabic as the lingua franca of commerce, yet feel little compromise to their own 
ethnic identities. As Bona Malwal surmised about the first war, ‘The eastern and 
western Sudan, indeed the rural Sudan, may already have come to realize that the 
South struggled, not against Islam, but for its share of power at the national level and 
for an equitable distribution of economic benefits’.185
In this sense, language, culture, history, and religion are not necessarily immutable 
elements by which groups are mercilessly driven: under the right circumstances they 
can be instruments by which to create a national identity. While nationalism 
traditionally assumes a foundation on some ethnic core, in many post-colonial states, 
political leaders simply do not have the powers of persuasion or coercion to 
reconstruct national identity along such ethnic lines. Northern nationalists in the 
first war aggressively sought to impose their culture on southerners, but ended up 
pushing too hard and only ensured insurgency and war. The slow encroachment of 
Islamists on secular national institutions concerned southerners until the September 
1983 Islamic laws, which imposed brutal punishments such as amputation.187 The
183 Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 408, 454. Holt, A Modern History o f the Sudan, 6, 9. 
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declaration of Sharia laws ended the tensions between southern factions which had 
been at odds over the issue of redivision, turning the collective resentment of the 
south towards Khartoum.188 By this point the AAA had collapsed, and the south was 
at war again. Nimeiri’s Islamization program was met with opposition even from the 
southern factions Nimeiri had traditionally relied on. Abel Alier and Joseph Lagu 
overcame their suspicion of each other to write a joint open letter in which they 
warned the president that amendments to Islamize the constitution would upset the
1 8Qorder upon which peace in the south had relied.
Had economic and ideological factors not intervened, the AAA could have formed 
the basis for national integration which had until this time eluded the regimes in 
Khartoum. Nimeiri emerged from the AAA talks in 1972 with more popular support 
than any regime before him, including from a quarter of the population which had 
previously been at war with the rest of the state. As late as 1978 it could be 
speculated, with regards to national integration efforts of the 1970s, that ‘the 
dynamics in the process are quite likely to blur, if not eliminate, the South-North 
dividing line in favour of consolidated national unity’.190 Many Dinka chiefs 
considered the post-AAA period an opportunity to prove themselves as southerners, 
not to let Nimeiri stand alone in his efforts to integrate and strengthen the Sudanese 
state.191 Catering to these traditional leaders might have provided an opportunity to 
achieve these objectives, but Nimeiri was unable to do so. Instead, the next effort at 
forging a new, more inclusive Sudanese identity would come not from Khartoum but 
from the second wave of southern insurgents. The formation of the SPLM/A after the 
separatist ambitions of the first war was ‘a victory for the nation-building ideals
192successive Khartoum regimes have purported to espouse’.
National events also halted integration efforts. The aftermath of the 1975 coup began 
a period in which Nimeiri would focus on enhancing his personal power over the 
state. Under the 1973 constitution, the president was a strong executive with
188 0 ‘Fahey, interview. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 57.
189 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 430-431, 551-552.
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significant control over the legislature as well. Amendments introduced after the 
1975 coup attempt would give him even more authority, disrupting an already slim 
balance of power.193 Although Nimeiri did not use these powers to abrogate the 
AAA, there were still ramifications for southern government. The self-government 
act of 1973 pertaining to the south was ambiguous or silent on some issues connected 
with executive and legislative functions of government.194 Regional government in 
the south consisted of a parliamentary system in which the executive was directly 
dependent on the legislative body, yet the national executive was a strongly 
authoritarian presidency. The 1975 coup showed how difficult this system might 
become to perpetuate, since other regions might want the same parliamentary 
freedom at a sub-national level, potentially damaging the authoritarian foundations of 
the May Regime. Accordingly, Khartoum tried to reassert more control over the 
south in order to decrease the disparity of freedoms between that region and the rest 
of Sudan.195
At the beginning of the second civil war, a group of southern military officers 
formulated a new response to the cultural insecurity which they believed drove 
Sudan’s center-periphery structure. The SPLM/A sought not secession or regional 
autonomy, but to advance a new Sudanese identity by breaking the dichotomy it 
believed was instigating conflict. It noted that these blurred identities in Sudan make 
the division of the state unfeasible, regardless of how much popular support that idea 
had in the south. Its New Sudan project sought to create a democratic secular state in 
which traditionally marginal areas of the state had permanent access to power at the
193 Fadlalla, “The Search for a Constitution,” 47.
194 Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 132.
195 El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 41-42. Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de 
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competitive one-party system operating within a plebiscary one-party regime controlled from Khartoum. Hamid, 
“Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 132. ‘A related anomaly was that the 1973 constitution let Nimeiri 
dissolve the National Assembly, but the Addis Ababa Agreement made no such provision for the Regional 
Assembly.’ When Nimeiri would later dissolve the latter body, he would note the discrepancy but charge that he 
was doing so under his expanded presidential powers after the 1975 amendments. Kok, Governance and Conflict 
in the Sudan 1985-1995, 127. Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self 
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that the amendments curtailed human rights, such as freedom of movement, allowed for administratively ordered 
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which protected the right to the writ of habeus corpus.
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center. 196 The original SPLM/A manifesto declared, ‘Although the movement has 
started by necessity in the south, it aims eventually at engulfing the whole country in 
socialist transformation. The SPLA is fighting to establish a United Socialist Sudan, 
not a separate Southern Sudan’. Nevertheless, East Bloc states were suspicious of 
the socialist credentials of the movement, noting that not a single SPLM/A leader was 
a known communist. In addition the Sudanese Communist Party disavowed the
1 QRSPLM/A as not communist, declaring instead that it was a separatist movement.
The SPLM/A’s vision of national revolution, and its eventual retreat to southern self- 
determination if that vision could not be achieved, made it a difficult movement to 
classify in comparative analysis with other African insurgencies. The multiplicity of 
its sometimes contradictory goals is not a result of a poorly articulated vision or of 
ideological vagueness. Rather, it is an inevitable by-product of a movement which 
has been fighting for several decades. The war between Khartoum and the SPLA, 
Africa’s longest-running conflict, has simply been a continuity for so long that it 
effectively defies comparison with most other African conflicts. As Johnson notes, 
the most useful comparison of the SPLA is not to other African insurgencies, but to 
the Anya Nya. This is because the SPLM/A was formed not to emulate the Maoist or 
separatist insurgencies then found throughout Africa, but to rectify the flaws of the 
earlier Anya Nya insurgency. These included poor organization, tension between 
political and military leaders, a lack of supplies and poor training. 199 The Anya Nya’s 
call for self-determination in the south prevented it from relying on the prospect of 
federalism to form alliances with other remote regions of Sudan (as the Liberal Party
196 Mohammed O. I. Maundi, William Zartman, Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Kwaku Nuamah. Getting In: 
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had had some success in doing politically in the late 1950s).200 On the other hand, the 
SPLA call for a national revolution gave it political flexibility and regional support, 
but complicated efforts to effectively advocate for southern unity. Consequently, 
the movement’s base still remained susceptible to fractiousness and division, as the 
1990s would demonstrate.
One theory concerning southern objectives in the two wars argues that the popularity 
of separatism among southerners during both wars indicates that the second war is 
essentially a continuation of the first. This analysis underplays the role of elites in 
the various conflicts, and does not adequately account for the difference in the 
composition of the insurgencies, particularly the alliances made in the second war 
with rebels in non-southern areas of Sudan. SPLM/A goals affected the very 
structure of the movement, which had different internal organization than the Anya 
Nya. The SPLA was modelled on the Sudanese army, making it a more disciplined, 
and effective force than its rival Anya Nya 2 militias. It was staffed with many 
senior officers who had deserted the national army, along with about 2,000-3,000 
civilian recruits.204 The SPLM/A attempted not to base its administrative division of 
conquered areas along tribal lines, as had been commonly done in the first war. 
Instead, the leadership structured administration within the boundaries of existing 
sub-provinces, or provinces which had existed before the war. Unlike insurgents in 
the first war, it took few initial steps to create a ‘shadow government’. This variance 
was primarily a consequence of the movement’s ultimate goal: it did not see itself as 
a southern ‘alternate government’; it sought instead a unified and secular ‘New 
Sudan’. Most administration in captured areas correlated with the old Native
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Administration and the Southern Regional governments. In addition, an over­
reliance on NGOs as substitutes for state administration not only hindered the 
development of genuine administration by the SPLM/A, but also hindered further 
integration of the region.208 The SPLM/A sought to control NGO support by creating 
programs such as the Sudan Transitional Assistance and Relief (STAR), which was 
meant to re-establish southern civil society in SPLA-controlled regions, but this had 
middling success.209
The SPLM/A objective to challenge the foundation of Sudanese national identity also 
directly challenged the foundation of southern resistance. While separatism may 
never have been an achievable goal for early southern insurgents, it at least had a 
rationale that could be clearly understood by northerners and southerners alike. Calls 
for separatism were the most extreme method southerners had to alert northerners of 
the injustice and oppression which they felt epitomized the northern presence in the 
south. The separatist position had appeal to southerners too: there is some evidence 
that separatism had always been broadly, if shallowly, supported by most southerners,
907
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especially in Equatoria, and during the second war, in Bahr Al-Ghazal. The call for 
a constitutional conference, a ‘back to the drawing board’ approach to a constitution 
that would be fair and equitable to all regions, was first made by the SPLM/A. 
Previous nationalist initiatives had all originated from forces in the north. The 
SPLA’s military challenge to northern identity was even more dramatic. Once the 
insurgency began making significant gains against the Sudanese Army in the mid- 
1980s, opposition to them began consolidating in the north. The SPLA advance on 
Kurmuk and Gaysan in the southern Blue Nile region during late 1987 in particular 
was seen as a threat by the Sadiq Al-Mahdi government, which was both offended 
and alarmed that a southern rebellion could capture what were considered the 
northern areas of the state. The government resented the SPLM/A’s claim to 
represent northern Sudanese as well as southerners, an indignity the state had never 
faced from the Anya Nya. The insurgents advance was greeted with more panic in 
the north than earlier hostilities from neighboring states such as Ethiopia and Libya 
had fostered, resulting in a wave of nationalist rhetoric in which Khartoum called on 
other Arab states to defend Islam, and an anti-southerner backlash rose again.214
Over time, SPLA intrusion into the north became commonplace, especially as its 
broad message of a New Sudan began to translate into recruitment of insurgents in 
remote areas such as the Nuba Mountains, Darfur, and the Beja regions. The Nuba 
were particularly involved in the SPLA’s campaign against Khartoum. Marginalized
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from the riverine center, yet not dissimilar or remote enough to seek separation, the 
Nuba had no deep ties to the state. Although Nuba were anti-secessionist during the 
first civil war, they had built no lasting political alliances with the north during the 
parliamentary periods. The Nuba considered themselves among the most 
indigenous of Sudanese, and while those who joined the SPLA also sought self- 
determination, this was more to advance regional autonomy and access to power 
nationally rather than secession. Their participation in the second war was a 
significant boost to the SPLM/A’s campaign against the traditional arabized 
conception of Sudanese identity, but did not signify that the Nuba now considered 
themselves culturally or politically southern.
Under the right circumstances, the SPLM/A might have reached an agreement with 
northern nationalist parties such as the DUP or Umma, in which it achieved its 
minimum goals of a national constitutional conference and a united Sudan with 
respect for secular principles. However, the unstable nature of northern Sudanese 
democracy thwarted efforts to achieve a solution before the 1989 coup which brought 
Bashir’s Islamist-military coalition to power.218 Unlike the sectarian parties and trade 
unions the SPLM/A engaged with in the 1980s, the new junta was a mixture of 
military authoritarianism and revolutionary Islam. The lack of a nationalist core in 
the NIF regime first made compromise impossible with SPLM/A, then made it 
possible only as long as identity was codified and segregated. As a result, the CPA is 
not an agreement promoting national identity or integration as the AAA was: it is a 
codification of regional identities.
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THE EVOLUTION OF SELF-DETERMINATION AS A SOUTHERN 
DEMAND AND THE 1991 SPLA SPLIT
The self-determination movement in southern Sudan has always faced a conundrum: 
it has for decades routinely been suspected of advocating secession, which most 
southerners seem to prefer, yet which seemed unlikely to be implemented either 
through violence or negotiation. Self-determination was a useful rallying cry for 
southern politicians in the first war because of its potential to unite a broad coalition 
of peoples with grievances against Khartoum. During the 1960s, though most SANU 
members ultimately hoped to separate peacefully from the Sudanese state, the 
movement officially championed not secession but self-determination.219 The 
vagueness of the concept made it easier to defend than those of specific solutions 
such as secession, federation, or regional autonomy. However, it also forced 
advocates of self-determination to defend themselves against charges of secretly 
supporting secession. In addition, in the first war it helped confuse the ultimate 
objectives of southerners, and therefore the purpose of the movement.
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The lack of any political coherence in the separatist movement during the first war 
was exemplified at the 1965 Round Table discussions, in which southern leaders 
could not put a united front to their demands from the north. William Deng’s SANU 
faction endorsed federation, Aggrey Jaden’s faction endorsed peaceful separation, 
and the Southern Front called for a self-determination referendum allowing options 
ranging from a unitary government to secession, a prospect which northern delegates 
abhorred as it seemed likely the south would vote to secede if such an option were 
presented.““ Northerners declared they would allow, at most, a negotiated form of 
regional government for the south. While many southern delegates might have 
been receptive to an autonomous arrangement, they could not remove the separation 
option from the table. To rule out the option would split the already weakly aligned
219 Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan 's Civil Wars, 31. O'Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99, 
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southern groups. Attendees also had concerns that politicians who had not attended 
the conference in Khartoum would use the compromise to build their own prestige, 
denouncing those southerners who had participated as ‘sell-outs’. So personality- 
based and ideologically unserious was the political movement of the 1960s that by 
1971, several leading separatist politicians finally came together to back the military 
leader Lagu, who after the drafting of the AAA declared that he had never actually 
been a separatist.2“3
The demagoguery of the issue of secession by southern politicians in the first war 
seemed to be a response to the various new offensives against southern resistance 
launched by successive governments in the 1960s. The more aggressive northerners 
became towards the south in the war, the less southerners were able to picture an 
amicable solution in which Sudan remained united. This trend began anew in the 
second war after the Islamist coup in 1989. As the Islamist regime in Khartoum 
alienated an ever-larger portion of the Sudanese population, it managed to foster a 
new separatist movement within SPLA ranks. As in the first war, this movement was 
based more on personal ambitions and general frustration than on any connection to 
the broad appeal such a message might have with the southern public. As some 
SPLA officers concluded that the NIF regime would never submit to the New Sudan 
policy of a multi-religious, secular democratic Sudan, a wiser strategy would be to 
allow Khartoum its homogenous Islamic state in the north while negotiating with it 
for southern independence. In this way, the ascent of the post-nationalist Bashir
994regime led directly to the rupturing of the SPLA goal of a united New Sudan.
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The SPLA, for much of its early existence was run fairly autocratically by John 
Garang, whose reluctance to delegate power and to respect tribal priorities over 
political and military objectives was also at the heart of the 1991 schism. A major 
factor in the split was Garang’s decision, by late 1990, to attempt to take Juba, the 
heavily fortified Equatorian capital that no rebel force was ever able to capture from 
the government in either war. Johnson writes that Garang’s detractors within the 
movement knew that once he took Juba he would become essentially unstoppable, so 
they decided to attempt a revolt against him soon after the Marxist Ethiopian regime 
supporting the insurgents fell in May 1991, when SPLA forces would be disorganized 
and weak.225
The SPLA’s disciplined structure, which put national strategy foremost, had the 
potential to cause some dissent among not just rival elites in the movement, but its 
fighters in the most vulnerable areas of the south. A focus on regional strategy over a 
more grassroots concentration on individual fronts sometimes meant the separation of 
fighters from their home territory, potentially leaving their land and families exposed 
to the enemy. This practice became a contentious issue in the mid-1980s, when 
Misseriya raids on the Dinka and other tribes in Bahr Al-Ghazal led some of 
Garang’s rivals to step up their criticism of his leadership.“  More bloody dissent 
would manifest itself tribally however, when in November 1991 30,000 Nuer united 
under former SPLA commander Reik Machar to declare war against Garang’s faction 
and its Dinka base. “ The new group, SPLA-United, was only one of a myriad of
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new southern groups to form during the 1990s, but the only one with any real initial 
power to damage SPLA-Mainstream (Garang’s original faction). The split took on a 
dramatic new tribal dimension early on, when Nuer units in the SPLA began killing 
Dinka officers in anticipation that they would not support the new movement. Such 
slaughter instantly branded the new faction a tribal-oriented movement, a label from 
which the SPLA breakaway groups never overcame.229
Khartoum encouraged this split and indeed allied with the separatist SPLA-United for 
several years throughout the 1990s in order to weaken the southern insurgency as a 
whole by playing factions against each other.“ Most separatists groups were highly 
tactical, and as a result were natural allies of the NIF regime, despite obvious 
ideological incompatibility. Yet unlike that regime, few separatists had serious 
ideological underpinnings to their movements and were driven more by ethnic 
insecurity.231 Members of many smaller tribes, and large ethnicities that felt excluded, 
such as the Nuer, considered Khartoum to be a long-term enemy. However, the 
authoritarian nature of SPLM/A leadership, as well as the tendency for high positions 
to be filled by Dinka, instigated other groups to revolt and form militias that favored 
separatism but also accepted backing from the government.232 This paradox was 
difficult to justify to those outside any given militia’s dominant ethnic group, and 
eventually sapped away at the credibility of these factions. It became yet another 
example o f tribalism stifling a broader-based southern nationalism.
Reik Machar, a Nuer, merely by virtue of their non-Dinka ethnicity, helped a tribal element materialize to the 
1991 schism.
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The separatist movement was instructive about the nature of Sudanese identity 
conflict in both wars. These factions were often a marriage between disenfranchised 
individual elites and the narrow base of their ethnic group.233 Their petitions to 
represent a broader southern separatist movement failed, even though their goal of 
secession seemed to have more resonance with the public than John Garang’s 
message of a united Sudan.234 However, the movements did reintroduce separatism in 
a dramatic manner and forced Garang to concede that self-determination for the south 
should be an option if national liberation could not be achieved. The NIF regime 
took advantage of these scaled-back SPLM/A ambitions to charge the main 
movement itself with separatism in an attempt to rob it of support from other 
marginalized areas of Sudan. Moreover, the government never implemented the 
self-determination provisions of the agreements it signed with the southern militias, 
which resulted in many southerners eventually leaving the alliance with Khartoum. 
Some, like Reik Machar, even rejoined Garang’s SPLA.
Throughout most of Sudan’s post-colonial history, few regional actors in East Africa 
have concurred with the principle of southern self-determination if it meant the 
possibility of secession. This was in part because of the potential separatist 
movements in several African states with arbitrarily-drawn colonial-era borders. In 
the first civil war, particularly with secession being the obvious goal of most southern
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insurgents, the south had few African allies. The inability of separatist groups in 
developing states to attract international support against ineffective regimes often led 
to protracted stalemates, followed by the formation of ‘national unity’ 
governments.238 Such governments must be established, no matter how unwieldy or 
unrepresentative of the population at large, simply because no other options exist.
The state lacks the power to quash the rebellion, and the insurgency lacks the power 
to successfully secede without international support. Such was the environment in 
which both the AAA and the CPA were concluded. In the second war, the SPLM/A 
received early support from states such as Libya and Ethiopia because of its anti­
separatist agenda, and as a result posed a more significant threat to Khartoum than 
had the Anya Nya.“' However, the geographic expanse of Sudan was so large and 
the government so well embedded in the capital and major northern towns that once 
again, the insurgency was forced to settle for a ‘national unity’ government.
In the past decade, scholars have questioned the wisdom of providing recognition to 
states which are incapable of controlling their internal security. Herbst has argued, 
using the southern Sudan as an example, that the devotion of African states to 
maintaining borders they cannot extend state power over is one of the crucial flaws in 
the post-colonial African political order.240 He argues that benefits such as UN 
membership and financial dealings with the IMF and the World Bank have bestowed 
legitimacy on states which may not have demonstrated an ability to maintain internal 
stability and cohesion, but which are nevertheless favored at the expense of more 
effective regional or ethnic identities.241 He further suggests that the US should 
‘decertify’ states with no control over their hinterland as sovereign states, the way it 
does de facto with states that cannot control narcotics production.242 Boas and Dunn 
have noted that the outmoded fixation on nation-states in Africa has seen insurgent 
movements with valid grievances not as stakeholders in the states in which they
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reside, but as sources of instability.243 This re-examination of the sanctity of state 
sovereignty generally has coincided with erosion of the taboo of examining the merits 
of Sudanese secession on a point-by-point basis. Soon after the schism in the SPLA 
appeared in 1991 over secession, regional actors sympathetic to southern grievances, 
or at least antagonistic to the Bashir regime, appeared more conflicted over the 
principle of a united Sudan at any cost. In the negotiations between the SPLM/A and 
the Bashir regime in Abuja during the early 1990s, the Nigerian mediators ruled out 
self-determination as an option if it meant secession, anathema to Nigerians who had 
faced their own secessionist civil war in the 1960s. In addition, the only potential 
compromise the government might have been willing to make -  allowing the 
SPLM/A some regional control until a satisfactory solution for national unity could 
be arranged -  was unacceptable to the movement.244
By 1994, however, IGAD’s East African mediators would emphasize in their 
Declaration of Principles that unity was conditional on the ability of the government 
to uphold the rights of all its citizens.245 An early round of negotiations had fallen 
through due to an impasse over southern self-determination.246 A second set of talks 
was more successful, since by then the 1GAD mediators had drafted the Declaration 
of Principles as a framework for negotiation.247 For southerners, the principle of self- 
determination put moral responsibility for southern secession solely on Khartoum. 
The SPLM/A had already acknowledged the new relevance of self-determination as 
policy with its August 1992 manifesto ‘Legal Framework for the Peaceful Resolution 
of the Civil War in Sudan (Interim Arrangements)’, in which it proposed a north-
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south confederation for two years, and then a referendum in the south on 
confederation versus independence.248
During the June 1995 Asmara talks, other elements of the NDA conceded that the 
south should be allowed to separate if it chose to do so in a referendum after two to 
four years. In the interim, the region should be allowed to retain its own separate, 
standing army.249 The Ngok Dinka of Abyei were to have a referendum on whether to 
join the south or stay in Kordofan, and the Nuba would also have a right to determine 
their future.250 This new arrangement was the ultimate indicator that the formerly 
nationalist forces which were included in that exile group -  the Democratic Unionist 
Party and the Umma party in particular -  had accepted that a united Sudan was no 
longer a stated fundamental objective of any major northern political force.
THE CODIFICATION OF IDENTITY FACILITATED BY THE CPA
The SPLM/A’s signing of an agreement that represents at some level an antithesis of 
what it initially stood for highlights the disjointed nature of the SPLM/A’s basic 
policy: its message of unity was bom out of the era of peace following the AAA, but 
the codification of identities during war made the insurgency’s goal more difficult: 
northerners viewed the SPLM/A as a southern movement and southerners were 
unhappy with northern representation in the movement, either because of anti- 
northerner prejudice or simply because they resented the complications it created for 
the secession option. By compromising its ideals, the nationalist SPLM/A was forced 
to accept an agreement in 2002 which the southern nationalist SSLM would have 
been envious to conclude in 1972.251
The SPLM/A had attempted to overcome tribal divisions by forming nationwide 
alliances between dissidents and advocating common principles and ideals over
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ethnic or religious distinctiveness -  in the manner of the more successful African 
liberation movements of decades earlier.2'^ 2 Their efforts had mixed results, however, 
and the SPLM/A was forced to accommodate southern tribalism and factionalism, 
particularly after the 1991 split of the movement.253 The split was ostensibly about 
strategic differences, secession versus national revolution. Yet the clear ethnic 
element to the split indicated early on that it was not entirely ideological in origin and 
became less so as time went on. There had always been a contingent of the SPLA 
that saw talk of unity as a propaganda tactic, with separation as the preferred 
objective.254 Many southerners thought that the goal of a united, egalitarian Sudan 
was unrealistic, and were unhappy that the SPLA had begun working with the 
National Democratic Alliance, the northern anti-government organization which 
included several parties who had violently opposed southern resistance in the past, 
such as Umma and the DUP.255
The allowance for self-determination after a six-year interim period became the 
touchstone of the entire CPA from which several other complications arose which the 
AAA had not sought to address. A primary distinction between the AAA and the 
CPA is the degree to which the latter seeks to quantify elements of Sudanese society. 
The integrative goal of the AAA -  giving southerners some regional autonomy and 
access to the state but little else -  was a nationalist response to the lack of integration 
during the colonial period 30 years later. Specifically, the end of the nationalist 
project in Khartoum made it easier for the SPLM/A to seek many more regional 
concessions than the AAA had provided, and not simply for the south but for
252 Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan’s Civil Wars, 76. Michael E. Brown. “Ethnic and Internal Conflicts: 
Causes and Implications.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, 
Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 
216. Many African states and ethnically diverse states such as Indonesia have attempted to move towards a ‘civic 
nationalism’ of this kind, since it is generally seen as reducing the potential for violence found in ethnic 
nationalism.
253 Alfred Sebit Lokuji. Hazards in the Power Sharing Aspects o f the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the 
Interim Period in the Sudan. Waterloo, Onario, Canada: Project Ploughshares, 2006, 14-15. Al-Shahi, interview. 
Yongo-Bure, interview. In return, by the mid-1990s the SPLA began to receive more grassroots support from 
communities within the southern areas it controlled. This was in part because of the new tribal dimension of the 
war and in part because the setbacks the SPLA was dealt by the government and its allied militias galvanized 
southerners generally to save and support the only significant southern insurgency. Clapham, “Introduction: 
Analysing African Insurgencies,” 10. Clapham makes the distinction between movements which break apart over 
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254 Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan ’s Civil Wars, 64.
255 Suliman, “Civil War in Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation,” 24. Kelleher, “A Small State’s 
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disputed regions on the north-south fault line as well. Concessions for power-sharing 
were also sought at a national level in which the two parties were meant to stand in 
for northerners and southerners generally. CPA stipulations on divisions of power 
sharing before interim elections and in government ministries demonstrate 
dramatically how Sudanese identities had sharpened over the course of the conflict.
In the years of interim government preceding parliamentary elections, the National 
Congress Party was to be appointed 52% of the National Assembly seats, the SPLM 
28%, other northern political forces 14% and other southern political forces 6%. 
Similar divisions, albeit with different ratios, favoring the NCP and SPLM in the 
north and south respectively, were made between the parties in assemblies at lower 
tiers of government. Even the administration of the national capital was to be 
divided, with the two parties to be ‘adequately represented’.257
By the end of the second war, the SPLA had formed ties with insurgent groups in 
such areas as the Beja east, where the Anya Nya’s message of southern separatism 
had earned it no followers in the first war.258 However, such ties between the SPLA 
and northern groups became strained as peace between the south and Khartoum 
became more likely. ' When the SPLM/A and Khartoum began their peace process 
in 2002, anti-government forces in Darfur, the Nuba Mountains, and the Beja regions, 
feared a deal between the south and north to partition the state, thereby allowing the 
NIF to declare Sudan an Arab Muslim nation-state into which marginal northern 
populations and other political groups would be forced to assimilate. Without
256 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 2.2.5.
257 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 2.4.2.
~58 Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan’s Civil Wars, 138.
' 59 Idris, Conflict and Politics o f Identity in Sudan, 92.
260 Ouma, Federalism as a Peacemaking Device in Sudan ’s Interim National Constitution, 35. In early 2005, Beja 
rebels also demanded to be included in the peace negotiations which had just recently led to the conclusion of the 
CPA. Leonardi, interview. Leonardi notes that the Nuba are also remote from the heart of the southern separatist 
movement in Equatoria. Their location on the north-south faultline, as well as the fact that some Nuba have 
fought on the side of the government in both wars and have an Islamic majority has led some Equatorians to 
disregard them as being a vital concern in negotiations for self-determination. Committee of the Civil Project 
2005, 6. Reasons cited as to why residents of such marginalized areas as the Nuba Mountains and the South Blue 
Nile might oppose secession are ‘ 1. The uncertainty of state formation for these small and isolated entities. 2.
The problems of setting and demarcating boundaries. 3. Decisions over the status of minorities living within the 
marginalized areas. 4. The interconnection between ethnic groups within the territories. For example within 
South Kordofan there are many groups including Nuba, Baggara Arabs and Nilotic Dinka.’
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military pressure from southern insurgents in the SPLA, this would be a much easier 
policy for Khartoum to implement.
Nowhere were the concessions the SPLM was forced to make more apparent than in 
its negotiation of the three disputed areas along the north-south fault line in Sudan: 
Southern Kordofan, the Blue Nile State, and Abyei. The SPLM had been pushing for 
50/50 representation in the legislatures of the Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, split 
evenly with the governing National Congress Party, but were forced to accept a 55/45 
split in favor of the government in order to secure an agreement.“ “ Under strong 
international pressure from the 1GAD partners to concede on key points, the SPLM/A 
were forced to retreat from stances that Blue Nile and South Kordofan be allowed to 
participate in the referendum for the south in 2011.“ Should the states wish to 
secede from Sudan, they would be forced to do so through a vote in the legislature, in 
which the governing NCP expected to have substantial influence.264 Significantly, 
Khartoum also insisted that the new arrangements for these regions could not be 
included as part of the official CPA, but only as separate, parallel agreement265 The 
final agreements on the disputed regions were in keeping with the government’s 
position regarding the nature of the war since coming to power. During the first talks 
between the NIF-backed regime and the SPLM in Addis Ababa in August 1989, the 
government delegation made it clear that it proposed to treat the new war as a 
continuation of the southern problem, disregarding the SPLM/A’s nationalist 
objective or its recruiting of members from outside that region of Sudan.266 This
261 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 190.
262 Hassan Arouni. “A long day in Naivasha.” BBC News. 27 May 2004. Charles Snyder. “Remarks on the 
Signing of the Naivasha Protocols.” Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs On-the-Record Briefing. 27 
May 2004. Resolution o f the Conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States, 2004, sections 11.1.1 and
11.1.2. The resolution also called for rotational governorship in each state, with the two parties alternating their 
hold of the office until elections.
263 Johnson, interview.
264 Johnson, interview. Johnson notes that this possibility was seen as some consolation to the SPLM/A for these 
regions. Though Johnson himself is unsure about the constitutionality of such a move, he notes that because 
Sudan’s independence was acquired through such a vote in 1955, there is precedence.
265 Waithaka Waihenya. The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process.
Nairobi: Kenway Publications, 2006, 130.
266 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 172-174. The government delegation was so ill- 
prepared for the first talks with the SPLA in August 1989, the author and SPLA delegate Mansour Khalid suspect 
the talks served only to provide the appearance that the new regime was seeking peace with the south. This would 
have been necessary for the junta to appease Egypt and Ethiopia, which saw a commitment to a resolution of the 
war in the south as a sign of stability and moderation in the new regime. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the 
Sudan 1985-1995, 172-174. Members from the government delegation taunted northern SPLM/A members to
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complete rejection of the SPLM/A’s nationalist objectives for Sudan as a whole was a 
constant policy of the Bashir regime.
At the same time it sought to curb the SPLM/A’s nationalist agenda, Khartoum was 
scaling back the northern nationalist project. The driving force behind the wane of 
nationalism during the NIF regime was Hassan Al-Turabi, who took a dim view of 
the process, especially as practiced in Sudan. His distaste for the tendency of secular 
Sudanese nationalists to lean on Islam as a tool can be traced back to his arrival on 
the political scene in 1964. At that time, Islamists had become unhappy with the 
Abboud regime’s mining of Islam for rhetoric and culture to legitimize its 
authoritarian brand of nationalism rather than relying on Islam as an instrument of 
governance in itself. Turabi’s ascent to the Muslim Brothers leadership in 1964 led 
to that movement joining more leftist parties in the 1964 October Revolution which 
overthrew Abboud.“
Upon his rise to power along with the Bashir regime, Turabi showed further 
indicators that he rejected the conventional practices of the nation-state. His ultimate 
goal was not a united Sudanese state, but an Islamist revival whose energy would 
sweep aside artificial constructions such as national borders. To this effect, he began 
the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress in 1991. Sudan declared that visitors to the 
Khartoum airport from Arab states would no longer require visas. However, the 
purpose of this exercise was revealed throughout the mid-1990s not to be a 
revitalization of the Arab nationalism of previous eras, but the fostering of a 
revolutionary Islamist state which both hosted Islamist terrorist networks and fostered 
hostile relations with its neighbors, Arab and non-Arab alike.
begin a war in their own regions of the state if they wished to negotiate a peace, and not to presume to speak for 
southerners.
267 Al-Shahi, interview. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 33. El-Affendi, “Discovering the 
South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa,” 372, 373-374. El-Affendi cites the opposition of Islamists to the 
Abboud regime, despite its aggressive Islamization policy in the south, as evidence that the Islamist/nationalist 
schism remained regardless of the liberal or conservative nature of various nationalist regimes.
2f,H J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins. Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989- 
2000. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003, 57. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 46-47. Lobban, 
interview. Khalid Al-Mubarak. Turabi’s “Islamist” Venture: Failure and Implications. Cairo: El Dar El 
Thaqafia, 2001, 100. Under the Nationality and Passports Law of 1994, the president was permitted to grant 
Sudanese citizenship to any foreigner, regardless of other outstanding conditions. It was used to facilitate the 
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The post-nationalist nature of the NIF regime did not preclude it attempting to retain 
the south, especially to access the natural resources in the region. At each conflict 
resolution forum it attended with the SPLM/A throughout the 1990s and 2000s, 
Khartoum began ‘forum-shopping’ as soon as the details of a self-determination 
agreement were to be negotiated.269 However, Garang offered a consistent, stark 
choice throughout the decade, a secular Sudan or two Sudans. The government could 
not achieve both objectives. Ultimately, the regime chose to compromise the 
decades-old objective of a nationalist Sudan in favor of an Islamic state, thereby 
converting Islam from a nation-building tool into an end in itself. Consequently, 
Islamic law took on an even more significant role than it had during the debate over 
an Islamic constitution in the late 1960s. The need to retain Sharia throughout the 
north became self-reinforcing: the government argued that because Islamic law was 
the primary basis for its rule, to remove Sharia from the constitution would lead to its 
removal from power by either a military coup or a popular uprising.271 By the early 
1990s, there were still some NIF members who were receptive to the possibility of 
southern secession if it would help facilitate the implementation of Sharia elsewhere 
in the state.272 Both sides eventually agreed on Khartoum as the capital city, with 
Sharia to be the law and non-Muslims exempt.273 Allowing Sharia in the national 
capital was a major concession made by the SPLM/A, but it fits well with the 
concession made by the government to allow the south to secede. By further 
codifying the Arab/non-Arab, Muslim/non-Muslim dichotomy, the parties are 
facilitating a divided state, whether willingly or unwillingly.
269 Johnson, interview. Johnson notes, for example, that the regime turned to South African president Nelson 
Mandela to host a new mediation process in South Africa when the self-determination issue arose at the second 
Abuja round.
270 Johnson, interview. ‘Self determination for the south had risen on the agenda with the intransigence of the NIF 
government.’
271 Osman Antwi-Boateng and Geraldine Maria O’Mahony. “A Framework for the Analysis of Peace Agreements 
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(2008), 164. In 2001, Vice President Ali Osman Taha, who would negotiate several points of the CPA personally 
with John Garang, asserted that ‘anyone who believes that the government will accept peace that dilutes Islam is 
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272 Sikainga, “Northern Sudanese political parties and the civil war,” 88. Ann Mosely Lesch. “Sudan: The Tom 
Country,” Current History 98:628 (May 1999). By the late 1990s, Bashir encouraged the possibility that 
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ISLAM: FROM NATION-BUILDING TOOL TO INSTRUMENT OF JIHAD
Early post-independence regimes saw Islam, with its unrivalled legitimacy and 
authenticity among most Sudanese, as a potential cornerstone for the new state. The 
attractiveness of this concept to northern nationalists was the primary impediment to 
an earlier peace agreement in the first civil war. The first attempts to spread the 
religion after independence came in 1957, when Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil 
authorized more than 170,000 pounds to promote Islam in the southern provinces.274 
The Abboud regime was even more aggressive in this capacity, viewing the southern 
problem as an artificial one that would be resolved after the state forcefully pushed 
for a centralized, united Sudan.275 Islam and Arabic had created a somewhat 
integrated -  if not homogenous -  culture out of many ethnic tribes in the north, the 
junta’s notion that this formula could also be applied to the south did not seem 
outlandish.276 The spread of Islam and Arab culture throughout the north of Sudan 
had been steady and unhurried, however, and Arabization too took place gradually 
over generations. As a result it was not often seen as a threat to local identity or 
cultural autonomy. By contrast, due to the abrupt nature with which it was re-
277introduced in the south at independence, locals there feared its influence.
The tendency of the northern nationalist movement to disregard the causes of 
southern anxiety continued following the October Revolution. After the return to 
parliamentary democracy in June 1965, northern parties fixated on another issue 
certain to alienate southerners; the creation of a national Islamic constitution. The 
prospect of an Islamic constitution had intrigued the Sudanese establishment almost 
since independence. It was seen as having the potential to encapsulate the legal 
embodiment of the religion which united Sudanese throughout the north, regardless 
of Arab or African traditions. The draft constitution submitted during this period had
274 Poggo, “General Ibrahim Abboud’s Military Administration in the Sudan, 1958-1964,” 72-73.
275 Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 107. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f 
Identities in the Sudan, 139. Moves taken to Islamicize the south included a February 1960 decision by the 
Council of Ministers to authorize Friday instead of Sunday as the day of rest, as it was throughout the other 
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276 Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 128.
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131
been a step in that direction, specifying that Sudan was ‘a socialist, democratic 
republic based on the guidance of the official religion, Islam’. Early post-colonial 
northern Sudanese nationalism required more than simply the ‘institution 
maintenance’ of a secular constitution as an expression of national identity. The 
Islamic element of northern nationalism could not be neglected in such a vital 
codifying document as the constitution. The war continued through the late 1960s 
into the early May Regime, but Islam as a nationalist tool had lost its vitality. It was 
clear to all but the most conservative Sudanese, especially after the Round Table 
discussions, that the northern imposition of Islam was one of the most galvanizing 
elements which led to southern hostility.
The National Reconciliation of 1977 was the crucial turning point in the 
conceptualization of northern identity. The event marked a reaffirmation by the 
government of the religious character of Sudan, and allowed the Islamists to lay the 
foundation for their post-nationalist version of the Sudanese state.280 Islamist 
Abdelwahab El-Affendi notes that in the 1970s, following the AAA, Islamists 
debated the merits of letting the south secede, arguing that as long as Islam was 
coupled with northern nationalism, it would be difficult to ensure the religion’s 
spread in the south. Ultimately it was agreed that Islamists could best solve this 
dilemma by decoupling the religion from nationalism. This natural process would
278 Ismail Bin Matt. “Toward an Islamic Constitional Government in Sudan.” Thirty-Fifth Annual Conference o f  
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occur as southerners became more educated. In essence, the conflict between Islam 
and the south would resolve itself. Islamists therefore recognized the dilemma, but 
declined to resolve it. With the coming of the National Reconciliation in 1977, 
Islamists were returned to some level of power and no longer compelled to analyze 
the situation.
Nimeiri began drifting towards a personal Islamist conversion in the late 1970s, after 
his reconciliation with the Muslim Brothers and the sectarian parties. Whether his 
new faith was sincere or not, his experimentation with Islamizing the laws of Sudan 
in the early 1980s marks the first time in Sudan’s post-independence history that 
Islam would be used not predominantly as a state-building tool, but as a political 
weapon. Nimeiri’s implementation of a crude and brutal version of religious law, 
introduced in September 1983, both contributed to the renewal of war in the south 
and made it extremely difficult for later governments to accommodate the grievances 
of the SPLM/A. The laws were also deeply unpopular among northern Sudan’s Sufi 
majority, who practiced a more flexible and adaptable Islam than Nimeiri’s harshly 
implemented measures would allow for. Only the Muslim Brothers greeted the laws 
enthusiastically. The introduction of Sharia law created its own challenge to the 
legitimacy of the state, one which had never existed under the nationalist regimes of 
previous decades. The laws were not implementable in the south, not because 
Nimeiri had spared that non-Muslim region but because the region’s officials simply 
refused to enforce them. It was ‘the first time in the history of Sudan where 
national laws were defied openly in any region of the country’.284 Even during the 
first civil war, it was northern nationalism and a lack of southern representation and 
autonomy which was the incentive to rebellion, not any specific set of laws. 
Nimeiri’s assault on secular institutions accelerated after the introduction of the
281 El-Affendi, “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa,” 379, 389. El-Affendi himself 
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Sharia laws, as his next maneuver was to replace the People’s Assembly in Khartoum 
with a Majlis Al-Shura, a body of religious consultation, whose members were to
I O C
swear an oath of obedience to Nimeiri.“ When 97 ministers of parliament, all 
southern, objected to some of the Islamist amendments Nimeiri had designed, he 
disbanded the body. It remained dissolved until he was toppled in 1985.“
The waning of northern nationalism as a governing principle continued in the four- 
year pause between the Nimeiri and Bashir dictatorships. What distinguished the 
1985 revolution most from the 1964 revolution was that leftist nationalism was not at 
all represented. The trade unions were moderate compared to other elements of the 
Transitional Military Council, but there was no ideological equivalent to the 
Communist Party. This new reality decreased the pressure on the conservative 
generals heading the regime to adhere to the principles of secular nationalism. 
Although the 1985 uprising was led by guilds such as the Sudanese Lawyers 
Association which rejected Nimeiri’s September Laws and endorsed the non-religious 
transitional constitution of 1956, General Al-Dhahab of the TMC considered 
repealing the laws to be ‘blasphemous’.“ Kok alleges that the TMC was under little 
pressure to cancel the laws from the organization of trade unions it was affiliated 
with, and surmises this was the greatest testament to the ambivalence of northern 
society towards secularism as a governing principle.289
As explained earlier, implementing Islamic law in Sudan had been seen as the 
ultimate goal of Sudanese nationalism for many politicians in the north, and even 
some secular politicians felt obligated to champion the idea. As a result, once Sharia 
laws were decreed, politicians were loath to remove them, regardless of how 
imperfect they were generally considered to be.290 Despite superficial commitments
285 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 137.
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to the post-colonial parliamentary nationalism, Al-Mahdi’s government of the 1980s 
was unable to reverse the Islamist laws put in place by the opportunistic Nimeiri, 
revealing the weakness of the northern nationalist project by the 1980s. Islam had 
been a tool for early nationalists, but had been converted into a political weapon by 
Nimeiri. This new foundation of Islam could not be revoked, only built upon. In 
addition, it revived southern anger at the north, and ended what little potential 
remained for national integration during the uneasy peace which followed the 
AAA.291
Simply put, northern Sudanese elites seemed sufficiently underwhelmed with the 
post-AAA attempt at creating an inclusive nationalist identity that they were prepared 
to let it be sacrificed in favor of a northern nationalist objective that had seemed 
abandoned permanently fifteen years earlier.292 Sudan’s economic woes post-AAA 
may have been valid reasons for the national government’s inability to fund the 
agreed level of development in the south, but the abolition of the southern region and 
the passage of Islamic law in the south were against both the letter and spirit of the 
agreement, and a strong indication that the project to integrate the south into the state 
had failed. As Lake and Rothchild note, the reintroduction of Sharia was to 
southerners ‘a confirmation of their second-class status’ in Sudan, confirming the 
historical suspicion of northerners which had only been temporarily abated by the 
AAA. Southerners viewed the laws as a gauntlet thrown down by the north to 
demonstrate their uncompromising vision of Sudanese identity, and this alienated 
them from the government more than any other single issue in the second war.294 The 
inability to resolve the issue at negotiations hindered the parliamentary peace 
initiatives throughout the 1980s, and helped give credence to the breakaway separatist
Government in Sudan,” 12. The severe hudud punishments, including amputation, contradicted the transitional 
constitution of 1985 and were suspended, but revoking the actual laws was too politically sensitive. Sadiq Al- 
Mahdi and his Umma party, after campaigning against the September Laws, soon joined the NIF and DUP in 
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135
faction in the second war which declared that Sharia made a united Sudan all the 
more impossible.295
After their 1989 coup, staged in part to prevent the suspension of the September 
Laws, the National Islamic Front-supported regime began pushing political Islam 
wholeheartedly." Unlike Sudan’s nationalist governments during the first war, the 
NIF junta was under few illusions that its regime was ultimately inclusive. Its open 
disdain for traditional Islam in Sudan estranged it from northern factions. Turabi’s 
pan-Islamist agenda was not simply a return to the Islam-influenced nationalism of 
the 1950s and 1960s. The sectarian parties during that period were not predominantly 
devoted to Islamist policies. Rather, ‘their strength derived from Islamic sentiments 
of solidarity... used to articulate basically secular nationalist positions’. The new 
regime, on the other hand advanced a narrow interpretation of Arab-Islamic culture, 
foreign to Sudan’s native Sufi traditions. Khartoum’s aggressive new Arab 
chauvinism alienated non-Arab groups such as the Beja and even the devoutly 
Muslim Darfuris. The ruling Islamists attempted to delegitimize the sectarian 
parties, especially the DUP, both because they wanted to weaken rivals and because 
they disliked the compromises over the status of Islam they felt had been made by 
these parties in the parliamentary eras.299
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streets looking for indecently dressed women. The teaching of arts and music was banned, as was the mingling of 
the sexes in social gatherings and the drinking of alcohol.
297 O’Fahey, “Islam and Ethnicity in the Sudan,” 261-262. O’Fahey cites Islamist Abdelwahab A.M. Osman’s 
criticism of both Sufi sectarianism and the Western-oriented secularism espoused by intellectuals, dismissing them 
both as alien colonial creations’. Telephone interview by the author with Baqie Muhammed, Bloomington, 2009. 
Omer, interview.
298 Al-Shahi, interview. El-Zain, “Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan,” 8-9. 
Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan’s Civil Wars, 138. This eventually led to a restored Beja Congress joining the 
NDA in Asmara. Interview by author with Monawar Sharif, Canberra, 2009. Sharif says in the first war, Arab 
identity was more important than Islamic identity, especially Arabic language. Southerners migrating to the north 
were forced to adopt Arabic names to gain access to jobs or university enrollment. Khartoum relied on secular 
institutions such as the army to draw non-Arab northerners, such as the Darfuris, into the war with the south.
Calls for Islamic jihad would only surface in the second war.
299 El-Zain, “Articulation of Cultural Discourses and Political Dominance in Sudan,” 12-13. El-Zain makes a 
distinction between the political Islam espoused by Turabi and the more traditional elements represented by the 
sectarian parties. Whereas the former evolved from a small cadre of students and academics in the 1960s, and 
placed a priority upon keeping its ideological integrity, the latter built its foundation upon the historical 
allegiances of the largely rural, illiterate peasantry. While these sectarian movements were much larger than the
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The tension between Islamism and Arabism in Sudan has been a constant in post­
colonial northern Sudan, with the latter including everything from an embrace of 
Arab Sudanese culture to a desire to join a federation of Arab states. As Aguda wrote 
in 1973, ‘The political aims of the pan-Arabists are fundamentally and diametrically 
opposed to those of the Islamists, except as regards the wish to subordinate the 
interests of non-Arabs. Their major goal is to merge Sudan with other Arab states, 
and it must not be assumed that there is widespread militant support for this. But 
they are also anxious to break the stranglehold of the religious sects over Sudanese 
politics, and to make the state play the leading role in all aspects of development.’300 
Even while Islamists such as Hassan Al-Turabi disdained the traditional pairing of 
Islam and nationalism in Sudan, the NIF-backed regime used the ambiguous 
relationship between the two to its advantage from the outset. In the early days of his 
regime, Bashir liked to stress that the new order was ‘pan-Arab’ in order to help 
solidify support among the crucial, arabized, riverine center of the country as well as
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to draw attention away from the Islamist element of the regime. The first policy 
statement of the Revolutionary Command Council (the junta organization) asserted 
the revolution was pan-Arabist, though non-partisan, and emphasized strengthening 
the armed forces and improving international relations.302 The Bashir regime was able 
to rely on Sudan’s history of takeovers from secular, army officers to mask the 
Islamist nature of the regime.
Sidahmed argues that after several years in power, ‘it could safely be said that 
nothing uniquely Islamic seemed to have been produced by the Salvation regime. 
After a ‘period of trial and error it established a system that did not differ from other
TOTauthoritarian regimes in the Middle East and Africa except in its ideological cover.’ 
While this analysis eventually proved to be accurate, it gives too little credit to the 
regime’s early radical phase and its lasting impact on the regime, even as it became
modem Islamist movement, allegiances were foremost spiritual, not political. Their family-oriented leadership 
left them open to ideological and personal divisions which the more disciplined Islamist movement was able to 
avoid.
300 Aguda, “Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics,” 191.
301 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 97.
302 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000, 30. Madut-Arop, 
Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 231 -232. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 97.
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more conventionally authoritarian. The precedents set during that ‘early period of 
trial and error’ allowed the Islamist element of the regime, while not powerful enough 
to realistically implement a complete Islamist revolution, to pose a significant enough 
challenge to Sudanese nationalism as to permit the government to accept in principle 
the division of the Sudanese state in the CPA.
The refashioning of the southern war into a formal jihad in 1992 by the NIF regime 
was an inevitable move.304 As the most militant of Islamists and Arabists, the junta 
leadership would have squandered its credibility as a legitimate government had it not 
taken the most ardent line a pious Islamic regime could take. The SPLM/A’s 
advocacy of a national identity ‘renaissance’ was a threat to Arab-Islamic supremacy 
and helped radicalize the NIF regime. ‘Islam, rather than Arab race or culture, was 
their only weapon for mobilizing the Northern majority’.305 With the abrogation of 
the AAA, non-Muslims no longer had a state-guaranteed right to defend their own 
identity or develop their culture. They were to either assimilate culturally or 
sequester themselves in small territories in which they could claim exemption from 
religious laws and language requirements.' Hassan Al-Turabi had for years viewed 
it as a religious obligation of Sudanese Muslims to convert the south, which he 
argued had no real culture of its own.307 The Sudanese campaign in the 1990s became 
the first jihad initiated by a modem Muslim state in post-colonial Africa to Islamize 
its minority peoples. To curb the SPLA’s influence, Khartoum attempted to 
implement a cordon sanitaire around the south by relocating non-Arab villages just 
north of the three southern provinces, the most aggressive attempt to isolate the 
region since the colonial Southern Policy.309 While the Islamist attack on southern 
cultural identities may not have had the backing of most northern civilians, who had
304 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 53.
305 Luka Biong Deng. “The Sudan Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Will It Be Sustained?” Civil Wars 7:3 
(2005), 7. Sharif, interview.
306 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 21. Sikainga, “Northern Sudanese political parties and the 
civil war,” 88. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 301-302, 309. Before their coup, 
the NIF had first put forth this very limited notion of minority protection in 1987 as the Sudan Charter, the party’s 
response to Umma’s 1986 Koka Dam Declaration concerning a peaceful resolution of the war.
307 Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question,” 24.
308 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 65. Ronen, “Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudanese 
Civil War,” 118. Jihad was specifically announced as the motivation for the January 1996, mass mobilization 
against forces supported by Ethiopia in Eastern Sudan.
309 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 161.
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grown tired of war, it could not have helped but foster more southern animosity
1 1 A
towards the north generally.
The Islamist regime’s goal to unify Sudan with a narrow Arab-Islamic identity might 
have had some success in the north, but it could not be realized during the war due to 
the regime’s reliance on coercion, a difficult method for state-building in a vast 
territory over which the state has so little control. This strategy may work better post­
war; now that the regime has enough revenue to support it from oil wealth, Khartoum 
can extend its patronage network across north Sudan. The policy would be nearly 
impossible to implement in the south, however, where differences are too 
exaggerated. ‘The Arab Islamic aspect of Sudan’s national identity is part of the NCP 
configurations, but its not shared, either part by the south. So the more you unify the 
north on that basis, which they haven’t really with the Nuba and Darfur and the 
east... the more they alienate the south. This model of national Islamic Arab unity is 
not functioning. ’311
SELF-GOVERNANCE FOR SOUTHERN SUDAN
A fundamental question which both peace treaties attempted to address to some 
degree was the role of democracy in keeping peace. Democracy -  or at least a 
democratic form of self-govemance -  is an obvious way groups can defend cultural 
integrity, but the experience of the AAA has shown that it is not always the most 
sought after institution for insurgents seeking to protect their culture from national 
intrusion.
The lesson to draw from these arrangements is that protecting the fragile democratic 
institutions of the south created in the AAA was not a high-ranking objective for the 
southerners who negotiated that treaty. Although it allowed an unprecedented 
amount of self-govemance, including a regional executive and legislature, the heavy 
influence of the national president pervaded these democratic institutions. In the
310 "The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward," 15. Muhammed, interview. Yongo-Bure, 
interview.
311 Lobban, interview.
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legislature, President Nimeiri was permitted by the AAA to appoint up to one fourth 
of the People’s Regional Assembly delegates. The People’s Regional Assembly 
could ask the national president to ‘postpone’ a national law coming into effect in the 
south, but he was not obligated to comply. The national president could appoint 
and remove members of the Southern Region’s High Executive Council, on 
recommendation from the council’s president.314 The national president also 
appointed the High Executive Council president and members for the eighteen-month 
interim period between the March 1972 ratification of the AAA and the 1973 
elections.315
In addition, the democratic nature of the Southern Region suffered due to the 
formation of informal factions instead of formal political parties. Sudan remained a 
one-party state, with all political business conducted within the Sudan Socialist 
Union. Officially, there were no parties in the south, in keeping with the continuing 
neo-patrimonial nature of the regime, by which rulers were happy to introduce 
competitive elections, but only within the context of a single party and primarily to
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weaken the political class.“ This situation led to a lack of direction on the part of the 
opposition which was ‘simply a group of members that were opposed to the then 
leadership of the regional government’, and no doubt made the body less vigorous 
than it could have been.317 This disregard for the principles of multi-party democracy 
was not relegated to the south alone. Kok observes that for most of the 1970s, a 
return to multi-party democracy was not a key demand in the reconciliation of the 
SSLM, the Islamists or the Umma Party, the three most powerful forces to oppose the 
regime.
312 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
o f the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Article 10.
313 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
o f the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Article 14.
3,4 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
o f the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Article 20.
315 Addis Ababa Agreement: Protocols on Interim Arrangements, Article 1.
3,6 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 75. The authors speculate that this also accounts 
for the rapid turnover of personnel in neo-patrimonial regimes
317 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 324, 398-399. Lagu states that ‘there seemed to 
be two undeclared political parties in the south: one patronized by Abel Alier and the other by me.’
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In hindsight, the democratic principles established for the Southern Region seem 
almost incidental. Since the insurgents had no shared nationalist identity and no 
charismatic, regionally popular leader, a weak democratic structure was inevitable. 
Lagu initially returned to the army, and former Minister for Southern Affairs Abel 
Alier assumed the executive office in the south. As they were enacted, these 
ephemeral democratic arrangements revealed that southern democracy appeared to be 
following in the shallow footsteps of the parliamentary democracy practiced in 
Khartoum in the 1950s and 1960s, with the rule of law upheld arbitrarily and 
factional and regional squabbling taking the place of policymaking with the public
1 q
good in mind.
This conundrum is the ultimate demonstration of the weakness of southern identity by 
1972: a vibrant southern nationalist movement with a charismatic authoritarian leader 
would have preferred a more independent regional executive. Alternatively, a vibrant 
democratic movement in the south would have preferred a more independent regional 
assembly. Even if the SSLM delegation was unable to obtain these concessions from 
the government, a truly democratic-minded southern establishment would have 
revolted against Nimeiri for his constant intrusions into the political system 
throughout out the 1970s and 1980s. There was also great southern passivity towards 
monitoring the actions of regional government during this period, which led to the 
atrophy of good-government after the AAA. In fact, had the southern movement 
been a more coherently nationalist force by 1972, it may even have settled for a less 
democratic structure. There existed a tension between nationalist movements and 
democratic movements, particularly in areas with no modem democratic traditions: 
‘the tasks of liberation and democracy are driven by different logics. Liberation is 
driven by the need to unite, which in much of history is accomplished through strong 
authoritarian states... Democracy, in contrast, is driven not by the logic of 
unification, but rather diversity. Democracy creates divisions between groups; it 
factionalizes, rather than unifies.’ While in many states this tension often leads to 
authoritarianism in the name of the continued cause of nationalism, in southern
319 Al-Shahi, interview.
j2° Yongo-Bure, interview. ‘People, they are naive, they think leaders will take care o f them without pressure, 
they will not mistreat their southern brothers. But leaders have their own agendas.’
321 Metelits, “Reformed Rebels? Democratization, Global Norms and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army,” 77.
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Sudan, the nationalist movement was so weak that the politics of the Southern Region 
veered towards the other extreme. Democratic procedures led to factionalism and 
provincialism with few uniting southern principles to hold the region together.
It has been observed that simple majoritarian democracy is not often accepted by 
peoples who see themselves as permanent minorities, whether southerners in Sudan 
or smaller, non-Dinka tribes in the People’s Regional Assembly of the Southern 
Region. This situation undermines the utility of a conventional parliamentary system 
of the kind many European colonial powers exported to their colonies. On a 
national level, reliance on the Westminster parliamentary system in Sudan led to a 
neglect of the regions and multiple military takeovers. No party ever had enough 
support to dominate parliament, resulting in political maneuvers such as opportunistic 
alliances with regional parties. This often led to a public disillusionment with 
democracy as a formal institution as implemented in Sudan. However, a southern 
lack of reliance on democratic institutions demonstrates less an anti-democratic 
inclination among the region’s peoples than ambivalence about democratic 
institutions as introduced from the central government. None of the parliamentary 
eras in Sudanese history are remembered with fondness in the south. The second 
parliamentary period of the 1960s would have been fresh in the memory of 
southerners by the time of the AAA drafting. By 1965 the elites of the two major 
parties were determined to hold the first elections to follow the Abboud dictatorship. 
When the war raging in the south precluded a security situation in which elections
T94.could be held in the region, northern parties simply petitioned to cancel them there. 
The decision was made despite the objections of both southern and smaller northern 
parties that it would simply foment separatism.325
Indeed, the 1965 elections confirmed to many southerners the hypocrisy of the north, 
which they saw as demanding democracy for every region except the most
322 Roy Licklider. “Obstacles to Peace Settlements.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing 
International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 707.
323 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 114.
324 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 85.
325 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 25. SANU, the Southern Front, the Sudanese 
Communist Party and the People’s Democratic Party all argued against the principle of holding elections in all 
sections of Sudan but one, arguing that it would vindicate separatist charges.
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disenfranchised and alienated. This perception was a severe blow to southern faith in 
a democratic political process within Sudan, and by the time of the 1967 elections, 
many southerners were openly supporting secession. The damage to southern faith 
in parliamentary democracy was two-fold, as the Southern Front had signed on to the 
plan to not hold the 1965 elections in southern districts. The Maghoub government 
showed its disdain for southern parties by appointing northern traders who resided in 
the south to those assembly seats, even though the High Court had ruled against this 
policy. As a result of behavior such as this, many southerners held neither the 
democratic process nor democratic political parties in high regard when it came to 
defending their security.
Another challenge to the integrity of democratic politics in the Southern Region was 
the accommodation of resurgent tribalism. The need to manage such sensitive 
divisions as tribal politics made authorities fearful of relying purely on democratic 
institutions. The practice of one candidate voluntarily stepping down in favor of 
another one seemed as acceptable as a contested election, as demonstrated by the 
1978 contest between Clement Mboro and Samuel Aru Bol, the latter of whom 
eventually withdrew his claim to the disputed position of speaker of the People’s 
Regional Assembly.329 This principle was illustrated again that year when the 
president of the High Executive Council, Abel Alier, agreed to stand down so that the 
more popular Joseph Lagu could serve in the office without having to defeat Alier in 
a general election. Such a defeat might have provoked tribalist tension once again, 
this time between Dinka supporters of Alier and Equatorian supporters of Lagu.
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The southern suspicion of parliamentary politics continued into the 1980s, and was 
remembered so bitterly that John Garang assured his supporters at the signing of the 
CPA that future democracy would not simply be a return to the parliamentary eras. 
Instead, the CPA sought to combine an autonomous southern region with a formal, 
nationwide federal structure. The CPA allowed for a multi-level system of 
government: national, Southern, state, and local.332 The Government of Southern 
Sudan and each of the Sudan’s states were also to have their own constitutions, in 
compliance with the National Interim Constitution. Under the CPA, the right to 
vote was guaranteed to every citizen, as were general periodic elections.334 The first 
elections were to be held at all levels of government before the end of the third year 
of the interim period which began in mid-20 05.335 In a similar move as that which 
occurred in elections after the AAA, the CPA excluded from running candidates who 
did not vow to uphold the agreement.336
A commonly noted structural flaw of the CPA was the undemocratic nature of its 
crafting. The rationing out of representation to the two parties which had concluded 
the peace agreement -  the SPLM and the NCP -  had the potential to alienate other 
southerners and even cause further disillusionment with Sudanese democracy. At the 
time of the signing of the CPA, John Garang could only promise parties excluded 
from the agreements that they would not be ignored.3,7 However, a complication the 
CPA faces is that democratic representation in a united Sudan does not appear to be 
as high an objective for most southerners as self-determination. The eternally 
thwarted goal of self-determination has only become more popular, as demonstrated 
by a 2004 African Security Analysis paper which argues that it has become a ‘holy 
grail’ for many southerners. In it, the conundrum is noted that many southerners 
would ‘bypass a transition to democracy’, especially at the national level, if such a
331 John Garang. “Text: Garang’s speech at the signing ceremony of S. Sudan peace deal.” Sudan Tribune. 
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transition is seen as a threat to southern self-determination. Yet northerners 
generally stated in the same survey that returning to democracy and ending the war 
are the most important goals.
Neither agreement cited tribal division in the south in any detail when discussing self- 
governance. In the first agreement, this omission might have come as a result of the 
nationalist May Regime seeking not to further categorize Sudanese according to 
tribes, as the colonial relic of tribal rule, the Native Administration, had only just 
been abolished by 1971. In the second war, the nationalist SPLM/A might have 
simply assumed that the multi-tier federal system to be implemented would allow the 
states to protect their own cultures. Self-governing aspects of the CPA seemed 
vindicated when a study completed in June 2005 revealed that the most popular 
model of government through Sudan remained a decentralized federal system.339
Antwi-Boateng and O’Mahoney are correct in their assessment that the CPA is 
heavily biased towards the NCP and SPLM at the exclusion of other parties. They 
are also correct in noting that neither of these parties ‘have a record of internal 
democracy that promotes democratic competition to elect its leaders’ .34° However, 
this seems to overestimate the degree to which southerners in particular are relying on 
democratic institutions to preserve their autonomy. While the SPLM has made 
efforts towards implementing less exclusive partnerships than are traditionally seen in 
Sudan, it will not sacrifice southern autonomy for democracy. To some degree, 
southern wariness over the value of democracy for its own sake is supported by 
empirical evidence, but not conflict resolution theory. An axiom of conflict 
resolution has been that power-sharing arrangements without strong democratic 
underpinnings are more likely to fail as they rely more on the mutual interests of the 
parties rather than democratic institutions.341 However, empirical data has shown that 
democracy in the late twentieth century has not been a primary factor in decreasing
338 "The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward," 11.
339 Lokuji, Hazards in the Power Sharing Aspects o f the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the Interim 
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340 Antwi-Boateng and O’Mahony, “A Framework for the Analysis of Peace Agreements and Lessons Learned,” 
143.
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the chances of renewed civil war.342 As a result, one of the most obvious instruments 
by which a people can assert and defend their cultural identity, democratic 
government, is not in itself enough to prevent war.
Despite its initial weakness with regard to civilian institutions, the SPLM/A had no 
intention of settling for an apparatus that could be defined, manipulated and 
controlled by the central government, as happened in the 1970s. As Garang outlined 
at the CPA ceremony, ‘in preparing to implement [the CPA], the SPLM/A had 
established committees to work out mechanisms for the transformation from organs 
for guerrilla warfare and armed opposition into organs of good governance.’343 
Instead of focusing on democratic elements such as early elections and the 
invigoration of political parties, the SPLM instead argued for a defined set of powers 
to be shared by the government and the former insurgents. At a national level, the 
power-sharing protocol devised three ‘clusters’ of ministries: sovereignty, economic 
sector and services sector.344
LANGUAGE IN THE CPA
Rather than the strength of democratic institutions, southerners would rely on three 
elements to protect their culture during the interim period which followed the CPA: 
the threat of secession, the southern army’s ability to protect its citizens, and the 
direct codification of culture and rights in the CPA agreements. Discrimination from 
the national government on the grounds of religion was the most important of the 
prohibitions in the Machakos Protocol. Khartoum was not to discriminate against 
anyone on the basis of religion ‘or other beliefs’.345 National legislation which
342 Paul Collier. “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy.” Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges o f Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. 
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343 UN Security Council 5120 meeting, press release 2005.
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contradicted religious or customary practices of the majority of a state or region could 
be challenged at a local level or subjected to review at a national level.346
The enervation of the northern nationalist movement by 2004, particularly in 
asserting itself via the spread of the Arabic language, meant that Sudan’s regional 
languages would see even more protections added than under the AAA. More 
importantly, the self-determination component of the earlier Machakos protocol 
precluded any outright regulation against use of any language in the power-sharing 
agreement. English was promoted to equal status as Arabic within the south, as both 
were to be official working languages and languages of higher education, with 
discrimination against either forbidden.347 All indigenous languages were considered 
national languages, worthy of promotion.- Any state or region could adopt 
additional official languages as they saw fit.349
The staggered order of agreements by which the CPA was concluded over three years 
provides some insight into the significance of issues not as obvious in the rapidly 
concluded AAA. Following this logic, it appears that by the early 2000s, southerners 
were more concerned about Khartoum committing to the right of southern self- 
determination than what had been a vital issue of concern in the AAA: language. 
While cultural issues of religion, autonomy and self-determination were all 
mentioned in the 2002 agreement, the specifics of the status of language were not laid 
out until the 2004 Power Sharing Agreement. The Machakos Protocol simply
350contained a passing acknowledgement of Sudan’s ‘linguistic diversity’.
This was very likely a decision influenced by the personal philosophy of John 
Garang, who had never considered limiting the spread of Arabic as a primary goal. 
During the 1980s, he had even stated that while he did not speak Arabic fluently, he 
could accept it as a national language that need not threaten his southern identity, in
346 Machakos Protocol, 2002, section 3.2.4.
347 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 2.8.3 and 2.8.5.
348 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 2.8.1.
349 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 2.8.4.
350 Machakos Protocol, 2002, section 1.5.1.
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the same way Americans used English and South American peoples spoke Spanish. 
The diffusion of language as a cultural weapon may be one of the few legacies of 
integration which survived from the era of the Addis Ababa Agreement. Despite 
sometimes simplistic propaganda, the early southern nationalist movement was able 
to distinguish between Islam and Arab culture: many southerners involved early in 
the southern nationalist movement had an Islamic background or were themselves 
Muslim.352 The ability of southerners to easily make a distinction between Arab and 
non-Arab Islam is a testament to Arabic’s ability to spread easily throughout Sudan 
before hostilities began in the 1950s. In northern Sudan, Arab identity -  Arab custom 
and particularly language -  generally arrived with each wave of Islam. ‘As Islam 
spread in Sudan, knowledge of Arabic spread, too, both because Muslims sought to 
study the Arabic Qur’an, and because Arabic offered a welcome “technology of 
literacy” for recording land deeds, significant events, mercantile and budgetary 
transactions, and biographical accounts of remarkable figures.’ This is a primary 
reason why regimes such as Abboud’s leaned so heavily on Arab-Islamic culture for 
assimilation of the south.
However, such assimilation efforts were ultimately counterproductive, and would 
become even more so with the reintroduction of the Islamic project in Sudan with the 
Islamic laws of 1983. Sharkey quotes the French linguist Catherine Miller, who 
wrote in 1989 that ‘abusive centralization and the non-recognition of ethnic 
minorities have cancelled out the capacity for potential integration that [the 
government’s policies] of Islamization and Arabization may have held’. Reflecting 
on Arabic culture in Southern Sudan, the Sudanese linguist Ushari Ahmad Mahmud 
was equally blunt. ‘International and indigenous professionals acting as linguistic 
specialists will get nowhere,’ Mahmud wrote, ‘as long as they continue to avoid the 
real issues of political power distribution and social inequalities.’354 As general
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353 Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 22.
354 Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 35-37. 
Sharkey contends that ‘language policy became a mode of resistance’. She quotes linguistic scholar Yusuf Al-
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resentment toward the riverine northern Arabs’ treatment of other remote areas of 
Sudan grew, as well as towards that group’s near monopolization of resources and 
political power, by the 1990s, ‘the spread of Arabic was not ineluctably leading to the
o c r
spread of Arab identity’.
The CPA was crafted in order to recognize this impasse. However, it also recognized 
that any efforts for a Sudanese national identity which can be shared by Sudanese of 
all religions and cultures would also come to nothing as the Bashir regime was 
adamant about retaining Islamic elements such as Sharia law throughout the north, 
including in Khartoum. As the Islamist writer Al-Affendi explains, the objective of 
an Islamic society, governed according to Islamic law, is incompatible with the 
SPLM/A’s secular objective. ‘If these positions are maintained, one of these visions 
has to triumph, and there is no possibility of accommodating the two in one polity.
If, as looks increasingly likely, neither could win outright, then either both visions
o c  z:
would have to change, or the polity be broken up.’ Prospects for a newly 
conceived, inclusive identity appeared possible following the AAA, but tribalism in 
the south and regime insecurity and opportunism in the north eventually led to the 
creation of a new agreement in which codified the differences between north and 
south instead of attempting to transcend them.
Khalifa, who notes that during the first war, ‘Far from the eyes and control of the Government... the Anyanya... 
were running their schools in the 1960s in the jungles of the South according to the old system (vernaculars as 
media in classes 1 and 2 with English as a subject in these two years and as a medium of instruction from the third 
year on).’
355 Sharkey, “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race,” 25.
356 Abdelwahab El-Affendi. “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa.” African Affairs 
89:356 (July 1990), 69.
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CHAPTER THREE: PATRONAGE STATE DYNAMICS AND CONFLICT
RESOLUTION
This chapter examines the political dynamics of the state in Sudan, specifically the 
typically center-periphery patronage system which has been a near constant feature of 
administration, predating even Anglo-Egyptian rule. The state in Sudan has been too 
weak to survive purely by relying on coercive methods, and has therefore been forced 
to rely on selectively chosen patron-client relationships. 1 2The term ‘patronage’ is used 
to describe the asymmetrical relationship by which one group’s political power in 
Sudan is reliant on the legitimacy or military power it receives from another larger or 
more established group. These relationships are usually unstable, exclusive 
coalitions. Neo-patrimonialism is defined as a ‘mixed type of rule combining... lack 
of separation between public and private spheres’.- State reliance on patronage 
networks exists independently of more abstract political concepts such as national 
identity, though nationalist movements have often been forced to depend on these 
networks as well. Their persistence has contributed to all of Sudan’s dominant peace 
agreements since independence, as well as the abrogation of the AAA.
The chapter explains why this dynamic has prevented the southern conflict from 
being resolved during the parliamentary eras. Patronage systems generally rely on 
exclusive coalitions. The conservative nationalists who inherited many post-colonial 
sub-Saharan states turned to patronage politics. While many nationalists sought to 
form inclusive relationships with elites representing various factions of the state, 
some instead formed narrow political coalitions, which Lindemann labels
1 Telephone interview by the author with Peter Woodward, Reading, 2007. Muhammed, interview. As 
Muhammed describes, Sudanese political society is dominated by individual elites who have formed their own 
political culture, regardless o f which geographic region o f the country they represent. It is from within this 
political culture that both the push for war and the resolution o f war derive.
2 Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn. “African Guerrilla Politics: Raging Against the Machine?” African 
Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine. Eds. Boas, Morten and Kevin C. Dunn. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner, 2007, 22. ‘The privatization of the public has three main consequences: 1) Political administrative 
power, instead o f having the impersonal and abstract character o f legal-rational domination specific to the 
bureaucratic state, is transformed to personalized power. 2) Politics becomes a kind o f business, because political 
resources provide access to economic resources and vice versa. 3) Mass politics are structured around virtual 
client relationships.’ Gero Erdmann and U lf Engel. “Neopatrimonialism Revisited -  Beyond a Catch-All 
Concept.” German Institute of Global and Area Studies. Working Paper 16, February 2006, 18.
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‘exclusionary elite bargains’ .3 Sudanese factions typically opt more for the latter, 
exclusionary model of coalition-building. This practice is common because society’s 
sense of identity has traditionally been so fragmented that democratic coalitions lose 
political vitality as they become more representative of Sudanese society. The 
sectarian political parties have only been able to form fragile governing coalitions, 
constricting their ability to make bolder gestures towards peace or secularism.
The relationship between exclusivist coalitions and the patronage state has been 
explained with the theory that the large coalitions which typify democratic regimes 
are dependent on successful policies, while exclusivist coalitions must depend instead 
on ‘their ability to satisfy their core supporters through the distribution of private 
goods’ .4 The dynamic of an authoritarian state at war is fundamentally different from 
a democracy: ‘authoritarian leaders devote fewer resources to war because the costs 
of failure are less and because they need those resources to distribute to their key 
supporters at home’ .5 This theorization appears to have been in the context of inter­
state wars. However, the fact that the dynamic fits so well with Sudan’s civil wars 
only emphasizes how unintegrated the state has remained since independence. 
Authoritarian regimes in Sudan, not reliant on popular support, have also had more 
freedom to negotiate peace and more incentive. Both wars have ended when an 
autocratic government in Khartoum with a narrow base of support had recently been 
forced to quash a coalition partner that had threatened their rule. In both cases, the 
exiled partner had formed an impediment to conflict resolution in the south. Also in 
both cases, the north had sought to use the peace agreements as the basis for a new 
exclusivist coalition with the south.
3 Stefan Lindemann. “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the Causes 
of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Development Studies Institute. London School of Economics and Political 
Science. Discussion Paper 15 (February 2008), 19.
4 Jack S. Levy. “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War: A Levels-of-Analysis Approach.” Turbulent Peace: 
The Challenges o f Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela 
Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 360. Interview by the author w'ith Cherry 
Leonardi, Durham, 2007. Leonardi describes how these exclusive coalitions have become integrated into the 
Sudanese concept of the state: ‘The whole pattern of politics in Sudan has always been about regional 
competition. Even within the south you see the same things, there’s competition between the different regions or 
ethnic groups. The whole system of government has been set up in that kind of way. It’s very hard therefore to 
unify people unless you can promise them all a slice of the pie and make sure that they get it. Then it tends to fall 
apart, there’s always going to be someone who feels they haven’t gotten their fair share.’
5 Levy, “Theories of Interstate and Intrastate War,” 360.
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This chapter will focus on the patronage system of the state -  as opposed to 
subnational patronage systems -  because it is within the context of state patronage 
that the agreements were concluded. Once the AAA is viewed as an attempt to induct 
southern elites into the patronage system, the relative lack of success at integrating 
the region with the rest of Sudan and the exaggerated internal divisions which 
appeared in the south before the outbreak of the second war become easier to 
understand. The coalition finally collapsed in part because of Nimeiri’s need to seek 
a stronger coalition in the north to preserve his rule. This resulted in Nimeiri’s 
withdrawal from the nationalist project and his attempts to access newly discovered 
southern oil to accommodate his northern coalition partners.
The CPA was a more difficult agreement to conclude between the Bashir regime and 
the SPLM/A as, for most of the conflict, the two parties had incompatible visions for 
the future of Sudan. As a result, each party sought to form as many tactical coalitions 
as possible. This process destroyed the integrity of national institutions, most 
significantly the army, making its status in a post-war Sudan subject to negotiation 
for the first time. Consequently, the CPA is unique in that it successfully petitioned 
the government to authorize the instruments through which the patronage system 
could be challenged: a separate standing army and the right of secession. Post­
independence challenges to the system have been few and have not lasted long, but 
they have never been as carefully arranged as the 2005 agreement, in which the 
national government has been pressured into ceding an unprecedented amount of 
control to the south. Previous challenges had never met such acquiescence from the 
state. Most of Sudan’s peace agreements, including both the 1977 National 
Reconciliation and the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement, have been attempts to draw 
opponents of the state into an exclusivist, patronage-based coalition. However, the 
compromises necessary for such exclusivist coalitions, often made between groups 
with radically different platforms, erode the ideological vitality of the participating 
parties’ agendas. Since these compromises can also erode base support, regimes 
become increasingly reliant on force to sustain patronage-based partnerships, either 
co-opting the army or relying on more pliable forces such as militias.
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Sudan’s system of administration has been described as neo-patrimonial, an advanced 
form of earlier patrimonial forms of rule. The constant forging of new alliances and 
the subsequent erosion of institutions has made politics in Sudan heavily reliant on 
individual personalities. This tendency is also apparent in the crafting and 
implementation of both agreements, and with respect to both the parties that signed 
them. It is a result of Sudan’s reliance on neo-patrimonial networks, in which the 
customs and traditions of patrimonial rule -  some of which may predate colonial rule 
-  co-exist with rational-legal institutions that were first introduced during the colonial 
era.6 Erdmann and Engel describe the typical trajectory of colonial power in Africa 
which fostered the neo-patrimonial rule that would continue in African states after 
independence. They note that the colonial state has never been modem, rather a 
traditional state with features of the pre-colonial era. The legal-rational ‘sphere’ 
consisted only of the area surrounding the capital, any European population, and 
other immigrant groups. Most of the rest of the Sudanese territory was still 
administered under a patrimonial system which relied on sheikhs and elders who 
served as an intermediate authority. It was only during the decade following World 
War Two that colonial powers sought to enhance the modem bureaucracy and 
incorporate native peoples into it.7 8
Lindemann suggests analyzing the inclusiveness of the regimes’ coalitions generally. 
He quotes Clapham, who explained that neo-patrimonialism is ‘a form of 
organization in which relationships of a broadly patrimonial type pervade a political 
and administrative system which is formally constructed on rational-legal lines. 
Officials hold positions in bureaucratic organizations with powers which are formally 
defined, but exercise those powers, so far as they can, as a form not of public service
o
but of private property.’ Lindemann rejects neo-patrimonialism as a cause for 
conflict, noting that, while it might lead to economic mismanagement, it is difficult to 
see how a concept so pervasive among sub-Saharan states has led to conflict in some,
6 Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1997, 62. T he characteristic feature o f neo-patrimonialism is the incorporation of patrimonial 
logic into bureaucratic institutions.’ “Neopatrimonialism Revisited -  Beyond a Catch-All Concept.” 105.
7 Erdmann and Engel, “Neopatrimonialism Revisited -  Beyond a Catch-All Concept,” 106. ‘After independence, 
with the Africanisation o f the bureaucracy and the establishment of authoritarian rule, the bureaucracy was 
extended and at the same time challenged and invaded from above and below by informal relationships. Thus, the 
state in Africa has always been a hybrid one, a mixture o f patrimonial and legal-rational domination.’
8 Lindemann, “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter?” 14.
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but not in others. Rivalry between factions may be fundamental to the composition 
of such systems, and even encouraged by the state, but rivalry to the point of conflict 
is far from an inevitability. Instead, Lindemann suggests that what is significant is 
not the structure of the system of patronage, but who the beneficiaries are.9 Indeed, in 
Sudan, both the AAA and the CPA were meant by the state as a form of inclusion of 
the south into the patronage system, to the detriment of more traditional partners in 
the north.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARLIAMENTARY PATRONAGE SYSTEM
The pervasiveness of neo-patrimonial networks during the parliamentary periods was 
a severe source of southern disillusionment with democracy as practiced in Sudan, 
accounting for the light emphasis on democratic institutions in the peace agreements 
as described in the previous chapter. In fact, governments established by sectarian 
political parties were actually less flexible at selecting a base of patronage than 
authoritarian regimes. Their allegiance was foremost to the traditional sectarian 
factions, well-established sources of patronage in the Sudan. This often prohibited 
them from any incentive to compromise with the south while in power. To 
understand the inability of parliamentary regimes to resolve the southern conflict, this 
dynamic must be examined in detail.
As noted in previous chapters, the patronage system in Sudan had its foundations 
established before independence. The Condominium, to compensate for its small 
occupational presence, became a patron to the two largest sectarian factions: the 
Khatmiyya and eventually the neo-Mahdists. In return for their cooperation in 
stabilizing the regime, the colonial administration encouraged their participation in 
commerce and agriculture, allowing them to invigorate their own patronage networks 
throughout the countryside, religious affiliations that would outlast Anglo-Egyptian 
rule. 10 During World War I, both sectarian leaders proved reliable collaborators.
9 Lindemann, “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter?” 15.
10 Ali Suliman Fadlalla. “The Search for a Constitution.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, 
Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 46. Martin 
Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket: the political and economic background of the Sudanese civil war.” Civil 
War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993, 7. 
Interview by the author with Ahmed Al-Shahi, Oxford, 2007. Ahmed Alawad Sikainga. “Northern Sudanese
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Sayyid Ali al-Mirghani, Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman, and other Sudanese notables signed 
a letter to the Governor General on 23 April 1919, pledging loyalty to King of 
England and assuring a complete lack of involvement in the nationalist tensions 
shaking Egypt at that time. While a concern not to upset Egyptian claims to Sudan 
led the British to initial wariness in allowing the sectarian leaders too much formal 
power, after 1924, officials in Khartoum would give them freer reign to shape 
northern Sudanese society in their own image.* 11 By 1924, the sectarian leaders were 
able to put major constraints on the growth of Sudanese secular nationalism. The 
November 1924 revolt by Sudanese and Egyptian troops did not inspire a mass 
following in part because it lacked sectarian support. Religious leaders could 
dissuade their followers or even turn them against the nationalist movement. Without 
sectarian support, Latif s nationalist White Flag League could barely function outside 
of larger towns. While colonial authorities might have preferred direct control, 
sectarian participation allowed them to argue that the educated class spoke for a tiny
• ITelite clique while the religious leaders spoke for the majority.
Colonial promotion of the sectarian factions therefore created the dominant political 
division in northern Sudan, one that would reappear consistently during the state’s 
parliamentary episodes. The parliamentary system as introduced by the
political parties and the civil war.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. 
London: British Academic Press, 1993, 79. Robert L. Tignor. “The Sudanese Private Sector: An Historical 
Overview.” The Journal o f Modern African Studies 25:2 (1987), 185, 198. The early Condominium government, 
for example, restricted licences to use the irrigation networks surrounding the Nile to only regime supporters.
11 Muddathir Abd Al-Rahim. Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1969, 
99-100. The formal partnership of the government and the sectarian leaders particularly benefited Sayyid Abd Al- 
Rahman of the Mahdiyya, and by the mid-1930s he had become the wealthiest man in the Sudan, with enormous 
religious influence in Darfur and the White Nile region. Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in 
a Traditional Society. London: Frank Cass & Company, 1978, 31-32, 43. Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: 
the Unstable State, Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers; London: L. Crook Academic Pub, 1990, 50, 69. 
Sayyid Mirghani was more inclined to refrain from politics than Abd Al-Rahman, but nevertheless viewed his 
rival’s gains with alarm.
12 Abdel Salam M. Sidahmed. Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 
22. Al-Shahi, interview. Francis Mading Deng, War of Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan. Washington, 
Brookings Institute, 1995, 108-109. The sectarian leaders were also implicated in countering nationalist 
propaganda with their own. At the time of the 1924 revolt, a widely read article insulting nationalist leader Ali 
Abd Al-Latif for both his non-Arab and slave origins was printed in a newspaper co-owned by both sectarian 
leaders. Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 35. Sayyid Abd Al-Rahman in 
particular was happy to advance the government’s concept of Native Administration when he realized that tribal 
leadership was too weak to threaten his increasingly political ambitions.
13 John Voll and Sarah Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985,56. Al-Shahi, interview. Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities: Refections on the 
Origin and Spread o f Nationalism. London: Verso, 1983, 127. ‘The expansion of the colonial state which, so to 
speak, invited “natives” into schools and offices, and of colonial capitalism which as it were, excluded them from 
boardrooms, meant that to an unprecedented extent the key early spokesmen for colonial nationalism were lonely, 
bilingual intelligentsias unattached to sturdy local bourgeoisies.’
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Condominium in the 1940s did little to change the basic composition of the sectarian 
power structure it had previously advocated, as Sudan had little background in such 
secular institutions.14 Representative assemblies such as the Advisory Council and 
Legislative Assembly were established to appease the second wave of Sudanese 
nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s, more as concessions to the politically active 
element of northern Sudan than as enduring national institutions. For most of the 
Condominium period, there were no national institutions whatsoever in the south, 
either formal or informal, apart from the few colonial administrators.15
The British system of administration also ensured the state would remain 
unintegrated after independence, and reliant on sectarian patronage. For the purposes 
of the British, Native Administration had one major flaw, borne of one of its 
strengths. It was entirely local-based, and the leaders it advocated commanded little 
authority outside their own small areas, much less at a national level. They were no 
substitute for the more powerful sectarian movements, which easily co-opted it. 
However, even as the British knew how weak tribal leadership was in the north, they 
continued to promote it as a viable system of governance. The weakness of tribalism 
in the north became most obvious with the creation of the Advisory Council in the 
1940s, in which tribal leaders who served on the board had few opinions on national 
issues, generally deferring to the Mahdiyya.16 Tribes simply had lost the power in the 
north which they still retained in the south, and had been supplanted by sectarian 
factions. As a result, the north did not have the benefits of a poorly integrated state,
14 Al-Shahi, interview. Woodward, interview. Democratic institutions left by the British were relatively new and 
weak by independence, little more than ‘facades on the front of political manoeuvres’. Sidahmed, Politics and 
Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 61. Dunstan M. Wai. The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan. Teaneck, New 
Jersey: Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc, 1981, 183. Wai notes that the lack of consensual leadership at any stage 
of Sudan’s post-colonial history has led to poorly formed, weak political institutions. ‘The absence of an 
established political order and the perpetual crisis of leadership in the north drove it to excesses in the South.
15 Sarkesian, “The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment,” 5, 8.
16 Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 63. P.M. Holt. A Modern History o f 
the Sudan. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961, 134. An oft-cited quote pertaining to the artificialness of 
Native Administration and its overreliance on tribalism was that of James Currie, a former British educational 
officer who, upon his return to the Sudan after years in 1932, remarked, ‘After the troubles that culminated in 
Stack’s murder, the British local administrators took fright, and in spite of the loyalty of the educated Sudanese to 
the Government that had given them the opportunity, the spectacle could be beheld of young administrators 
diligently searching for lost tribes and vanished chiefs and trying to resurrect a social system that had vanished 
forever.’ Voll and Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State, 64. Peter Woodward. “Parties 
and Parliaments.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo 
and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 57. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 
85. A tribally based political party which the British had begun championing during this period, the Socialist 
Republicans, would fail to attract followers despite the best efforts of Condominium authorities.
but all the disadvantages: its various populations could be easily manipulated by 
broader sectarian movements.
The competition between nationalist and traditional elites which would define post­
independence nationalism was also a result of Condominium policy. Governor 
General Lee Stack’s original 1920s plan o f ‘complementing’ tribal chiefs with 
educated elites did not work out as intended when put into practice. Both groups fell 
victim to sectarian pressures and quarrels. Tribal chiefs selected for the council were 
disdained by intellectuals, both those who served on the council and those who 
boycotted it. Most of these chiefs had little input on matters not directly related to 
their own local authority and were happy to generally take the positions of Sayyid 
Abd Al-Rahman, a vigorous supporter of the council. Through his benefaction was
17formed the Umma party in 1945, the first modem Sudanese political party. 
Khatmiyya-oviented parties were to follow. Since rural Sudanese had little 
involvement in the nationalist movement, these parties were strongly sectarian, 
without strong involvement in the political issues which concerned nationalists. 
Peasants would simply vote for the tribal or religious leaders with whom they were 
familiar.18
The British had initially tried to repress popular Islam in Sudan, but by the 1940s they 
had accorded the two sectarian leaders a higher position than any other Sudanese.
The two luminaries lent their legitimacy to more recent political institutions, as when 
they would appear at the beginning ceremony of each session of the Advisory 
Council, withdrawing when debate commenced.19 Accordingly, the Legislative 
Assembly was reliant on sectarian benefaction from the outset. As the 
marginalization of Prime Minister Azhari showed, even the most liberal, secular and 
modem politicians realized soon after independence that they did not have the ability
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17 Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 61. Sikainga, “Northern Sudanese 
political parties and the civil war,” 80.
18 Al-Shahi, interview. Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 67. Woodward, Sudan, 1898- 
1989: the Unstable State, 70. Parties in the mid-1940s were not competing in elections, which were not held until 
the years before independence. They were merely statements of allegiance.
19 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 74.
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to directly confront the traditional leaders of these factions. Though the power of 
both groups was a result of British manipulation during the colonial period, the 
legitimacy bestowed to both was the result of a foundation that preceded the 
Condominium, and which modem democratic institutions did not possess. As a 
result, these politicians quickly began aligning themselves with either the Umma 
Party or the DUP, a practice which compromised the vitality of the nationalist 
movement and inhibited the liberal nature of any parliamentary democracy in Sudan. 
While this did not necessarily facilitate anything resembling religious fanaticism, it 
ensured that conservative elites could protect their own interests against less 
established political factions. A prime example came during the parliamentary period 
of the 1960s with the banning of the communist party, Sudan’s preeminent leftist 
nationalist movement, despite a high court ruling that the action was illegal.“ This 
example of the priority of constituencies over legal standards was typical of the 
parliamentary regimes. The undermining of the judiciary and opposition in civil 
society, or opposing political parties, are classic aspects of neo-patrimonialism.22
20
The manipulation of the principles of liberal democracy under the parliamentary 
regimes was constant. Yet ironically, each election during these periods were seen as 
being as fair -  mechanically -  as any held by states in the region.“ However, regional 
parties which wished to compete in the democratic process, including those from the 
south such as the Sudan African National Union and the Southern Front, were forced
20 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 98. Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed. Sudan: 
The Contemporary Middle East. London: Routledge, 2005, 30. From early in Sudan's democratic history, 
gerrymandering in the service of sectarian patronage politics was the norm. In the lead up to the March 1958 
elections, to halt the re-emergence of the National Unionist Party, the sectarian parties which formed the ruling 
coalition at the time changed voting laws and geographic constituencies to increase rural representation: not in a 
measure to grant remote areas permanent access to the center, but in a temporary bid to halt the NUP. As a result, 
the coalition gained a disproportionately high amount of seats in the assembly to the NUP in relation to the 
amount of votes cast.
21 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 47. Adam M. Abdelmoula. “An Ideology of 
Domination and the Domination of an Ideology: Islamism, Politics and the Constitution in the Sudan.” Religion, 
Nationalism and Peace in Sudan. US Institute of Peace, Washington DC. 16 September 1997. The Al-Mahdi 
government’s outlawing of the Sudanese Communist Party in 1968, the removal of its ten seated officials in the 
assembly, and the disregard for the order of the High Court to reinstate the party showed a disregard for 
institutions and liberal principles. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 47.
Sidahmed notes the contempt which parliamentary regimes had for state institutions and liberal principles 
generally. He cites the constitutional amendment during the 1960s to make former Prime Minister Al-Azhari the 
permanent president of the Supreme Council with some executive powers, such as heading official delegations 
abroad -  despite the fact that it had been intended as a figurehead position.
22 Diana Cammack. “The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism: What Role for Donors?” Development Policy 
Review 25:5 (August 2007), 602, 604.
23 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 35.
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to form tactical alliances with one of the larger sectarian parties.“4 There was little 
ideologically to unite these coalitions. For example, Sadiq Al-Mahdi relied on the 
support of SANU for his Umma party to form a government in the 1960s, but voiced 
little support for the smaller party’s championing of southern rights. In cabinet 
positions, southerners were rarely appointed, and then only to the most marginal 
positions.26
Southerners were ill-equipped to compete in the parliamentary process from the 
outset, in part because of their exclusion from earlier democratic institutions. 
Southerners had no representation to voice their interests until 1948, when the region 
was included in the Legislative Assembly. Finally, in response to southern 
exclusion from the Sudanization process and approaching independence, southerners 
formed the Southern Party in 1952, renamed the Liberal Party two years later. A 
conference of the Liberal Party at Juba in October 1954 passed a resolution 
demanding federal status with the north. After the conference, the Liberal party 
declared that all southern MPs regardless of party must form a united Southern Bloc.
29This motion was supported at a meeting in Juba in June 1955.“
24 Dunstan M. Wai. “Political Trends in the Sudan and the Future of the South.” The Southern Sudan: The 
Problem o f National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 162.
25 Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan 's Civil Wars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 35. 
Abel Alier. The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. Exeter, Devon, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991,
24. This was also a maneuver used in the early parliamentary periods by southern parties to avoid charges of 
separatism. Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket,” 5. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the 
Sudan, 11. Kamal Osman Salih. “The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading Democracy.” Sudan After Nimeiri, Ed. 
Woodward, Peter. London: Routledge, 1991, 48. The Southern Party worked with the Democratic Unionist Party 
(DUP). Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan 's Civil Wars, 130. In northern Sudan, the DUP would form alliances 
with regional interests in the east and the Umma party with those in the west. By the end of the 1960s, this was 
seen by those marginal areas as an ineffective way to gain access to central power, leading to a resurgence of 
regional parties. Alex De Waal. Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa. London: Hurst & Company, 2004, 
79. The Islamist Charter Front, Turabi’s forerunner to the National Islamic Front, had also considered entering 
into an opposition coalition with Sadiq Al-Mahdi and William Deng’s branch of SANU during the Maghoub 
government, a demonstration of how tactical the Islamist movement had become in the early days of Turabi’s 
stewardship.
26 Human Rights Watch. “The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of 
National Unity on Southern Sudan.” March 2006, 7. These consisted primarily of the ministries of Wildlife and 
Tourism, Animal Resources and Transportation.
27 Sarkesian, “The Southern Sudan: A Reassessment,” 5, 8. Al-Rahim, Imperialism and Nationalism in the Sudan, 
179.
28 Abel Alier, “The Southern Sudan Question.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem o f National Integration. Ed. 
Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 18. Beshir Mohammed Said, The Sudan: Crossroads o f Africa. 
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Press, 1970, 31. In 1953 the British ratified an agreement between northern parties and Egypt about future 
independence. Southerners had been excluded from negotiations on the grounds that they had no political party, 
an impetus for the Southern Party’s formation.
29 Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972. London: David & Charles, 1974, 39. Albino, The 
Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 34-35. Said, The Sudan: Crossroads o f Africa, 75-76.
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Southern elites seemed to be trying desperately to make up in political organization 
what they could not make up in economic development, attempting to slow down the 
apparently unstoppable drive towards independence. However, southern attempts to 
participate in the political process independent of northern patronage were 
undermined by northern parties. The Liberal Party was poorly funded, with few staff
TOor offices and almost no influence outside Khartoum and larger southern towns.
This made it susceptible to personal rivalries and northern parties luring its members 
away for their votes. Southern rivals would run against each other, splitting their vote 
and allowing more organized northern parties to pick up the seat. This theme 
continued after the reintroduction of the parliamentary system in 1965. The elections 
that year were contested by numerous small parties, but the government inevitably 
regressed into the same coalitions headed by conservative sectarian factions. 
Especially in the south, the disorganized nature of civic participation in a time of war 
led to numerous small political parties, some of which seemed to have more support 
from outside the region than within it.31 This situation led to suspicions of northern 
interference in the nascent southern democratic process, and subsequently southern 
disillusionment with democratic institutions. During the parliamentary eras, southern 
parties were especially susceptible to division when lured by larger parties with the 
promise of power or money. This ‘factionalism’ reached its apex during the 
parliamentary government of the late 1980s, in which the dominant parties lured 
candidates from ‘peripheral Sudan’ to align with them in exchange for employment 
or other benefits. After southern political groups such as the United Sudan Africa 
Parties began establishing communications with the SPLM/A in late 1987, Sadiq Al- 
Mahdi’s government began to use patronage and the promise of positions for 
individuals to break the party’s unity. Khartoum feared a united southern political
30 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 101.
31 Edgar O’Ballance. Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000, 31. Of the 
three southern parties established in 1965, one, the Southern Unity Party, was formed by a former minister in the 
Abboud junta and another, the Southern Peace Party, was formed to protect the interests of northern merchants in 
the south. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 29-30. The election followed a 
similar tactic employed during the March 1965 Round Table meeting, in which Alier claims the traditional 
northern parties assembled a group called ‘Other Shades of Opinion’ to water down the unity of the two wings of 
SANU further, as well as the Southern Front.
32 Peter Nyot Kok. Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995: Analysis, Evaluation and Documentation. 
Berlin: Deutsches Orient Institut, 1996, 147.
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movement with ties to an extremely effective military organization could become a 
threat.33
It is significant that the AAA and CPA were concluded under the only two regimes in 
Sudanese history which were not heavily reliant on one of the two primary sectarian 
factions as a base of their power. The sectarianism of northern Sudanese society 
created difficulties in efforts to make peace during Sudanese parliamentary eras; for 
example, the weakness of successive nationalist governments, and their subsequent 
need to appear aggressive, especially towards southern insurgency.34 In addition, a 
simple Westminster style government was not sufficient to accommodate the 
democratic needs of a geographical territory as diverse as Sudan. Simple democratic 
elections are often not enough of a concession to self-governance for ethnic 
minorities which fear or distrust the power of the state. Election mechanisms must 
correspond with other elements of a democratic political society like multi-party 
coalitions, regional autonomy and the protection of minority rights.35
Parliamentary procedures in Sudan did not typically adhere to the above criteria. 
Khalid provides a detailed description of how leaders such as Sadiq Al-Mahdi made 
rewarding party members, and especially his family members, a priority over tending 
to the national interest. Access of state resources can take the form of distribution of 
commercial rents, distribution of licenses, and distribution of land rights. During
33 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 63. Arop Madut-Arop. Sudan ’s Painful Road to 
Peace: A Full Story o f the Founding and Development o f the SPLM/SPLA. Charleston, South Carolina:
Booksurge, 2006, 172.
34 Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket,” 5. Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 13. 
Mansfield and Snyder 2003, 120. Democratizing states are susceptible to war not because war is popular with the 
mass public, but because ‘domestic pressures create incentives for elites to drum up nationalist sentiment.’ 
However, once nationalist feelings are conjured up they become hard to control. Democracy weakens the central 
government’s ability to keep policy consistent. This in itself provides an incentive for many military coups while 
a state is at war, as the military abhors erratic civilian decision-making.
35 David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild. “Containing Fear: The Origins and Management of Ethnic Conflict.” 
International Security 21:2 (1996), 60.
36 Mansour Khalid. The Government They Deserve. London: Kegan Paul International, 1990, 382. Soon after 
taking power, Al-Mahdi's government granted his family 35 million pounds, supposedly in compensation for the 
property confiscated by the Nimeiri regime. In addition, his government would engage in practices such as 
insisting foreign companies replace their usual representatives in Sudan with members of his family. Khalid, The 
Government They Deserve, 384. In addition, Al-Mahdi’s government allowed the importation of 400 cars to be 
distributed, tax free, to the Members of Parliament. Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 386. Khalid 
describes how a relative of Al-Mahdi’s, a Minister of Energy under Nimeiri who was caught up in a scandal 
involving profiteering off oil imported from Saudi Arabia, was given a stay of prosecution as part of a private deal 
between the Prime Minister and the Attorney General.
37 Lindemann, “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter?,” 20-21.
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parliamentary governments, the distribution of licenses for imports and exports and 
agriculture was on a partisan basis. In accordance with their preferred areas of 
economic activity, during coalition governments, UmmaIMahdiyya would usually 
control or influence the ministry of agriculture while the ministry of commerce was 
under control of NUP/Khatmiyya affiliates. Lindemann lists the primary areas 
where employment has been sought under sub-Saharan African patronage systems as 
jobs in the government, military, and parastatal organizations. The parliamentary 
regime of the 1980s spent an enormous amount on military hardware, in addition to 
doling out lavish benefits, such as private cars exempt from excise duties, to senior 
military staff.40 In this way, the military was treated more as a constituency in itself 
than an instrument of state policy.
As described in Chapter Two, the determination of most parliamentary governments 
to put down southern insurgency by force, coupled with a wariness to impose too 
much of a burden for this effort on northern taxpayers and recruits, highlighted the 
citizen/subject structure of Sudan’s patronage system. Parliamentary governments 
lacked a mandate to impose taxes or conclude a peace with the south, composed as 
they were of parties that adhered tightly to sectarian factions. They derived their 
legitimacy from their respective factions alone, and even that authority was not 
usually granted based on specific policy proposals, but deeper spiritual and political 
allegiances.41 The instability of these governments meant they could not match their
'x Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 123.
39 Lindemann, “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter?” 20.
40 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 34.
41 Al-Shahi, interview. Benaiah Yongo-Bure. The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan. Lanham, 
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Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 
710. Yongo-Bure, Licklider and Tilly have noted the difficulty unstable regimes in poor states have in 
implementing sales and income tax systems nationwide, instead succumbing to the temptation of taxing exports 
and resources. The latter process is politically easier for governments to establish, but it is less beneficial to 
economic growth and it allows the state to avoid making difficult compromises with the other productive sectors 
of society. Jeffrey Herbst. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. 
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 116-117. Herbst also notes that a heavy reliance on 
taxation of trade has been a constant of administration in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Africa. Herbst, 
States and Power in Africa, 130-131. African states have not established the quid pro quo relationship between 
taxpayers and regimes, in which the population payed taxes in return for security, a galvanizing factor in the 
formation of European nationalism. ‘It is simply easier for the state to tax international transactions because it is 
not required to interact with individuals but simply control access points on the borders. Marina Ottaway. 
“Dysfunctional states, dysfunctional armed movements, and lootable commodities.” Big African States. Edison,
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ambitious national objectives with sound fiscal policy. Sudan’s foreign debt doubled 
between 1964 and 1969, partly because the government relied too much on indirect 
taxation and not enough on income tax.42
The democratic movement in Sudan has never been strong. ‘Independent Sudan 
inherited a civil war and a weak ruling elite composed of an alliance between the 
traditional leadership who provided the needed grassroots, and intellectuals who 
supplied leadership for political and executive activity.’43 The result was coalitions of 
convenience, not conviction, which are easily toppled by the military. Most notably 
after the 1958 and 1989 takeovers, the overthrown government was unable or 
unwilling to rally democratic forces in Sudan to take back power. In addition, all 
three military regimes saw collaboration at some point with the very democratic 
forces they had upset.44
PEACEMAKING EFFORTS OF THE 1980s
Despite the difficulty parliamentary regimes had in negotiating peace accords with 
southern insurgents, there was a definite evolution to the peace process following the 
collapse of the Nimeiri regime, albeit an evolution that was ultimately too tepid and 
slow to achieve significant results. The evolution did not begin, however, with the 
Transitional Military Council, the military regime which replaced the May Regime in 
April 1985. The TMC was effectively a conservative nationalist organization, which 
did little to assuage the SPLA as to the merits of ceasing hostilities. John Garang was 
not convinced that TMC leader and Nimeiri’s former defense minister, Siwar Al- 
Dhahab, shared the SPLM/A’s priorities of a secular, inclusive state. This suspicion 
peaked after Al-Dhahab repealed the 1973 constitution, but refused to do the same for 
Nimeiri’s Islamic September Laws (except for the punishments of flogging and
New Jersey: Transaction Publishing, 2006, 191. ‘Domestic revenue is... a state building activity, not only 
because it provides the resources to finance all its other activities, but also because it builds institutional capacity.’
42 Fatma Babiker Mahmoud. “Businessmen and Politics.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, 
Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 14.
43 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 36.
44 The 1958 coup was essentially invited by Prime Minister Abdullah Khalil, and the May Regime and Bashir 
junta would also eventually work with factions of the Umma Party whose governments they had usurped.
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amputation).45 The new Transitional Constitution drawn up by lawyers under the 
TMC in 1985 actually affirmed the basis for the September Laws in the 1973 
constitution, but did not express respect for indigenous, non-scriptural religions as the 
1973 constitution had. In addition, this was the first drafting of a constitution in 
Sudan in which no southerners were consulted.46
What the SPLM/A saw as an informal alliance between members of the TMC 
government and the newly created National Islamic Front (NIF) impeded serious 
negotiations.47 The TMC allowed the continued infiltration of the NIF into the 
military, while cracking down on the influence of other radical ideological 
movements, such as the Ba’athists. This apparent double standard was yet another 
indication that the TMC leadership had neither the liberal outlook nor the imagination 
necessary to reach a compromise with the SPLA. The most the TMC would offer the 
SPLA was a reinstitution of the AAA, which Garang by that period had declared to 
be totally discredited 49
The Transitional Military Council limited itself to one dominant objective: stabilizing 
Sudan just enough to hold parliamentary elections within a year. It was, however, 
unable and unwilling to strengthen democratic institutions. New parties did not have 
enough time to regroup strongly across the country, giving strength to those 
conservative parties which had gained an advantage in organizing themselves since 
the 1977 reconciliation and could simply assemble their religious partisans. The 
sheer number of new parties, combined with the weak alignment of the Khatmiyya-
45 Ismail Bin Matt. “Toward an Islamic Constitional Government in Sudan.” Thirty-Fifth Annual Conference o f  
the Association o f  Muslim Social Scientists. Hartford Connecticut. 27-29 October 2006. Accessed 16 October 
2007, 12. Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan 's Civil Wars, 71. Amir Idris, Sudan's Civil War: Slavery, Race 
and Formational Identities. New York: Edwin Mellen Press, 2001, 110.
46 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 27.
47 Sikainga, “Northern Sudanese political parties and the civil war,” 87. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the 
Sudan 1985-1995,24-25. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 122. Abdelwahab El-Affendi. 
“Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa.” African Affairs 89:356 (July 1990), 384.
48 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 42-43.
49 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 271. Khalid notes how accepted the AAA had finally become by this 
period that the TMC would choose to make this offer, even though the junta had otherwise sought to wipe away 
every vestige of the Nimeiri regime.
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affiliated Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), led to poll results which favored Umma 
and the National Islamic Front (NIF).50
The SPLM/A throughout the late 1980s was wary of government attempts to ‘buy 
off insurgent leaders, a key flaw which Garang and his lieutenants believed helped 
destroy the AAA. Garang accused the Transitional Military Council of attempting 
the same intrigues as former president Nimeiri: luring the insurgency leadership to 
Khartoum where they would be given government positions and prestige, keeping 
them cut off from their base in the south, inducting them into a clientalist 
relationship.51 This suspicion of exclusive alliances made a peace agreement even 
more elusive, since the state was slow to break the pattern of making such narrow 
coalitions even during parliamentary periods.
The parliamentary era of the 1980s started with similar weaknesses as in earlier 
decades, but the powerful existential threat posed by the SPLA to the patronage 
system led to a political evolution in the north not seen during the earlier war. While 
the 1960s parliamentary era began with the first real dialogue between the two parties 
in Sudan’s history, further progress would not be seen under any of the successive 
elected governments before the 1969 coup. In contrast, two decades later the SPLA’s 
power and its desire to overthrow the fragile coalition governments in Khartoum led 
to a series of peace initiatives proposed by various opposition parties. Though each 
of these motions was a calculated maneuver within the context of northern party 
politics, they laid the groundwork for a more inclusive national dialogue. In the 
1980s, each of the dominant northern parties in the parliamentary era viewed an 
agreement with the increasingly powerful SPLA as a platform off which to enhance 
its own fortunes, not the basis for an inclusive process involving rival parties. This 
emphasis on parliamentary tactics instead of the formation of a larger strategy to end
>0 Ann Mosely Lesch. The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, 
70. Khalid Al-Mubarak. Turabi’s “Islamist” Venture: Failure and Implications. Cairo: El Dar El Thaqafia, 
2001, 16.
51 John Garang. John Garang Speaks. Ed. Khalid, Mansour. London: Kegan Paul International, 1987, 67. 
Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 96. Woodward, interview. Suliman Baldo. “Could peace 
unravel?” Sudan: Prospects for Peace. Eds. Marion Couldrey and Tim Morris. Forced Migration Review 24 
(November 2005), 26. The concept of northern rulers luring southern elites into exclusive patronage systems had 
a well-established reputation even by the mid-1980s. During the IGAD process, SPLA members joked that they 
would be drawn into a patron-client relationship by Khartoum as well, as southern politicians were in the 1970s 
and 1980s.
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the war is why each northern faction’s attempt to find common ground with the 
SPLM/A was rejected by other northern factions, despite the potential for a broader 
reconciliation. In 1986, the Koka Dam Declaration was rejected by the NIF and 
DUP, the DUP and Umma dismissed the NIF’s 1987 Sudan Charter and the Sudan
S ’?Peace Initiative of 1988 was rejected by the NIF and Umma.
Each of these exercises in reconciliation was limited by the difficulty parties had in 
expanding bilateral talks into multilateral ones. The parties each sought to use a 
peace accord to launch an exclusive dialogue with the increasingly powerful SPLA, 
but were internally too weak to commit fully to it. Al-Mahdi’s ability to follow up 
after Koka Dam was limited by his own reactionary Ansar movement, his DUP 
coalition partners in government, the hardline NIF opposition, and his preference to 
keep the dialogue dependent on his own involvement, rather than convert it into a 
more formal, inclusive process. Consequently, momentum from the talks was lost 
and the planned constitutional conference to be convened in June 1986 was not held. 
Instead, Al-Mahdi simply sent an emissary to Addis Ababa to ask the SPLM to join 
the government and to set up a personal meeting between himself and Garang, which 
occurred in July 1986.54 This attempt to establish a personal rapport with the 
insurgent leader, possibly the basis for an exclusivist coalition, came to nothing. 
Relations between the new regime and the insurgency collapsed even further when it 
became apparent that Al-Mahdi would rely heavily on the ministers from the former 
May Regime, leading the SPLM/A to jeer that the new parliamentary government 
was simply ‘Nimeirism without Nimeiri’.55
52 Sikainga, “Northern Sudanese political parties and the civil war,” 85-86. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to 
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Al-Mahdi’s choice to push vigorously for peace in the 1986 period prior to elections, 
then to back away quickly from the Koka Dam talks after his ascension to 
premiership is indicative of not only how poor his ability to form strong coalitions 
was, but of how much ideological freedom he retained. This apparent contradiction 
was a result of the neo-patrimonial nature of Sudan’s traditional parties. Al-Mahdi’s 
prestige among his followers, particularly the militant Ansar, was a product of his 
esteemed lineage as a fourth generation descendant of the original Mahdi of the late 
1800s. While this devotion to his personal qualities ensured that he always had to 
remain mindful of the conservative, traditional bent of his constituents, he was not 
expected to carry out any political agenda that differed radically from the rival 
Khatmiyya leadership in the DUP. This is consistent with the assessment of neo- 
patrimonial politics in sub-Saharan Africa that ‘campaigns and parties are centered on 
personalities -  individuals and their historical connections -  rather than on voting 
records, platforms or principles. In fact, a politician can take a stand at one time 
which (s)he will diametrically oppose only a few months later.’56
It appeared for a short time during the late 1980s that the neo-patrimonial system 
might not have been able to withstand the combined pressures of the SPLA 
insurgency and democracy re-establishing itself in Sudan. The DUP’s search for new 
political partners after becoming marginalized in the government coalition may have 
been the start of a trend towards building broader, more inclusive coalitions in the 
parliamentary era. The DUP began to mend relations with the southern United Sudan 
African Parties and with the National Alliance for National Salvation, the urban 
coalition of trade unions and academics which had established some contact with the 
SPLM/A. NIF and Umma were both unhappy with these coalition-building attempts 
on the part of the DUP, and furious with its dispatch of emissaries to Addis Ababa to 
meet SPLM representatives in late 1988. In fact, Al-Mahdi actually endorsed the 
terms of the DUP-SPLA agreement, but resented the challenge that initiative posed to 
his personal authority as Prime Minister. He preferred that parliament grant him
56 Cammack, “The Logic of African Neopatrimonialism,” 602.
57 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 292. Al-Shahi, interview.
58 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 82.
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exclusive authority to deal with the insurgents, in this way undermining serious 
attempts to break out of the trend towards exclusivist coalitions and continuing 
Sudan’s historical tradition of strong individual personalities and weak political 
institutions.
By the end of the 1980s, the second war was costing the Sudanese army an average of 
US$1 million per day, leaving the government unable to pay public servants or 
reform its budget by cutting expenditures, as the IMF had been insisting Khartoum do 
since the Nimeiri regime.59 The broad national support for the ‘November Accords’ 
between the SPLM/A and the DUP was an implicit refutation of Al-Mahdi’s 
recalcitrance, but in order to save his premiership from the DUP’s momentum, he was 
forced to organize a new coalition excluding the rival party and relying on the NIF.60 
The peace initiative was broadly supported throughout northern civil society as well, 
backed by more than 50 organizations in a signed statement, including all political 
parties in Sudan except the NIF.61
Pressure from the army, specifically its February 1989 memo advocating a political 
solution to the war, began to soften Al-Mahdi’s authoritarian tendencies towards 
negotiations with the SPLM/A. The army at this time remained one of the few 
institutions with enough power and legitimacy in the north to curb the appetites of 
national leaders. The NIF, however, remained unpersuaded. As Umma’s coalition 
partner, the Islamists were unwilling to consider the political compromises which 
would be necessary to negotiate with the SPLM/A, particularly the suspension of 
Islamic law. The group had political, not merely ideological, reasons for opposing 
the potential peace settlement the DUP-SPLA initiative foreshadowed in 1988. Were 
this initiative to pave the way for a real settlement, it might erode the electoral gains
59 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 162. Salih, “The Sudan, 1985-9: The Fading 
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the NIF had been making in both the cities and countryside at the expense of the 
DUP. A peace agreement would enhance the popularity of the DUP in the north, as 
well as provide it with a powerful southern partner in the SPLA. The result was that 
while a peace process dominated by one sectarian party might damage the other, the 
NIF saw its very existence threatened. Turabi’s Islamists were now out of the 
governing coalition: they supported the June 1989 coup, which was launched just as
• A Tthe Prime Minister was preparing to fly to Addis Ababa to meet Garang again.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE MILITARY-COMMUNIST COALITION AND 
FORMATION OF THE AAA COALITION
While the above history demonstrates how parliamentary regimes in Sudan have 
typically relied on coalitions that are too unstable to commit to peace agreements, 
authoritarian governments have also faced challenges in the establishment of 
governing coalitions. The Nimeiri regime remains the best Sudanese example of 
exclusivist coalition-building and its corrosive effect on ideological governance, a 
phenomenon which defined both the eventual crafting of the AAA and its subsequent 
abrogation. Nimeiri would turn away from the communists after the July 1971 coup 
attempt against him by communist-affiliated officers. The purging of the far left in 
mid-1971 opened up a window in which the less ideologically-minded technocrats 
could appeal to Nimeiri to make peace for both the stability of the region and the
64regime.
Contrary to its early rhetoric, the May Regime was not radically leftist at heart but 
was instead composed primarily of ‘dissatisfied nationalists with no political
62 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 293.
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commitment. The military-communist alliance was practical, not ideological. ’65 
Nimeiri relied on the small but highly organized Communist Party, banned during the 
second parliamentary era, to help his junta of Free Officers combat both the 
reactionary sectarians and the modem Islamists, the earliest enemies of the regime. 
The nationalization of many banks, businesses and private companies during this 
early socialist period was the first attempt to reorient the patronage system, as it 
crippled the sectarian factions which were its traditional beneficiaries.66 However, 
early goals of the May Regime such as overhauling local administration and resolving 
the southern problem were all influenced heavily by the regime’s leftists.
Nimeiri’s early coalition with communist leaders actually prohibited his stated goal 
of making peace in the south. The regime’s first Minister for Southern Affairs was 
former Sudan Communist Party member Joseph Garang. Despite his Dinka origins,
z: o
Garang and other communist leaders had absolutely no base of support in the south. 
Their hasty efforts to establish a socialist network in a region with little interest in
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cultures.
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67 Joseph Garang was of no direct relation to fellow Dinka and future SPLM/A leader John Garang.
68 Telephone interview by the author with Richard Lobban, Providence, 2009. Mohamed Omer Beshir. The 
Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1975, 72-74. Eprile, War and Peace in 
the Sudan 1955-1972, 128. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 146. Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and 
Communism in a Traditional Society, 167. The lack of support in the south for Garang’s communist platform was 
nearly unanimous: he had been defeated so overwhelmingly in three previous elections that he lost his deposit 
each time.
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socialism amounted to an attempt to establish their own patronage system.69 For 
Garang and his comrades, socialism was to be a necessary precondition to southern 
regional autonomy. The communists preferred not to reach any settlement with 
southern ‘bourgeoisie and separatists’ who would no doubt seek to take power away 
from the nascent regional socialist institutions. Garang opted instead to advance 
socialism in conjunction with any settlement. Southerners rejected these efforts
71generally, since communism as a formal ideology had no following in the south. By
771971, the war was becoming extremely expensive for the government to conduct.
The political impasse between the socialist government negotiators and the Anya Nya 
was slowly sapping away at the credibility and vitality of a supposedly revolutionary 
government, as the southern problem had done to the regimes that had come before 
it.73
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Garang was attempting to set up a Soviet-style cell system there. He is remembered with widespread bitterness in 
the region. Alexis Heraclides. “Janus or Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan.” Journal o f Modern 
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The fundamental sticking point during the first war was that most leftists in Sudan 
were not concerned with accommodating the emerging southern nationalism. There 
was suspicion by leftists of the authenticity of the southern insurgency as being truly 
popular, demonstrated by communist May Regime member Joseph Garang in his 
statement that the south had no ‘real national identity’ upon which rested a legitimate 
basis for the principle of self-determination.74 Many moderate leftists such as 
Mansour Khalid, and even southerners such as Abel Alier, were members of the May 
Regime. In the second war, these same moderates would place their sympathies with 
the SPLM/A, itself is a demonstration of how much ground the nationalist movement 
had lost in the north by the outbreak of the Bor Mutiny in 1983. The majority of its 
left wing, which had always been small but was highly organized and influential, had 
either joined the rebels or been eradicated. This bolstered the SPLA legitimacy as a 
national insurgency and actually gave the south a key role in the Sudanese nationalist 
movement, no longer simply relegating it to the role of a passive entity to be acted 
upon, or an incoherent quasi-separatist force. As Lobban states, Tn the first war, 
Joseph Garang was trying to deliver the government’s message to the south, whereas 
in the second war, John Garang was trying to deliver the south’s message to the
7c
government.’
The AAA was, in composition and implementation, an exclusivist agreement. Lagu’s 
negotiating team concluded with the Khartoum delegation in early March 1972 the 
tenets that would become the AAA. In the following weeks however, the SSLM 
delegation was unable to gain the confidence of their rank-and-file without the 
insertion of several amendments, including proposals for a separate southern army, 
the power of the south to make treaties with foreign governments, and other 
arrangements of loose confederation. When these amendments were seen as too 
contentious by the Khartoum delegation to be worth considering, Lagu himself made 
the decision to sweep aside all the suggested amendments to the AAA and ratify it as 
it had been negotiated the previous month. He returned an entirely new team of
74 Abdel-Rahman Abdalla and Robert Fancher. Sudan: Integration or Disintegration. Edison, New Jersey: 
Transaction, 2001, 97.
75 Lobban, interview.
76 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 154. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements 
Dishonoured, 118. Christopher R. Mitchell. “Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese
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delegates on 27 March 1972. Though some hardline separatists, such as Joseph 
Oduho, were included in the new line-up to demonstrate how much support the 
negotiations had in the south, the reshuffle of delegates underscored that the
77agreement was primarily between Lagu and the government.
The traditional nationalist forces of the north voiced strong opposition to the AAA 
upon its conclusion and formed an impressive coalition which stretched across the 
Sudanese political spectrum. The communist party, once again in exile, declared that 
the AAA represented a ‘drastic crime that endangers the passage of progress and 
revolution not only in Sudan, north and south, but in all parts of the Nile Valley and 
in the Arabic area’. The DUP and Umma parties thought the agreement gave too 
much to the south and would foster separatism. By 1974, a National Front had been 
formed in exile with leaders of the two sectarian parties, the Muslim Brotherhood, 
and even a few communists.79 Islamists particularly remained opposed to Addis
80Ababa and the 1973 constitution that had included it on principle and practicality. 
Their opposition was primarily because under the agreement, the Southern Regional 
Assembly could vote to ask the President to remove bills before the National 
Assembly that adversely affected the south. As a result, Islamist laws could only be
89fully implemented after the Southern Region was dismantled.
The AAA was the start of a new phase in southern politics, where the patronage 
system was extended to the south free of the ideological constraints of nationalism or
Settlement of 1972.” Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. George Mason University, Washington DC. 
August 1989, 8. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 261.
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reservations. He was assured by General Al-Baghir of the northern delegation, a former superior whom he 
trusted, that it was understood that those positions in the new army would go to former Anya Nya as there was 
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socialism. Southern elites would be reliant on Nimeiri alone to defend the integrity 
of the treaty in Khartoum.84 However, even this was presented as a privilege: the 
Regional Assembly could stand up to the central government in a way national ones 
could not, for example by petitioning the president to defer national legislation from 
coming into effect in the south.85 Nimeiri had positioned himself to be the guardian of 
southern autonomy against reactionary northern forces. The AAA set out a 
framework allowing political negotiations and compromises along the road to its
oz:
implementation. It was recognized at the time that this structure may have been the 
only realistic way of reaching an agreement, delaying the most difficult decisions 
such as the finality of borders and the permanent status of southern troops while 
allowing the flexibility to resolve them after the signing of the agreement. However, 
the agreement consequently lacked the rigorous implementation regime which the 
CPA would later seek to include.
THE PATRONAGE STATE IN THE INTERBELLUM SOUTH
The coalition formed between Nimeiri and southerners under the AAA faced inherent 
problems for governing state. Remote regions have not traditionally been 
incorporated into the Sudanese patronage system, as their poverty and distance makes 
them of limited usefulness to the consolidation of central power. In a vast country 
with as little infrastructure as Sudan, stable coalitions must have a central base in the 
riverine region. As a result, Nimeiri would be forced to make another reconciliation 
in 1977 with northern dissidents, and narrow his coalition with the south to an even 
smaller field of southern elites who would champion, in the name of employment 
opportunities, such concepts as redivision of the Southern Region into three 
provinces.
83 John Howell. “Horn of Africa: Lessons from the Sudan Conflict”. International Affairs 54:3 (1978), 436. 
Woodward, interview.
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Neo-patrimony networks rely on the benefaction of one sector of society or elites 
over others, and in post-AAA southern Sudan there were many schisms which such a
o o
network could exploit. While tribal and regional divisions in the south were 
profound, as discussed in the previous chapter, one of the most significant splits 
between southern elites following the AAA was between those who had remained 
inside Sudan, sometimes working for the government, and those who had been either 
in exile or an active part of the insurgency.89 ‘Insiders’ included Abel Alier and were 
generally more moderate and had more education. ‘Outsiders’, including Joseph 
Lagu, were less willing to compromise on benefits to be derived from the post-war 
arrangements. As a group, they had leaned most strongly towards armed resistance 
and secession during the war. The earliest beneficiaries from the AAA were 
‘insiders’. This was not simply a matter of favoritism, but of practicality: with the 
exception of some Anya Nya elites and politicians, ‘outsiders’ had a more difficult 
time getting employment after the AAA because they were less educated, in some 
cases even illiterate.90 Government employment, especially in the armed forces, was 
most prized, further advancing the viability of southern inclusion in a patronage 
network.91 However, it was barely feasible to employ all Anya Nya, and most of 
these positions went to better-educated ‘insiders’. “ However, Nimeiri would turn 
towards the former ‘outsiders’ to become the beneficiaries of his patronage by the end 
of the 1970s, inducting them into his own dwindling neo-patrimonial network. He
88 Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 86. In neo-patrimony, politicians ‘come to be 
defined according to whether they are insiders or outsiders in relation to the patronage system’.
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Regime, and who believed that the position of High Executive Council president should be conferred upon one of 
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first promised that more government jobs would be available in the south with the 
redivision of the Southern Region. In the last years of his regime, he would support 
disaffected southerners through his patronage for various ‘Anya Nya 2’ secessionist 
groups fighting the SPLA.93 This was an early example of the national government 
using the patronage system to widen the internal fault lines of the south, a principle 
tactic of the various regimes during the second war.
Nimeiri also used the tension between the authoritarian national government and the 
democratic administration of the Southern Region to further extend his patronage 
power. While the national constitution outlined that Sudan was a one-party state 
under the Sudan Socialist Union, the regional arrangements made in the AAA noted 
no corresponding function in the south. The SSU did not significantly intrude on 
regional government until 1973, when Nimeiri nominated Alier as the official SSU 
candidate to continue serving as the High Executive Council president, a role he had 
filled in the interim period following the peace treaty.94 Nimeiri’s rationalization for 
this nomination was that the HEC president was required to be a member of the SSU, 
therefore the SSU should nominate him. As head of the SSU, Nimeiri felt that 
obligation belonged to himself. Nimeiri’s intervention was actually unnecessary, as 
Alier had majority support for his leadership in the Regional Assembly.95 The 
incident, however, set a bad precedent for democratic proceedings in the south and 
made it easier for Alier’s detractors to paint him as a northern stooge. Other 
candidates for the position withdrew after Nimeiri’s intervention. Thus the SSU’s 
very presence went against the logic of southern regional autonomy. ‘A monolithic 
organization, nationally directed in its programs and policies, the SSU took no notice 
of the policies of the south's regional government. Constitutionally, the state was 
subservient to the SSU. Thus in practical terms, the SSU could directly control the
93 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 273. Idris, Sudan 's Civil War, 125. Maundi, 
Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, Getting In: Mediators ’ Entry into the Settlement o f African Conflicts, 127.
The Anya Nya 2 continued fighting the SPLA until 1988, by which point they were either defeated by or 
consolidated into Garang’s stronger movement. Johnson, interview. Johnson notes that Nimeiri’s patronage of 
the Anya Nya 2 resembled an early tactic of his regime in the years prior to the AAA, in which the government 
sponsored ‘national guards’ which were actually tribal militias the government, by relying on local hostilities, 
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affairs of the Southern region by invoking constitutional powers whenever any 
conflict arose between the two.’96
Nimeiri’s intrusion into the internal politics of the Southern Region to support his 
preferred faction remained constant. Elections for the southern Regional Assembly 
were held in 1973, 1978, 1980 and 1982, with Nimeiri regularly intervening, even 
arbitrarily dissolving the assembly in 1980.97 Provincial Commissioners in the south 
still reported directly to the national president, regardless of the fact that they worked 
within the Southern Region. The president had so many avenues of influence, and 
the southern institutions were so weak that, even if Nimeiri had not launched such 
bold frontal assaults on the legal status of the region, he could still undermine 
southern autonomy’s effectiveness.99 There remained discrepancies in the AAA 
concerning the separation of powers. The AAA implicitly allows the national 
president to remove the president of the HEC, and therefore the entire regional 
government as the cabinet would also be forced to resign.100 The national president 
could also veto regional legislation, a fairly significant compromise of the region’s 
autonomy.101
Ultimately, therefore, the agreement was reliant on the benevolence of the national 
president and his respect for the constitution of 1973, in which the AAA was itself 
enshrined. The constitutional amending process in Article 34 was never used under 
Nimeiri, even on the question of the redivision of the south, perhaps because the 
motion would have been rejected. Nimeiri instead relied on Articles 81 and 82,
96 Wakoson, “The politics of Southern self-government 1972-1983,” 31.
97 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 50. Kasfir, “Southern Sudanese Politics Since the Addis 
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interview. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 320, 365, 378-379. Nimeiri used a 
financial scandal involving Lagu, which had resulted in heated debate in the Regional Assembly, as a pretext to 
dissolve both the regional and the national assembly, and to ask for Lagu’s resignation.
98 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 172. These commmissioners in turn appointed assistant 
provincial commissioners to oversee specialized fields such as education and agriculture, directly overlapping 
with the responsibilities of the region.
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Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces o f the Democratic Republic o f the Sudan, 
Article 28.
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which allowed him extra authority as president to protect national unity. The 
national president was legally obligated to consult the High Executive Council’s 
president and the speaker of the Regional Assembly concerning any attempts to 
dissolve that assembly, making his 1980 proposal to carry out a plebiscite in the south 
on the issue of division constitutionally suspect since the decision did not come from 
the region’s president or speaker, but from Khartoum.103 After the initial regional 
resistance to Nimeiri’s attempt to redivide the south in 1980, the president 
reinvigorated his efforts to form a reliable cadre of patrons in the region, while 
strengthening his standing in the army nationally in the event of southern resistance. 
In 1981, Nimeiri succeeded in convincing four southern politicians who had recently 
been defeated or removed from government, including Joseph Lagu himself, to sign a 
petition requesting that the president redivide the Southern Region.104 Nimeiri 
assured them that redivision would allow for more government jobs. There would 
now be three governors instead of one head of the High Executive Council. There 
would be 45 ministers instead of 15. Nimeiri also vowed that more money would be 
sent to the three resurrected provinces for development.105 These politicians now 
formed the core of Nimeiri’s new ‘outsider’ base.
102 Akolda M. Tier. “A Critical Comparative Analysis of the Processes of Resolving The Conflict in The Sudan.” 
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Pressure from the national government to realign the patronage system in the south 
eventually began to crack the ideological coalitions forming there. In the spring 1982 
elections, those who favored keeping the Southern Region united won more seats 
than those who favored redividing the south into three provinces. However, in a 
demonstration of how weak ideological convictions had become, several unionists 
broke away to back the divisionist Joseph James Tambura as speaker. Some southern 
activists charge that Nimeiri, not being satisfied with the initial results which favored 
the unionists, delayed responding to the results of the elections until he had persuaded 
enough unionist candidates to change positions. After intense lobbying throughout 
May 1982, enough unionists were persuaded to vote for divisionist James Tambura 
that he won the election.100 Some of these members felt they had a better chance of 
getting cabinet positions from smaller divisionist groups and others may have 
opposed Aber for personal reasons. Tambura defeated the unionist Clement Mboro, 
and Nimeiri now had an ally in undermining the most basic tenets of the AAA.107
By 1983, Nimeiri felt strong enough to implement a rapid succession of moves to 
dismantle the AAA. In June, he issued a presidential decree dividing the south into 
three regions again. HEC president Tambura would become head of the restored 
Equatorian region. Aber was removed from the national Vice President post and 
replaced with Lagu.109 It was on the basis of this abrogation of the terms of the AAA 
by the very parties which had concluded it eleven years earlier that SPLM/A leader 
John Garang denounced the agreement as nothing more than a deal between 
bourgeois northern and southern elites. The north dictated the terms and the southern
106 Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 34. Malwal, The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood, 33. 
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Equatorians, while they were appointed to mid-level technical positions, resented Alier for appointing primarily 
Dinka to top positions in the regional government. They also resented what they alleged was mistreatment by 
Alier-appointed Dinka police.
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elites ‘compromised the interests of the masses in return for jobs which had long been 
denied them during the Sudanization of the 1950s’.110 The SPLA was formed 
between May and July 1983, nearly concurrent with the south’s redivision, and would 
be defined by its refusal to be ‘bought off by the government in Khartoum, 
especially during its formative years.* 111
Nimeiri’s lack of attention to the exclusive coalition he had formed with his southern
112
partner meant that the renewed insurgency in the region caught him by surprise.
His response was haphazard. Military offensives were ineffective and his various 
mediation and reconciliation efforts with southern insurgents were not greeted 
seriously. Nimeiri approached the World Council of Churches and African states 
such as Kenya to mediate between Garang and himself, futile gestures after his drift 
towards political Islamism. Nimeiri attempted, without success, another ‘National 
Reconciliation’ maneuver between the Khatamiyya and Ansar to face the south with a 
united front, as he had used the south to face off these northern factions a decade 
earlier. By late 1984, Nimeiri was reduced to rescinding the redivision edict and 
returning to the original AAA. The SPLA surely must have sensed weakness in this 
completely arbitrary decision by a leader who had exhausted his credibility 
nationwide.114
SECURITY, THE MILITARY, AND THE PATRONAGE STATE
The AAA marks the first time the army was used explicitly as an instrument of the 
patronage state. Nimeiri’s acquiescence to allow the induction of former insurgents 
into the military may have been a necessary condition of peace with the Anya Nya, 
but it began an evolution by which the state slowly began to cede its monopoly on the
110 John Garang, John Garang Speaks, 51.
111 Bamaba Marial Benjamin. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and the Peace Process,” The 
Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, Ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East 
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2005, 45. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 
284. Taban Lo Liyong. “South-South Sudanese Dialogue,” The Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future 
Prospects, ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 
2005, 145. Johnson, The Root Causes o f  Sudan’s Civil Wars, 62.
112 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f  Dis-may, 286, 389.
113 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f  Dis-may, 287, 388.
114 Madut-Arop, Sudan 's Painful Road to Peace, 118. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 371, 389. 
By early 1985 Nimeiri was offering Garang a cease fire, along with the Vice Presidency and development of oil in 
the south. It again appeared a desperate, insincere move to Garang.
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legitimate use of force to various clients via the military, security, and paramilitary 
forces. The ultimate result of this long process has been the delegitimizing of the 
national army as a guarantor of southern security and the subsequent validation of the 
SPLA demand for a separate southern army.115 In addition, Khartoum’s inability to 
consistently integrate southerners into the national army following the AAA allowed 
the SPLM/A to argue for more robust security provisions in the CPA process.
The army is perhaps modem Sudan’s oldest secular institution. Founded in 1924 by 
the British, it was rarely used during the colonial period as an instrument of internal 
repression.116 The military in Sudan was not seen as a detached institution like some 
counterparts in Africa, but as a ‘mirror’ of Sudanese society. It has traditionally 
had exposure to all the varied ideological trends in northern Sudan, and has acted on 
those influences regularly as its history of mid-level coups d ’etat, both successful and
1 I o
unsuccessful, demonstrate. Because of the modem secularist structure upon which 
it was founded, top military officers, even religious conservatives, had traditionally 
been hesitant to use religion as a mobilizing force in warfare. The call to jihad was 
never issued during the first war against southern rebellion in part because each of the 
successive regimes saw it as an outmoded, anti-modem method of conflict.119
The Abboud regime, Sudan’s first post-independence dictatorship, may have posed 
the first compromise of the army’s reputation for impartiality and integrity among 
northerners. Immediately following the coup, the army could rely on its military 
nature to assuage urban, riverine northern Sudanese that it would be a welcome 
antidote to the chaotic and unstable parliamentary period of the 1950s. However, 
Woodward lists several reasons the Abboud regime could not adopt the appearance of 
neutrality in its state-building efforts as the British had done. The junta was 
identified with distinct elements of Sudanese society which it favored, such as the
115 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 118. A proposal for such an army had been 
one of the amendments Lagu’s SSLM subordinates had pressed him to introduce in the weeks of March 1972, 
after the drafting of the AAA and before its ratification. The discarded amendments included other such 
arrangements of loose confederation such as the power of the south to make treaties with foreign governments.
116 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 102.
117 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 232.
118 A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinycwa. “The Border Implications of the Sudan Civil War: Possibilities for Intervention” 
The Southern Sudan: The Problem o f National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973,
127.
119 Gingyera-Pinycwa, “The Border Implications of the Sudan Civil War: Possibilities for Intervention,” 127.
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1 70Umma party which many junta members had been affiliated with before the coup.
In addition, political parties were much more developed now and could protest this 
bias. Civil society was also more complex by the late 1950s than it had been during
171the Condominium, allowing more outlets for protest and dissent.
By the 1960s, the army was also not as reliably conservative as it had been before 
independence. Nasser’s radical example in Egypt had been a major influence on low 
to mid-ranking nationalists in the officer corps, as the 1969 revolt would 
demonstrate. In fact, the officers who staged that coup would claim they were 
defending the 1964 October Revolution -  which had brought down the conservative 
Abboud regime -  from the same reactionary sectarian forces which by 1969 
dominated parliament. It was this mix of nationalist vigor, combined with the 
desperation of a fragile regime seeking a new partner, which allowed for Nimeiri to 
absorb the Anya Nya into the armed forces. The novelty of this move disguised the 
fact that it was in accordance with other elements of the AAA which incorporated the 
south into a national patronage network.124 The induction of southern insurgents into 
the army would have been unthinkable to the orthodox Abboud, who considered the 
ill-trained Anya Nya to be little more than bandits impeding the army’s Arab-lslamic 
state-building project. Abboud instead relied on sectarian support from the Mahdiyya 
faction for his regime’s legitimacy, and was therefore also more subject to the civil
i 7  c
society which would withdraw its support for his regime in 1964.
The patronage system established by the AAA in the south was not enough to solidify 
Nimeiri’s hold on power, as demonstrated by a series of events in the mid-1970s 
which led him to consider another exclusivist coalition. The short-lived coup attempt
120 Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 30.
121 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 135.
122 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 135. Dunstan M. Wai. “The Sudan: Domestic Politics and 
Foreign Relations under Nimeiry.” African Affairs 78:312 (July 1979), 301. Telephone interview by the author 
with R. S. O’Fahey, Oslo, 2009.
123 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 84. Daly, “Broken bridge and empty basket,” 5. Deng, War 
o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 17.
124 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law’ to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
o f the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Articles 10, 14 and 20. These articles pertain to the immense freedom the 
national president had to intervene in southern institutions and the reliance of the High Executive Council and the 
People’s Regional Assembly on his benefaction. They allowed the national president to appoint an interim head 
of the Regional Assembly, the freedom to ignore southern requests to postpone national legislation in that region, 
and the right to appoint members of the High Executive Council ‘on recommendation’ from that body’s president.
125 Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 30.
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in September 1975 undermined Nimeiri’s faith in his regime’s stability, and 
convinced him to introduce amendments giving him more power to issue decrees and 
build up his security apparatus. While this indicated the trend of an increasing 
personalization of power, and of reliance on security forces, it did not contain the 
threat to Nimeiri from his powerful enemies abroad. Another coup attempt in 1976 
highlighted how Nimeiri’s obligations to his southern partners under the AAA 
compromised his regime’s security in other remote regions. Many conspirators in 
this attempted power grab came from the western regions of Darfur and Kordofan. 
Westerners were increasingly unhappy with the continued underdevelopment of their 
area, especially when money these regions sent to the national government was used
1 97to fund administration in the south.
Increasing insecurity in the south would become a factor in the National 
Reconciliation. Southern soldiers began periodic revolts as early as early as 1975 and 
1976, when they defied authority in Akobo and Aweil respectively and mutinied, 
forming the basis of what would later comprise the Anya Nya 2. A little-cited 
February 1977 incident at the airport in Juba also may have shaken Nimeiri’s faith in 
southern support and, coming only six months after the 1976 coup attempt, the 
stability of his own rule. A detachment of mainly absorbed Anya Nya forces 
attempted to take over the airport, declaring that forces would be flying in from 
Uganda, Ethiopia and Libya to take over the south and then overthrow the regime. 
When the attempt to take over the airport failed, the mutineers escaped into the 
jungle, leaving it uncertain as to whom their conspirators within the national
126 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 190. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The 
Contemporary Middle East, 48. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 49. An amendment was 
introduced to the president’s articles in September 1975 which severely damaged the integrity of the constitution, 
which gives the assembly the power to monitor the president. Article 106 gave the president the right to issue 
Provisional Republican orders when the People’s Assembly was not in session or when it was urgent, a much 
wider realm of authority.
127 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 143. Fadlalla, “The Search for a Constitution,” 48. 0 ‘Fahey, 
interview. After the south, Darfur was typically among the least developed regions of Sudan. Darfur had seen 
almost no development during the colonial period and, aside from a railroad constructed in 1959 reaching the 
town of Nyala in the south of the province, little development since independence. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil 
Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 209. Assefa writes that southerners, being a bedrock for 
the foundation of Nimeiri’s regime after the AAA, may have been tainted in the eyes of other Sudanese because of 
the exclusive relationship they now shared with the military dictator.
128 Madut-Arop, Sudan 's Painful Road to Peace, 29. Akolda M. Tier. “A Critical Comparative Analysis of the 
Processes of Resolving The Conflict in The Sudan.” United Nations Public Administrations Network. Addis 
Ababa, 2002, 4. Liyong, “South-South Sudanese Dialogue,” 145. The Akobo group by 1978 had crossed into 
Ethiopia to launch regular attacks.
1 ? Qgovernment or that of the Southern Region might have been. “ The incident 
coincided with the ending of broader southern patronage by Khartoum as Nimeiri 
turned towards dissident northern Islamists to further bolster his regime.
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By the mid-1970s, the security network was not loyal to Nimeiri personally, and it 
was not clear that it would be able to neutralize the threat from opponents in exile 
even if it were.130 As a result of his weakness nationally, which the AAA could only 
temporarily abate, Nimeiri was forced to reconcile with his northern enemies, seeking 
to induct them into his patronage network. While the 1977 National Reconciliation 
was aimed primarily at the major sectarian parties, the ultimate beneficiaries were the 
Muslim Brothers. Nimeiri’s interest in incorporating the security apparatus into his 
patronage network, coupled with his need to accommodate his new Islamist allies
. 1  T9with employment, led to a natural infiltration of Islamists into the security forces. 
Nimeiri found that patronizing the security forces was even more economical than his 
efforts to do so with the military, and his increased reliance on them to defend his rule 
would be emulated by the NIF regime. Nimeiri’s last vice president, Omar 
Mohammed Al-Tayeb, had spent most of his career as an intelligence officer and was 
used by the president as a counterweight to any over-reliance on the 
military.134 However, if the National Reconciliation of 1977 was indeed to be a truce
129 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 353-354. Lagu asserts that just to make sure, 
various southern politicians opposed to Alier, such as Joseph Oduho, were detained.
130 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution ofDis-may, 170. Khalid asserts that Nimeiri had asked his head of security 
to consider assassination attempts on such exiled sectarian leaders Yusuf Al-Hindi and Sadiq Al-Mahdi. When 
the security head refused, he was fired in 1977.
131 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution ofDis-may, 170. Voll and Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a 
Multicultural State, 86. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 52.
132 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 112. 0 ‘Fahey, interview. Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi. 
The Making o f an Islamic Political Leader: Conversations with Hasan al-Turabi. London: Al-Mustakillah, 1996, 
23. As Muslim Brothers’ leader Hassan Al-Turabi stated in an interview: ‘New areas of work like security 
emerged in the movement as a result of the new strategy. We had very timidly ventured into that field in the early 
seventies, but during reconciliation security became an established function. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan:
The Contemporary Middle East, 56-57. Sidahmed describes a situation by the late 1980s where Islamists in the 
intelligence services were able to protect their colleagues in the military by drawing attention away from their 
subversive activities, preparing the environment for what would become the June 1989 NIF-supported coup.
133 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 111. De Waal describes the tendency of the NIF regime 
to pursue a strategy similar to the one Nimeiri used towards the end of his rule: heavy reliance on security and 
patronage networks to cement the regime. Bratton and van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa, 76. The 
authors note the transition of military regimes towards relying on civilian institutions over military ones as 
indicative of a neo-patrimonial system: the flexibility and technical expertise of civilian bureaucrats, as well as the 
perceived legitimacy of civilian leadership over that of the military, becomes enough of an incentive for such an 
evolution.
134 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 166. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State 
(From Ruin To Hope), 432. Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, 119-120. Gurdon notes that Al-Tayeb’s 
background as head of security gave him little support from the army, which was also insurance against his
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with marginalized northerners as the AAA was with the south, it was comparatively 
inadequate. Unlike the agreement with southern insurgents, under National 
Reconciliation, former National Front fighters were not treated as combatants and 
absorbed into the national army. They were instead resettled as farmers on
1 T r
agricultural schemes, if they were employed at all. This disparity of conditions 
under the terms of the two treaties only heightened the alienation felt in remote areas 
such as the west towards the national government, leading to further pressure for 
AAA abrogation.
National Reconciliation may not have marked the end of the AAA, but in practice it 
was clear that it would be at odds with it. The National Front, particularly the 
Muslim Brothers, would consistently push for review of AAA provisions in areas 
such as language, culture, religion, and security arrangements. Nimeiri’s motion of 
inclusion towards northern exiles coincided with widespread retirements and 
dismissals of southern officers, who had been absorbed into the national army as part 
of the AAA, coinciding with the end of the five-year period by which these troops 
were guaranteed positions. 137 While these retirements did not violate the letter of the 
agreement, they did violate its spirit. Southerners had expected these positions were 
to mark the beginning of southern representation among officers, not serve as a one-
complicity in a coup attempt. There were also rumous of a private scandal involving the vice president which 
were useful to Nimeiri. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 58. Al-Tayeb had the potential to assist 
Nimeiri in the event of a coup attempt, as his security forces in the capital area numbered 45,000, more than the 
number of troops garrisoned there.
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notes that between 1973 and 1982, no southerners officers had been commissioned except for 270 in 1974. By 
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were replaced with southerners as this was not a directly expressed condition of the AAA. Madut-Arop, Sudan 's 
Painful Road to Peace, 24-25. Southern troops were slowly being rotated out of the south in the period almost 
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caused which gave John Garang his first recruits: former Anya Nya officers who were tacitly opposed to the 
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1 "38time gesture. Unlike the CPA, the AAA was not reliant on implementation 
modules so much as it was the goodwill between the parties.
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It was finally the rotation of southern troops in the early 1980s which provoked war 
again, particularly out of areas that were important for reasons of strategy or 
resources.139 By the early 1980s, Nimeiri was becoming more explicit in his 
intentions regarding the Bentiu oil fields. During this period he had begun to rotate 
southern troops out of the region, replacing them with western troops.140 This action 
became a precursor to the rotation of southern troops in early 1983 which would 
result in the Bor Mutiny and the second civil war. Nevertheless, it is instructive to 
note that it was the removal of southern troops from their region which led to the 
mutiny, not the removal of southern troops from oil regions. This indicates that, 
while exclusion from access to Sudan’s natural resources and regional redivision may 
have raised hostility among southerners towards Khartoum, it was only the attempt to 
remove southern troops from their region which led them to violence.
As his rule became ever more fragile throughout the 1980s, Nimeiri was increasingly 
obliged to ensure the army’s loyalty. Army patronage was expensive, however, and 
Nimeiri soon began to realize that rather than pay the army out of the treasury, he 
could use state power to allow it to function as a commercial enterprise. The armed 
forces were now allowed a monopoly on the importation and production of certain
138 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 325. Lagu refers to the halt in recruitment of 
southerners into high positions in the military as a major blow to the legitimacy of the May Regime after the 
AAA.
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“Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan.” Sudan Update, (December 1999), 77. Sidahmed, Politics and 
Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 158. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 161. To southern 
soldiers, the rotation of troops was suspiciously similar to the rotation of troops that had instigated the 1955 Torit 
Rebellion which sparked the first civil war. There were also rumors that the May Regime was planning to send 
southern soldiers to aid Iraq in its war against Iran.
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Troop rotation was common prior to the AAA, but it was viewed by southerners as a way for Khartoum to remove 
southern troops from the area they were most dedicated to protecting, the south. Rotation was not practiced from
1972 to 1983. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 131. El Obeid notes the 
hesitance which former insurgents had towards being rotated out of the south, arguing that by 1980 this 
demonstrated that it was unlikely the former Anya Nya would ever integrate nationally with their northern 
counterparts. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 42. The attack on the mutineers 
was taken by the National Defense Council and had the support of four camps: Islamists and Arabists, Equatorian 
soldiers who wanted to cut Dinka power down, military officers who sought order and discipline among the 
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goods and began to make up a vital sector of the national economy.141 The 
establishment of this Military Economic Cooperation seemed to work temporarily. 
The army had remained loyal by 1982 when it crushed civilian unrest after riots over 
IMF-backed price rises on basic goods.142 With the collapse of the AAA, the military- 
economic alliance may have exacerbated tensions in the south. After the Bor mutiny 
and subsequent renewed warfare in the region, the cooperative benefited from the 
instability which disrupted reliable transport. With civilian traders from the north 
unable to reach southern markets, the military was able to comer many areas of trade 
throughout the region.143 Hence, by the time of Nimeiri’s April 1985 downfall, the 
military actually profited from the lack of security in the southern region.
This experience of absorbed insurgents after the AAA would provide a severe 
learning experience for the SPLA during the IGAD negotiations. During these talks, 
the government’s original position concerning security was ‘immediate integration’ 
of the SPLA with the Sudanese Armed Forces. However, in the 2003 negotiations it 
conceded the SPLA’s point that the similar integration after the AAA had ‘meant that 
the south had ended up without a means of self-defense.’144 Both parties in the IGAD 
process negotiated ‘on the underlying assumption that conflict might be necessary 
once more, either during the interim period or subsequently’.145 As a result they 
sought to avoid provisions in the agreement which would hinder their ability to 
maintain and equip their armed forces. In order to keep negotiations alive, mediators 
allowed this to happen. During the negotiations to finalize the permanent cease fire 
in late 2004, neither the primary government negotiator nor his SPLM counterpart 
considered the issues of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration to be 
important enough to warrant extended discussion, leaving matters to their advisors
141 Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, 111. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 222-223. Khalid 
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and resource people.146 In the 2003 Security Agreement, the role of the police and 
judiciary was not described. It was instead referred to in the power-sharing 
agreement.147 This arrangement is noteworthy, as both these elements of law are vital 
to security but were contested like everything else, and therefore discussed in terms 
of power.
PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY AND THE RISE OF THE POPULAR 
DEFENSE FORCES
The disintegration of the unity of the Sudanese Armed Forces is a key factor in 
Khartoum’s willingness to allow the SPLA to preserve their military capability under 
the terms of the CPA. The evolution of this process was a long one, and coincides 
with the recession of the nationalist project in northern Sudan. The militia networks 
which would pose the greatest challenge to the army’s monopoly on violence can 
trace their origins back to the 1970s. Khartoum’s inability at that time to stop 
desertification of northern lands contributed to the pressure on savannah nomads to 
move southward in search of water. This migration began intense competition 
between arabized and non- arabized tribes in the south over grazing land.148 Nimeiri 
exacerbated this problem when he armed tribes friendly to the government at the 
beginning of the second civil war. Baggara Arabs in Bahr Al-Ghazal particularly 
were armed to fight the Dinka.149 Later governments would continue this policy of
146 Barltrop, The Negotiation o f Security Issues in Sudan ’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 23-25. As 
Sulafedeen Salih Mohamed, head of the Northern Sudan Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
Commission was quoted in 2007, ‘In Sudan we ended up with two very strong military institutions, whereas in 
most peace processes you end up with one. Could this have been avoided? I doubt it very much. Disarmament, 
demobilization and reintegration wasn’t really part of the agreement.’ Barltrop notes that both parties rejected the 
standard terminology of disarmament and reconciliation. Southerners favored the term ‘force reduction’ over 
‘disarmament’, since the latter implied defeat.
147 Barltrop, The Negotiation o f Security Issues in Sudan 's Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 34.
148 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 191. Jendia, The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969-1985, 161.
149 R.S. O'Fahey. “Islam and Ethnicity in the Sudan.” Journal o f Religion in Africa 26:3 (August 1996), 265. 
Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 273. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to 
Peace, 134. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable Slate, 192. The Rezeigat and Misseriya tribes were 
particularly common in the PDF, being natural foes of the Dinka in this area. Jendia, The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 
1969-1985, 162. Jendia notes that the Baqqara tribes had been generally neutral in the first war, seeing the 
conflict as a fight between the south and Khartoum, not directly involving them. However, in 1983, Nimeiri 
removed the ethnic demarcations along the border of Bahr Al-Ghazal and the northern provinces of Darfur and 
Kordofan, allowing the pastoralist Baqqara free passage to southern grazing lands. The result was not only the 
overgrazing of traditional Dinka and Nuer lands, but that in the second war the northern pastoralists would 
become Khartoum’s clients as it was the government which allowed access to the fields.
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arming tribes in the south to show that the conflict was tribal, not ideological, and to 
disguise the level of direct government involvement in the campaign.150
The weak nature of the parliamentary regimes following Nimeiri, and their eventual 
inability to rely on the army to prosecute the renewed war in the south, led to the 
most important rival of the conventional military, the umbrella organization of 
northern militias known as the Popular Defense Forces (PDF). The PDF represented 
an expansion of the patronage system to the hinterlands of north Sudan, where the 
military was too overwhelmed with the rebellion in other parts of the south to provide 
security, even against the SPLA.
The formal creation of the PDF was an assault on Sudanese institutions both 
venerable (the army) and recent (the assembly). After a particularly brutal Dinka 
attack on a south Kordofan village in July 1985, tribal leaders in the region gave the 
visiting Minister of Defense an ultimatum: Khartoum would either provide security 
for the Arab Baggara peoples in south Darfur and south Kordofan or these tribes 
would turn to the SPLA for their security, effectively joining the rebellion. The 
military was at the time too demoralized and overstretched to be moved into the area. 
As a result, the minister’s delegation made a decision to start arming the Baggara -  
without the required authorization from the National Constituent Assembly.1' 1 The 
formation of the paramilitary Popular Defense Forces was therefore an attempt to put 
the patronage network to work fighting the civil war as it became clear in the 1980s 
that the army had neither the capacity nor the will to serve in them. The factional 
nature of Sudan during the parliamentary period made the politics of the military a
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Drought and Disaster Relief on the Nile. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994, 240. Khalid, The 
Government They Deserve, 357,391. Madut-Arop, Sudan’s Painful Road to Peace, 159,167,184. Kok, 
Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 70, 96. Kok stresses the segregated makeup of the army by the 
early 1990s, when over 94% of the officer corps was of arabized background and over 80% of the enlisted men 
were from the non-Arab regions of the west, east and south.
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political consideration. While Khatmiyya, and increasingly the NIF, had many
loyalists among the army, Sadiq Al-Mahdi and the Umma party typically had
ambiguous support, especially in the officer corps. Al-Mahdi realized that by turning
to a paramilitary force such as the PDF, he could mobilize his Ansar loyalists
1
independent of the army, and continue relying on tribal militias.
However, the decision was not a popular one. The reason Al-Mahdi had not 
consulted the assembly regarding militias was that many members of his own Umma 
party opposed the plan. It is revealing that, of the various parliamentary factions,
i o
only the NIF gave overwhelming support to this move to bolster the war effort.
Hence, what began as a tool of convenience by one of Khartoum’s more fragile 
coalitions paved the way for further compromises under the later, even less popular, 
NIF regime. The move was therefore not without controversy. Defense Minister 
General Abd Al-Majid Khalil, who would resign in February 1989 over the war, was 
upset by what he saw as the Prime Minister’s erosion of the integrity of the army, one 
of Sudan’s most stable institutions. Khalil disapproved not only of the Umma-backed 
militias in the west and south, but of Al-Mahdi’s appointment of his own cousin, a 
Baqqara Arab chieftain, as Chief of Staff of the army.154 This appointment further 
demonstrates the political patronage which continued even throughout parliamentary 
periods.
Despite the vital need to discuss its role in a peaceful Sudan, none of the peace 
initiatives proposed in the parliamentary era of the 1980s -  neither the Koka Dam 
Declaration, the Sudan Peace Initiative, nor the Sudan Charter -  discussed the 
possibility of reorganizing the army. The AAA admitted a set amount of rebels to 
join the institution individually, but made no deeper attempt to restructure the
152 Leonardi, interview. Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan’s Civil Wars, 81. De Waal, “Some comments on the 
militias in contemporary Sudan,” 143-144. Robert O. Collins. “Civil Wars in the Sudan.” History Compass 5:6 
(2007), 1785. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 83, 135. The NIF approved of Al-Mahdi’s PDF 
militia plan over the army’s objections, and after the 1989 coup, Turabi sought to emulate Al-Mahdi’s strategy, 
replacing Ansar warriors with NIF cadres from the urban riverine area. Idris, Sudan 's Civil War, 125. Atta El- 
Battahani, “A complex web: politics and conflict in Sudan.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan ’s Conflicts. 
London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 12. Al-Mahdi also increased the usage of Rizeigat and Misseriya Arab 
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force.1' 5 While the structure of the army seemed non-negotiable in Sudan’s various 
peace agreements, the challenges to its hitherto unique role posed by the various 
militias throughout the state left its unity a subject of negotiation by end of the 
twentieth century. Nationalist officers had traditionally considered withdrawal of the 
army from the south as an admission that it was a northern institution only, an 
anathema to them.156 The erosion of the army’s capability over the course of the 
second war made its universal authority easier to challenge by the time of the 2003 
Security Agreement.
COALITION-BUILDING IN THE SECOND WAR: NEW NORMS FOR 
CONFLICT RESOLUTION
The NIF has tried hard to hold to some element of ideological integrity, namely its 
strict interpretation of Islamic law, to avoid the ideological inertia which seems to 
have affected previous governments based on coalitions in Sudanese history.
However, its resulting lack of popularity has forced it to govern the state as though it 
were still an opposition party. The history of the regime seems to confirm the theory 
that NIF tactical planning is suitable for building a power base in opposition, but not 
for running a government; the ability to manipulate political divisions among 
opponents has severe limitations when applied to policy dilemmas. For most of the 
war, the Bashir regime offered no strategy to reconcile ethnic or political differences, 
simply short-term manipulation. The regime’s particular Islamist vision of the 
government’s role could not match transcendental rhetoric with the inclusive 
administration. To the contrary, in his study of the NIF version of Islamism in Sudan, 
Sidahmed notes that Sudanese Islamists were especially cynical and self-serving 
when practicing politics compared with other political parties in the state. As a 
result of this limited scope, the movement has fallen victim to Arab chauvinism and 
traditional geographical bias in favor of the riverine areas. Non-Arab Islamists often
155 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
o f the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, Article 27.
156 Justice Africa, 23 February 2005.
I>7 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 97-98.
158 Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan, 225. Alex De Waal, “Sudan: international dimensions 
to the state and its crisis.” Crisis States Research Center, Occasional Paper no. 3 (April 2007), 20. De Waal 
concurs, writing that ‘Khartoum’s perfidy is not a cunning stratagem to deceive its adversaries, it is a structural 
condition of a dysfunctional regime whose members expend most of their efforts on internal intrigue and who do 
not keep one another fully informed.’
191
accuse the regime of racism, and the 1999 Bashir/Turabi split occurred along ethnic 
lines, with Turabi taking on for himself the cause of western Sudanese and non-Arab 
Muslims while riverine Sudanese and Arab elites generally sided with Bashir.1' 9 This 
is an indication of the limits of militant Islamism as a governing ideology: it has only 
had success in Africa by working to support local agendas.160 Attempts to impose a 
top-down, post-nationalist Islamic agenda have failed, as the Arab nationalist project 
itself had failed in Sudan decades earlier.
The highly tactical nature of the NIF regime leads to an advanced erosion of 
institutions under it.161 As the NIF compromised institutions such as the army and 
banking system it created new norms, namely, allowing for self-determination and a 
separate army for the south. A reason that so much more was subject to negotiation 
in the second war was not simply that the SPLM/A had many more demands than the 
SSLM had, but due to the simple fact that the Bashir junta had made so many tactical 
agreements by which it indicated what it would allow in a settlement. As time 
passed, the issue of whether Khartoum was sincere or not in its concessions to 
southern militias in treaties such as the Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 became 
less important than the fact that its acquiescence to formerly controversial 
concessions in these agreements set precedents. These allowances provided a pretext 
for the SPLM/A and international actors to pressure the government to repeat earlier 
concessions, only this time in a more substantial, comprehensive treaty. As an 
SPLM/A negotiator during the IGAD process told John Young, treaties such as the 
KPA ‘laid the basis for the CPA’.162 In the first war, there was little difference in the 
intensity with which parliamentary and military regimes conducted the war in the 
south since both types of regime were nationalist and had the same objective. 
However, there was a significant difference between the way these regimes 
conducted their war and the way Nimeiri, and especially Bashir, fought the second
159 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f  Africa, 97-99. Aleksi Ylönen. “Grievances and the Roots of 
Insurgencies: Southern Sudan and Darfur.” Peace, Conflict & Development 7 (July 2005), 127-128. Ibrahim, 
interview. Leonardi, interview. Leonardi notes that Turabi has championed a version of Islam which transcends 
racial questions such as Arab or African identity, and he has been able to use this to find a faction of support in the 
Darfur conflict.
160 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f  Africa, 9.
161 Emeric Rogier. No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan ’s Torturous Ascent to Heights o f  Peace. Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, Clingendael. August, 2005, 41.
162 John Young. “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation.” Institute o f Governance Studies, Simon Fraser 
University, Vancouver. 30 May 2007, 15.
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war. Neither of the latter two regimes had nationalist objectives at heart, and so had 
freedom to cut deals with militias, even making promises which they would later be 
held accountable for in which they promised to allow the south to secede under 
certain circumstances.
The Bashir regime revealed its ultimate priority, unfettered Islamization throughout 
the north, over the course of several years. At Abuja 2, an early initiative to end the 
second war which was hosted by Nigeria in 1993, Kok charged that the government’s 
hidden agenda ‘was to secure a deal for NIF-SPLA/M Condominium rule over the 
Sudan. [The Bashir regime] invited the SPLM/A to be a full partner in the system 
and to participate in and defend it.’ The specifics of resource sharing were not 
discussed and the regime aspired to keep the south divided, as well as to ensure that 
the SPLA renounced its plans for national revolution. Khartoum also opposed an 
independent southern army and multi-party democracy.163 While many of these 
demands would later become part of the CPA protocols at this time, the government 
delegation at this time was not able to detail how the two systems could coincide, 
since the SPLM/A itself had recently committed to multi-party democracy through its 
agreements with other members of the NDA.164 One could make the case that it has 
been this coalescing of the most powerful northern opposition groups in the NDA 
around the SPLM’s secular agenda that has pressured the Islamist regime to make 
concessions concerning self-determination for the south and a separate army, but this 
has not been the truth in at least one important instance. The Cairo Declaration of 
May 2003 was signed by both Sadiq Al-Mahdi and Al-Mirghani, along with John 
Garang. It called for a secular national capital, which had been up until then a point 
of contention in the peace process.165 Instead of conceding this point, the government 
angrily rejected the July 2003 Nakuru document which stipulated secularism openly 
for the first time in the negotiations. This is the best indication of the regime’s 
strongly held priorities in negotiation, and that it was not simply aping the positions 
of the exiled sectarian parties in the hope of mollifying or neutralizing them. Unlike 
the sectarians, Bashir could not compromise the Islamic project.
163 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 194.
164 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 195. Similar deals were attempted with the DUP in 
October 1993 and the Umma party in January 1994.
165 International Crisis Group. “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace.” 11 December 2003, 14.
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After the Nakuru document was rejected, the government realized it needed to
demonstrate some popular backing in order to push forward its agenda, which
included defense of Islamist policy in the north. This involved loosening restrictions
on certain elements of civil society, particularly those which had supported Turabi.
The government tried to rally elements of northern society by appealing to their
patriotism. 166 Haysom believes that, while the Nakuru draft contained much of what
the parties would eventually agree to, it was too early in the process for the
government to make such concessions. It was not until Vice President Taha was
1involved personally in negotiations that the talks were able to make headway.
THE BASHIR REGIME AND NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN MILITIAS
The Bashir-Turabi partnership, by its very nature as a military-civilian Islamist 
coalition, carried within it tensions which would contribute to its unravelling. While 
the military faction under Bashir saw the army as the ultimate keeper of order and 
stability, Turabi saw it as simply a means to the end of Islamic Revolution. The NIF 
had sought for years to infiltrate the army, and backed Bashir and his Islamist officers 
in the coup, but Turabi believed the ideal Islamic state could not have a military 
leader. 168 The weakening of the army as a stable, secular, independent institution 
advanced much more rapidly under the NIF regime than had happened under the 
governments which came before it. Upon its assumption of power, the junta began 
methodically removing senior army officers whom it deemed a threat to its command 
or the new regime, even as Bashir himself accused the previous government of
166 ICG, “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace,” 15-16. Asa result, following an October 2003 rally in 
Khartoum championing peace and democracy, the regime released Turabi from prison. The Islamist leader then 
credited Garang and pressure from the international community with his release, and acknowledged ‘the peace 
process as the driving force of political developments in the country’.
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corresponding with via mobile phone in Khartoum: Vice President Ali Osman Taha. Through the Kenyan foreign 
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undermining the army’s efforts in the south.169 While many Islamist officers might 
have understood the need for the regime to switch to civilian leadership for 
appearance’s sake, they became increasingly concerned about Turabi’s attempts to 
give to civilian institutions duties the military felt were its own. Turabi understood 
the need for coercion in the new regime, but preferred to rely on the security 
apparatus, over which he, as a civilian, would have more control. Security forces
171would see unprecedented growth under the regime.
It was increased reliance on the militia networks which most undermined the 
military’s monopoly on force in the south, however. Militias were cheaper for the 
government to sustain than regular army because they did not receive regular salaries, 
but were instead allowed to keep ‘the spoils of war’. The lack of regular salaries 
allowed Khartoum to deny accountability for the militias, and blame their actions on 
the generally fragile security situation or inter-ethnic violence. The N1F regime 
expanded upon the PDF militias after their 1989 takeover, introducing conscription 
and better coordinating with tribal leaders. Northern secondary students were sent 
to military training camps, and failure to appear resulted in the loss of education and 
employment opportunities.174 Turabi saw the militias as a way to counteract the 
influence of the army, which he still felt was too secular and difficult to Islamize.
He believed instead that for its security Sudan should rely on a small standing army
169 Interview by author with Monawar Sharif, Canberra, 2009. De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f  
Africa, 184, 187. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 307. Over 350 primarily 
senior officers were dismissed following the June 1989 coup. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 
135, 151. By October 1993 over 1500 officers had been fired, even as fighting in the south intensified.
Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 39. Woodward puts the number at approximately 2000 
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170 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000, 8. An example 
of Turabi’s preference for civilian institutions was a new doctrine stating that the president’s appointed High 
Court was now charged with safeguarding the constitution, traditionally a military role.
171 Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 103. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 
205. The quashing of an attempted uprising in September 1995 showed how strong the NIF and its security forces 
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103.
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and a huge militia organization.176 Most military members of the new junta were 
suspicious of any rival to the army, but they could not argue with the early success of 
the murahileen, arabized nomads based in Bahr Al-Ghazal and western Kordofan, in 
revitalizing the war effort against the SPLA.177 Critically, it was cheaper to supply 
militias than it would be to train and equip an expanded conventional army. As the 
imperative of the war became to guard the oil fields, relying on tribes located near 
that area seemed more practical than transporting troops unfamiliar with the territory 
to fight there.179 Relying on tribal militias also meant fewer casualties among soldiers 
recruited from the urban centers, thereby mitigating the war’s unpopularity in these 
crucial areas.
As the SPLA grew stronger in the late 1990s, Khartoum began to speed up efforts to 
recruit tribal militias on the north-south border to fight. As a result, it began to lose 
control over its war efforts. PDF recruits operate autonomously from the command 
of the regular armed forces, weakening Khartoum’s authority over them and blurring 
the line between organized militia and affiliated tribal forces.180 The militias pursued 
not only the government’s agenda, but localized vendettas as well. The subsequent 
government-sanctioned brutality often led non-Arab Sudanese who might have been 
neutral or even sympathetic to aspects of government policy to become radicalized by 
the prospect of their land being raided or even confiscated by Arab 
tribes.181 Government-backed militias were also becoming upset with their lack of
176 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 134. By 2003, the PDF was meant to replace the armed 
forces as the nation’s dominant fighting force. Popular police would take over for law enforcement from the 
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government funding and began increasingly cutting their own deals with the SPLA 
and southern peoples. “ By 1997, momentum favored the SPLA again, and the PDF 
was running out of recruits.183 By 1998, PDF recruitment in the north had reached an 
all-time low, and Khartoum increasingly began to invest in its alternative strategy: 
supporting southern-based militias against their larger rival, the SPLA. The Bashir 
junta promoted its patronage of southern militias throughout the 1990s as a ‘Peace 
From Within’ process, signing a series of agreements with various anti-SPLA
1 o r
southern factions. With the 1992 Frankfurt Agreement, Khartoum began 
patronizing the breakaway factions in earnest, demanding they be allowed to 
participate in the first round of peace negotiations in Abuja.186 The SPLA breakaway 
group SPLA-United, later the Southern Sudan Independence Movement (SSIM), 
began to accept arms and funds from Khartoum.187 Khartoum also began to back 
smaller, tribal oriented militias in Equatoria which resented the heavily Dinka 
composition of the SPLM/A and the movement’s authoritarian nature.188 Several
182 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 129-132. Details of Dinka/Baggara reconciliation in 2000-2001 in particular are 
noted here.
182 Salmon, “A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces,” 20-21. Increasingly desperate fighting 
conditions led PDF affiliates to turn to measures such as recruitment of child soldiers. In a sign of conflict to 
come, Bashir used setbacks during this period to challenge Turabi’s control over the militias by appointing a 
mobilizing authority over the PDF which reported directly to him. The army was also given control over 
appointing personnel to certain PDF positions.
184 Salmon, “A Paramilitary Revolution: The Popular Defence Forces,” 20. Woodward, interview.
185 Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan ’s Civil Wars, 121. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary 
Middle East, 77. Dean, “Rethinking the civil war in Sudan,” 80. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 
1985-1995, 202. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 251-252. In addition, several Islamist NGOs, 
including one headed by former TMC president Suwar Al-Dhahab, were set up. These agencies would pose as 
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examples are listed of NIF-favored candidates taking governorships in the south, and 
treating the state budgets as largesse.189
Under the guise of better coordinating these southern militias, the government sought 
to marginalize the leading southern figures in these units by making them clients, 
methodically sapping their autonomy. By the mid-1990s, the so-called secessionist 
movement seemed to discard even the possibility of secession, with the apparent 
willingness of Lam Akol’s movement, a primary breakaway faction of the SPLA, to 
settle for self-government within Sudan.190 In the new organization, Reik Machar’s 
forces were divided into units which were taken out of his chain of command.191 
Eventually Machar consented to a token degree of federalism in an Islamist Sudan, 
betraying his initial separatist goal entirely. By 2001, his movement was
i  O '}
ideologically exhausted and irrelevant.
To Khartoum, the militia factions were useful tools to put political pressure on the 
SPLM/A. By signing various peace agreements with them and demanding their 
presence at negotiations with the SPLM/A, Khartoum could give the appearance of 
faithfully pursuing peace efforts staving off international pressure. However, when
government. The author cites the example of Arop Acier Akol, who was appointed Regional Minister of 
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the Bashir regime became more serious about a negotiated peace after 2001, it did not 
seek to include separatist elements, most of which had collapsed or returned to the 
SPLA by that point anyway.193 The tactical maneuvering by the government to work 
with smaller separatist factions against the SPLM/A locked Khartoum into setting 
standards which would later be cited at Machakos.194 In 1997, the government met 
with several factions who united under the umbrella militia organization the South 
Sudan Defense Force (SSDF). The government agreed to allow a four-year interim 
period, preceding a referendum under which the south could opt to secede from 
Sudan.195 This treaty had short-lasting impact, but set a precedent by which the 
SPLM/A could bargain for a similar six-year accommodation in the July 2002 
Machakos Protocol.190 When Khartoum finally began to make peace with the only 
substantial insurgent movement in the south, the SPLA, this proposal which the 
government had already agreed to was introduced again.197
THE NIF REGIME, THE BANKING SYSTEM AND COMMERCIAL 
PATRONAGE
The patronage networks established by various regimes are key in determining which 
sections of society support the state and which oppose it. The division of wealth, 
particularly in an impoverished state, is therefore a fairly strong indicator of how 
warring elites seek to appease their base by codifying wealth sharing arrangements in 
an agreement. One of the primary economic issues of contention concerning wealth 
in the Naivasha peace process also touched on cultural issues: the banking system. 
According to the Wealth Sharing Agreement, the parties would have two banking
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Southern Sudan,” 20.
194 Lobban, interview. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 119. Woodward notes the 
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Canada: Project Ploughshares, 2006, 10. Ibrahim, interview. Ibrahim notes that the significance of the KPA was 
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systems, an Islamic one in the north, and a branch of the national bank in the south
1 Q O
which practiced conventional banking. The accord contains no equivalent in the 
AAA, as the rise of Islamic banking did not occur until the early 1980s. For the 
ruling National Congress Party to compromise on the issue was a major concession. 
Control of finance had been an early goal of the Islamist regime, and one of the most 
important ways in which the new regime would seek to realign Sudan to its patronage 
network.
The first experiment with Islamic banking in Sudan, initiated under Nimeiri in the 
early 1980s, was crude and poorly executed. In his most dramatic and destabilizing 
move, at one point the president ordered all banks to immediately cease charging 
interest, regardless of the effects such a sudden move would have on the Sudanese 
economy.199 Actions such as this were meant to show the president’s extreme piety 
but simply demonstrated how detached he was from urban Sudanese society. The 
destabilizing move had ‘affected prejudicially the lifestyles of the commercial 
bourgeoisie more than other social groups: government encouragement of Islamic 
banking frustrated the economic undertakings of some businessmen.’200 Nimeiri had 
thus alienated himself from the wealthy, conservative business sector in the vital 
riverine area of Sudan, hastening the collapse of his regime.
The Muslim Brothers would not make the same mistake. Their involvement with 
Saudi Arabia’s Faisal Islamic Bank helped speed their rise to prominence in the late 
1970s, and their experience in that area led to them becoming favored in 
administrative positions and as legal advisors in their own country. Turabi realized
198 Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, Sections 14.1 and 14.2.
199 Jendia, The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969-1985, 155. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution ofDis-may, 289. 
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firsthand in this period what a powerful potential alliance this could be for a 
narrowly-based, highly organized political party. With funding from Islamic 
banking, Turabi’s Islamists could bolster their own press organizations, attacking 
figures and policies detrimental to their cause.202 Upon his removal from Nimeiri’s 
tottering regime in early 1985, Turabi first formed the National Islamic Front in a 
gesture to appeal to conservative Sudanese disillusioned with Nimeiri’s handling of 
the Sudanese economy. The new party was a coalition between urban Islamists and 
tribal and popular figures determined to defend the Islamist gains made under the late 
Nimeiri regime from secular forces.204 The coalition favored stability over 
democracy. Military gains made by the SPLA against the Transitional Military 
Council regime in the mid-1980s, and Sadiq Al-Mahdi’s subsequent government, 
disillusioned conservative businessmen with the return to parliamentary politics. As 
the insurgency spread into the north in the late 1980s, the Nuba had also joined the 
SPLA in destroying large mechanized agricultural schemes, angering local merchants 
who demanded a stronger government that could protect their investments. This class 
formed a base for the NIF coup of 19 8 9.205
Upon its rise to power, the NIF-backed junta sought to establish close ties to the 
business and finance community.206 A key stated goal of the new regime in 1989 had 
been to maintain control over the economy, both to reassure the public and 
international investors after the erratic economic policies of the parliamentary era,
Mubarak, Turabi ’s Islamist ” Venture, 56-57. Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the 
Islamist State, 1989-2000, 3. The Muslim Brothers were banned from organizing in Saudi Arabia, but were active 
in Islamic banking throughout the Gulf and were able, after National Reconciliation, to establish contacts with 
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907and to insert NIF supporters into crucial economic positions nationally. Turabi in 
the early 1990s gave an Islamist rationale to his support for free markets, noting ‘the
90 8state is the guardian of social justice, rather than the proprietor of the economy.’
This rhetoric wed his ideological, economic and political goals by reassuring wealthy 
Arab investors, especially from Saudi Arabia, that their investments would be free 
from government interference. Arab investment in turn helped give domestic 
legitimacy to a young regime with a narrow base of support. By 1991 the regime was 
considered more financially reliable by the International Monetary Fund than the 
government it had overthrown.209 Eventually the economy stabilized and Sudan was 
able to achieve impressive growth for a wartime economy, even before oil came 
online in 1999.
The Bashir junta, as had the May Regime, sought to enhance its own system of 
patronage at the expense of the traditional sectarian parties.210 The NIF began its 
assault on the foundations of sectarian support even before the 1989 coup. The 
aggressive expansion of Islamic banking into rural areas throughout the 1980s cut 
into the role of traditional money lenders, whose reliance on high interest rates had 
historically kept rural borrowers heavily in debt, while benefiting the sectarian
207 “Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan,” 44. De Waal, “Sudan: international dimensions to the state 
and its crisis,” 7. Euler, “Human Rights in Sudan,” 26. Within a decade of its coup, the NIF regime had 
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211 •factions to whom these merchants were often aligned.“ Upon assuming power, the
regime took control of trading and agriculture from businessmen and landlords who
212had been supporters of the traditional sectarian parties.
The regime rapidly sought to spread its base of support in the first few weeks of its 
control. The merchant class, tired of the instability that had marked the democratic 
period, wanted ‘strong government’, and could be relied on as long as its economic 
prospects improved.213 Early NIF supporters ‘displayed] the social and political 
characteristics of Islamists in other states with large Muslim populations, and include 
members of the urban intelligentsia, students at the University of Khartoum, small- 
business owners discontented with the ties of bigger business to the traditional 
political parties, and lower-class elements suffering economic hardship. ’214 
Consequently, the NIF regime immediately began privatizing large areas of the public 
sector, often allowing small businessmen with Islamist connections first chance to 
buy. While this contributed to the collapse of many basic services in peripheral 
areas of the north, such as Darfur and the Beja Hills, it consolidated NIF power in the 
central riverine areas so crucial to a new regime seeking to stabilize itself.216 Soon the
211 Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, 69. Suliman, “Civil War in Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation,” 
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NIF would begin giving tax breaks to businesses that contributed to the ‘jihad’ 
against the south.217
The exclusivist nature of Islamic banking could also be easily grafted onto a 
nationwide patronage system. Islamic banks created a system whereby finances 
could be used to support a tightly-controlled Islamic project. An individual seeking a 
loan from an Islamic bank was generally required to provide references from other 
businessmen better established with that bank." Domestic businessmen, even those 
with deep allegiances to the sectarian parties, sought to align themselves with the 
Bashir regime simply to remain competitive.219 Islamic banking has been a difficult 
instrument for the state to relinquish. Two years after the CPA was signed, Islamic 
banks were still prevalent in the south, and the conventional banking institutions set 
up for the region by the agreement remained weak." The CPA stipulated the 
formation of a Bank of Southern Sudan as a subdivision of the Central Bank of 
Sudan. The southern branch would provide conventional banking services for the 
South, while the central bank operated as an Islamist bank. In this way, the preferred 
cultural and religious identity of both parties to the CPA were recognized as 
legitimate, if only for their respective regions of influence. The southern bank’s 
continued subordination to the Sudan’s central bank, which maintained control over 
national monetary policy, was in keeping with Khartoum’s desire for a unitary bank 
in Sudan.221
REGIONAL ADMINISTRATION AND THE PATRONAGE SYSTEM
Integration of Sudan following the AAA was a result of the increased importance of 
personal relationships over modem institutions. This situation compromised the 
effectiveness of the south’s regional autonomy, and of regionalization generally.
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Throughout the Bashir regime as well, Khartoum’s extension of its patronage 
network dictated removal of individuals it considered untrustworthy and replacing 
them with regime loyalists. On the understanding that a successful implementation of 
the CPA would involve some degree of restoring the Native Administration system, 
Khartoum stepped up its effort to recreate that system in accordance with its own 
interests. The centralized nature of the Sudanese state has made a serious 
devolution of power very difficult to achieve in Sudan historically. Instead, the 
central government seeks out select factions to patronize, at the expense of other 
parties. The continued promotion of informal, exclusive relationships to administer 
Sudan, as opposed to functioning modem bureaucracies, ultimately undermined the 
integrity of the AAA, a reality not ignored by southern rebels during the CPA 
process.
One of the most effective ways both Nimeiri and Bashir were able to implement their 
patronage system was through making drastic changes to regional administration. In 
1971, Nimeiri sought to abolish the traditional Native Administration, replacing it 
with the Sudan Socialist Union (SSU), the nation’s only legal party. Throughout his 
rule, he showed a lack of interest in integrating the south into the national 
administrative structure, an early sign that the AAA was simply to serve as an 
exclusive coalition, not a tool to bring about further national integration. Bashir used 
a similar method of dependent regionalism, allowing the term of ‘federalism’ in 
reference to de-centralized government for the first time. Throughout the CPA 
negotiations, the SPLM/A would attempt to secure guarantees for a legitimate federal 
system, based on the states and structures Bashir had created to advance his own 
patronage system.
Native Administration began as collaboration between the early imperialists and 
regional tribal leaders. Though it was seen as feudal and backward by late colonial 
administrators and nationalists alike, dismantling the institution in the north would 
prove more difficult than ending the Southern Policy. The Marshall Report of 1949
222 Justice Africa, 23 February 2005. In the weeks following the signing o f the CPA, Khartoum became intensely 
involved in the tribal politics o f Native Administration in south Darfur, replacing the Fur Madgum o f Nyala and 
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conflict.
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presented a foundation for modem democratic local government in the Sudan, 
dismissing the Native Administration policy as a hindrance to good government.““ 
Dependence on central administration had never been discontinued in the south, 
however, making even a cosmetic switch to local government difficult.224 Native 
Administration would continue in some capacity until well beyond independence, 
primarily because the allegiance the tribal leaders had to the various sectarian factions 
made it a useful administrative tool for the sectarian leaders.
Diminishing the power of local chiefs is often a priority of new regimes in Africa, 
who see such leaders as rivals to their authority. As the leader of the first post­
colonial regime in Sudan without the backing of the sectarian movements to whom 
these local leaders were often loyal, Nimeiri’s move to abolish Native Administration 
was therefore an obvious maneuver. Native Administration, which had empowered 
tribal elites with most administrative, economic and judicial authority, was held in 
particular disdain by the May Regime’s modernist technocrats, who were most 
adamant in persuading Nimeiri to end the system.226 In its place, the Sudan Socialist 
Union was created in January 1972 to be a modern coordinator of local 
government.227 It had been a cause championed by the communists early in the 
regime, but Nimeiri very early on recognized its political potential in addition to its 
administrative usefulness. The organization took years to assemble and was only 
fully operational by 1974, long after the communist faction which had envisioned it
223 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 77. The report recommended that Sudan replicate the 
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had been removed from the regime.228 Nimeiri, however, did not wait for its 
implementation to reap the political benefits of the apparatus, and expanded his 
regime’s social control over tribal and sectarian leaders in the north by using the SSU 
as a conduit to distribute state resources.229
The SSU’s primary role as a political rather than administrative tool became most 
apparent when it is observed that, like Native Administration under the British, the 
organization was to play no real role in the south, where it had little presence outside 
urban centers. In fact, the AAA somewhat reinstated a form of Native 
Administration with its reliance on chiefs’ courts. This decision was not without 
merit, as customary law allows more flexibility than codified law. Therefore it was 
considered suitable for small, often illiterate tribal communities, even if it was less 
useful on a large scale and opened the government up to charges of anti-
9 0 9
modernism.
Nevertheless, the abolition of Native Administration in the north alone had 
unintended, adverse effects concerning national integration. The disparity between 
north and south after the conclusion of the AAA meant that chiefs in Bahr Al-Ghazal 
now found themselves without any direct counterparts with whom to communicate in 
Kordofan and Darfur.233 A council for the coordination between regional and central 
governments was created on 10 May 1973, and presided over by the well-respected
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First Vice President, General Baghir, but it was only continued until a reorganization 
in February 1975.“ This finalized the standing relationship between the south and 
Khartoum: the region was not linked to the center via the SSU or the National 
Assembly so much as the faith of southerners in Nimeiri to personally protect their 
interests.235 As under the early British governors general, personal relationships were 
more important than modem institutions. By the late 1970s, the new, SSU-centered 
pyramid system was already collapsing across northern Sudan. In marginalized areas 
of the north such as Kordofan, Darfur and the East, the dysfunction of the People’s 
Local Government Act of 1971 often led to de facto re-establishment of Native 
Administration which had supposedly been abolished by that act.“ Northern local 
government councils, more than regional institutions in the south, were both 
financially and democratically depleted institutions. Efforts for further 
decentralization which could have been focused on these regional government and 
local councils were instead focused on the south, which had relatively free 
institutions. Nimeiri’s decentralization of the north had been for the political 
objective of consolidating his rule after the coup attempts of the mid-1970s. Having 
achieved this goal, he now redirected the resources necessary to fund the devolved 
northern institutions towards the south, where he would need the funds for the further 
redivision of the Southern Region.238
The SSU served almost as a microcosm of the decay of the May Regime. Nimeiri’s 
hostility to institutions which were not reliant on his patronage undermined a system 
which was already fragile. While these new structures superficially seemed to 
advance devolution of central power from Khartoum, they actually increased the 
president’s personal power by putting him at the top of the pyramid which was 
grounded in villages and neighborhoods. Nimeiri referred to himself as the ‘patron of
234 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution ofDis-may, 155.
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local government’, but he appointed and dismissed governors so often that the 
structures could pose no threat to his power, and were therefore rendered 
ineffective.“ As a result, the SSU eventually became an arm of the patronage 
system, in which professional advancement could only be achieved by acquiescing to 
central demands.240 The size alone of the organization impeded its effectiveness, as it 
eventually morphed into a sprawling bureaucracy with no organizing principles and 
with leaders detached from public needs. This inaction led to a cycle in which more 
intrusion from the top was necessary to make administration effective. Over time, 
increased presidential intervention began to undermine even the faqade of local and 
regional involvement, which was ostensibly the primary purpose of the SSU.241
The Regional Government Act of 1980, by which Nimeiri divided Sudan into regions 
that were easier to manipulate, was another tool of patronage. The act was never 
made part of the 1973 Permanent Constitution, thereby bypassing any critical 
examination of its legislative qualities by any assembly.242 In a sense this showed the 
complete about face the regime had taken since 1971, when Nimeiri condemned the 
regional system of Native Administration, then discarded as a colonial relic, and 
sought instead a more centralized, one-party system.243 There were criticisms 
nationally of proposals to expand the concept of regionalization to all regions of 
Sudan. An entire state as devolutionised as the south would be ‘one of the most 
decentralised countries in the world’.244 However, Nimeiri would retain enough 
personal power to manipulate the regions as needed: the regionalization system 
allowed for the national president to choose regional governors, and ignore their
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Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 380. The SSU was also a vessel through which one could marginalize 
undesirable politicians by including them in the politburo without giving them any significant authority.
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that it was poorly organized, which lowered the value of its membership. He quotes Sadiq Al-Mahdi, who joined 
the regime for a brief period after the 1977 National Reconciliation, as concluding that the SSU should seek 
vitality from acting more as a modem political party rather than a governing bureacracy. In addition, Khalid cites 
a ‘palace cabal’ of Nimeiri’s patronage network, which had ingratiated itself with the president, as encouraging 
him to ignore these earlier institutions of the May Regime. Khalid writes that Nimeiri’s indifference on the 
effectiveness of institutions made him especially susceptible to this kind of influence.
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requests for services if they did not demonstrate loyalty to him.245 Nimeiri actually 
had three self-serving reasons for championing regionalization: he wanted to appease 
other peripheral regions like Darfur and the Nuba Mountains area, he wanted to 
undermine the power of the national parliament and the central government ministers, 
and, in the wake of Sudan’s declining economic prospects as the ‘breadbasket’ dream 
waned, he wanted to shift responsibility for deteriorating services away from 
himself.246 Niblock says a further reason for regionalization was to encourage funding 
for development in the regions, as the IMF-enforced cutting of expenditures 
precluded all but the most basic development being budgeted nationally.247 The 
regionalization project was yet another example of how the devolution of powers by 
the central government which set a precedent for the CPA were simply part of a long 
process by which various regimes sought short-term political advantage.
In a trend reminiscent of Nimeiri’s redivision of the south in 1983, Bashir’s 
government has shown no reluctance to reconsider the most basic components of 
regional administration in order to support its patronage system. Instead of an SSU- 
style party, Bashir would seek to manipulate power throughout the regions by 
claiming to provide a long held goal of southerners and other Sudanese, that of 
federalism. Even internal borders were redrawn according to the interests of the 
regime and its supporters. In 1994, the government divided up Sudan into 26 states, 
seven of which were in the south. The new provinces created positions of 
employment for party loyalists and distanced them from the capital, where their 
proximity to the ruling clique would have allowed them to pressure it ideologically, 
diluting the regime’s patronage network. Borders to the new states were drawn in 
accordance with the interests of those factions favored by the regime. Like Nimeiri 
and the Anglo-Egyptian Administration, the regime sought to cement loyalty by
245 Malwal, The Sudan: A Second Challenge to Nationhood, 23. Malwal cites an example in 1980, when Nimeiri 
chose el-Tayeb el-Mardi as governor of the Darfur province. This appointment was met with much protest in that 
region, as the candidate was not himself of Darfur. When he was replaced with the more regionally popular 
Ahmed Ibrahim Derieg, the new governor was unable to gain access to Nimeiri in Khartoum to ask for assistance 
for his ailing province, he therefore quit the governorship in protest.
246 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution ofDis-may, 206. Niblock, “Numayri’s Fall: The Economic Base,” 39.
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taking advantage of Sudan’s vastness, redirecting the political involvement to the 
local level, with regional and subregional groups each competing for favors from the 
central state. The regime was even willing to compromise its supposedly 
revolutionary Islamist objectives by resurrecting institutions previously regarded as 
imperial relics to sustain the patronage system over sectarian factions. In the mid- 
1990s, Khartoum formally re-established a council of Native Administration in each 
state.249 Paradoxically, this now meant that tribal leaders were authority figures in an 
ostensibly ‘modem’ Islamic state. The NIF needed these leaders to gain legitimacy 
from local elites, and to isolate the traditional sectarian parties.
The inability or simple reluctance of various northern regimes to hold elections in the 
warring parts of the state has enhanced the patronage system by legally excluding 
residents of rebelling areas from the democratic process, under both parliamentary 
and authoritarian regimes. For example, the 1986 parliamentary elections were not 
held in many southern constituencies because of the inadequate security situation at 
the start of the second war. Similarly, the Bashir regime excluded as eligible voters 
who lived in rebel-controlled areas. ' As of 1999, journalists were only authorized to 
quote ‘those parties that agreed to sign the Register of Political Associations’, which 
excluded popular parties such as Umma and the DUP. These new laws were 
designed and had the intended effect of splitting these exiled sectarian parties. 
Factions would return to Sudan to compete in elections, or more accurately, vie for 
the patronage of the ruling NCP.
An SPLM/A partisan argument is that the failure of Sudan’s attempts at regional 
autonomy or federalism has less to do with the deficiencies of each particular system 
than with the very centralized structure of Sudan itself, which is not amenable to any 
administrative forms of power-sharing. The system by which elites control the state 
is a ‘structural injustice’ not easily alleviated.“' However, even the NIF/NCP’s
249 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 127. El Amin, “Eastern Sudan Indigenous Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanisms.” Johnson, interview.
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opportunistic model of federalism set a new norm for the construction of the 
Sudanese state, which had traditionally been a centralized system. The Islamist 
regime had set a precedent in that it accepted the legitimacy of regional control. As 
Sidahmed notes, ‘Now that federalism has been instituted -  albeit inadequately -  
reverting to a unitary state looks almost impossible.’254 Consequently, further 
divisions of territory and devolutions of power were also possible, as the final CPA 
would prove.
BREAK UP OF TURABI/BASHIR COALITION FACILITATES THE CPA
An important factor creating an environment in which the CPA could be concluded 
was the stabilization of a regime that had for a decade revolved around two power 
centers, the Islamists and the military. Bashir was able to remove the most significant 
challenge to his rule, that of Turabi, and was therefore able to engage with southern 
rebels and international mediators without significant fear of contradiction or reprisal 
from within the regime. The tensions between Bashir and Turabi that ultimately led 
to the most significant schism in the regime in 1999 were based primarily around the 
degree to which the military-Islamist coalition should stay revolutionary or become 
more pragmatic and conservative. Turabi believed the Islamic project should be 
progressive in nature, and consistently pressed for the regime to become less 
authoritarian throughout the 1990s. His concept of revolution was to begin with a 
military vanguard, which would eventually cede power to civilian institutions as the 
revolution spread. By the end of the decade, he declared it was time for 
liberalization, and spoke of reinstituting some basic civil liberties and other political 
reforms. Bashir may have felt this was unrealistic, but he also recognized the process 
as a threat to his own power.2' 5 It was this tension which eventually broke the 
civilian-military Islamist coalition. As president, Bashir had maintained good 
relations with the military, his most crucial base of support.256 As it became clear in 
December 1999 that Turabi, as speaker of the assembly, was about to use that body to 
legislate Bashir’s powers out of existence, loyalist forces surrounded the legislative
254 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 61.
255 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 36. Woodward, interview.
256 Interview by author with Kazim Omer, Canberra, 2009.
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building and Turabi was dismissed as speaker.257 Even though the Islamists had 
successfully been able to infiltrate the army over decades, the military would not 
allow Islamist civilians, with their vision of a network of militias dominating Sudan’s 
state security, to take over completely.258 Turabi had overestimated the appeal of his 
Islamist vision among key sectors of the Sudanese establishment.
However, the tensions which led to the schism were not simply personal or factional, 
but also ideological. By 2001, the regime had lost its revolutionary fervor. It could 
block democracy and peace in the south, but could not achieve its larger goals. Had 
its rigid Islamism fewer contradictions this might not have been the case, as regime 
opposition was divided and weak.“ However, as time wore on, Bashir felt he had to 
remove the ideological element of his regime. Turabi’s revolutionary project was not 
compatible with the pragmatic nature of Bashir’s vision of a rentier state, which 
prioritized stability.“60
Bashir’s tack towards pragmatism even drew support from former Turabi acolytes. In 
the 1990s, security head Ali Osman Taha had been a high-profile Turabi loyalist, 
attempting to replace the traditional tools and institutions of the state with Islamic 
ones. After a decade, he concluded that this was not possible: the regime remained 
unstable and the war was not being won. He consequently decided that Islamists had 
to become more pragmatic about transforming the state, adhering to already-
9 A1established Islamic laws but scaling back Turabi’s broader revolutionary vision.“
The failure of Islamic finance networks was another incentive for Taha and his 
successor as security head, Salah Abdullah Gosh, to switch camps from Turabi to
257 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000, 270-271. 
Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe, 227. El Obeid, Chronique Politique du 
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Bashir. Scandals had undermined Islamic banks and charities by the late 1990s, and 
the security cabal speculated it would be easier to make money through state 
institutions directly.262
Bashir’s consolidation of power versus Turabi removed one of the key impediments 
to a peace process: the duelling power centers within the regime. Bashir was hardly 
more moderate than Turabi, but his ability to negotiate and make concessions would 
not be undermined once he was the undisputed leader of the government. With Taha 
as his Vice President he also had enough control over security institutions to ensure 
opponents could neither undermine a peace process or his leadership. The new 
arrangement began showing dividends almost immediately on an international level, 
as demonstrated by US special envoy John Danforth agreeing in 2001 to help 
negotiate a cease fire in the Nuba Mountains, a precursor to a wider peace in the 
south.264
The schism between Turabi and Bashir led to a related a dramatic realignment of 
partnerships and coalitions among Sudan’s elites. The first came with a rift within 
the PDF, encouraged by Turabi’s denunciation of the conflict as a false jihad. Turabi 
had cultivated ties with pious peoples in the more remote areas of the north, and now 
powerful leaders of such tribes as the Misseriya and Rizeigat, formerly participants in 
the jihad against their southern neighbors, began discouraging young men from 
joining the militias.265 The Turabi/Bashir split weakened the government somewhat,
262 De Waal, “Sudan: international dimensions to the state and its crisis,” 8. Dagne and Everett, “Sudan: The 
Darfur Crisis and the Status of the North-South Negotiations,” 4. Al-Mubarak, Turabi’s “Islamist" Venture, 82.
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the Status of the North-South Negotiations.” Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division o f the Congressional 
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the army to the side, at least in regard to conflict in Darfur. Sharif, interview. Sharif says that Turabi 
miscalculated that intelligence agencies would be loyal to him, but shared concerns for security and stability 
meant that civilian agencies backed the military-focused Bashir in his power struggle with Turabi.
264 De Waal, “Sudan: international dimensions to the state and its crisis,” 17. Francis Kornegay. “Regional and 
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Prospects, ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 
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but this was amplified by the fact that Turabi would now continue the pattern of 
alienated northern politicians in the second war by seeking reconciliation with the 
SPLM/A. Throughout 2000, Turabi transformed himself into an outspoken advocate 
for representative democracy throughout Sudan.“ His ultimate rebuke of Bashir 
came in February 2001, when he signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
SPLM/A declaring that an Islamic state could not be created without an Islamic 
society.“ In June 2003, SPLM/A representatives met with Turabi in London, and 
Garang met with sectarian leaders Sadiq Al-Mahdi and Mohammed Osman Mirghani 
in Cairo, affirming an allegiance to secular law. Turabi’s Popular Congress Party at 
this point announced its support for the principles of the Machakos Protocol, thereby 
diffusing the possibility that Islamists who did not agree with the peace process 
would be a serious threat to it.“
However, Bashir faced pressure to retain Sharia law in the face of protests from 
urban Islamists who were also a chief faction of the PDF, and who would likely 
abandon his regime were he to compromise on Sharia. Bashir became constrained 
from supporting a more moderate position because he drew most of his support from 
this group, who were better positioned than the remote tribal militias to pose serious 
challenges to Bashir’s leadership if they felt he was being too conciliatory.“ The 
resurgent debate over the role of religion in the state became a delicate issue after the 
Machakos Protocol in 2002, when Khartoum was forced to find common ground with 
the militantly secular SPLM while seeking to mitigate outrage from the regime’s 
urban Islamist base.271 Bashir therefore shunned a major public role in the negotiation
recruits for high-level army and police positions, giving him a substantial body of loyalists there. ICG estimated 
that at least half the student movement was also sympathetic to Turabi, and many of them were armed.
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process to avoid being drawn into taking a premature stance on delicate issues such as 
the status of Sharia law in the capital. He sought instead to present himself as 
operating at the behest of the Sudanese people in his defense of religious law 
throughout the north.
THE NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE AND THE CPA
The National Democratic Alliance, the broadest umbrella network of anti-government 
organizations formed during the second war, contained a broad cross-section of 
Sudanese society. For negotiations to occur between this coalition of dissidents and 
the government might have seemed a natural circumstance. However, in the tradition 
of Sudanese conflict, the government sought to weaken the movement by luring 
elements back into its patronage system. Partially as a result of its weakness, the 
NDA played almost no direct role in the IGAD process. However, once it had been 
rendered ineffectual, Khartoum was content to allow some of its members and 
supporters to attend the process as observers.
The NDA was initially united in 1989 simply by its shared hostility to the new 
dictatorship.273 It did not gain cohesion until the mid-1990s, partly because the 
sectarian parties believed the narrowly-based regime in Khartoum would eventually 
be forced to negotiate with the broadly popular factions which it had overthrown. 
Accordingly, they waited several years before reconciling completely with the 
SPLM/A.274 In December 1994, the Umma Party and the SPLM/A signed an 
agreement between each other in which they endorsed such tenets as secularism and 
self-determination for the south, something no northern party had done up to that 
point. After an initial period of wariness, the NDA and SPLM/A took steps to work
the Declaration of Principles, with concessions made by the SPLA away from a secular state and by Khartoum 
away from a Sudan that was united under any circumstances.
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in concert against Khartoum. Finally, in the Asmara Declaration of June 1995, the 
NDA united the SPLM/A and fourteen other parties opposed to the NIF regime.“ It 
called for a secular state as the only way to ensure Sudan’s viability as a unified state, 
as well as self-determination for southern Sudan.277 While it had little ideological 
solidarity, the NDA’s very existence demonstrated a measure of inclusiveness, 
making it the summation of the Koka Dam Declaration and the Sudan Peace 
Initiative, the peace efforts between the sectarian parties and the SPLM/A which had 
been drafted in the 1980s. In addition to the united front of opposition to the 
government, the factions of the NDA initially seemed to compliment each other. The 
SPLA had a seasoned, dedicated military presence inside Sudan, which the NDA 
lacked. The NDA provided the SPLM/A with political legitimacy in northern parts of 
Sudan, and helped the insurgency establish itself diplomatically in the Arab world, 
most significantly with Egypt. For a period in the 1990s, the group even managed 
to incorporate insurgents among the Beja, an eastern Sudanese people, against 
Bashir’s regime.279
While the regime sought to marginalize the traditional sectarian orders throughout 
most of the 1990s, it was only the schism between Bashir and Turabi towards the end 
of the decade that led to a new patronage approach. Bashir had preferred to make a 
‘national reconciliation’ type of deal with the sectarian leadership. As early as 1993, 
he appeared to determine that, though he could not avoid negotiating with all the 
regime’s enemies, he could try to sway such negotiations towards backstage, bilateral 
talks in order to make private deals with opposition elites. Fie was prevented from 
doing this by Turabi, who sought to keep what he considered an ideological 
revolution pure and untainted by Sudan’s reactionary religious figures. As Turabi
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became more outspoken and the role NIF cadres played in the regime became more 
apparent, the sectarian parties began to oppose the junta even more vigorously^
With Turabi removed from the regime, Bashir felt free to make peace individually 
with the sectarian leaders. Bashir sought to gain influence among sectarians by 
returning seized property to those elites who abandoned the NDA and returned to 
Khartoum. Turabi’s Islamic project had removed assets from the Mahdist and
Khatmiyya factions, but not the allegiances of their rural followers, who were too 
conservative to follow the NIF’s brand of revolutionary Islam. Bashir sought to 
tempt back the sectarian elites who could appeal to the masses on behalf of the 
government.
The quickness with which Bashir was able to draw sectarian elites back to Khartoum, 
once he made it a goal, exposed the decline of sectarian power inside Sudan and 
eventually impinged on their credibility within the NDA movement. Both Khatmiyya 
and Umma members demonstrated that they were capable of being lured back to 
Khartoum to be inducted into the Bashir regime’s patronage network, and several 
sectarian elites joined the government in the early 2000s. The NDA simply had too
preferred to keep the traditional sectarian leaders in exile status, both to attack their credibility as authentic 
Sudanese leaders and to destroy their connections to the base of their movements. Burr and Collins,
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many inconsistent factions with too many different interests to be a viable party for 
negotiations with the government, which did not seek to reach a settlement with the 
organization until it had already done so with its most formidable member, the
9 8 7  , . . .  •SPLM/A. In addition, though the sectarian parties which comprised the NDA had 
the allegiance of many throughout northern Sudan, the allegiances were no longer 
deep enough that they could organize their followers politically from their positions 
in exile. Most northerners were not looking to join the SPLA in the war against the 
government, but simply wanted little to do with the war at all.288
As a result of their powerlessness, Khartoum was able to control the sectarian parties 
with respect to the exclusively negotiated CPA. During one of the rounds of 
Naivasha talks, Khartoum negotiator Ghazi Salahuddin Attabani successfully 
encouraged Umma and DUP members to attend the negotiations as observers and 
witnesses. This invitation was perhaps an attempt to pressure factions opposed to 
the process within the regime to not interfere. On 4 December 2003, Taha met with 
DUP and NDA leader Ali Al-Mirghani in Saudi Arabia to sign a peace accord, which 
DUP officials later declared confirmed the NDA’s support for the IGAD process.290
A primary reason for the NDA’s susceptibility to enticement into Bashir’s patronage 
network was the war which broke out between the organization’s most prominent
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recruitment tactics as plying young Sudanese to join the Popular Defense Forces with the promise of university 
enrollment. Omer notes that the Umma party’s support for the organization did not mobilize Ansar warriors 
against the government, as those cadres looked to the Mahdiyya movement more for spiritual guidance than
an Incomplete Peace,” 13.
290 ICG, “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace,” 14.
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foreign backers, Ethiopia and Eritrea, in May 1998.291 The war led the SPLM/A to 
reject forming a confrontational alliance with the NDA against Khartoum, both 
because the collapse of the NDA as an effective military movement destroyed the 
SPLM/A’s military strategy of opening an eastern front against the regime, and 
destroyed its political strategy of uniting with northern dissidents to form a New 
Sudan.“ “ At this point the SPLM/A was ready to negotiate with Khartoum to defend 
its own interests as opposed to those of the disenfranchised in Sudan nationally. 
However, with the temporary collapse of IGAD as a functional forum, serious 
mediation would have to wait until the US became directly involved in the peace 
process in 2001.“ The general unreliability of the sectarian factions was another 
incentive for the SPLM/A to seek to negotiate one-on-one with the national 
government, finally abandoning its long-held goal of a constitutional conference 
involving all sectors of Sudanese political society.294 Ironically, the pressure these 
factions put on the Bashir regime also benefited the SPLM/A. In the first war, and in 
the resulting peace, the south was unable to form coalitions with other dissident 
factions. Nimeiri was successfully able to keep opposition isolated. The SPLM/A’s 
message of unity allowed it to reach out to other dissident factions and avoid being 
marginalized as the Anya Nya and southern separatists in the second war had 
become.295
291 Ronen, “Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War,” 119-120. Ibrahim, interview. Ibrahim, a former 
NDA commander in Eastern Sudan, states that the Ethiopian-Eritrean war ‘broke the back’ of the NDA as a 
cohesive military and political movement.
292 Telephone interview by the author with Richard Barltrop, London, 2009. Barltrop notes that SPLA members 
he had talked to were dismayed at how little other National Democratic Alliance members provided to the eastern 
front in relation to the SPLA: ‘We provided uniforms, radios, soldiers, Umma party provided nothing!’ Madut- 
Arop, Sudan 's Painful Road to Peace, 393-394. One reason for the lack of recruits to the NDA might have been 
poor leadership. The author submits that Al-Mirghani lacked the charisma and political skill of a leader such as 
John Garang, and was therefore unable to inspire the DUP members and affiliates in the Khatmiyya order to leave 
Sudan en masse to join the insurgency. (He lacked the charisma and political skill of John Garang, for example.). 
The author also believes that the NDA made a mistake by not allowing Al-Mahdi to head the NDA once he left 
Sudan to join it in 1995. As the deposed prime minister, Al-Mahdi would have had international prestige by 
leading the govemment-in-exile, supported by nearly every element of Sudanese society. However, neither Al- 
Mahdi nor Al-Mirghani were able to get significant members of their respective sects to join the movement.
293 Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 99.
294 Woodward, interview. Garang, John Garang Speaks, 132, 145.
295 Lobban, interview.
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THE CPA CHALLENGE TO EXCLUSIVIST COALITIONS
The participants and mediators in the IGAD process after Machakos believed the 
sweeping nature of the issues to be covered in the talks had the potential to render the 
forum dysfunctional with the early inclusion of too many parties. There was also a 
fear that leaks and ulterior agendas might sink the process if too many parties were 
involved. Instead, the IGAD mediators made it clear during the Naivasha process 
that they saw the peace process as a two-step solution, starting with a GOS/SPLA 
agreement and then bringing in other groups via elections.“ It was generally 
understood that the failure of the signing parties after the AAA to progress to this 
second stage, bringing in other parties to enhance the legitimacy of the agreement, 
was that agreement’s greatest weakness.“ The 1972 agreement’s inability to 
stabilize the regime meant that only five years later, Khartoum felt compelled to sign 
a separate agreement with northern exiles, an agreement completely uncoordinated 
with the AAA. However, the exclusionary tendency of negotiations would continue 
during the second peace process as well. As talks progressed after Naivasha in 2002, 
the negotiating delegations on either side began to shrink. After the breakthrough at 
Machakos, Garang replaced Salva Kiir as lead negotiator, first with Garang loyalist 
Nihal Deng Nihal, then with himself299 Similarly, several observing parties, 
including the United States, felt that Khartoum’s lead negotiator, Ghazi Salahuddin 
Attabani, was ineffective. Vice President Taha replaced him with Idris Mohammed, 
than also commandeered the discussions directly.300
296 "The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward." African Security Analysis Programme. 
Occasional Paper 86, March 2004, 8.
297 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 1.4.6. Fen Osier Hampson and Holly Reid. “Coalition Diversity and 
Normative Legitimacy in Human Security Negotiations.” International Negotiation 8:1 (2003), 9. This conflict 
resolution technique is referred to as ‘minilateralism’, prioritizing consensus between the dominant parties, then 
seeking to include minor players. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 12. Young views the 
Machakos Protocol as a compromise on the broader reaching Declaration of Principles, which made no such 
arrangement.
298 "The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward," 8. Deng, “The Legal Implications of the 
Sudan Peace Process,” 124.
299 Woodward, interview. Johnson, interview. Interview by the author with Ghanim Atara, Canberra, 2009. 
Leonardi, interview. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 16-17. Young writes that Garang 
was concerned that Kiir, generally understood to be sympathetic to the separatist wing of the SPLA, would not 
negotiate adequately on behalf of the disputed areas: Abyei, South Kordofan, and the Blue Nile states. Garang 
had wanted these three areas to be included in the text of the Machakos protocol, but this was not done. Johnson, 
interview. Sumbeiywo also stipulated that the three areas had to be addressed. Khartoum finally relented but 
insisted that this not be done as part of the Machakos process, only separately.
300 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 17. El Obeid, Chronique Politique du Soudan 2003, 30.
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While the talks between elites marked a level of engagement that was difficult to 
achieve and unprecedented in the history of Sudanese conflict resolution, there was a 
danger that such contact could perpetuate the exclusive coalition-building which 
traditionally defined such agreements. The private, bilateral negotiations between 
Vice President Taha and John Garang beginning in 2003 were not recorded in
i n  i
significant detail. Detailed discussion of human rights violations throughout the 
history of the war was avoided by both parties and mediators. CPA mediators have 
stated that the government and the SPLM sought to grant each other a general 
amnesty concerning such issues, but were discouraged by outside parties. During 
the Naivasha process, the NDA and civil society organizations were able to pressure 
the mediators and the two parties, especially the SPLM, for some concessions. The 
primary area of compromise was on the importance of recognizing the need for an 
eventual democratic transformation in Sudan.304 While both parties had started from 
the position that no elections would be held during the interim period of the CPA, the 
SPLM/A, under pressure from other members of the NDA and its regional allies, 
agreed to a compromise in which elections would be held at all levels, including the 
presidency, before the end of the third year of the interim period.305 Under the 2004 
Power Sharing Agreement, the free establishment of political parties was also
301 Yoh, “The Politics of Alliances Among Sudanese Stakeholders in Post-War Sudan,” 84.
302 John Young. “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace.” Review o f African Political 
Economy 32:103 (2005), 102. Young surmises this was a result of the absence of any representation of civil 
society in the negotiations.
303 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 24. HRW, “The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on Southern Sudan,” 16. Instead, the CPA includes a 
clause calling for a reconciliation process to be a task for the new government, but avoids a general amnesty such 
as that which was included in the AAA. Addis Ababa Agreement: Protocol on Interim Arrangements, Chapter III, 
Article 1. Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 1.7.1. Antwi-Boateng and O’Mahony, “A Framework for the 
Analysis of Peace Agreements and Lessons Learned,” 169. The authors write that past abuses during the war 
were not covered under the final agreement because the elites realized their personal conduct might have been a 
focus. Instead, the agreement stated more vaguely that ‘the parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of 
national reconcilation and healing throughout the country as part of the peace-building process.’
304 Young, “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace,” 112. "The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: 
Signposts for the Way Forward," 7. Al-Shahi, interview. Schüepp, To Make Unity Attractive, 20. Lokuji, 
Hazards in the Power Sharing Aspects o f the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the Interim Period in the 
Sudan, 16. Lokuji speculates that it was only war fatigue and the promise of elections that prevented NDA 
members from seeking to sabotage the CPA. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 20, 23. 
Pressure from civil society organizations on the IGAD process was minimal, primarily because Khartoum 
estimated that it would ultimately take the SPLM line on thorny issues such as secularism and democracy.
305 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 1.8.3 and 2.3.7. Justice Africa, 7 January 2005. Lokuji, Hazards in 
the Power Sharing Aspects o f the Comprehensive Peace Agreement during the Interim Period in the Sudan, 16. 
Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 30. NCP negotiator Ghazi Salahuddin Attabani began 
pushing for elections immediately after the signing of the Machakos Protocol, seeing an advantage over the SPLA, 
which would be poorly organized in comparison to the highly organized governing party. By contrast, southern 
elder statesman Abel Alier urged that elections not be held soon, as it would upset the peace process. Eventually 
both parties saw an advantage to holding quick elections.
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formally allowed.306 Despite Garang’s alleged authoritarian tendencies and exclusion 
of other SPLM/A mediators during late-stage negotiations, it was in the SPLM/A’s 
long-term interest to keep the results of negotiations as inclusive as possible, 
particularly with regards to the concerns of southerners and residents of areas on the 
north-south border. This was in order to prevent the national government from 
inducting certain elements of the south into its patronage system as militias, the tactic 
Khartoum had used both in the aftermath of the AAA and in the second war after the 
1991 SPLA split. The SPLM/A tried to counter this possibility by allowing a small 
amount of non-SPLM/A southerners in the Regional Assembly, and by attempting to 
induct southern militias into the SPLA proper.307
Sumbeiywo says that as talks became more intense between the parties, negotiations 
became more private, often conducted solely between Taha and Garang. However, 
Sumbeiywo was employed as a middleman to protect them from the interference of 
outside parties seeking to have more of a presence than they felt was necessary at the
•>no
negotiations. Rather than trying to exclude Sumbeiywo, at times both parties 
attempted to involve him more than he believed appropriate: ‘Early on the parties 
started wanting me to produce papers for both parties, so that they could attribute it to 
the Secretariat, claiming it wasn’t their position. They were concerned about their 
people back home accusing them of selling out.’309
The resurgence of civil society in the 2000s also made keeping the CPA process 
exclusive more difficult than in previous agreements. The Bashir regime had spent 
most of its rule attempting to neutralize civil society’s political impact, efforts which 
reached their peak in the early 1990s. The nascent civil society that had emerged
306 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, Section 1.4.6.
307 Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, Section 3.6. Before elections, the SPLM was to dominate the assembly of 
the Government of South Sudan with 70% of the seats, the NCP was allotted 15% and other southern parties the 
remaining 15%.
308 Lazaro Sumbeiywo. “The Mediator’s Perspective.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan ’s Conflicts. Accord 18 
(2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 26.
309 Sumbeiywo, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 27.
310 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000, 9. For example, 
during this period the well-respected Sudanese Bar Association began to protest recently introduced martial law 
courts. Accordingly, Bashir sought to neutralize it by appointing a chief justice to impose an Islamic judicial 
system on the state, using criminal and civil courts for national security cases. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested 
National Identities, 135. The judiciary was also compromised. Bymid-1991 Bashir had fired 128 judges and 
legal advisors, targeting those who had gone on strike to protest the military courts. They were replaced by
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from the parliamentary era of the 1980s became the regime’s target as, from 1989 to 
1992, NIF security forces oppressed various guilds and associations in search of
o 1 1
NDA sympathizers. The Bashir junta sought to erode the robust civil society which 
had existed in Sudan up until the 1980s by replacing trade unions with new welfare 
and issue-based organizations. These new organizations lack the political role and 
power of the old trade unions and therefore are less able to influence the IGAD 
process, even though they are often supported by international development agencies 
or the government/12 The government’s heavy-handed tactics increased the
likelihood of a backlash against it, but also allowed Khartoum a free hand in its war
1 1 1
policy, foreign policy and more discretion on how it enforced Sharia law.
By the end of the 1990s, tensions had begun to thaw. Political parties were 
effectively allowed to participate once again in the assembly, though this freedom 
was partially suspended during the regime infighting in 1999 when Turabi used the 
new liberalization to push for further reforms.314 This tension led to a more 
substantial easing of restrictions on political activities after a decade of authoritarian 
Islamist rule. Opposition groups and the local media began pushing harder for more
t i c  ,  t
liberal reform. By the signing of the Machakos Protocol in mid-2002, civil society 
in the north was slowly re-emerging after over a decade of arrests and crackdowns on
‘unqualified, fanatic individuals, often with little or no legal training at all’ according to a former bar arssociation 
figure. Rajab, “Naivasha Peace Agreement: Analysis and Evaluation Part I,” 10. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested 
National Identities, 145-146. The government closed newspapers which criticized regime leadership or policies, 
even those owned by NIF members. By mid-1996, there were only two newspapers, both government owned, 
operating daily. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 23. Young notes that by the start of the 
IGAD process in the early 1990s, most NGOs in the north were already instruments of the government.
311 Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and Nuamah, Getting In: Mediators' Entry into the Settlement o f African 
Conflicts, 147. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 94.
312 Hassan Abdel Ati. “Untapped potential: civil society and the search for peace.” Peace by Piece: Addressing 
Sudan ’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 68.
313 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 15. Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan ’s Civil Wars, 100. Kok, Governance and 
Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 108, 175. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 149. In retaliation 
against such early state oppression by the regime, trade union activists joined together in October 1989 to form the 
nucleus of the NDA, which came to consist of 51 banned unions and twelve political parties. Rajab, “Naivasha 
Peace Agreement: Analysis and Evaluation Part I,” 10. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 
94, 104. Banning trade unions was one of the earliest acts of the Bashir junta. The NIF had retained a particular 
antipathy for the unions and was quick to marginalize them. The regime would often set up its own replacement 
unions, such as for the Farmers Union of the Gezira and Manaqil, but would dissolve them as soon as it was 
discovered that they were ineffective and difficult to control, further destabilizing civil society. Unions such as 
the Sudanese Bar Association Steering Committee were not recognized abroad by other Arab legal associations, 
limiting their effectiveness.
314 Schiiepp, To Make Unity Attractive, 18. Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the 
Islamist State, 1989-2000, 65.
315 ICG, “Sudan Endgame,” 22.
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independent organizations and activists. Intense public interest in the peace process 
would provide another avenue for the resurgence of civil society in the north, to the 
government’s dismay. An example was the Sudan First Forum, a group of civil 
society leaders, politicians, and academics formed in mid-2002 to evaluate the 
Machakos Protocol, recommending their own proposals to the two parties and the 
mediators. Its purpose was to ensure that the peace process was not entirely mediated 
by foreign bodies without the firsthand influence of Sudanese intellectuals. In April 
2003, the government disbanded the group’s initiative. Churches and local NGOs 
were also excluded from the process as much as possible, as the junta wanted full
O 1 o
control over the peace process. However, throughout 2003 and 2004, bolder pushes 
by non-Islamist candidates in the larger unions and associations forced the 
government to reassert control.319
Bashir continued to solidify his power over the NCP, even after his alliance with 
Turabi ended, and after he had established a new coalition with the SPLM/A. At its 
April 2005 internal council, the NCP elites removed any doubt that Bashir was in 
charge of the party, recommending replacing autonomous positions in the party, such 
as that of the Secretary General, with deputies loyal to Bashir. This move was to 
ward against attempts to subvert presidential leadership as Turabi had attempted in
320the past and continued to via his connections to various civil society organizations. 
The regime has also sought to suppress Turabi’s Popular Congress Party, blaming it 
for repeated coup attempts in 2004 and connecting it to the uprising in Darfur against
1 1 /:
316 ICG, “Sudan Endgame,” 27. Kevane, “Sudan: 2001-2002,” 18. Throughout 2001 and 2002, newspapers were 
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Sudan on the roles and rights of civil society, whose engagement in briefings and informal sessions was only 
made possible after the wider international community became involved.’
319 International Crisis Group. “Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD.” 5 October 2004, 7-8. In 2003, 
sectarian-aligned students had success in defeating Islamist candidates for office in the prestigious student union 
at the University of Khartoum, the regime began to organize against this potential threat. In August 2004, 
elections were held for positions in the Medical Association and the Journalists’ Union, but the deadlines for 
registration and voting were only disseminated to regime supporters, causing other members of these professional 
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the government/’21 This charge, combined with the SPLATs relative inability to 
pressure its new partner, has allowed Khartoum to exclude Darfur rebels from the 
Naivasha process. “ In addition, Khartoum has been able to rely on oil revenues to 
increase its patronage to the central riverine area so crucial to regime support.
To avoid situations in which the peace agreement is slowly undermined, as it was 
throughout the 1970s and early 1980s by the Nimeiri regime, the power sharing 
agreement makes it clear that the new constitution for the government of national 
unity is to be subordinate to the CPA and the 1998 constitution. Where laws in the 
interim constitution were found to conflict with the CPA, the latter was given 
precedence. The constitution is also required to be an instrument of the legal 
implementation of the CPA. " This arrangement is the opposite of the AAA, which 
was made part of the 1973 constitution and had no priority over administrative 
structures in existence before its signing, such as the Sudan Socialist Union. The 
Addis Ababa meetings, unlike the Round Table Conference of 1965, were closed to 
press and radio: only delegates, advisors and observers were admitted.325
321 HRW, “The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on 
Southern Sudan,”15. Interview by the author with Alex Donato, Canberra, 2009. Woodward, US Foreign Policy 
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Assessment Mission reports drafted to oversee the implementation of the CPA, the government cautioned against 
such ‘historical analysis’, arguing that such language was abstract and would make the agreement more difficult to 
‘sell’ to the NCP’s constituency. Donato, interview. Donato notes that many southerners are now apathetic 
towards the insurgency in Darfur against Khartoum: ‘Many in the south sarcastically say “let them fight”, because 
when we were fighting, they were fighting [on the side of] the Arab people.’ 0 ‘Fahey, interview. ‘Darfuris also 
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For the duration of the war, most civil administrative and law enforcement positions 
in SPLA-controlled territory were occupied by former soldiers in the insurgency. It 
was rare that such positions would be merit-based and open to civilians. As a result, 
civil administration management was ‘highly personalised, and extremely 
hierarchical and militaristic’.326 As the second war progressed, the SPLM was also 
forced to take into account the needs and opinions of civil society to better administer 
regions under its control. This process continued during the peace process when 
workshops such as the one held in Rumbek during November-December 2002 united 
senior administrators, community representatives and NGOs in a dialogue on topics 
such as civil administration, health, education, and law enforcement. The SPLM 
was able to use the feedback generated from this type of gathering to assess what the 
foundation for administration might look like in a post-war environment. In this way, 
the insurgency was also able to determine what to push for in a peace settlement, 
even if it did not allow broad elements of civil society to participate directly in that 
settlement.328
THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND THE MACHAKOS 
PROTOCOL: FROM NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK TO PRACTICAL 
IMPLEMENTATION
The Machakos Protocol represented a more practical re-evaluation of the Declaration 
of Principles that had been concluded eight years previous. It was a necessary 
document in the process to move negotiations forward after what had been a 
dangerous period of impasse. The IGAD process had reached a stalemate by 2000, 
after a round in which mediators essentially delivered a statement to the parties which 
paraphrased the Declaration of Principles without adding anything significant to 
them, the SPLM/A issued a 26 September 2000 letter in which they noted that a more
326 Peter Blunt. “Governance Conditions, Roles and Capacity-Building Needs in the Rebel-Held Areas of 
Southern Sudan.” Public Administration and Development 23 (2003), 133-134. Blunt argues that this can 
alienate civil administration from the needs of local communities, particularly because there is little central 
funding, which encourages corruption.
327 Blunt, “Governance Conditions, Roles and Capacity-Building Needs in the Rebel-Held Areas of Southern 
Sudan,” 128.
32* Luka Biong Deng. “The Sudan CPA: A Framework for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Transformation of 
Sudan.” Address to the US Congressional Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health. 24 January 2007. SPLA 
member Deng noted in 2007 that the level of services had increased in the interim period after the CPA, mainly 
due to humanitarian assistance. By 2007, there was better access to social services in the south than during the 
war, and even before the war.
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significant commitment to southern self-determination would have to be included 
than was already stipulated in the Declaration of Principles.
During the 2002 talks at Machakos, Salva Kiir, head of the negotiating team for the 
SPLM/A, endeavored to find one of the outstanding issues between the parties on 
which to compromise. The parties could not make progress on the issue of a secular 
Sudanese state, so Kiir sought an agreement on the issue of power-sharing, but once 
again, an impasse was reached. It was only on the issue of self-determination that the 
SPLM/A was able to make a serious breakthrough not already covered in the abstract 
by the Declaration of Principles, locking in a six-year interim period before a 
referendum on southern self-determination.3^ 0 In 2006, Sumbeiywo confirmed this 
when he explained that he had wanted to incorporate the Declaration of Principles 
into a more specific negotiating text, and sought to address what he felt were the 
dominant issues of contention: ‘self-determination and the separation of state and 
religion.’331 Hence, the Machakos Protocol was essentially a reiteration of the 
Declaration of Principles, except with the exchange of a secular Sudan for a more 
concrete promise of southern self-determination. This adjustment more accurately 
and specifically clarified and addressed the parties’ interests.
A critic of the ultimate result of the Naivasha process, Young actually divides the 
IGAD peace process into two parts: the first initiated in 1994 with the Declaration of 
Principles and the second in 2002 with the Machakos Protocol. Young writes that the 
early 1990s IGAD initiative tried to realize a broad-based peace agreement that 
would address the conditions which led to domestic insurgency. When this could not 
be achieved, the second initiative of the 2000s attempted to disregard such large 
objectives in favor of a more exclusive agreement ‘based on the lowest common 
concerns of the parties’. This assessment is correct, but it understates the difficulty
even of addressing these concerns. Young makes little allowance for the immense 
difficulty in getting the two primary parties to talk to each other and make
329 Deng and Khalil, Sudan ’s Civil War The Peace Process Before and Since Machakos, 6. Declaration o f 
Principles, 1994, sections 3 and 4.
330 Johnson, interview. This was relayed to Johnson from Bona Malwal, from a conversation he had with Kiir 
soon after the Machakos Protocol.
331 Sumbeiywo, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 23.
332 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 12.
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concessions, let alone less militarily powerful parties. There was deep reluctance 
among the rank and file SPLA towards the possibility of Garang meeting Vice 
President Taha to negotiate the primary points of the CPA. Except for Salva Kiir and 
Pagan Amun, all of Garang’s advisors and most of the 3000 commanders in Rumbek 
preferred he not attend the summit. However, Kenyan Foreign Minister Musyoka 
told the SPLM/A’s top officer in Kenya, Justin Yac, that if Garang did not come to 
Kenya, the SPLM/A delegation would be kicked out of the country. Khartoum could 
argue that the SPLM/A was not serious about peace negotiations. Without this 
meeting it was possible the peace process would disintegrate.
Young notes that none of the advisors to the IGAD secretariat were experts on Sudan, 
nor was Sumbeiywo himself. Instead, their specialty of conflict resolution looked at 
‘short term Exits’ instead of deep-seated structural problems.334 This accusation 
seems unfounded, as the advisors were tasked first and foremost with attending to the 
grievances of the warring parties to the degree that they would cease conflict, a nearly 
insurmountable objective. In addition, though he was not an experienced diplomat, 
both parties saw Sumbeiywo as honest. He was also good at applying appropriate 
pressure on the parties: ‘He tried to be assertive on the process but leave the 
substance to the parties.’335 The negotiations should therefore not be judged in 
comparison to an ideal peace process which has never been undertaken, but instead 
contrasted with the wreckage of ineffective initiatives, conferences and forums which 
have marked the second war. By these standards, the IGAD peace process from 2002 
onwards was well-organized, flexible, and most importantly, responsive to the 
demands of the warring parties.
Young also argues that a primary failure of the IGAD process was the 
marginalization of Daniel Mboya, a Special Envoy to the conflict appointed by 
Kenya’s President Moi prior to Sumbeiywo’s mediation. Young believes that Moi 
did not support Mboya’s efforts and did not show sufficient support for the peace
333 Sumbeiywo, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 122-123. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 
20. Garang had given a deputy, Justin Yac, a letter to give to Musyoka asking to reschedule the negotiations with 
Taha, but Yac did not give the letter to Musyoka, instead writing back to Garang that either he return to Kenya or 
the entire SPLA would be evicted.
334 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 35.
335 Haysom, “Reflecting on the IGAD Peace Process,” 31.
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process during this time. In addition, Young charges that the pre-Machakos IGAD 
process was underfunded because potential donors felt there was a lack of 
accountability to the forum. However, there is no reason to believe that increased 
funding to IGAD during this period would have made regional states any more 
organized, increased the military capability and coherence of other factions in the 
NDA or changed the objectives of either warring party. Young quotes Sumbeiywo as 
admitting that the Declaration of Principles had a ‘deeper analysis’ of the problems 
than the Machakos Protocol. However, it is important to note that Sumbeiywo also
' l ' i n
states that Machakos was ‘functional’. In other words, the Declaration was an 
abstraction and the Protocol was a reality. The process following Machakos was 
formed around the actuality of specific contested issues.
The flexibility of the mediation in the IGAD process was not conducive to imposing 
heavy structural changes to the Sudanese state which would address the problems 
Young points out. However, a less flexible process might not have been as 
successful. Lane believes that Sumbeiywo’s mediation style was effective ‘because 
he was the sole mediator over wealth, power, security and the three areas. He didn’t 
have a large bureaucratic team, he had only a couple of dedicated advisors in the 
power sharing: the rest were basically resource people brought in ad hoc to deal with 
specific issues, who then departed... Sumbeiywo didn’t say, “This is my mediation 
strategy, step one, step two, step three”: he would do whatever worked or looked like 
it would break the deadlock of the day. ’338 Lane argues that Sumbeiywo remained 
flexible and ‘took different tacks’ in mediating if the existing strategy had reached an 
impasse. By contrast, Lane notes that other mediation processes in Sudan have been 
less successful. ‘When you compare it with subsequent mediations, all of them have 
been run through bureaucracies with a degree of diplomatic protocol that tended to 
get in the way of fast changes in tactics. It is difficult to be critical of the AU in the 
subsequent negotiations on Darfur; they had a much less centralized and more
336 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 12.
337 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 44.
338 Telephone interview by the author with Patricia Lane, Sydney, 2009.
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disorganized set of players in the Movements. But there were also a lot of advisors, 
which in some cases might have reduced flexibility.’
There had been attempts in the 1990s to turn the Declaration of Principles into a more 
broad-reaching, conciliatory framework for negotiations. Government negotiator Ali 
Al-Haj had come close to conceding on the issue of southern self-determination as 
well as some compromise on the issue of Sharia during the mid-1990s negotiations, 
but he was removed from the process and a statement from Khartoum was issued 
stating such concessions would not be made.340 It was not for several more years that 
government would be amenable to such compromises again, when internal 
restructuring of the regime and pressure from the SPLA and outside actors combined 
to see the drafting of the Machakos Protocol.
A disadvantage of this analysis of the CPA lies in the assertion that the Machakos 
Protocol and the following agreements should have been more inclusive. This 
assessment does not recognize that opponents of the Bashir regime require military 
capabilities in order for the government to sustain a dialogue with them. As former 
NDA member Mohammed Ibrahim notes, the government has not negotiated 
seriously with the NDA because it does not see them as a threat.341 At a meeting in 
Cairo in 2003, NDA representatives complained to SPLM/A officials that they did 
not feel their interests were being adequately represented in the ongoing peace 
process. SPLA official Pagun Amun instructed the umbrella organization to ‘use 
your stick in the East if you want the government to pay attention to you’.342 Some 
NDA affiliates seemed to acknowledge this reality. As the chairman of the Beja 
Congress, Omer Mohamed Tahir, told ICG in October 2003, after the conclusion of 
the Security Agreement between Khartoum and the SPLM: ‘The lesson we learned is 
that IGAD and the government will only listen to force. The SPLA were recognized 
because they resorted to force. This is why we launched our activities in the east.’343 
In addition, the Darfur rebellion was initiated in part due to the resentment felt by
339 Lane, interview.
340 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 27.
341 Ibrahim, interview.
342 Ibrahim, interview.
343 ICG, “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace,” 18.
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marginalized peoples in that section of Sudan at not having their grievances 
addressed in the 1GAD process.344
The disunity of the NDA was a key reason for its ineffectiveness as either a 
negotiation partner or a military force. Omer has described the NDA as a ‘soft 
entity’, less than the sum of its parts. He has noted that the movement lacked strategy 
or planning.345 This shortcoming was in part a result of the lack of coordination 
between international supporters of the group such as Egypt, Libya and Eritrea. Each 
of these regimes was primarily devoted to supporting their preferred individual NDA 
sub-groups, as Uganda was viewed as primarily a sponsor of the SPLA.346 As a 
result, any tensions or disagreements between these disparate states concerning Sudan 
policy manifested themselves as internal dissent within the NDA.
The most effective NDA theatre in which the SPLA was not heavily involved was in 
Eastern Sudan, and here its limitations were most obvious. The Beja Congress was 
the most active anti-government force during the late 1990s, but their insurgency was 
hindered by a lack of clear political objectives in addition to poor organization and 
leadership.347 Furthermore, they were unable to form alliances with non-Beja 
ethnicities in the east, such as the Hadendowa, who were reluctant to fight other 
Muslims and were suspicious of the organization’s links to the SPLA.
Consequently, the NDA had at its height in 1998 approximately 5000 soldiers in East 
Sudan, a fraction of the SPLA’s numbers.349
The difference between the Declaration of Principles and the Machakos Protocol 
seems a vindication for those opponents of the Bashir regime who believed that only
344 Barltrop, The Negotiation o f Security Issues in Sudan ’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement, 39. Heather J. 
Sharkey. “Arab Identity and Ideology in Sudan: The Politics of Language, Ethnicity, and Race.” African Affairs 
107:426 (2008), 38. ‘Many observers suggest that the political rhetoric of John Garang inspired and emboldened 
the Darfurian rebels of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA), whose attack on government garrisons in El Fashir 
2003 are said to have precipitated the current violence. Garang extolled the possibility of a ‘New Sudan’ -  a 
Sudan that would be ethnically pluralistic and socially inclusive, and inherently ‘Africanist’ rather than ‘Arabist’. 
Darfurian rebel leaders later envied what Garang and the SPLA secured [in the CPA].’
345 Omer, interview.
346 Ibrahim, interview. Ibrahim describes Egypt as particularly cautious, attempting to ‘hedge its bets’ with the 
NDA, the SPLA, and the Sudanese government.
347 Collins, “Civil Wars in the Sudan,” 1792.
348 Ibrahim, interview.
344 Ibrahim, interview.
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force could attract the government’s attention. As Young has noted, the Declaration 
of Principles calls for separation of church and state. Machakos only does so for 
southern regions. Young dismisses the fact that Sudan’s ruling junta would not allow 
a separation of church and state, countering that the NDA has endorsed this concept 
since 1995 and that that organization represents more Muslims than the ruling
r A
National Congress Party. However, the inability of the NDA to pose a sustained 
military threat to the regime negates the relevance of this truth. The weakness of 
NDA made it almost irrelevant in terms of fighting for its interests. In addition, a 
widespread southern apathy towards fighting for the interests of remote northern 
regions such as Darfur and eastern Sudan was demonstrated in IGAD process.
This represents a longstanding trend in Sudan. Atlas and Licklider note that the AAA 
and the National Reconciliation contradicted each other, and that the tension could 
not be resolved. It was indicative of Nimeiri’s governing style, ‘faced with dangerous
r  i
enemies he could not defeat, he cut a deal with them’. The IGAD process was an 
attempt to better synchronize these patronage networks, and, as with the Nimeiri 
regime, to diffuse the power of the regime’s enemies. This is why the CPA cannot be 
compared to the AAA alone, but must be viewed with an understanding of the 1977 
National Reconciliation. Conflict resolution in Sudan must always take into 
consideration the reality that there are so many parties with differing objectives 
within the state, the only ones which can be reconciled with are those which pose a 
threat to the regime. Consequently, factions which have proved militarily ineffective 
under the NDA and southern militias reliant on Khartoum for patronage have not 
been granted an equal footing with the dominant parties. This also explains why the 
period after the AAA and the National Reconciliation are so essential to 
understanding the 1972 agreement; they are part of the same process in a way. In a 
sense, they were an unsynchronized forerunner to the relatively synchronized CPA.
El-Affendi disagrees with Young that the CPA does not represent a significant 
change to Sudan’s government, noting that the CPA protocols ‘prescribe limits
350 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 15.
351 Pierre M. Atlas and Roy Licklider. “Conflict among Former Allies after Civil War Settlement: Sudan, 
Zimbabwe, Chad, and Lebanon. ” Journal o f Peace Research 36 (1999), 39.
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beyond which various tiers of government must not trespass, and individual and 
group rights that may not be violated. ’3' 2 However, he also notes that ‘the agreement 
is unique in that it has not come about as a result of any major transformation in 
either the outlook or the relative strength of the major parties. Both parties remain as 
committed as ever to divergent, even antagonistic visions for the future of the state. 
Both remain strong enough to seek to advance that vision. Both entertain realistic 
hopes that the agreement will make them even stronger. Both have hailed the 
agreement as a victory for their project.’
While analysts such as Young believe the CPA did not seek structural change, in a 
fundamental way it reflects an entirely different vision of the Sudanese state -  one 
that challenges the principle of the state’s very unity. In addition, the agreement 
challenged the effectiveness of the Sudan’s neo-patrimonial networks by allowing the 
south to create its own autonomous army. This compromise of the monopoly of force 
in Sudan damages the traditional center-periphery power structure, even if it does not 
destroy it.
352 Abdelwahab El-Affendi. “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa.” African Affairs 
89:356 (July 1990), 65-66.
353 El-Affendi, “Discovering the South: Sudanese Dilemmas for Islam in Africa,” 65-66.
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CHAPTER FOUR: SECURITY, RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT
The role of natural resources was significantly less substantial in the first of Sudan’s 
civil wars than it was in the second. Prior to the 1970s, oil companies had found few 
opportunities to invest in Sudan.1 23Khartoum realized it had to give oil companies 
more license to search for oil if it hoped for the discovery of any significant reserves. 
By the end of that decade, the more relaxed commercial atmosphere and the stability 
of post-civil war Sudan allowed Western oil companies to discover enormous 
deposits in the southern central region. Sudan’s primary oilfields lie on the boundary 
of northern and southern Sudan, with the largest reserves in the Upper Nile Province 
region of Bentiu. This chapter examines the impact which contested natural 
resources have had on conflict resolution, and the close relationship between security, 
natural resources and development. The introduction of significant resources into 
Sudanese conflict has made resolving the second war a much more complex and 
intricate process than the first, as oil reserves give added emphasis to geography, 
financing, and even identity. Oil has internationalized Sudanese conflict and added 
yet another prism through which groups in the conflict view their identity and seek to 
formalize it.
Some scholars have argued that Sudan’s conflict is ‘environmentally created’, and 
hence ‘the battle over the control of resources... take[s] analytical priority over other 
factors of race, religion and the African-Arab dichotomy commonly cited as 
determinants of north-south enmity.’4 This chapter comes to an opposite conclusion: 
oil wealth was not in itself incentive enough to lead to the second rebellion, but that it 
exaggerated ethnic tensions already in existence, which probably prolonged the war. 
Contrary to some economic determinist theories of conflict, such as the Collier- 
Hoeffler model’s contention that resources lead to ostensibly ethnic/religious civil
1 Mansour Khalid. Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may. London: Kegan Paul International, 1985,84. Paul 
Goldsmith, Lydia A. Abura and Jason Switzer. “Oil and Water in Sudan.” Scarcity and Surfeit, The Ecology o f 
Africa ’s Conflicts. Eds Jeremy Lind and Kathryn Sturman. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 
2002, 222. Benaiah Yongo-Bure. The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan. Lanham, Maryland: 
University Press of America, 2007, 76. Before exploration of the south in 1974, oil exploration in Sudan 
primarily took place on the Red Sea coast and in other parts of Eastern Sudan.
2 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 84.
3 International Crisis Group. God, Oil and Country: Changing the Logic o f War in Sudan. 10 January 2002, 132.
4 Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 197.
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wars, SPLA objectives in the second war did not appear to be predatory. Resources 
in Sudan’s case may simply have given a more legitimate, quantifiable face to the 
relatively undefinable marginalization of the south; which southern resistance 
movements had never been entirely successful at presenting as distinctly southern 
since marginalization has constantly been a nationwide phenomenon. In the same 
way SPLM/A elites determined settling for an option to secede from the Sudanese 
state was more achievable than the New Sudan goal of national revolution, they may 
have concluded that addressing quantifiable issues such as natural resources was 
more realistic than addressing fundamental identity differences.5
The need to resolve the contest over natural resources with a wealth-sharing protocol 
not only extended the length of the second war in comparison to the first, but of the 
second peace process. This was not simply because the division of oil revenue 
between parties required its own distinct agreement, but because oil impeded such 
fundamental benchmarks as the implementation of a lasting cease fire during 
negotiations. The SPLA insisted on fighting throughout the Naivasha process in part 
because they felt that allowing the government too stable a security situation would 
also allow it to extract a greater amount of oil from the south before CPA 
implementation, oil which could be used to purchase arms or support for the war.
The government consequently sought to improve its security in the region either by 
guarding oil fields with its own forces or relying on its proxy militias for the task. 
The resulting emphasis on security by both parties discouraged integrating individual 
SPLA insurgents into the national army, as had been done in the AAA with former 
Anya Nya. Instead, southerners were finally able to extract their longstanding 
concession of an independent army for the region.
5 Lee J. M. Seymour. “The Oil-Conflict Nexus in Sudan: Governance, Development and Statebuilding.” Money 
Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy of War in Sudan. Maison International, Brussels, 12-13 
June 2001, 18. Seymour notes that the SPLM has understood the symbolic politics surrounding oil, and how they 
have attempted to use it to advance the southern cause. He describes SPLM efforts during the second war to draw 
international humanitarian attention to ‘blood oil’ in the way some West African states have decried ‘blood 
diamonds’. Anthony J. Regan. “The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas.” The Political 
Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. Eds. Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman. London, 
Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2003, 156-158. Regan describes a similar inversion in the Bougainville conflict in 
Papua New Guinea.
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Oil wealth also exacerbated the conflict of identity in Sudan by increasing the 
disparity of wealth throughout the state, thereby aggravating ethnic animosity 
between haves and have-nots. Creating this tension had been a strategy of the ruling 
Bashir junta, which uses oil wealth to enhance the patronage system it relies on to run 
the state, a similar system as the one devised by Nimeiri and previous regimes. In 
accordance with this reality, in both agreements Khartoum tried to seek and maintain 
peace by placating southern elites, often with high-ranking jobs or other benefits. 
However, after the CPA, southern elites would enjoy both a broader power base in 
the region and a formidable standing army, disrupting the traditional patronage 
system.
This chapter argues that it is useful to fit the debate over oil and other natural 
resources into the context of southern Sudan’s wider concerns about its own regional 
development, throughout both wars. Nothing strikes more closely at the sensitive 
issue of development projects than the Jonglei Canal. An examination of Sudan’s 
debate over oil wealth with respect to this much older project is instructive to 
understanding southern concerns about development and natural resources. The 
project also highlights the simple fact that the interrelatedness of development, 
security and resources allows the potential to misidentify the origins of conflict.
SUDAN’S ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS
The premise put for that the start of this chapter that Sudan’s oil wealth has not been 
the dominant contributing factor to its conflicts should not imply that it has been a 
neutral element in both the perpetuation of the war and the nature of the peace 
process. However, the government’s desire for maximum profits from oil revenues, 
coupled with the regional need for a level of stability and security for the extraction 
of oil, has complicated the role of economic partners in the conflict. In addition, the 
internal politics of these potential partners has also dictated the nature of their 
involvement in Sudan.
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Ross hypothesises that the end of the Cold War may have intensified Sudan’s efforts 
to rely on primary commodities in the 1990s, but this seems unlikely.6 Khartoum did 
not become a net exporter of oil until August 1999 and had not been reliant on 
superpower clientage since the fall of the Nimeiri regime in 1985. Instead, 
throughout the 1980s and mid-1990s Sudan relied on the support of friendly regimes 
and, occasionally, the benefaction of wealthy radical Islamists such as Osama bin 
Laden. By the mid-1990s, Sudan’s renewed efforts to secure Bentiu oil fields, and 
the subsequent series of international partnerships it formed with foreign oil 
companies, would see Khartoum become less reliant on Islamists to finance its 
economy and war effort.7 As Sudan broke its alliances with terrorists in the mid- 
1990s, it received less international condemnation and made itself more attractive to 
states seeking to purchase its oil. Outrage over the government’s conduct had kept 
otherwise interested Western states such as Canada from investing fully in Sudanese 
oil.8
However, while Sudan was slowly rehabilitating its international image by the late 
1990s, Khartoum was becoming aware of how unreliable the investment of Western 
oil companies would remain. These companies were less willing to work in areas 
where security was unstable, as demonstrated when the January 2002 counter 
offensives by the Sudanese army in Block 5A forced the companies to suspend 
operations for a second time in two years. During the summer of 2002, when the wet 
season caused a lull in hostilities, Khartoum ordered companies to resume work or 
have their concessions cancelled. That October, Austria’s OMV and Sweden’s 
Lundin approached Malaysian and Chinese representatives, proposing a new 
consortium with Khartoum to review its management of security.9 That deal 
collapsed, however, and so both sold their rights by mid-2003.10 In addition, pressure
6 Michael L. Ross. “What Do We Know About Natural Resources and Civil War?” Journal o f Peace Research 
41:337(2004), 349.
7 ICG, God, Oil and Country, xxiv. Telephone interview by the author with Richard Barltrop, London, 2009. 
Abdel Salam Sidahmed and Alsir Sidahmed. Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East. London: Routledge, 2005, 
59.
8 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 79.
9 Egbert Wesselink. “Oil Fuels War in Sudan.” Adding Fuel to the Fire: The Role o f Petroleum in Violent 
Conflicts. Swisspeace Annual Conference 2003, (2004), 18.
10 Christine Batruch. “Oil and Conflict: Lundin Petroleum’s Experience in Sudan.” Adding Fuel to the Fire: The 
Role o f Petroleum in Violent Conflicts. Swisspeace Annual Conference 2003, (2004), 23. Wesselink, “Oil Fuels
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from Western NGOs and governments ultimately ended most Western oil investment 
in Sudan in the period just preceding the Machakos Protocol. By 2001, European 
NGOs also became more active in raising awareness about Sudan.* 11 US pressure to 
cut ties with Khartoum in the 1990s especially affected small Western companies 
such as Canada’s Talisman.12
Over the course of the decade, Western based corporations were eventually replaced 
by Asian, state-owned rivals which were less sensitive about Sudan’s internal policies 
and less risk-averse.13 In August 1999, Khartoum finally filled its first tanker load 
and was able to make sizeable profits by regular exports of oil.14 By August 2001, 
Sudan was producing enough oil to earn observer status at OPEC meetings.15 
Khartoum was able to stall the SPLM/A’s advances long enough to use the oil money 
to finance its army. In 2000, a military spokesperson declared that due to oil profits, 
Sudan had manufactured mortars, tanks and armored personnel carriers.16 The 
economy began growing throughout 2001 and 2002, though most of the new revenue
War in Sudan,” 18. The withdrawal from Sudan by these companies coincided with a fresh outbreak of violence 
and disregarded cease fires from October 2002 to February 2003.
11 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 208. The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan was a group of more than 40 
European NGOs who sought to end oil development and the marketing of Sudanese Nile Blend until a 
comprehensive peace agreement was reached by the parties.
12 Luke A. Patey. “A Complex Reality.” Danish Institute for International Studies. Report 2006:2 (2006), 24. 
Peter Woodward. US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa. Hampshire, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2006, 
119. Woodward writes that access to more efficient Western oil companies was another incentive for Khartoum 
to seek peace by 2001, once it had removed its more ideological element.
12 Emeric Rogier. No More Hills Ahead? The Sudan ’s Torturous Ascent to Heights o f Peace. Netherlands 
Institute of International Relations, Clingendael. August, 2005, 82. Daniel Large. “China’s Involvement in 
Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa: Sudan in Comparative Context.” Danish Institute for 
International Studies. 2007:8 (2007), 61. Sarah Skorupski. “Sudan’s Energy Sector: Implementing the Wealth- 
Sharing Agreement.” Center for Strategic and International Studies. Africa Notes 22 (August 2004), 4. Ann 
Kelleher. “A Small State’s Multiple-level Approach to Peace-making: Norway’s Role in Achieving Sudan’s 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.” Civil Wars 8:3 (September 2006), 301-302. Richard Barltrop. The 
Negotiation o f Security Issues in Sudan ’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Geneva: Center for Humanitarian 
Dialogue, 2008, 37. Kelleher, “A Small State’s Multiple-level Approach to Peace-making,” 304-305. Another 
example is the Wunlit conference of 1999 between regional actors which became a model for later small-scale 
peace conferences. Amani M. El Obeid. Chronique Politique du Soudan 2003. Cedej, Le Caire, Etudes et 
document, 16-17 (2004), 18. Another Wunlit conference, held in July 2003, helped reconcile longstanding 
grievances between Nuer and Dinka and sought to curb the cattle-rustling rife in the area.
14 “Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan.” Sudan Update, (December 1999), 2. Abdel Salam Sidahmed 
and Alsir Sidahmed. Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East. London: Routledge, 2005, 113. ICG, God, Oil and 
Country, 135. Endre Stiansen. “GOS Revenue, Oil and the Cost of the Civil War.” Money Makes the War Go 
Round: Transforming the Economy o f War in Sudan. Maison International, Brussels, 12-13 June 2002, 2, 5. In 
1998 and 1999, non-tax revenue accounted for 25% of total revenues. In 2000, the government’s non-tax revenue 
jumped to 52%. In 2000, exports exceeded imports for the first time in decades, all as a result of oil, which by 
2001 accounted for 80% of Sudan’s total exports.
15 Michael Kevane. “Sudan: 2001-2002. From war to the possibility of peace in the south and then to new 
conflict in Darfur.” Chapter prepared for African Contemporary Record (December 2004), 28.
16 Shannon Lee Field. “The Internal and External Contexts of Oil Politics in Sudan: The Role of Actors,” The 
Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East 
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2005, 73.
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coming in from oil was put towards the war effort, not paying off debts owed to 
organizations such as the IMF.17
Sudan’s military-resource coordination was not limited to buying arms on the 
international market with oil revenues. Khartoum sought to use the incentive of oil to 
form strategic alliances internationally. It became clear early on that oil was not just 
of interest to Sudan as a commercial product, but for how it allowed the NIF regime 
to consolidate power domestically. However, this behavior did not follow a profit- 
based, economic determinist pattern. Sudan did not seek to improve relations with 
the West in order to partner with the more advanced, efficient Western oil companies. 
To the contrary, in order to avoid doing business with Western states which might 
attempt to pressure it over human rights concerns, the regime actually chose to do
1 o
business with less technologically advanced, non-Westem oil companies. Eastern 
European firms such as Slavneft lacked the more sophisticated exploration and 
production techniques of their Western rivals, making them slower and less efficient. 
These small firms were also able to demand more favorable contracts from Khartoum 
than they normally would because they were not forced to compete against Western 
companies.19 Sudan’s dependence on Eastern European and Asian state oil companies 
hindered Sudan’s rising economic status somewhat, as they were ‘less reliable, less 
swift and less efficient than Western oil companies’.
As Sudan increasingly looked to the East for oil partners, it became clear that its most 
valuable economic partner abroad would be China. China could provide not only a 
dependable client for Sudan’s oil, but in return it could offer the weaponry Sudan
17 Kevane, “Sudan: 2001-2002,” 25, 27. Robert O. Collins. “Civil Wars in the Sudan.” History Compass 5:6 
(2007), 1790. ‘The greatest percentage of oil revenues was used to modernize the army, and by 2002 the defense 
budget had increased to US$665 million, half the annual Sudan government budget and 5% of the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP)’ Wesselink, “Oil Fuels War in Sudan,” 15. Tn 2001, oil revenues represented 38.5 % of the state 
income, up from zero in 1998. According [to] the IMF, Sudan’s military expenditures were US$242 million in 
2001, a rise of 50%, roughly proportional to the total rise in government earnings as a result of the oil boom.
They have stabilized since. Government oil revenues were expected to reach US$600-700 million in 2003.’ 
Wesselink, “Oil Fuels War in Sudan,” 17. Earlier, in the late 1990s, European governments and the European 
Union had applauded Sudan’s financial reforms allowing for declining inflation. These were seen as being in 
accordance with recommendations made by the IMF.
William Reno. “Economies of war and their transformation: Sudan and the variable impact of natural resources 
on conflict.” Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy o f War in the Southern Sudan.
Maison International, Brussels, 12-13 June 2001, 2.
|g Reno, “Economies of war and their transformation,” 20-21. Barltrop, interview.
20 Wesselink, “Oil Fuels War in Sudan,” 18.
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needed to conduct its war in the south, and provide a UN Security Council veto over 
resolutions condemning Sudan for how it conducted its internal affairs. Khartoum 
had steadily been cultivating its relationship with Beijing at the expense of Western 
oil companies for years, as for example in the mid-1990s, when it pressured the small 
Canadian firm Arakis to allow the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) 
into the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company (GNPOC) consortium so 
Khartoum could gain greater access to Chinese weapons. The relationship between 
Sudan and China has come to revolve around a military-resource alliance, and could 
not be replaced easily by Western companies, even if that would be a more 
financially sound arrangement for Khartoum.
Sudan clearly considers its oil wealth to be a resource to be used for objectives other 
than just maximum profit, turning to Asian oil companies to improve its security 
situation even before Western oil companies began turning away. In a similar vein, 
the CNPC has stated that China’s energy security is more important than commercial 
interests in company decisions. As a result, the company is able to pursue investment 
in less lucrative operations which allow it to further cement its bond. China has 
expanded its activity in Sudan into banking, pharmaceuticals, agriculture and 
industry.“
China’s concern about the flow of oil from Sudan has contributed to its ambiguous 
role in the peace process. In 1997, GNPOC finished work on a pipeline connecting 
the southern oil fields to the Red Sea, relying primarily on Chinese convicts and 
armed Chinese personnel for labor.24 This labor force worked with the Sudanese army 
to depopulate areas of the Western Upper Nile in order to drill oil wells, incurring 
significant resistance from SPLA troops in the region.“ However, after the oil
21 Telephone interview by the author with Richard Lobban, Providence, 2009. Peter Nyot Kok. Governance and 
Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995: Analysis, Evaluation and Documentation. Berlin: Deutsches Orient Institut, 
1996, 180. Large, “China’s Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa,” 61.
22 Patey, “A Complex Reality: The Strategic Behaviour of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in 
Sudan,” 34. Chris Alden. “China In Africa.” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy 47:3 (2005), 152. China has 
provided helicopters, guns, ammunition, and anti-personnel mines to Khartoum, and between 4,000 and 10,000 
armed contract workers have been active in the oil-producing regions as well.
23 Patey, “A Complex Reality: The Strategic Behaviour of Multinational Oil Corporations and the New Wars in 
Sudan,” 33.
24 Wesselink, “Oil Fuels War in Sudan,” 15.
25 Robert O. Collins. “Civil Wars in the Sudan.” History Compass 5:6 (2007), 1790.
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regions first came online in August 1999, China began urging some sort of settlement 
by which the stability of oil extraction and transportation would not be 
compromised.“ This attitude shifted again by 2003, when China began moving more 
armed personnel to Sudan to protect a new pipeline being constructed there in 
cooperation with Petronas of Malaysia. This presence, in turn, allowed Khartoum to 
divert its own forces to other unstable areas such as Darfur and the East.
Sudan has been described as China’s ‘premier off shore oil source’, and is a
98launching pad for China’s further interests in securing energy sources from Africa. 
An incentive for the regime to reach a peace agreement was Beijing’s assurance that, 
if the security situation around the oil fields stabilized, China would switch to 
financial payments for the oil it bought, rather than trading oil for Chinese goods as 
was more common in the past.“ Considering how much influence it had with the 
Bashir regime, China might have been expected to be more assertive about its 
preferences for the terms of a peace agreement after 2002. However, Large suggests 
that China’s preference for bilateral relations in Africa has inhibited it from playing a 
larger role in the 1GAD process, which involved several tiers of activity from several 
states. China retains a close relationship with the NCP, but ‘while it has exploited 
instability in Sudan, it has an interest in the success of the CPA and above all an 
enduring political framework in Sudan within which to continue its relations.’31 To
26 Telephone interview by the author with Peter Woodward, Reading, 2007. Barltrop, interview. Barltrop notes 
that as the peace process progressed, China became less involved, not even seeking to insert itself in topics of 
interest such as the Wealth Sharing Agreement. Lobban, interview. Lobban surmises that the Chinese are not 
opposed to a peace agreement if it will facilitate more oil production. ‘If the oil flows, they don’t care’.
27 Francis Komegay. “Regional and International Dimensions of the Sudanese Peace Process,” The Sudan Peace 
Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East Lansing, Michigan: 
Michigan State University Press, 2005, 65. Interview by the author with Ahmed Al-Shahi, Oxford, 2007. 
Telephone interview by the author with Peter Woodward, Reading, 2007.
28 Alden, “China In Africa,” 148.
29 Achim Wennman. “Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s North-South Peace Process.” 
The Centre on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, 2009, 18.
30 Large, “China’s Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa,” 67. Waithaka 
Waihenya. The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process. Nairobi: Kenway 
Publications, 2006, 127. The one notable exception to Chinese lack of direct involvement in the peace process 
occurred in January 2004, when Guan Ruoxun, a woman working with the Chinese government as a political 
officer in Kenya coordinated with the Chinese ambassador in an attempt to contact representatives from the 
negotiating parties. She was finally ejected from the negotiations at Naivasha by mediator Lazaro Sumbeiywo 
after attempting to pressure him to sign the Wealth-Sharing Agreement sooner.
11 Large, “China’s Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa,” 72.
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this effect, following the settlement in January 2005, China contributed over 400 
peacekeeping troops to UNMIS.32
SECURITY AND CEASE FIRES IN THE FIRST WAR
The incidents above demonstrate the need for a stable security environment in order 
to exploit oil wealth. This has added another dimension to the importance of cease 
fires in civil war. The contesting of natural resources in the Naivasha process was a 
primary reason for its duration, as compared to the relatively brief Addis Ababa 
negotiations of 1972. The introduction of oil as a dominant issue of dispute led to 
vigorous efforts by both sides to pressure the other, such as by abandoning cease fire 
agreements and attempting to sell concessions off to foreign states in deals rejected as 
illegitimate by the other party. Such behavior would have derailed the Addis Ababa 
negotiations, which were largely based on trust that had been established through a 
quick series of confidence-building measures, including cease fires. In contrast, oil 
wealth provided a greater incentive for parties in the second war to continue fighting 
while negotiating, in accordance with the axiom that the terms of such agreements 
often reflect relative strength on the battlefield.33
While conflict throughout negotiations was most pronounced after the Machakos 
protocol, the tendency for the government and southern rebels in both wars to break 
cease fires or take advantage of periodic lulls during fighting is well documented.
The separatist nature of the first war meant that the Anya Nya rebels typically felt 
little reason to allow liberal forces in the north room to move diplomatically, as no 
government in Khartoum, no matter how open-minded about southern concerns, 
would allow the region to secede peacefully -  the only objective southern separatists 
would agree to a cease fire in order to obtain. After the fall of the Abboud regime in 
1964, the Anya Nya used the transition government’s conciliatory policy of repealing 
harsh security measures in the south to beef up their strength in the region, damaging 
the credibility of that government with northern voters, who opted for a more
32 Large, “China’s Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa,” 67.
33 Richard K. Betts. “The Delusion of Impartial Intervention” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing 
International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United 
States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 286.
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hawkish, conservative one in June 1965/4 Perhaps also because of the lack of 
coordination between the Anya Nya’s political and military wings at that time, the 
movement relied on coercion out of habit. Even as late as 1971, at a time when both 
parties were looking to open negotiating channels, fighting was intense as each side 
sought to bargain from a position of strength. In December of that year, after early 
mediation had already begun in Addis Ababa, both the government and the Anya Nya 
launched offensives.36
It took a change in southern objectives to disrupt this pattern. After Anya Nya 
military commander Joseph Lagu began to determine that a separate southern state 
borne out of revolution was an unrealistic objective, his immediate goal became the 
creation of an atmosphere conducive to negotiations for regional autonomy. At the 
15 May 1971 meeting between WCC/AACC representatives and those of the May 
Regime, it was resolved that:
1) Khartoum was in favor of WCC/AACC attempts to contact Anya Nya 
representatives interested in reconciliation with the government
2) that the groups to be represented had to have broad influence in the south.
3) that talks could be held in any location.
4) that Sudan would agree to an interim ‘cooling-off period, providing no risk to 
security was involved.
5) discussion was limited to regional autonomy within the context of a united Sudan
6) ‘the question of under whose auspices the talks would take place would be 
discussed later.’
In June 1971, this WCC/AACC report was given to Mading de Garang, the SSLM’s 
representative in London. The SSLM responded point-by-point to these six items,
34 Mohammed Beshir Hamid. “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy: ‘Splendid Isolation’, Radicalisation and 
‘Finlandisation’.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo 
and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 129. Mohammed Beshir Hamid and John Howell.
“Sudan and the Outside World, 1964-1968.” African Affairs 273 (October 1969), 307.
35 Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972. London: David & Charles, 1974, 150.
36 Joseph Lagu. Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope). Khartoum: M.O.B. Center for Sudanese 
Studies, 2006, 246. Lagu writes that he code-named the offensive ‘Operation Peace Talks’. Hizkias Assefa. 
Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 
1987, 128.
37 Abel Alier. The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. Exeter, Devon, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991, 
81. Alier writes that SSLM delegate Elisapana Mulla confirmed to him during the secret November 1971 
negotiations that Lagu was willing to accept a united Sudan, even if he did not believe many of his Anya Nya 
deputies were.
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specifying that it preferred an actual cease fire to a ‘cooling-off period, and that
t o
regional autonomy was a starting point for issues concerning the status of the south.
A cease fire was the most natural first step; both to establish trust between parties and 
to ensure Anya Nya representatives could safely reach Ethiopia for secret talks with 
representatives from Khartoum. Ultimately, by January 1972, it was the SSLM that 
had been the most persistent in calling for a cease fire before the Addis Ababa 
negotiations, not Khartoum’s representatives.39
The May Regime’s acquiescence to a cease fire was a significant breakthrough in the 
agreement. The debate over the nature and necessity of a cease fire in the Addis 
Ababa discussions seemed to skirt close to a formal recognition of a southern fighting 
force by the state. For this reason, several northern elements had been consistently 
opposed to a cease fire both before and during the Addis Ababa discussions. Most 
crucially, much of the Sudanese army establishment pushed against the move as they 
believed it would be a de facto recognition of the Anya Nya as a second army within 
the state, de-legitimizing the national army’s traditional monopoly on force. On the 
other hand, some officers did not oppose a cease fire as long as it helped facilitate a 
political settlement.40
In contrast with the SPLA, southern insurgents in 1972 had no known oil resources 
for which to be concerned about the exploitation of during the cessation of hostilities.
38 Dunstan M. Wai. The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan. Teaneck, New Jersey: Holmes & Meier Publishers 
Inc, 1981, 150-151. The SSLM rejected coordination with Khartoum concerning humanitarian aid to the south, 
however, noting that most southerners were outside the control of the government and fearing that Khartoum 
could use the aid to infiltrate Anya Nya-controlled areas.
39 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 78. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the 
Sudan, 152. Abu Baker El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement. Stockholm: Liber 
Tryck, 1980, 118. El Obeid notes that the SSLM did not ask for a cease fire as a condition for negotiations, but to 
be implemented before a final resolution. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 220-221. 
Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 111. A cease fire was one of 
Lagu’s preconditions for negotiations with the government as expressed in an October 1970 letter from himself to 
Mading de Garang, who was coordinating the SSLM response to the earliest international gestures of mediation. 
Other preconditions included the release of all southern political prisoners, negotiations to be held outside Sudan 
and a government announcement that the Anya Nya was the only body with which to negotiate.
40 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 78-79. Alier cites Major General Mohammed 
Al-Baghir, a northern officer with long experience in the south during the first war and a contributor to the AAA, 
as one whose willingness to implement a cease fire in order to allow a final peaceful settlement earned him a 
significant degree of trust and respect among SSLM leadership. Babiker Awadallah and Major General Abu el- 
Gasim Hashim are two establishment officials who opposed a cease fire, declaring that it would put the Anya Nya 
on ‘equal footing’ with the army. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan 
Conflict, 143. The first suggestion for a cease fire, rather than just a ‘cooling off period, was made by the SSLM 
in June 1971.
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For that reason, it was easier for both sides in the first war to use cease fires as trust­
building measures: there was less tactical incentive for either side to violate them, and 
it would have been pointless towards achieving broader strategic objectives. It was 
for this reason that at the end of the negotiations in Addis Ababa, Khartoum boldly 
announced a unilateral cease fire on 12 March 1972, in advance of the agreement’s 
actual finalization.41 This move was astute, not only because it was a leap of faith 
demonstrating Khartoum’s sincerity, but because it accentuated the AAA as 
effectively signalling the end of the war. This put pressure on the SSLM to hold to 
the terms negotiated by that point as the final agreement, rather than jockey for better 
positioning in another round. The final cease fire was particularly risky as it later 
became clear that some Anya Nya fighters in more remote locations might not hear of 
the agreement for months, staging raids on government facilities and compromising 
the treaty in the interim.4“ In addition, many Anya Nya fighters, some of whom 
would soon form Anya Nya 2, did not support the concessions made by the SSLM on 
their behalf.43
However, the parties had built up a sufficient level of trust that the agreement was 
able to withstand those immediate challenges. In conjunction with events such as the 
Anya Nya’s December 1971 release of the northern survivors of a plane crash in 
territory they controlled, the cease fires created a climate conducive to negotiations.44 
Nevertheless, Lagu refused to ask his men to turn in their weapons after the AAA, 
noting that once they were given their positions and modem weapons in the Sudanese
41 John Howell. “Horn of Africa: Lessons from the Sudan Conflict”. International Affairs 54:3 (1978), 436.
Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 256. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches 
and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 143. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 160-161. Nelson Kasfir. 
“Sudan’s Addis Ababa Treaty: Intraorganizational Factors in the Politics of Compromise.” Post-Independence 
Sudan. Ed. C. Allen. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981, 146. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the 
Addis A baba Agreement, 124.
42 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 154.
43 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 154. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, 99. El Obeid suggests that the authoritarian nature of Nimeiri’s and Lagu’s regimes helped conclude a 
peace agreement, even though many of the principles of regional autonomy had been established in the 1960s, 
when both the government and insurgency had weaker leadership. El Obeid notes that the strength of leadership 
in 1972 also allowed for Nimeiri to grant southern concessions such as an elected regional president, heavy 
insurgent involvement in the new security provisions, and a single Southern Region uniting the south.
44 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 241-242. Kasfir, “Sudan’s Addis Ababa Treaty: 
Intraorganizational Factors in the Politics of Compromise,” 148. Severino Fuli Boki Tombe Ga’le. Shaping a 
Free Southern Sudan: memoirs o f our struggle, 1934-1985. Torit, Sudan: Loa Catholic Mission Council, 2002,
371. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 130. Upon their return 
to Khartoum, the crash survivors spoke favorably to the press about Anya Nya, thereby making the northern 
public more receptive to them than they had been for most of the duration of the war.
army, they would then turn in their equipment.45 This condition was yet another 
example of the patronage involved in the AAA which would not be seen in the 2005 
agreement.
The relative status accorded to each insurgent group was significantly different by the 
time of a final peace agreement. By the beginning of 1972, the SSLM was still 
seeking to establish its reputation as a legitimate representative of southern 
grievances whom the government should negotiate with, and not simply a gang of 
predatory bandits unworthy of recognition.46 Khartoum refused to formally recognize 
Anya Nya groups in any capacity for most of the war, in part because the insurgency 
had such a disorganized hierarchy and in part because the insecurities of a recently- 
independent state seeking to establish its sovereignty and internal security prohibited 
any gesture which could be construed as legitimizing such an insurgency.
SECURITY AND CEASE FIRES IN THE SECOND WAR
Unlike the first war’s insurgency, the SPLM/A had far surpassed the use of cease 
fires as a milestone of state recognition by 2002, having met with representatives of 
the Bashir regime, as well as those from previous governments, several times prior to 
Machakos. Cease fires served as a final objective rather than as a trust-building 
measure. The Bashir junta might seek other methods to discredit the rebel movement 
it confronted, but could not deny the SPLM/A was an ideologically driven, effective 
rebel force. Until the early 1990s, the NIF representatives at the Abuja discussions 
made it clear that they would not agree to anything other than temporary cease fires 
until political issues were resolved.47 The government was convinced that it could 
eliminate the SPLA as a threat with its June 1993 offensive, while the SPLA in turn 
did not want to hold to a cease fire while it was at such a strategic disadvantage on
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46 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 240. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: 
Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 193. Acknowledging Anya Nya sensitivity about terminology 
the government had used in the past, during the Addis Ababa talks the government delegation referred to the 
SSLM delegation as the ‘Liberation Movement’. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  
The Sudan Conflict, 194. Assefa writes that the first war never reached a plateau, but continued to escalate. This 
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47 Ann Mosely Lesch. The Sudan: Contested National Identities. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998, 
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the ground.48 By 1994 this pattern was well enough established that it was included as 
an item that year in the 1GAD Declaration of Principles. From that point until the end 
of the war, it would remain SPLM/A de facto policy to call for a cease fire only after 
a final agreement had been concluded, thereby allowing the insurgency to push for a 
more advantageous situation on the battlefield.49
The incentive to extract oil from the south helped persuade the regime during the 
second war to seek the stability only a cease fire could provide. By 1997, the regime 
began to assert its preference for a cease fire before negotiations could even 
commence, asserting that such a move would be both a vital confidence-building 
measure between the two parties, and necessary to discuss the complicated issues of 
contention.50 The government also had two urgent incentives for this line of 
reasoning. First, from an economic perspective, it would be far easier to extract oil 
from the southern oil fields during a cease fire. A further motive was the increasingly 
isolated diplomatic situation in which the regime found itself that year against a 
politically resurgent SPLM/A.51 However, after Khartoum had repeatedly ignored a 
previous cease fire organized in 1995 by former US president Jimmy Carter in a high- 
profile visit to the Sudan, the regime had little credibility with the SPLM/A or 
neighboring states on the matter. " By 1997, the regime’s opportunism regarding the 
south had become too well established for its cease fire initiatives to be taken 
seriously by mediators or the SPLM/A and a pattern of such broken agreements 
marked the stalemate period of the war from 1997 to 2001.53
48 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 179.
49 Declaration o f Principles, 1994, section 6. Ted Dagne. “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, 
and US Policy.” Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade Division o f the Congressional Resource Service, Issue Brief 
for Congress. 2 August 2002, 5. Rogier, No More Hills Ahead? 41. The policy was reaffirmed in the Security 
Agreement, 2003, section 2. Interview by the author with Mohammed Ibrahim, Canberra, 2009. Former NDA 
commander Mohamed Ibrahim says that SPLA colleagues of his have stated that they did not wish to repeat the 
experience of the Polesario Front insurgency in Morocco, in which a cease fire was declared before a final 
agreement on political issues and the government used the following period to firm up its position militarily. Kok, 
Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 57. During the transitional period after the fall of Nimeiri, 
there was initial disagreement over the timing of a cease fire to be implemented during negotiations. The unions 
under the National Alliance for National Salvation preferred it come immediately, the SPLA preferred it be 
preceded by the implementation of other points of agreement.
50 Waihenya, The Mediator, 194.
51 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 207.
5: Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 161, 185. Arop Madut-Arop. Sudan’s Painful Road to 
Peace: A Full Story o f the Founding and Development o f the SPLM/SPLA. Charleston, South Carolina:
Booksurge, 2006, 313.
53 Interview by the author with Douglas Johnson, Oxford, 16 December 2007. Abdelwahab El-Affendi. “The 
Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan: The Limits of Regional Peacemaking?” African Affairs 100
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By the end of the century, oil revenues in the south shifted from being a long-held 
government objective to becoming an economic reality. They were a key factor in 
creating the stalemate conditions that would abate with the Machakos Protocol, but 
only fully be resolved with the conclusion of the CPA. By August 1999, the 
government had finally connected a pipeline from the southern oil fields to the Red 
Sea, allowing Khartoum a chance to pursue its ideal objective of crushing southern 
resistance with new oil revenue. The SPLA immediately began targeting the 
pipeline, launching an attack on it in September 1999.54 Insurgents also used targeted 
attacks to destroy the rationale behind Khartoum’s assurances to the public that oil 
would buy the weaponry necessary to crush the SPLA, capturing the Bahr el-Ghazal 
garrison towns of Raga and Dem Zubeir by June of 2001.55 In August 2001, the 
SPLA captured Heglig, and was poised to strike at the oil fields in that area.56
Even in the lead up to the Naivasha process, the perception that the government was 
using cease fires in bad faith elsewhere in other regions of Sudan undermined any 
attempt to use them in the south proper. The government’s willingness to reorganize 
troops for further antagonism in these other areas was underscored at a more 
advanced stage of the IGAD process, after the Nuba Mountains cease fire of 
December 2001, during which Khartoum transferred troops from that area into 
Western Upper Nile, where they began removing the population from strategic 
locations surrounding the oil fields there.57 As the Naivasha process got underway in
(2001), 589-590, 596. El-Affendi suggests that the ineffectiveness of the IGAD process during the late 1990s was 
one of the reasons Khartoum adhered to it, despite the growing bias against the regime by the forum and its 
Western backers. This would explain why Khartoum's more intense ‘forum-shopping’ efforts did not begin until 
after the turn of the century, when regional and international actors began coalescing around the IGAD process.
54 J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins. Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989- 
2000. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003, 274. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 114. 
The NDA launched another minor attack on the pipeline at Atbara in northern Sudan. Large, “China’s 
Involvement in Armed Conflict and Post-War Reconstruction in Africa,” 61. Wesselink, “Oil Fuels War in 
Sudan,” 15-16. The government also relied on its southern militias during this period, allowing Khartoum to 
announce to the world that confict in the south was merely inter-tribal squabbling. From 1997-1999, large areas 
along the pipeline to Heglig were cleared for the all-weather Bentiu-Adok road.
55 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 117. Waihenya, The Mediator, 76. Kevane, “Sudan: 2001-2002,” 7.
56 Kevane, “Sudan: 2001-2002,” 7.
57 Hartwig Euler. “Human Rights in Sudan: Islamic State and Cultural Diversity”. Missio. Pontifical Mission 
Society, 2005, 49. Rogier, No More Hills Ahead? 60. Practices such as these were initially addressed in the 15 
October 2002 Memorandum of Understanding on Cessation of Hostilities Between the Government of the Sudan 
and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army, section 3, which addressed abuse and violence against 
civilians. The principle was finally incorporated into the CPA via the Power Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 
1.6.2.14, guaranteeing citizens the freedom of movement and to choose their own residence.
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mid-2002, the practice of negotiating without cease fires posed a serious threat to the 
momentum of the peace process. At Machakos, IGAD mediator Lazaro Sumbeiywo 
had gone along with the SPLM/A demand that negotiations take place without any 
immediate cease fire. He believed that the continued possibility of a resumption of 
hostilities might put pressure on the parties to conclude the process quickly and deter
C O
them from unrealistic objectives. Instead, the government’s new oil wealth 
complicated the peace process. New oil contracts, in which the parties shared 
revenue, could only come into effect after the conclusion of a comprehensive peace 
treaty, creating a loophole for Khartoum to sign as many contracts as possible in the 
space between the start of negotiations and the CPA.59 This practice further damaged 
trust between the parties, rendering cease fires untenable or quickly violated.
After the framework for an agreement had been determined, it needed to be ‘sold’ to 
the rest of the Sudanese public and political elements other than the Sudanese 
government and the SPLM/A. This perceived necessity may account for what some 
authors saw as Machakos’s ‘vagueness’ about what specifically constituted 
democracy and secularism. The agreement seemed intended to draw the interest and 
support of parties not up to that point involved in the IGAD process. However, 
despite the apparent exacting deliberation of Machakos to ensure growing levels of 
consensus among parties, it soon became obvious that even the principle participants 
were not able to agree on the goals of the peace process. Bashir signed Machakos 
without first ensuring that Vice President Taha and Foreign Minister Mustafa Ismail, 
among others, were in agreement with everything in that declaration. Ismail in turn 
had reassured Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that no agreement would be signed 
with the SPLM/A allowing self-determination.60 That section of the protocol in 
particular raised objections from senior officials to the inclusion of provisions which 
had not been reviewed by others in the regime.61 By 2 September 2002, Khartoum 
would issue a letter accusing the SPLM/A of having already deviated from Machakos
58 John Young. “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation.” Institute o f Governance Studies, Simon Fraser 
University, Vancouver. 30 May 2007, 17. Waihenya, The Mediator, 95.
59 Justice Africa, 31 January 2004.
60 Alex De Waal. Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa. London: Hurst & Company, 2004, 243.
61 Machakos Protocol, Part C, sections 3.3 to 3.6.
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by pushing the issue of secularism in the north and a settlement of the status of the
f t ' )three disputed areas of Abyei, Southern Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan.
It was the regime’s internal dissent, along with SPLA gains made in the previous two 
months that led to Bashir’s temporary withdrawal from Machakos. ' The SPLA 
capture of Torit in October 2002 and the resulting deaths of several top government 
officials -  including a close ally of Bashir’s -  gave the president an excuse to pull out 
of the IGAD process.64 The Machakos negotiations had been conducted without a 
cease fire and the government could not resume them without retaking this territory.
It did so mere days after the insurgents captured Torit, thanks in part to oil revenue.65 
After a few more skirmishes had ‘satisfied honor’, IGAD mediators persuaded both 
sides to return to Machakos by 17 October, this time agreeing to a cease fire for the 
duration of the negotiations.66 When neither side initially abided by the cease fire, 
Sumbeiywo called for both parties to renew their efforts to do so in February 2003.6' 
This amended cease fire included an article specifically calling for a halt to 
construction of the Bentiu-Adok road, a mechanism to make troop movements for 
both parties and their allies more transparent, and the appointment of an international
62 Waihenya, The Mediator, 95.
63 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 243. Collins, “Civil Wars in the Sudan,” 1791.
64 Barltrop, interview. Madut-Arop, Sudan 's Painful Road to Peace, 317. Waihenya, The Mediator, 95-96.
Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 17. Dalai Mohamed Rajab. “Naivasha Peace Agreement: 
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Kegan Paul International, 1990, 355. This example of a government in Khartoum using SPLA attacks to pull out 
of an ongoing peace process is similar to one in late 1986, when the SPLA downing of an airplane near Kurmuk 
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Dam Declaration, the conciliatory agreement with the SPLA that was unpopular in his government.
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66 International Crisis Group. “Sudan Endgame.” 7 July 2003, 2. Addendum to the Memorandum o f 
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Army, 4 February 2003, article 3. Euler, “Human Rights in Sudan,” 50. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the 
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67 Brasset et al. 2004,2. Euler, “Human Rights in Sudan,” 50. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An 
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monitoring team. Despite violations, the Memorandum of Understanding was 
significant in that it allowed enough stability for international NGOs to extend 
operations in the south, allowing ‘unfettered access’ to Operation Lifeline Sudan, the 
dominant NGO, for the first time in the history of the conflict.69 This in itself was 
widely understood to be an indicator that the war was coming to an end.
This pattern of establishing cease fires, then breaking them, continued throughout the 
Naivasha process. As late as September 2004, the government-backed SSDF militia 
worked with military intelligence to capture strategic towns in the south in order to 
improve Khartoum’s standing in time for a final agreement.70 The 2003 Security 
Agreement instructed the Sudanese Armed Forces to begin redeploying from the 
south in the event of a final settlement, except for units jointly integrated with the 
SPLA, but Khartoum had for years supported and cooperated with several militias 
which were still actively hostile to the SPLA.' 1 Unlike the situation just prior to the 
AAA, the government during the Machakos process had strong economic incentives 
to control territory in the south through its proxies. The more territory its southern 
ally controlled, the more difficult it would be for the southern government to 
implement security, or pose a threat to the oil fields. In the second war, oil and 
security were closely conjoined.
LEGAL DISPUTES OVER OIL CONCESSIONS
The battle over southern oil was fought throughout the peace process not only 
militarily, but also in a political and legal capacity. Aside from attacking oil 
installations to put pressure on the government over oil rights, the SPLM/A launched 
another maneuver: signing contracts with oil companies over concessions the 
government had already sold. The objective was to voice SPLM/A unhappiness at
68 Euler, “Human Rights in Sudan,” 50. Waihenya, The Mediator, 101-102. Memorandum o f Understanding on 
Cessation o f Hostilities Between the Government o f Sudan and the Sudanese People ’s Liberation 
Movement/Army, 15 October 2002, article 3, and the 4 February 2003 addendum, article 6. The construction of 
this road, the primary transportation route to the oil fields, was displacing the villages of local people along the 
proposed route in what the SPLM/A declared was a violation of the initial cease fire.
69 El Obeid, Chronique Politique du Soudan 2003, 39-41. UNICEF and the World Food Programme were, by 
March 2003, able to reach the southern Blue Nile State for the first time.
70 International Crisis Group. “Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD.” 5 October 2004. 4-5.
71 Security Agreement, 2003, section 3b.
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what it considered government deception over oil contracts, but like broken cease 
fires, the legal confusion the SPLM/A sought to create further eroded trust between 
the two parties, emphasizing the differences over the parties’ ultimate objectives.
Based on analysis of reports by SPLM/A officials, it appeared that legally dubious oil 
contracts were signed primarily to retaliate against Khartoum’s rapid selling-off of 
concessions prior to the conclusion of the CPA.72 As the SPLA felt that the threat of 
resuming hostilities maintained its military leverage, it relied on the threat of 
competing concessions to maintain its political leverage when negotiating with 
Khartoum. Instead, as a final peace accord seemed increasingly likely, such tactics 
served only to de-legitimize the SPLM (soon the Government of South Sudan) as 
unserious about peace and incompetent in handling oil matters, especially considering 
such deals were signed after the wealth-sharing protocol the SPLM/A had already 
been agreed to. The legal gambit in hindsight can be viewed as an expression of 
southern frustration with Khartoum concerning the delay throughout 2003 and 2004 
of a final peace agreement. The SPLM/A’s activity during the Naivasha process 
indicates that it did not seek to complicate the legality of concessions primarily out of 
a desire to increase its share of wealth, but to protect the security of southerners in 
areas affected by Khartoum-contracted concessions. In September 2003, the 
SPLM/A stated that for a final peace agreement, the government would have to 
renegotiate contracts if they were ‘deemed to have fundamental social and 
environmental problems that cannot be rectified by remedial measures’. The 
SPLM/A argued that the contracts were illegal since southerners had not been 
consulted about them in any meaningful capacity.
By January 2004, the SPLM/A appeared willing to concede the issue. According to 
the terms of the Wealth Sharing Agreement, existing contracts could not be 
renegotiated and Khartoum accepted language allowing for remedial measures to be 
taken should the contracts create serious social or environmental problems.74 
However, the SPLA could assign representatives to review the contracts, and parties
72 International Crisis Group. “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace.” 25 July 2005, 19.
73 Jostein F. Tellnes. “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan.” National 
Political Science Conference, Hurdalssjoen, Norway, 5-7 January 2005, 19.
74 Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 4.2 and 4.3.
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affected by the contracts could receive compensation.75 The right to renegotiate 
contracts was itself a negotiable point for the SPLA, but it was not for the 
government, which did not want its business reputation damaged with international 
oil companies as a result of breaking contracts it had already committed to.76 The 
government told southerners that their region would also suffer from the wariness of 
oil companies to invest in production there if they felt they could not trust the region 
to remain stable. Such a lack of confidence could be a hurdle for further investment 
from Western oil companies, since the possibility of the south’s secession already 
made the area high-risk for oil operations. Instead, in recognition of SPLM 
concerns, states were given an appeals process by which they could contest oil
78contracts signed during the interim period.
As the process stalled in late 2004, southerners began to pressure the government to 
return to the negotiation table again, this time raising legal challenges to concessions 
that had been signed away by Khartoum throughout the course of that year. The 
southern Sudanese regional oil company, Nile Petroleum, and a company appointed 
by the southern government were to join a consortium in the southern oil fields. A 
consortium led by Total renewed its annual agreement with the government in 
December 2004 to the oil rich area of Bentiu called ‘Block B’, a concession it had 
held since 1980. However, just two months later the government became aware that 
the SPLM/A argued that since its deal was signed in August 2004, it predates the 
Total-led consortium’s renewal.80 A host of other legal and technical difficulties with 
these southern concessions led to John Garang’s pledge in February 2005 to de- 
register concessions the SPLM/A had signed prior to the CPA.81
75 Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 4.1 and 4.5. Section 4.5 specifies only that ‘persons who have their 
rights violated by the oil contracts are entitled to compensation’. Skorupski, “Sudan’s Energy Sector,” 6. In a 
demonstration of how willing the SPLM was to concede on the issue of existing oil contracts, section 4.1 
stipulates that SPLM representatives who review existing contracts must sign confidentiality agreements. While 
this further augmented the charge that both parties were shunning transparency, it may also be interpreted as an 
example of the SPLM’s willingness to concede on oil rights, since an inability to disclose information about oil 
rights would hinder the SPLM’s ability to make a case against agreements it felt were unjustly concluded.
76 Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 18-19.
77 Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 18.
78 Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, section 3.5.4.
7g International Crisis Group. “A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan.” 26 July 2007, 4.
80 ICG, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace,” 19.
81 ICG, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace,” 20.
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A fundamental dispute over oil wealth concerned to which Sudan’s natural resources 
ultimately belonged: local (southern) communities or the national government. The 
two parties were able to compromise on the issue of oil wealth ownership by leaving 
it unresolved, but only once it became apparent that oil revenues could be shared even 
while these fundamental legal rights were not immediately addressed. The SPLM 
was less cooperative on the division of other resources derived from the south, 
especially those produced above ground. It insisted on the establishment of a 
National Land Commission and a Southern Sudan Land Commission, which would 
adjudicate competing land claims and give some legal protection to customary land 
rights, protecting the rights of local communities. The two parties disagreed over 
what should be the foundation of Sudanese property law: one option was the Land 
Registration Ordinance of 1925, which allowed the traditional landowners some 
freedom to keep the title. Alternatively, the Bashir regime held to the Land Act of 
1970, which declared that all land belonged to the government unless otherwise 
specified.85 The SPLM argued that the 1970 law was enacted at the height of the first 
civil war, before the SPLM was even in existence. In addition, much of the 
documentation on what land was owned had been lost or destroyed during the course 
of the second war. It proposed instead that land should be regarded as belonging to
82 Domenico Polloni. “Land and the Sudanese transition to peace.” Sudan: Prospects for Peace. Eds. Marion 
Couldrey and Tim Morris. Forced Migration Review 24 (November 20, 21-22. Rahhal, Suleiman Rahhal and 
A.H. Abdel Salam. “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform.” Committee o f the Civil Project. 
Issue Paper E-2 (2006), 2.
82 Telephone interview by the author with Patricia Lane, Sydney, 2009.
84 Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 3.1.5. Egemi 2006, 55. Neither the CPA nor the 
Interim National Constitution specifies if the National Land Commission was to be centralized or decentralized. 
Waihenya, The Mediator, 129. Waihenya notes that Garang was especially hesitant to share non-oil revenues with 
the government, especially revenues derived from gum arabic, of which the south was a major exporter. After 90 
days of debating about the issue, Garang finally compromised, ensuring 50% would be allocated to the 
Government of South Sudan but allowing Khartoum to allocate the rest. Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, 
section 7.3.
85 Omer Egemi. “Land and the peace processes.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan 's Conflicts. Accord 18 
(2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 54. The 1970 Unregistered Land Act saw unregistered land given 
to the state. It could not be acquired ‘through long-standing use, which encouraged the patronage of land by the 
government as a means to secure political power’. Lane, interview. ‘There was still a special procedure for 
recognizing traditional title under the second enactment, but much more difficult for anyone to follow.’ Rahhal 
and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 3. Land customs in south Sudan, 
southern Kordofan and the Nuba region were not generally implemented under Condominium law, as they were in 
the north. Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 4. The act ended the 
rights of traditional authorities to allocate land, and preceded the 1971 abolition of Native Administration entirely. 
Yet in remote ares this change was unenforcible, as local peoples continued to adhere to the Native Administration 
hierarchy. As a result of this reality, in the 1980s and 1990s, the Native Administration was eventually recognized 
in these regions. Egemi, “Land and the peace processes,” 54-55. The CPA calls for incorporating customary laws 
with the establishment of four Land Commissions: one national, one in southern Sudan and one for Southern 
Kordofan and Blue Nile states each. The final agreement recognizes customary rights, but how to reconcile this 
with the Native Administration system, which manages land conflicts, is not explained.
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local communities. The SPLM/A regarded itself as negotiating on these local
07
communities behalf.
Patricia Lane, the Australian property lawyer who assisted as a resource person 
during the wealth sharing negotiations, recognized that the negotiation could hit an
00
irresolvable impasse over the issue of land ownership. She suggested that instead of 
hinging the resolution of the land dispute in the peace process on the resolution of the 
ownership debate -  which was intractable -  the parties should record the existence of 
a disagreement and create mechanisms which could later be used to resolve them. 
This arrangement was the basis of the National and Southern Sudan Land 
Commissions -  it was envisaged that a process of reform of the land law would 
eventually sort out the question of ownership. The same dispute existed in relation 
to ownership of natural resources. Especially concerning natural resources, Lane 
argued that ‘the purpose of making this agreement is really how to share the 
wealth. ’90 The parties were able to leave the question of ownership to one side if the 
mechanism for dividing the returns from oil (particularly) and other resources could 
be achieved.91
This compromise encapsulates some of the respective priorities of the parties. 
Khartoum was most concerned with maintaining oil revenues from contracts it had 
already negotiated, and was not urgently concerned with demonstrating its 
sovereignty by claiming these resources if revenue was not threatened. While the 
government had some concern over the possibility of southerners protesting the 
development of land for priorities of the national government (the Bentiu-Adok road, 
for example), it did not have as much invested in wide scale use of land in activities
86 Skorupski, “Sudan's Energy Sector,” 3. Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 200. The 
allusion that customary rights to land must first have a proven legal basis is perceived to be an inherent 
contradiction within the Act for communities in the Sudan who subscribe to customary laws and value systems.
87 Lane, interview.
88 Lane, interview. T argued that neither [the 1925 nor the 1970 statute] conclusively abrogated traditional rights, 
but that really wasn’t the point -  the SPLM/A would not accept that the Government owned anything other than a 
sliver of registered land in South Sudan, the Government said -  “by virtue of these acts, we own it all.”’
89 Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 14-15. 2004 Wealth 
Sharing Agreement, section 2.6, 2.7.
90 Lane, interview.
91 Lane, interview. This method of agreeing of a division of revenue while the issue of ownership remained in 
question was derived from a similar process used in Australia under the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) to arbitrate 
disputes between miners and Aboriginal communities in advance of a determination of whether or not the native 
title claimants actually had native title over the claimed land.
256
such as agriculture that they would consider this arrangement to be economically 
debilitating. Khartoum also recognized that southern autonomy over surface land as 
a legitimate demand of the SPLM/A, and in accordance with the principles of self- 
determination as laid out in the Machakos Protocol. Most importantly, Khartoum 
has realized that control over southern land was not a negotiable issue for the SPLM. 
Use of land could not be divided as neatly as the profits from subterranean resources, 
and of course had a longer history of tradition. As a result a more complex regime 
had to be established.
In addition, while the undemocratic nature of the SPLM/A hierarchy allowed it more 
freedom to negotiate with the government than it might otherwise have enjoyed, the 
movement was still forced to address the priorities of southern constituents if it hoped 
to implement the agreement without significant continued resistance. This meant that 
championing land rights would take precedence over ownership claims on 
subterranean resources. For the SPLM/A, oil revenues might have been more 
valuable when reconstructing the south after over two decades of war. However, for 
the pastoralist and agrarian majority of southerners, as Lane explains, ‘People don’t 
actually see a lot of their own cultural or economic interests being articulated when 
you talk about oil. Because oil... they just pack it off out of the country in a huge 
pipeline, whereas land and their own economies are going to be much more poignant 
and meaningful. ’94
OIL WEALTH AND THE SOUTHERN ARMY
SPLM/A concerns over the security situation created by oil wealth in Sudan, and its 
concentration in the south, facilitated the demand for the creation of a separate 
southern army, controlled solely by the Government of South Sudan. A southern 
army, independent of Khartoum’s control, has been for southern rebels a 
longstanding condition in acquiescing to a united Sudan throughout both wars.
92 Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 15. Lane, interview.
93 Machakos Protocol, 2002, sections 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and 6.4.
94 Lane, interview. Lane adds that the non-economic significance of oil lay more in the method by which the 
pipeline had been built -  ‘by bombing people along the route out of the way during construction... It was fair to 
say that people did see a large symbolic issue in the oil, but as a symbol of oppression, not as a wealth generator in 
their daily lives.’
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Southerners’ demand for control over their own security has roots in the grievances 
southerners feel the national army and its militia allies have committed against 
southern civilians in the past, which have only been exacerbated by oil. Oil wealth 
did not create the desire among southerners for a separate army. Instead, southerners 
believed, as they had since independence, that the absence of security could be used 
to disenfranchise them politically in a united Sudan. This suspicion was retained 
even under ostensibly democratic governments, as in 1986 when the instability and 
chaos of the early second civil war led to the government cancelling voting in half the 
southern constituencies due to the unstable political situation.95 The IGAD mediators 
noted the priority of a standing army for southerners as well. In his visits to the south 
during the Machakos process, Sumbeiywo discussed with various residents their 
concerns and objectives for a settlement. He observed that, ‘the people did not mind 
dividing oil or living under Sharia law. All they wanted was their own army.’96 As 
Garang stated, ‘our guarantee is organic. The fact that Southern Sudan will have its 
own separate army during the interim unity in addition to the integrated forces and 
other security forces is the only fundamental guarantor and indeed the cornerstone for 
the survival of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.’97 It was yet another reason that 
a security agreement was the first protocol to be agreed upon after Machakos.
Insurgent preference for an unintegrated southern military force has been consistently 
advocated in negotiations concerning the southern question. At the 1965 Round 
Table talks, southern representatives had pushed for at least a southern militia, 
responsible to the national government, to operate in the south instead of the national 
army. Northern representatives refused, arguing that such an arrangement would 
compromise the nation’s sovereignty by limiting the jurisdiction of the army, one of
95 “Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan,” 77. Oliver Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint.
London: Oxford University Press, 1970, 66. The 36 constituencies which did not have elections called were in 
areas at least partially under Anya Nya control.
96 Waihenya, The Mediator, 111. Nicholas Coghlan. Far in the Waste Sudan: On Assignment in Africa. 
Montreal: McGill-Queens University, 2005, 207. Alier also notes that the failure of the AAA was a result of 
former Anya Nya who forgot that the south’s military strength was its most important safeguard against future 
northern oppression. Alier blamed former military men in the insurgency for entering into the political 
environment of Khartoum, thereby allowing the command structure of the former Anya Nya to atrophy. In 2002, 
he asserted that during the ongoing peace process, southern negotiators should now fight to retain control of their 
own military apparatus.
97 Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 406. Ibrahim, interview. “Sudanese minister says 
‘unconventional method’ used to achieve peace accord.” Sudan Tribune. 5 October 2003. Sudanese Foreign 
Minister Mustafa Uthman Ismail concurred with the priority of security issues in the negotiations, noting a 
security agreement was the next logical step to comprehensive peace.
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Sudan’s strongest national institutions. However, the northerners did not even seek 
to diffuse the issue of employment by integrating southerners into the existing 
security apparatus. Few southerners were given commissions to the army or inducted 
into the police academy or prison warden services from independence until 1965."
The issue emerged again during the AAA negotiations. Government negotiator Abel 
Alier notes that during these discussions ‘security was the area where the most 
sensitive nerve of the north-south conflict was embedded. All other matters, 
including the sharing of resources, depended on it.’100 As in the Naivasha process 30 
years later, security became the negotiators’ top priority in the Addis Ababa 
discussions after making the initial breakthrough of agreeing to meet in the first 
place. The SSLM demand for a southern regional army almost led to a breakdown of 
negotiations, after which Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie was asked to personally 
intervene and guarantee southern security during the delicate process of 
integration.101
The SSLM believed it should control a southern army to protect the treaty in case the 
May Regime was overthrown in Khartoum, and a new government abrogated the 
AAA.102 The government counterproposal of a ‘road gang’, or a border patrol, was 
rejected, primarily because it would pay members less than the national army and, 
because it would keep southerners in the countryside and out of the towns, where 
they felt they would be needed to protect civilians. The border patrol concept was the 
exact opposite of the SSLM vision of security in the south, in which the capacity to
98 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 37.
99 Albino, The Sudan: A Southern Viewpoint, 104-105.
100 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 106.
101 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 151. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 44. 
Taisier M. Ali, Robert O. Matthews and Ian Spears. “Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan (1972-1983) and Angola 
(1991-1998).” Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press 
Incorporated, 2004, 287. Barbara F. Walter. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International 
Organization 51:3 (1997), 341. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan 
Conflict, 141, 146, 156. This guarantee was significant, as the concern of the safety of Anya Nya and other 
southern refugees returning home had been one of the points of contention that almost caused Lagu not to ratify 
the AAA. Barbara F. Walter. Committing to Peace: the Successful Settlement o f Civil Wars. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002, 68, 97. Walter stresses the weak nature of this guarantee, since the 
Ethiopians were not physically in a position to guarantee the safety of the rebels on their journey from their bases 
in Equatoria to Addis Ababa. Rather, the emperor was using his prestige to help facilitate what was essentially a 
trust-building measure between the SSLM leaders and the Sudanese government.
102 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 106. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State 
(From Ruin To Hope), 253.
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defend southerners from Sudan’s own troops was potentially more important than 
defending the national border.103
Security provisions were intensely debated in the lead-up to the AAA. A proposal 
discussed at the February 1972 negotiations was for a reinstitution of the 
Condominium-era Southern Command, with fixed ratios of southern to northern 
troops in the region. However, the two parties could not agree to the ratio: the 
government argued for three northern troops to each southern troop, southerners 
argued for the inverse ratio.104 Khartoum’s delegates also did not want to agree to any 
significant compromises without knowing the size of the Anya Nya force, though it 
was estimated to be from 10,000 to 15,000. In a move that would be emulated by the 
SPLA three decades later, the SSLM team did not want to reveal their total number of 
troops for fear it would compromise them should the agreement collapse. The 
government proposed that 15,000 troops be stationed in the south, half northerners 
and half southerners. The SSLM resisted this initially because only 4500 of its troops 
would have access to the armory. The rest would be prison wardens and police.105 
The security area was the most significant area of deadlock in the AAA talks, and 
required Carr to ask Emperor Haile Selassie to intervene. The Emperor was able to 
get the government to submit to a 50/50 ratio of troops in the south as long as the 
SSLM did. He leaned on the SSLM to accept the ratio.106 After debate over numbers, 
southerners finally accepted 12,000 troops in the south, with half of them to be Anya 
Nya who would all have access to the armory.107
In the early 1970s, weakening the unity of the national military with an autonomous 
southern force was anathema to Khartoum: the military, upon which Nimeiri’s 
vulnerable regime depended exclusively by 1972, was too important to the regime’s
103 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 108.
104 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 155.
105 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 138.
106 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 139-140, 178. Assefa notes 
that as Nimeiri and Haile Selassie cemented their relationship throughout 1971, it would become more difficult for 
Khartoum’s negotiators to decline the emperor’s suggestions during the peace negotiations. The SSLM also could 
not ignore his suggestions, as he was guaranteeing their safety. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From 
Ruin To Hope), 254. Lagu also testifies that it was the Ethiopian emperor, in order to break a deadlock over 
security issues by the parties at Addis Ababa, who suggested the final arrangement that southerners compose half 
the troops stationed in the south.
107 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 142, 152. Assefa writes 
that the Sudanese army numbered over 14,000 soldiers and 6,000 armed police in the south by the end of the war.
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existence to be compromised. Integration of individual Anya Nya fighters into the 
national armed forces and other government sectors was unpopular and complicated, 
but Joseph Lagu’s decision to lead by example and rejoin the army as a Major
1 AO
General may have helped facilitate the transition. AAA moderator Burgess Carr 
explains that it was actually civilian politicians who could not agree on the 
composition of forces in the south, the military officers were more amenable to any 
proposal.109 This underscores the point that a united military was more important to 
the political tenets of Sudanese nationalism than it was to actual military 
effectiveness.
In the south, however, protests for separate regional military arrangements persisted. 
Among a collection of proposed amendments to the AAA presented by Lagu to Alier 
on 27 March 1972 but later discarded were proposals to create two armies and two
1 1 A
financial institutions.1 * Proposals such as this would re-emerge during the talks 
leading up to the CPA. As a recently commissioned captain in the Anya Nya, John 
Garang also voiced several early criticisms of the AAA, especially the integration of 
insurgents. He instead proposed three separate armies: one for the south, one for the 
rest of Sudan, and one that was a mixture.111 This division of force was the 
foundation for the security agreement he negotiated personally with Ali Osman Taha 
31 years later at Naivasha.112
Garang’s advocacy of national revolution, as opposed to regional autonomy, meant 
that by the time the SPLA emerged in the early 1980s, he was no longer the most 
forceful advocate for the ‘multiple army’ solution. The idea was instead advocated
108 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 44. A confidence-building factor for Lagu was Nimeiri’s 
request that the Anya Nya leader send two hundred of his best fighters to be included in the Republican Guard, 
Nimeiri’s personal escort.
109 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 139.
110 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 119. The discarded amendment concerning 
the army in the south recommended replacing northern troops in the region with southern ones over a period of 
five years.
111 Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 23. Douglas H. Johnson and Gerard Prunier. “The Foundation 
and Expansion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad 
Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993, 121. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many 
Agreements Dishonoured, 261.
112 Ibrahim, interview. Ibrahim quotes Garang as stating that, after the AAA, ‘When we gave in our guns, we 
protected not the south, but the government.’ Garang stated that southern fighters must avoid mustaawhin, or 
assimilation, by the government. Barltrop, interview. The need for a separate standing army was ‘a lesson the 
SPLA drew from the AAA experience.’
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by early southern adversaries of the SPLM/A, especially those at odds with the more 
militantly united vision Garang’s movement championed for Sudan at the beginning 
of the second war. In November 1984, William Chuol, an Anya Nya 2 leader who 
was one of Garang’s early rivals, put forward a federal plan to Nimeiri which was 
almost a confederation of the north and south. It too proposed the creation of 
independent regional Sudanese armies. Throughout the rest of the 1980s, however, 
few of the charters or workshops instigated for the purpose of ending the war dealt 
seriously with the issue of reorganizing the army, possibly because none ever 
progressed far enough to tackle such a sensitive issue.114 However, by July 1989, 
Garang was demanding from the new Bashir regime that in addition to a secular 
democratic regime, the SPLA troops must be reintegrated into the national army on a 
50/50 basis.115 The new demand was in response to the growing push within the 
insurgent movement, and the south generally, for southern regional autonomy as a 
more immediate goal than national revolution.
The ongoing debate about security provisions throughout the war, and their 
significance in concluding a final agreement, made the issue an obvious candidate to 
be addressed early on in the Naivasha process. The September 2003 Security 
Agreement, though the first protocol to be signed after the Machakos Protocol, took 
over a year to conclude. A catalyst was Bashir’s angry July 2003 dismissal of the 
Nakuru document, Kenyan mediator Lazaro Sumbeiywo’s attempt to break the 
deadlock over how to best follow up the breakthrough at Machakos.116 Sumbeiywo 
had overreached with the document, but Khartoum’s absolute rejection of it was
113 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 274. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to 
Peace, 109. The plan was rejected by Nimeiri.
114 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 305.
115 Mohammed O. I. Maundi, William Zartman, Gilbert M. Khadiagala and Kwaku Nuamah. Getting In: 
Mediators ’ Entry into the Settlement o f African Conflicts. Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2006, 
130.
116 International Crisis Group. “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace.” 11 December 2003, 3. Immediately after 
the draft was presented, the government began forum-shopping again, seeking for either the African Union or 
Egypt and the Arab League to intervene, or at least for the dismissal of Sumbeiywo as IGAD’s chief mediator. In 
interviews conducted with persons close to the proceedings during July and August 2003, ICG suggests it was the 
requested compromise on the status of Sharia law in the capital which most angered the government about the 
Nakuru document. The fact that the government party was guaranteed 51% of the National Assembly and could 
therefore pass new Sharia laws throughout the north was not in itself enough. ICG, “Sudan: Towards an 
Incomplete Peace,” 4. Government delegates argued that Machakos had resolved the issue of state and religion, 
but Nakuru sought to open it up again. Waihenya, The Mediator, 116-117. The government rejected the 
document in part because of the clause proposing the two-army solution, but also because it allowed the first 
southern Vice President significant influence over national decisions made by the president. The most 
objectionable area was that which touched on compromising Sharia law.
262
viewed by several of the IGAD supporters in the West as indicative of a less than 
sincere commitment to the peace process.117 This in turn increased pressure on 
Khartoum’s new lead negotiator, Vice President Ali Osman Taha, to concede on at 
least on substantial point. As a result, during the Naivasha process the government 
conceded to the two-army plan, along with the Joint Integrated Units. The funding of 
this became problematic, however, as Khartoum argued it could not finance a 
southern army that had until very recently been an insurgent force fighting against the 
state. The SPLA objected to that position, arguing that it would be contrary to the 
national, united spirit of the Security Agreement. However, the rebels finally 
conceded that the southern government would fund the southern army, primarily 
because it would not acquiesce to the national government’s demand to reveal troop 
numbers and other details.119
Taha’s consent to the removal of the national army from the south by July 2007 was 
popularly seen in the south as vindicating the SPLA’s charge that the army had been 
an illegitimate occupying force. “ The fact that Khartoum preferred to concede this 
point rather than compromise on issues such as Sharia demonstrates the lack of 
commitment to nationalist principles by the regime. Instead, Khartoum chose to rely 
on the SPLA’s rival militias in the south to keep the region destabilized.
117 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 20. El Obeid, Chronique Politique du Soudan 2003, 9. 
Other objections the government had to the Nakuru document were that it played down unity during the interim 
period, that it allowed the SPLA a monopoly of power in the south versus other southern militias, and that it made 
the south a separate entity without any serious relationship with the federal government. El Obeid, Chronique 
Politique du Soudan 2003, 11. The cease fire extension of February 2003 was renewed in June 2003.
1 lx Barltrop, interview. Barltrop notes the international pressure Khartoum was under to reach an accommodation 
on at least one point, particularly with the threat of new US sanctions contained in the Sudan Peace Act passed by 
the US Congress. He speculates that Khartoum might have conceded the southern demand for two separate 
armies in order to buy time to negotiate more complicated issues such as the status of Sharia law and of wealth 
sharing arrangements, and that the brevity of the security protocol compared to the later agreement would seem to 
confirm this. In addition, the clashes between the Sudanese army and the SPLA over the towns of Torit and Leer 
in late 2002 and early 2003, and the subsequent need to pass a cease fire resolution, demonstrated that security 
issues would be paramount to a successfully concluded final agreement. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An 
Evaluation,” 19. In the year that had passed since the July 2002 signing of the Machakos Protocol, the US and 
other IGAD backers had determined that at least some of the fault lay with government negotiator Ghazi 
Salahuddin Attabani. They thought Taha’s status as Vice President, and his known reservations about conceding 
too much to the SPLA, would give him more authority as a negotiator and allow him to more quickly complete 
negotiations. Young reports that the US invited Taha to their London Embassy and told him that a concluded 
peace deal would result in better relations between Khartoum and Washington.
119 Waihenya, The Mediator, 131. Justice Africa, 15 November 2004. Tabitha Jeptoo Seii. “The 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Sudanese Peace Process.” The Sudan Peace 
Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, Ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East Lansing, Michigan: 
Michigan State University Press, 2005, 19. International Crisis Group. “Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on 
IGAD,” 3.
120 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 21. El Obeid, Chronique Politique du Soudan 2003, 15. 
By the end of the war, the government had between 80,000 and 100,000 troops stationed in the south.
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Walter submits that ‘the key difference between interstate and civil war negotiations 
is that adversaries in a civil war cannot retain separate, independent armed forces if 
they agree to settle their differences. ’ 121 However, this norm of conflict resolution has 
been challenged by the CPA. The creation of two armies connected by a smaller 
integrated force was also the first example of Garang’s strategy for the peace process: 
the creation of national institutions which could be easily separated in the event of 
southern independence. It was this principle of ‘unity, with the capacity of 
separation’, not that of regional devolution, which dictated the creation of southern 
institutions which mirrored national ones. "  This bifurcated vision not only allowed 
Garang to appeal to the strong separatist movement within southern Sudan, but also 
to buy time in an interim period whereby the SPLM could consolidate its gains free 
of warfare. 123
The meeting between Taha and Garang, which would move on to the security 
agreement after the stall in discussions following the Nakuru draft, saw both 
individuals overcoming internal resistance in their respective parties. Taha faced 
opposition towards meeting the head of the insurgency from the hard-line faction of 
the regime, in particular former presidential peace adviser Ghazi Salahuddin 
Attabani. 1“4 Garang was also almost detained in Rumbek by his own commanders, 
due to the widely-held reservations in the movement as to the wisdom of the SPLA 
commander meeting face-to-face with Vice President Taha in Kenya. These officers 
feared that the government’s stalling after the Machakos Protocol was a tactic, and 
that Khartoum was not serious about a negotiated peace. After the prolonged drama 
following the Nakuru draft in July to the signing of the Security Agreement in
121 Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” 337-339. ‘Once they sign a peace treaty they cannot 
retreat to their own borders and defensively reinforce their militaries, they do not become trading partners or 
important allies, and they cannot hide behind buffer zones. Only if they are willing to relinquish control over 
occupied regions, vital industries and independent military organizations is a cooperative peace agreement 
possible... In civil wars, disarmament can be postponed, and it can be done gradually and in a reciprocal manner, 
but it can never be avoided.’
122 Lane, interview. Lane cites Garang in 2003 declaring this expressly at one meeting with technical experts: 
national and southern bodies should be linked, but capable of separating should the south opt for independence. 
The creation of the Southern Sudan Land Commission, and Southern Sudan Petroleum Commission in addition to 
the National Land Commission and National Petroleum Commission as an example of this principle, as well as the 
SPLM push for a separate southern currency.
123 Lane, interview.
124 ICG, “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace,” 4.
125 ICG, “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace,” 4-5. Waihenya, The Mediator, 122.
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September, the parties took a hiatus from the talks in October 2003. This was in part 
because Taha and Garang had personally reached an impasse over the status of the 
Abyei region, and both men were feeling the pressure of internal politics within their 
own camps once again.126
OIL WEALTH AND SOUTHERN MILITIAS
The 2003 Security Agreement barred armed groups not aligned with either the 
national army or the southern army from operating in the Sudan. Such groups could 
be incorporated into either one force or the other, but could not operate 
independently. The most obvious casualties of this provision were government- 
aligned militias whom Khartoum had relied on as proxies in its efforts to protect oil 
fields from SPLA attacks and to fight in areas of the south that were inaccessible to 
the national army. At critical periods of the war, when the army was reduced to 
occupying only key garrisons and larger towns in the south, these militias had 
remained in the countryside as a major antagonist to the SPLA.128 As a final peace 
agreement seemed increasingly likely, the militias posed a problem in that they 
threatened the SPLA’s status as the only lawful southern army. Continued South 
Sudan Defense Force demands for inclusion as a separate force in the security 
provisions were rejected outright by the SPLA, which felt that such a move would 
abrogate the security protocol. Once that protocol was compromised, the government 
might also try to reopen protocols it wished to see renegotiated. SPLM/A leader 
and eventual Government of Southern Sudan president Salva Kiir would spend much 
of the interim period trying to neutralize the spoiler potential of the South Sudan
1 TODefense Force and other militias.
126 ICG, “Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace,” 7. As an indication of the poor state of relations between parties 
by October 2003, the government delegation sustained its involvement that month due to the Ramadan holiday, 
despite the fact that it had negotiated through that month in the previous year.
127 Security Agreement, 2003, sections 7a and 7b. Seii, “The Intergovernmental Authority on Development 
(IGAD) and the Sudanese Peace Process,” 20.
128 John Young. “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace.” Review o f African Political 
Economy 32:103 (2005), 109. Woodward, interview. “Raising the Stakes: Oil and Conflict in Sudan,” 12.
129 ICG, “Sudan’s Dual Crises,” 5.
Ijl) Woodward, interview. Ibrahim, interview. Ibrahim notes that the new southern army is becoming a loose 
confederation of southern militias. Interview by author with Monawar Sharif, Canberra, 2009. Sharif speculates 
that the only thing uniting the southern militias is the common threat of the north. Should the south secede from 
Sudan, it is possible that infighting will begin again. Ibrahim, interview. Ibrahim notes that this splintering 
potential also exists among militias in northern regions such as Darfur, since the unifying element of sectarian 
parties has been removed for 20 years. The Ansar movement united the people in the north, especially in Darfur.
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Under the CPA, the national army is limited to keeping 24,000 troops in the south, as 
part of the Joint Integrated Units. Should the government wish to support southern 
militias, they would have to become part of this force. Such absorption is unlikely 
to happen with a substantial amount of SSDF troops, as Khartoum surely realizes 
their secessionist nature would make them potential allies with the SPLA should the 
south chose to secede at the end of the interim period in 2011. Asa result, 
immediately after the Security Agreement was signed in September 2003, John 
Garang sought to reach an agreement with SSDF forces, or at least begin a dialogue. 
Until the signing of the CPA, this effort had mixed results, partly because of SPLA 
miscalculations and partly because of government determination not to allow the two 
southern groups to get too close, either by limiting their contact or by exacerbating 
tensions between them.
A critical point of contention between the SPLA and SSDF in the battle over which 
best represents southern interests is that of CPA wealth-sharing provisions, which are 
much less generous to the south, and the specific oil-producing regions, than the 1997 
Khartoum Peace Agreement was. For example, under the KP A the south was entitled 
to 75% of the oil revenues generated in the south, while under the CPA the region 
was forced to settle for 50%.133 The specific areas producing oil in the south were 
entitled to 40% of that revenue under the KP A, while under the CPA they receive 
only 2%.134 This arrangement reflected the nature of the insurgent movements who 
had signed the agreement. The southern groups who signed the KPA were primarily 
composed of Nuer, the Nilotic people who lived in oil rich areas such as Bentiu.
131 ICG, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace,” 9. Security Agreement, 2003, section 
4.1c. In addition, the Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile were each to host 6,000 Joint Integrated Units, and 
Khartoum 3,000.
132 ICG, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace,” 9. ICG, “Sudan’s Dual Crises,” 4.
Garang and an SSDF delegation headed by Major General Clement Wani had been working since October 2003 in 
Naivasha to establish a multi-track south/south dialogue at political, military, and civil society levels. Efforts by 
the SPLM and the Southern Sudan Coordinating Council (the SSDF’s closest equivalent to a political wing) to 
move the process forward had been stalled by the time of the CPA signing. El Obeid, Chronique Politique du 
Soudan 2003, 17. The SPLA and Lam Akol’s SPLA-United, formerly a government supported militia, merged in 
a ceremony in Nairobi, October 2003.
133 “Sudan: Wealth Sharing -  Tougher Economic Issues than Oil to Address”. IRIN News Service. Deng, “The 
Legal Implications of the Sudan Peace Process,” 120. Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 
225. MakwakTeny. “We Are All The Boat of Peace.” Sudan Vision Daily. 10 August 2004. Khartoum Peace 
Agreement, 1997, Annex 3.
134 Young, “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace,” 107.
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Many were suspicious of other southerners laying claim to what they saw as their 
wealth, particularly Dinka, and saw a tactical agreement with the government as the 
best way to secure their local interests. The SPLM/A, on the other hand, claimed that 
it was looking at the broader needs of the south. It conjectured that revenue largely 
did not need to be diverted to the oil areas, as they would already benefit from the 
development and infrastructure provided by oil companies and the national 
government, the Bentiu development being the most obvious example of this.135
The SPLM/A leadership realized that the legitimacy of their dominant position in 
negotiating for the south would hinge on what sort of compromise they could forge 
over substantive, technical issues such as the division of oil revenues. In the early 
post-Machakos protocol discussions about wealth sharing, the SPLM/A referred to 
the generous terms of the KPA regarding oil revenue for the south and insisted that if 
75% was to be agreed to for a relatively less powerful, less broad-based southern 
insurgent group than the SPLM/A, the SPLM/A must have 90% of revenue.136 By 
October 2003, after the signing of the Security Agreement, the SPLM/A scaled back 
its demands to 60% oil revenue for the south, 5% for oil producing regions and the 
rest for Khartoum. It was not until the wealth-sharing protocol of January 2004 that 
the 50/50 arrangement was agreed to, after 2% was appropriated for the oil producing 
states specifically.138 The SPLM appeared to join a National Petroleum Commission 
as a ‘trade-off for the government to concede 50% of the oil revenues. However, 
this was in keeping with the Machakos Protocol’s framework of unity-based, 
integrated institutions.139
135 Euler, “Human Rights in Sudan,” 50. Waihenya, The Mediator, 101. Madut-Arop, Sudan's Painful Road to 
Peace, 364-365. The Nuer composed over 90% of the first SPLA breakaway faction.
136 Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 20. Wennman, 
“Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s North-South Peace Process,” 17.
137 Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 20. Wennman, 
“Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s North-South Peace Process,” 17. Paul, Nantulya. 
“The Machakos Protocol and Prospects for Peace in Sudan.” Peacemaking 4 (2003), 11. In the January 2003 
IGAD session, the SPLA had also pushed for 60% revenue to be distributed to the south, while Khartoum insisted 
10% was a more realistic percentage. At this session, the SPLA also proposed allowing a rotating head of the 
national government. Khartoum rejected this, arguing that national coherence would be important during the 
interim period.
138 Wealth Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 5.5 and 5.6. Skorupski, “Sudan’s Energy Sector,” 3. All the net oil 
revenue from oil states went to Khartoum, which then transferred made deductions for producer states, the 
Government of South Sudan, and the Oil Stabilization Account in the event that the oil prices surpassed an agreed 
upon price.
139 Jostein F. Tellnes. “The unexpected deal: oil and the IGAD process.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan 's 
Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 39. Tellnes suggests Khartoum may have
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Another issue of consideration was the method by which revenue was to be collected 
and divided. While the southern government was able to split non-oil revenue and 
taxes 50/50 with the national government, there was almost no tax base upon which 
to depend by 2005.140 Almost all southern revenue would come from oil wealth, and 
little of it would be transferred from the national government. For the SPLM/A it 
was therefore vital to retain a large percentage of oil revenue.141 This objective was 
not purely a symbolic gesture of the south reclaiming its resources. Because the 
method proposed by Khartoum, in which the national government made regular 
transfers of funds to the south, had been discredited after the May Regime failed to 
act on a similar system that had been implemented after the AAA.142 The new 
arrangement also had appeal for separatists in the south: it would be easier for them to 
remind southerners that at the beginning of the interim period Khartoum had shown 
little interest in sharing national resources.143 This tactic is in clear contrast with the 
AAA, which relied heavily on establishing mutual trust between the parties. The 
CPA was instead devoted to clarifying and codifying differences between the parties 
in such a way that they would not erupt into conflict.
In the days prior to the Wealth Sharing Agreement’s conclusion, the government 
attempted to revive a section of the Nakuru Document which it had dismissed only 
six months earlier in which money would be transferred from the national 
government to the south according to an agreed percentage of the Gross Domestic 
Product.144 The SPLM/A refused, and held to its demand for a direct sharing of oil 
revenues. The government finally conceded on this point, in a large part because of
also anticipated its ability to manipulate the petroleum commission, this despite the SPLM’s de facto veto power 
over that institution.
140 Woodward, interview. Benaiah Yongo-Bure. “Peace Dividend and the Millennium Development Goals in 
Southern Sudan.” Bremen: Institute for World Economics and International Management, 2005, 29. Rogier, No 
More Hills Ahead? 130.
141 Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 22.
142 Tellnes, “Dealing with Petroleum Issues in Civil War Negotiations: the Case of Sudan,” 22-23. Wealth 
Sharing Agreement, 2004, sections 8.2.1 and 8.3. A Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission 
(FFAMC) would be established to assure transparencies in fund transfers to the southern and state governments 
from the National Treasury Fund. The FFAMC would be composed of three members each from the national and 
southern governments, and the finance ministers of each state.
143 Tellnes, “The Unexpected Deal,” 40. Osman Antwi-Boateng and Geraldine Maria O’Mahony. “A Framework 
for the Analysis of Peace Agreements and Lessons Learned: The Case of the Sudanese Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement.” Politics and Policy 36:1 (2008), 151. In addition, ‘separatist motives mesh well with a position of 
prioritizing direct oil revenues over federal transfers.
144 Tellnes, “The Unexpected Deal,” 40-41.
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actors outside the Sudan. Khartoum was under intense international pressure, 
particularly from the United States, to complete a comprehensive agreement during 
early 2004. When the SPLM/A renounced a claim to oil outside the south, the 
government finally agreed to the 50/50 division of southern oil.145
REGIONAL BOUNDARIES AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Redrawing boundaries to gain access to natural resources had been a regular method 
of depriving the south of wealth, and has been an issue of contention in both 
agreements. This tendency has been in practice as far back as the Abboud regime, 
when Khartoum transferred the copper-rich areas of Hofrat en-Nahas and Kafia Kingi 
from Bahr Al-Ghazal to Darfur province.146 Part of the AAA stipulated that these 
areas were to be returned to Bahr Al-Ghazal, and Nimeiri’s discrete leasing of Kafia 
Kingi to the Chevron oil company in the late 1970s, then outright transference of the 
area back to Darfur in 1980, was an early violation of the agreement.147 Nimeiri also 
kept the proceeds from licensing the Bentiu oil fields, even though the AAA specified 
that the southern regional government was tasked with legislating where such revenue 
went. By the 1980s, Nimeiri was demonstrating at least as much disdain for the 
integrity of Sudan’s regional borders as any regime which had preceded him since 
independence.149
145 Tellnes, “The Unexpected Deal,” 41.
146 Seymour, “The Oil-Conflict Nexus in Sudan,” 8. Peter Russell and Storrs McCall. “Can Secession Be 
Justified? The Case of Southern Sudan.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem o f National Integration. Ed. Wai, 
Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 111. Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 200.
147 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
of the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Chapter II, Article 3iii. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements 
Dishonoured, 239-240. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 48. Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes 
o f Sudan's Civil Wars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003, 44. Seymour, “The Oil-Conflict Nexus in 
Sudan,” 8. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 78-79. Bona Malwal. The Sudan: A 
Second Challenge to Nationhood. New York: Thorton Books, 1985, 32. Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and 
Water in Sudan,” 223. R.K. Badal. “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan.” African Affairs 75:301 
(1976), 144. In December 1980, a regional government bill included a map redrawing the boundaries to include 
Kafia Kingi and Hofrat en-Nahas in Bahr Al-Ghazal, as well as Bentiu, in which oil had been discovered two 
years earlier.
148 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 48. Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to 
Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces o f the Democratic Republic o f the Sudan, Chapter 
IV, Article 1 lxiv. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 15. Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil 
and Water in Sudan,” 223. The ire of southerners was raised further in 1981, when the White Nile Petroleum 
Company was established by Chevron and the Sudanese national government, but without any southern 
representation.
149 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 127. Federalism was another tool by which to redraw 
borders to disenfranchise the south. In 1993, Ali Al-Hajj, Minister of Federal Government Affairs, altered the 
borders again, giving the new state of South Kordofan control over Bentiu and nearby areas, and returning the 
Hufrat an-Nahas region to Darfur, along with thousands of acres of farmland. Such techniques have allowed
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Under the Bashir regime, land can be allocated to affiliates of the regime without any 
process at all, as was the case in the early-1990s when Khartoum granted land to 
Osama Bin Laden and other radical Islamists.150 The NIF has also used the prospect 
of granting West African immigrants, who have no prescribed Sudanese land of their 
own, land in use by communities which do not cooperate with the government. The 
rewarding of West Africans with land has also made them a loyal constituency of 
Khartoum.151 It is impossible to tell how much land the Bashir regime has 
confiscated, particularly in regions such as Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile and 
Northern Upper Nile, since the dearth of records on land registration makes it vague. 
In addition, some allocations have not been disclosed or put on the record to begin 
with. The land registration process is still an unknown system to most rural 
Sudanese. It requires literacy and familiarity with government institutions, personal
1 C l
contacts with government officials and, occasionally, bribery.1 J The NIF has been 
able to pay off local administrators under the reinstated Native Administration 
system, dismissing those which are uncooperative with Khartoum’s imperatives.154
The porousness of regional boundaries has also caused tensions which each 
agreement has had to address. After the abolition of Native Administration in 1971, 
commercial farmers moved in to northern farmland areas which had previously been 
administered by local authorities. These agricultural monopolies were better able to 
defend their land, forcing pastoralists to bring their herds to the lands of smaller, local 
farmers who could not afford to defend their land with guards. This caused much 
tension and conflict in areas such as South Kordofan.15' These new schemes were 
dominantly rain-fed farms which could be established quickly and cheaply and
Khartoum to reward its most loyal and effective militias in these areas, and are an especially pronounced 
demonstration o f the patronage system in Sudan.
150 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 7.
151 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 9, 10. Rewarding these West 
Africans, many of whom have traditionally been guest workers for generations, with citizenship has been ‘one of 
the few progressive acts by the NIF government’.
152 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 10.
153 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 6.
154 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 4.
155 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 4, 5. In the south, following 
the AAA, the roles o f chiefs were not rescinded as elsewhere in Sudan, meaning that administration by traditional 
authorities was effectively not abolished after 1971.
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expanded without authorization, often resulting in environmental degradation.156 
Between 1968 and 1986, the area of Sudan under mechanized farming more than 
quadrupled. They contributed to the 1984-1985 famine. While state-owned schemes 
were no longer expanded after the fall of the Nimeiri regime, their place was taken by 
private schemes well into the 1990s, many of which ‘either were not registered, or 
expanded beyond their registered boundaries. These farms were effectively beyond 
the reach of law and regulation.’ The reallocation of land has been a major
1 SRmotivation for rural communities joining anti-government insurgencies.
The contested border area of Abyei also complicates the CPA in terms of both 
security and natural resources. The protocol set up wealth sharing provisions for 
revenue from oil extracted from the area that were separate from arrangements in the 
south and the rest of the north. It became clear that during the interim period, most 
oil produced in the north of Sudan would come from the Abyei area, making it 
critical to the survival of the NCP government.159 The national government was to 
receive 50% of revenue from Abyei, the Government of Southern Sudan 42%, and 
the local people and states, 8% total.160
The debate over the status of Abyei shared characteristics with that of the south as a 
whole. The SPLM/A first argued that Abyei should be transferred to the south by 
presidential decree. When the government refused to do this, the SPLM/A suggested 
a referendum, similar to but separate from that to be held in the south regarding self- 
determination at the end of the interim period.161 Though the negotiations took place 
concurrent with the other Naivasha protocols, Khartoum would not discuss the 
interim status of the disputed areas under the auspices of IGAD. It would allow
156 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 6. By contrast, the traditional 
irrigation required more investment, but was more reliable and led to less environmental degradation.
I?7 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 7.
178 Rahhal and Salam, “Land Rights, Natural Resources Tenure and Land Reform,” 10.
159 International Crisis Group. “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock.” 12 October 2007, 1. Most of the oil 
produced in the north in 2005 came from Abyei.
160 The Resolution o f the Abyei Conflict, 2004, sections 1.2.3 and 3.1. ICG, “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei 
Deadlock,” 9. ICG speculates that the increase in oil production over the interim period may mean Abyei’s 
dwindling oil reserves are less hotly disputed by 2011. However, the pipeline infrastructure that has been set up in 
Abyei will ensure its importance in the years to come. ICG speculates more money might eventually be made 
from transit fees than from oil production within Abyei. Block 1 and Block 5a, where the Thar Jath field came 
online in August 2006, are both reliant on the Government of National Unity Oil Pipeline across Abyei.
161 Nantulya “The Machakos Protocol and Prospects for Peace in Sudan,” 13.
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1 A 9Sumbeiywo to represent Kenya, but not the regional body. ~ This condition was a 
continuation of Khartoum’s desire to negotiate with insurgents in remote areas 
separately. Sumbeiywo asserts that Khartoum prevented him from including other 
parties in the CPA, instead inviting him to come to the separate peace negotiations in 
Darfur and the East if he wished.16 . It was also more evidence that Khartoum sought 
to cast the SPLA as an exclusively southern fighting force, with no legitimate claims 
to areas outside that region.
In Abyei, as in the south generally, the problems of oil merely built upon the pre­
existing problems of identity. Resources alone cannot explain the significance of this 
area to understanding Sudanese conflict. Abyei remained a contentious issue in the 
years following the AAA, even before oil was a subject of dispute.164 In the 1972 
agreement, there was a subsection which allowed for areas of Sudan outside the 
Southern Region that were ‘culturally and geographically’ part of the south to be 
included in the region after a referendum on the motion, but no such referendums 
were ever held.165 This section was inserted by Francis Deng, a member of the Ngok 
Dinka people living in Abyei, in a meeting with the SSLM delegation in London, 
before their trip to Addis Ababa in late 1971. It was not a reference to Abyei alone, 
but the Southern Blue Nile, Chali Al-Fil, the Nuba Mountains and any other border 
area which wished to have a referendum. Nimeiri opted not to implement this 
provision of the AAA, and no one in the High Executive Council, the only body 
which could legally protest under the AAA, was interested in strongly challenging the
162 Sumbeiywo, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 24. Nicholas Fink Haysom. “Reflecting on the IGAD Peace 
Process.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan ’s Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 
2006, 30.
163 Sumbeiywo, “The Mediator’s Perspective,” 27.
164 ICG, “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock,” 9. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f  the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, 132.
165 Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
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Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 15.
decision.166 This situation was yet another example of the provincialism which
• 1 A 7defined southern administration after the establishment of the Southern Region.
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Redrawing the borders of states and provinces to manipulate natural resources has 
been a constant theme in the history of independent Sudan, but nowhere more so than 
Abyei in the years leading up to the CPA. Khartoum created the Heglig locality in 
2000 and Sitep locality in 2005, essentially removing oil areas from Abyei province 
proper. SPLM officials charge Khartoum with moving Heglig oil field, the second 
largest in Sudan, from the Pariyan district in the Upper Nile to Kordofan in December 
of 2004, just before the CPA was signed.169 This action denied a large source of 
income for the southern government, debilitating its effectiveness from the very start. 
Under the CPA, the issue was deferred to a boundary commission that would make 
its recommendation in mid-2005, in the wake of both Ngok Dinka and Misseriya 
leaders declaring they would fight if the new borders were not favorable to each 
respective group.170
The government sought to assert northern dominance over the Abyei areas wherever 
possible in the negotiations. They also demanded that mediators come from the 
regions being negotiated. Their subsequent presentation of a Misseriya Arab as a 
negotiator drew objections. The Misseriya visited Abyei seasonally, and the 
SPLM/A refused to accept that they had the status of ‘residents’. During the 
January 2007 celebrations in Juba marking the second anniversary of the signing of 
the CPA, Bashir claimed that the experts in the commission on Abyei’s borders had 
exceeded their mandate, and did not produce a map describing the Ngok Dinka area
166 Johnson, interview.
167 Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 317. Lagu blames Aber, HEC president after 
the AAA, for failing to raise the issues of contested areas such as Abyei and Hufra el-Nahas as stipulated in the 
agreement. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 539. By 1980, southerners were 
complaining about the constant delay of Abyei’s right to a referendum over its status.
168 ICG, “Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock,” 5.
169 International Crisis Group. “A New Sudan Action Plan,” 26 April 2005, 4. HRW, “The Impact of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on Southern Sudan,” 12. ICG, 
“Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock,” 7. ICG claims to have a copy of the order transferring Heglig signed by 
Nafie Ali Nafie, a senior NCP official. Johnson, interview. Johnson notes that because of the way the borders 
have been drawn in South Kordofan, the Nuba have become essentially ‘a permanent minority’.
170 Resolution o f the Abyei Conflict, 2004, section 5. ICG, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain 
Peace,” 14. Stiansen, “GOS Revenue, Oil and the Cost of the Civil War,” 24.
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transferred in 1905 to Kordofan, instead producing a map showing the 1965
settlement. Because they did not produce the 1905 map, Khartoum claimed the
commission had forfeited the right to decide the issue. In his speech at the January
2007 event, Kiir reiterated the SPLM position that the south would only accept the
position of that commission.172 Luka Biong Deng believes that the debate over the
Abyei commission was meant simply to delay the implementation of that protocol,
and its agreement on the extraction of oil in that region, noting that it is estimated that
1
Abyei produces 65% of oil in the north. The fact that the Abyei compromise was 
seen as so unsatisfactory by both parties’ local constituents there explains why it was 
the only text of the CPA ‘for which neither side claims any ownership.’174
DEVELOPMENT AND THE PATRONAGE STATE
National development in Sudan has followed the same riverine-oriented patterns as 
other economic and political activities, and was not drastically changed by the AAA. 
As the initial goals of the British in Sudan were not primarily economic but strategic, 
only selective, government-dominated development was to be stressed in the 
Sudanese territory under the Condominium. Such planning enhanced the center- 
periphery pattern of development and the disparity of economic and political 
integration of the outer regions with the riverine north. The earliest infrastructure 
projects entailed building a modem port on the Red Sea and a few railroads so Sudan 
was more easily accessible to trade.175 While the railroad was able to eventually reach 
deep into Kordofan by 1911, railway construction in the south was still too 
technically challenging and economically unfeasible. Economic development 
projects which enhanced the centralized nature of the state, such as the Gezira 
agricultural scheme and the White Nile pump schemes of the 1930s, were 
encouraged.177 Remote areas of the west and south, on the other hand, were generally
172 Luka Biong Deng. “The Sudan CPA: A Framework for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Transformation of 
Sudan.” Address to the US Congressional Subcommittee on Africa and Global Health. 24 January 2007.
173 Deng, “The Sudan CPA.”
174 Stiansen, “GOS Revenue, Oil and the Cost of the Civil War,” 24.
|7r- John Voll and Sarah Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State. Boulder, Colorado: 
Westview Press, 1985, 96-97. A major project in the first decade after conquest was the construction of a modem 
port, Port Sudan, to replace the aging port of Suakin. It was completed by 1909.
176 P.M. Holt. A Modern History o f the Sudan. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1961, 121.
177 Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers; London: L. 
Crook Academic Pub, 1990, 54. Benaiah Yongo-Bure. “The underdevelopment of the Southern Sudan since
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neglected. Southern Sudan not only had little development, it was not even 
economically incorporated with the rest of the state. The effects of southern isolation 
were apparent only a few years after the formal 1930 implementation of the Southern 
Policy. As the decade progressed, British officials finally started becoming 
concerned about the stagnation of region, with Governor General Sir Stuart Symes 
writing in 1936 that Uganda was 25 years ahead of the south.1 8 ‘Southern Policy’, 
with its technique of fostering purely local institutions, was creating a stationary
1 *70
condition that was ‘a negation of our trusteeship’. The early independent Sudanese
state generally was unable to promote development throughout the countryside,
instead building on the economic structure inherited from the British, who left only a
few small development projects in the south. Despite rhetoric advocating laissez
faire capitalism for the region, economic projects during the Condominium were
directed by the state, yet pursued neither the goal of developing any industry in the
south nor of tying the region economically to the rest of the Sudan.180 This trend was
not rectified with independence, but exacerbated. From the late 1950s until 1972,
there was almost no economic development in the south. The Abboud regime
relocated projects that were to be built in the south northwards to accommodate
1 81northern power centers.
While the AAA recognized that natural resources might be an issue of contention, it 
did not adequately address the problem. One article allows the Regional Assembly 
control of legislation over mines and quarries in the south, so long as such laws do 
not conflict with the rights of the national government. The constitution of the 
regime, however, declared that such resources were property of the state, which
independence.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British 
Academic Press, 1993, 52.
178 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 49.
179 G.N. Sanderson. “The Ghost of Adam Smith: Ideology, Bureaucracy, and the Frustration of Economic 
Development in the Sudan, 1934-1940.” Modernization in the Sudan. Ed. M.W. Daly. New York: Lilian Barber 
Press, Inc, 1985, 107. Symes conjectured that southern development would have to be selective and be confined 
to productive ‘pockets’. The sheer cost of development meant there would have to be some static areas in which a 
‘care and maintenance’ policy would be enacted, whereby administrative costs were kept austere.
180 Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 11. Sanderson, “The Ghost of Adam Smith,” 
Modernization in the Sudan. Ed. M.W. Daly. New York: Lilian Barber Press, Inc, 1985, 107-108, 115.
181 Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 11. Most significant were the northern 
relocation of a sugar factory originally located near Mongalla and a paper factory originally built in Malakal.
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1 87would control how they were extracted. This reality means that the conditional 
autonomy of the region over its natural resources was a fiction. The 1972 agreement 
may not have been consciously constructed to adapt to the neo-patrimonial system of 
Sudan, but it nevertheless adhered to its logic closely. The drafters of the agreement 
sought to give the south regional power, which it wanted, and ties to bind the region 
to the north, which the national government wanted. The resulting compromise was a 
form of dependent regionalism. The north provided most of the domestic funding 
and administration in the south as the southern economy, devastated by years of war,
i
was incapable of propping itself up. The AAA -  at least its financing -  had been
based on the constant reality of southern poverty, as had been the initial decision by 
the British to keep Sudan united.184 Aber notes that during the AAA talks, some 
government delegates relied on the poverty of the south to keep the state united, 
despite rebel talk of secession. Southerners continued to rely after 1972 on Arab
1 OZ"
traders from the north to import goods, as little was manufactured in the region.1 
The institutions created by the AAA were heavily dependent on Khartoum 
financially, as a viable internal revenue base was never established, and developing 
the post-war southern economy had never been a priority of the state. Yongo-Bure, 
in his listing of several projects which were begun after the post-AAA peace but 
never completed, surmises that they had been initiated to politically placate 
southerners, without long-term investment or economic viability being a
lx" Addis Ababa Agreement: Draft Organic Law to Organize Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces 
of the Democratic Republic o f Sudan, Article 11 xiv. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, 48.
1X3 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 143. Euler, “Human Rights in Sudan,” 21. Church 
organizations, NGOs and the UN would also contribute, but the vast majority of funds raised for the south were 
allocated by Khartoum.
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in the Grass: Britain in the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983,
291.
185 Aber, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 102.
186 Mohammed Suliman. “Civil War in Sudan: The Impact of Ecological Degradation.” Environment and 
Conflicts Project (ENCOP) Occasional Paper No. 4. Center for Security Studies and Conflict Research, Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology. December, 1992, 4. Telephone interview by the author with Benaiah Yongo- 
Bure, Flint, 2009.
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consideration.188 Funds were to be transferred to the regional treasury for southern 
development projects, but few were forthcoming. The Southern Region received 
less than US$5 million from international aid for southern development, less than 
10% of what was expected.190
A month after the signing of the AAA, Nimeiri signed a law which allowed the 
regional government to collect taxes imposed on the south by the central government. 
However, income taxes were difficult to collect in the south, as were excise duties of 
goods coming into the south from the north.191 This only increased regional 
dependence on the north. For most of the inter-war period, development funding for 
the south was between a third and a fourth of what had been budgeted. Most funding 
came from foreign sources or from inflationary financing: extra money printed by the 
government.192 Khalid and Yongo-Bure write that, between 1972 and 1977, only 20%
188 Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 71-72. Yongo-Bure believes that ‘earmarking of 
funds for the reconstruction of the basic minimum transport, energy, and financial infrastructure, educational 
institutions and the establishment of building industries should have been basic prerequisites before a peace 
agreement could be signed’. Without agricultural development in the region, there could be no viable 
industrialization projects. Sharif, interview. Wakoson, “The politics of Southern self-government 1972-1983,”
44. Ali, Matthews and Spears, “Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan (1972-1983) and Angola (1991-1998),” 289. 
Such projects included a beer brewery in Wau, sugar-refining projects in Mongalla and Melut, a nee scheme and a 
hydroelectric power plant near Juba. Catherine Jendia. The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969-1985. New York:
Peter Lang, 144, 155. Jendia notes that, while banks were established in the south during the 1970s, the 
Islamization of the monetary system by the end of that decade impeded their use in the region. By 1984, the 
implementation of the Islamic banking system halted all development investment in the majority non-Muslim 
south.
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Goals.” Respect 4 (November 2006), 5. Deng charges that less than 20% of the money budgeted for the Southern 
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Sudan.” Post-Independence Sudan. Ed. C. Allen. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981, 137. Arou notes 
that in 1978-1979, the Southern Region was to be allocated 13.8 million Sudanese pounds, but only received 5.6 
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190 Ali, Matthews and Spears, “Failures in Peacebuilding: Sudan (1972-1983) and Angola (1991-1998),” 288. 
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of the development funds slotted for the south were actually delivered.193 Southern 
inefficiency and poverty disguised the neo-patrimonial nature of the AAA, but the 
production of oil revenues or any other path to financial independence had the 
potential to upset this dynamic. An example was when the south began benefiting 
from its geographic location when, by the early 1980s, the Equatorian border town of 
Yei became the second largest customs duty point in the whole of Sudan. At this 
point, the central government withdrew the right of the regional government to collect
i • 194this revenue.
The south was simply not seen as a viable entity economically, and the AAA was an 
early attempt to incorporate southern elites into the northern patronage system.195 
Force and aggressive development suited exclusively around the needs of the central 
state had been met with southern resistance during the early years of independence, 
so some sort of compromise had to be made with moderate insurgent leaders. The 
patronage state could not exist without creating significant amounts of disparity 
between those with the support of the government and those without it, since it 
becomes difficult for a government to provide economic incentives for its base and 
clients if it is easier for them to achieve economic success independently. By the late 
1970s and early 1980s, most development projects had been established in the central 
riverine areas, especially Khartoum and Gezira. Remote regions did not receive the 
benefits of inaccurate economic projections such as development funds, but did 
receive related disadvantages such as increasing inflation and chronic shortages of 
basic goods.196 Sidahmed reports that in the mid-1960s, a study found that nearly
193 Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 21 A. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 31. 
Funds meant for development were often diverted towards building up the southern public service and the new 
institutions of the semi-autonomous southern region.
194 Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 140. Luka Biong Deng. “The Sudan 
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75% of Sudan’s industrial plants were located in the Khartoum area. By the mid- 
1970s, another study observed that nearly all towns with an industrial base were still 
located in the central riverine area of Sudan.197 Development throughout the nation­
state after the AAA was focused on the regime’s immediate political goals. An 
environment was created surrounding the Gunaid sugar factory in which government 
bureaucrats patronized union leaders at the expense of unskilled laborers, whose vast 
number did not translate into political capital. The union leaders were usually 
affluent merchants who benefited more than the poor farmers as a result. This pattern 
continued throughout the late Nimeiri regime. Neither did the AAA abate the 
reality that from independence, northern administrators in the south typically did not 
collected rents in the region from their relatives and associates.199
Nimeiri’s accelerated devolution into patronage politics coincided with the failure of 
development projects in the mid-1970s, when the regime pushed for further reliance 
on wide-scale agricultural schemes to sustain the economy. As a result, 
mismanagement of several agricultural schemes throughout the 1970s and 1980s led 
to the disruption of the agrarian economy and mass displacement, trends which 
simply exacerbated the disparity of conditions upon which the patronage state 
relied.200 The decline of this vital economic sector led to a shrinking base of support 
for the regime, which meant Nimeiri increasingly needed to ensure the support of the
and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 36-38. Nimeiri’s about face on nationalization of 
industry led to new projects by Western companies such as Hilton, Texaco and Chevron, which began exploring 
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Contemporary Middle East, 92. The author blames the early nationalization period of the May Regime for 
overstretching ‘the administrative capabilities of an already inefficient civil service, and as a result a number of 
projects were ill-concieved, and poorly planned and executed.’ Consequently, they wasted the state’s few 
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military, even at the expense of the national economy. It also gave added incentive 
for Nimeiri to seek as much control over oil revenues as possible, which in turn put 
pressure on him to abrogate the AAA.
Early controversies in the planning of development of the oil regions discovered 
along the north-south border in 1978 contributed both to southern resentment of the 
national government for denying southern access to economic activity and to southern 
contempt for their regional government. The construction of a refinery, which would 
have led to both development and employment in the southern region, was instead to 
be built in the north.201 HEC president Abel Alier’s reluctant acceptance of this 
decision as in accordance with the AAA damaged the regional government’s 
legitimacy, thereby making it easier for Nimeiri to further defy that agreement.202 
Southern objections during this period were not to a claim of ownership of the oil, but 
to southern exclusion from opportunities for development, employment, and 
representation in the division of oil wealth. Southerners had been denied positions on 
the board of Sudan’s national White Nile Petroleum Company. Even the 
headquarters of Chevron, the company with concessions in the region, remained 
based in the northern city of Muglad, and away from the oil fields.204 Chevron would 
become involved directly in tribal conflict, allegedly attempting to regain control over 
its operations in 1988 by sponsoring a Baggara militia to protect the oil fields from 
southern insurgents.205
The end of Nimeiri’s regime may have halted the corruption directly tied to him, but 
did not end the erosion of agricultural resources nationwide. The resulting
201 Badal, “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan,” 148-149. Wakoson, “The politics of Southern 
self-government 1972-1983,” 45. Jendia, The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969-1985, 149-151. Kok, Governance 
and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 133. Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 78. 
Over the objections of many southern politicians, Nimeiri finally decided to go along with Chevron’s plan to 
move the refinery to Kosti in 1981, but that project was eventually abandoned in favor of a pipeline to the Red 
Sea.
202 Jendia, The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969-1985, 151. Badal, “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern 
Sudan,” 148-149. As HEC president, Aber could recommend the refinery be built in the southern region, but had 
no further recourse if his recommendation was rejected by the president, which it was.
203 Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 78-79. Badal, “The Rise and Fall of Separatism 
in Southern Sudan,” 150-151.
204 Badal, “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan,” 150-151. In another example of the 
provincialism which marked the south in the post-AAA period, the only part of the Southern Region which 
supported Alier in his decision was the Jonglei area of the Upper Nile, his home territory.
205 Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 224. Chevron withdrew only two years later, in the 
wake of the NIF-supported coup.
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desertification from the farming schemes pressured nomadic peoples in the provinces 
of Kordofan and Darfur to move further south in search of water, leading to even 
greater conflict along the north-south border, and creating a body of disaffected 
northern tribesman from whom Sadiq Al-Mahdi would form some early Popular 
Defence Force militiasf Southern agriculture languished, even more badly affected 
by mismanagement and neglect than that in the north. The Zande scheme was 
reactivated after the AAA, but by the early 1980s, farmers who had worked the 
scheme after the government promised them good wages were not receiving 
customers to buy their cotton. By 1978, the difficulties of increasing agricultural 
activities with so little financing for the region had been recognized, and cooperatives 
were set up to help minimize costs. Finances were not even available for these 
relatively cheap activities, however. Half-hearted attempts were made by the 
government to take advantage of the wildlife in the south, as national parks and game 
reserves were established, though not developed significantly.207
Poverty actually increases the effectiveness of the patronage system, stabilizing it 
‘since critics of regimes and even the politically passive had to consider whether they 
needed to find a place in these political networks to secure exemption from insecurity 
and want’.210 Aside from an adherence to the traditional Islamic tenet of charity, 
neither of the sectarian parties in power attempted to expand social services widely to 
more remote areas, or even to the urban poor in central areas. Nor has the Bashir 
regime sought to extend these services. The May Regime, in its early Arab socialist 
incarnation, did seek to change this dynamic, but was unable to popularize socialism
206 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 191. 0ystein H. Rolandsen. “Sudan: The Janjawiid and 
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in Sudan, and instead was forced to settle for creating a more inclusive patronage 
system involving southerners. The promise of southern oil wealth seemed to have the 
potential to change the center-periphery dynamic and disrupted the patronage system. 
As Alier writes, ‘remove poverty from the south and Sudan’s unity would be shaken, 
especially now that that other weapon, the army, was no longer effective after the 
AAA.’212 Ultimately, oil revenues did not change the patronage character of the 
Sudanese state, they only intensified it. The highly coordinated nature of oil 
production allows it to be easily consolidated into patronage networks, advancing 
hierarchical and centralized power in a way more easily transportable resources 
typically do not. As a result, southern rebels have never been able to take 
advantage of the resource-richness of their territory in the manner that insurgents 
have been able to in diamond-producing areas of West Africa, for example. The 
remoteness of southern Sudan and its poor infrastructure also precludes extensive 
trade of other resources the region contains in abundance, such as timber. “ u  Seymour 
suggests that the absence of easily marketable resources -  or of easy access to 
markets -  may actually have helped the SPLM/A stay ideologically coherent in its 
crucial formative years, and prevented Anya Nya 2 separatists from being able to 
fund their less organized -  though ideologically more popular -  militias.215 This 
theory also explains why economic determinist models cannot fully account for the 
nature of Sudanese conflict, or the priorities addressed within the peace agreements.
Like Nimeiri, the Bashir regime has sought to perpetuate its patronage system under 
the rubric of decentralized authority. While the former sought to advance regional
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autonomy in the early 1980s, the latter created a federal system in the 1990s in which 
power nevertheless came from the top down at a national level. Post-AAA, Nimeiri’s 
government was able to politically marginalize the south again by abolishing the 
Southern Region’s right to tax the extraction of natural resources in its territory. In 
such a way he was able to undercut the powers of the south while championing 
devolution on a national level. The NIF regime’s selective understanding of 
federalism follows a similar logic. Under its 1998 federalization system, oil revenue­
sharing did not extend to the state level, leaving states with a limited base for tax 
revenue. Both regimes relied on the details of financing and taxation to retain 
central power.
Both peace agreements are to be examined in the context of this neo-patrimonial 
machinery. The patronage economy, by subjugating commercial activity and civil 
society to political and military networks, allows the state to rely on means other than 
coercion to control or isolate various elements of opposition. These include buying 
off rival factions, or creating or subsidizing new ones.218 While Nimeiri was only able 
to oppress or accommodate the traditional northern sectarian factions, Bashir has 
been able to divide them and further manipulate them. His ultimate goal, the 
preservation of his regime, is the same as Nimeiri’s, but oil wealth has given him 
more options. Nimeiri was forced to turn to Islam to consolidate his regime’s power, 
but oil revenues allowed Bashir to turn away from Islam, at least the more
919revolutionary version espoused by Turabi, to consolidate his own regime’s power.
The early Bashir junta was dependent on a similar fragile coalition as the late Nimeiri 
regime: Islamists and certain elites in the commercial class and the military. After 
early consolidation of its rule, Bashir’s regime faced difficulty in expanding its base 
during the early 1990s, when wealth disparity and poverty increased in Sudan to
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unprecedented heights. As challenges to it continued to rise up in the marginalized 
areas of Sudan, the regime began to rely even more on the promise of oil revenues to 
secure loyalty. Similarly, it is widely understood that SPLM elites have initially 
been provided with relatively lavish trappings in Khartoum in a regime attempt to 
make them direct beneficiaries of the post-CPA power structure, and perhaps even to 
encourage pro-unity sentiments among some elites in advance of the 2011 
referendum.
DEVELOPMENT AND ETHNIC TENSION
The south’s isolation, and its development according to the whims of external forces, 
predates independent Sudan. However, under colonial rule there was a tendency to 
avoid development projects that, regardless of their wisdom, might have met with 
open hostility from the local people, as the colonial administration was too sparsely 
staffed to deal with significant uprisings. The British also were concerned that ‘the 
pockets of development’ which would form in the south, using the few resources 
available to the colonial administrators, would have social implications the authorities 
could not control. History would confirm these suspicions, as labor disputes and 
anxiety about the discrepancy between southern development and that of the rest of 
Sudan led to riots in the Zande area of Equatoria in July 1955, where a cotton- 
growing development project had been situated.“" Northerners were also being hired 
for the Zande scheme, an offense to southerners in the region, and more evidence that 
the first war started in part because of a lack of employment opportunities for 
southerners. The event was a harbinger of the more serious mutiny at Torit the next
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month which began the first civil war, but few lessons were learned by the new 
authorities about the pace of development in an independent Sudan.224
To the contrary, later governments would be even bolder about such projects after 
independence, as the need to unite Sudan as a state and undo the colonially-imposed 
‘grass curtain’ between north and south meant urgent development, with national 
interests taking priority over local ones. Development was a particular priority for 
Sudan’s authoritarian regimes. Ball observes that military governments often prefer 
to win support by concentrating on basic development projects such as road, rails, 
and communications, and Sudan’s vastness and minimal basic infrastructure 
consistently made it ideal for such policies. ' Much early development and 
infrastructure in the north was undertaken during the Abboud regime, which made up 
for its ideological inertia by setting ambitious top-down development benchmarks.226 
However, the poor security conditions of the south in both wars meant that almost all 
development brought to the region was designed solely to give the government an 
edge in the conflict. For example, Abboud’s primary contribution to southern 
development during his entire regime was a railway connecting Wau to the rest of the 
country’s infrastructure, better allowing military access to Bahr Al-Ghazal.227 
Similarly, projects during the Bashir regime such as the construction of a southern 
road to Malakal were framed as ‘peace through development’ but were designed 
primarily to aid central commercial and military access to the south. Economic 
disparity between north and south increased during the 1990s, and as it did, so did the 
popularity of the demand for self-determination within the SPLM/AU Alternately, 
the early nationalist incarnation of the May Regime showed signs of having broader 
developmental goals for the south, an impetus for a settlement with the south.
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Nimeiri’s early policy statement on the south indicated a push for southern 
development, though it would take years before the regime was able to moderate its 
ideological objectives enough to implement its goals. Nevertheless, Nimeiri’s 
statement indicated that the May Regime understood that it would be almost 
impossible for a state as poor as Sudan in the late 1960s to simultaneously wage war 
and seek development.230
As outlined previously, a critical failure of the AAA was that the development 
promised the southern region was not forthcoming. Juba remained without a water 
system, the only hospital dated from the colonial era. There was no electricity grid. 
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, the south exported next to nothing, despite the 
region’s fertility. After the AAA, even the Dinka chiefs, with their reputation as 
conservatives averse to new technology, strongly demanded development and 
education in their regions/ Southerners continued to leave the region for the north, 
but were pushed back or forced to live in slums surrounding the urban areas. The 
south’s historic isolation from economic development issues had a direct effect on the 
composition of the AAA. Lagu admits that the economic provisions of the AAA 
were the weakest, a result of only one member of the SSLM negotiating team -  
Lawrence Wol Wol -  having any background in economics. Lagu notes that 
government negotiator Jaafar Bakheit noticed this and tried to assist the southern 
team in negotiating arrangements, but was dissuaded from it by others in the 
government delegation.233 The inability of peace in the south to be an incentive for 
the government to encourage widespread development there meant that the only 
projects given any significant attention were those of interest to the north: the Jonglei 
canal and the oil regions.
As the underpinnings of the May Regime began to unravel, along with Sudan’s 
economic prosperity, Nimeiri became increasingly adept at the divide-and-rule 
politics upon which a patronage state must be sustained. He pioneered the technique
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of using natural resources to divide southerners along tribal or sub-regional lines, a 
practice later emulated by the Bashir regime. In his quest to weaken the Southern 
Region and thereby exploit the oil reserves found in that area, in 1980, Nimeiri told 
Equatorian elites that if they supported division of the south, they would receive oil 
revenues from the central government.234 Equatorians felt excluded from the Dinka- 
dominated regional government, and turned instead to the National President and his 
Equatorian ally, Joseph Lagu, to share the profits.
A lack of consensual development and an inability to share resources led to the 
erosion of the foundation of the AAA in the south by the early 1980s. Slow 
development led to ethnic jealousy among the varied peoples of the region, 
sometimes provoked by a cynical national government. Until 1977, when a six year 
plan for the south was finally devised, annual budgets for the region were not 
coordinated with each other and, accordingly, lacked focus and direction.^ ' The 
failure of the government’s national development projects, and the need for financial 
stringency to pay back creditors and appease the IMF led Khartoum to hold back on 
development funds to peripheral regions which were not vital to its immediate 
stability, such as Darfur and the south. Competition among the regions, and various 
areas of the south, for development funds, damaged national and regional unity. The 
effect was exacerbated when funds which were expected to finance the High 
Executive Council in the south, the most vital institution established by the AAA, 
were not transferred from Khartoum.239 In the AAA’s later years, Nimeiri’s
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unwillingness to expand his patronage system in the south was ultimately 
counterproductive. Yongo-Bure speculates that if southerners had received any 
benefits at all from the oil revenues, they might have been more amenable to Chevron 
and Khartoum’s division of the profits.240
THE JONGLEI CANAL PROJECT
The mentality of hostility by southerners towards Khartoum’s perceived theft of 
southern resources predated large discoveries of oil in the south and was not brought 
to an end by the AAA. The Jonglei Canal Project was a long-existing plan to increase 
the flow of Nile water to the north, bypassing the network of swamps in south Sudan 
in which water is lost to evaporation.241 The extra water could help increase 
agriculture in northern Sudan and Egypt, but would change the ecology of some areas 
of the south. The debate over the canal throughout both wars typifies the southern 
concern over resource exploitation by the central government.
The idea of a canal to be established in southern Sudan was initially instigated in the 
first decade of the twentieth century. While it was never fully implemented under the 
Condominium, the project retained the interest of both Egypt and Sudan after the 
latter’s independence. By the mid-1950s, Cairo and Khartoum had begun to 
coordinate their efforts to increase the yield of the Nile, and established a Permanent 
Joint Technical Commission to study how a canal could achieve this in southern 
Sudan. However, from the time of the Torit mutiny onwards, most of the few 
development projects planned for the south had to be delayed or cancelled. 
Construction of the Jonglei canal to route Nile water from the southern swamps also 
had to be postponed for the duration of the war.242
While the southern insurgency and subsequent civil war prevented the canal project, 
it was revived immediately following the AAA.243 A June 1974 report submitted by
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the commission to the two states recommended the digging of the canal from Jonglei 
to Malakal. This analysis, which neglected to take into consideration the impact that 
the canal would have on the local economy, led to great southern opposition to the 
project.244 Events surrounding the engineering of the canal in the 1970s struck at the 
heart of southern insecurity with regards to the north: rumors arose soon after that the 
agricultural land recovered by the draining of the swamp would be made available to 
two to three million Egyptians, who would migrate to southern Sudan.245 Others were 
suspicious of the need for a canal, when more water could be supplied to the north via 
the Blue Nile flowing from the Ethiopian highlands, or further up the White Nile at 
Juba and Nimule.246
In addition to rumor and speculation, neglect on the part of the government also 
increased southern suspicions. The development projects which Khartoum had 
assured southerners would be built to compliment the canal were never completed.“47 
While economic conditions improved in the area around the canal zone from 1977- 
1983, it was as incidental as the later infrastructure built up around the Bentiu oil 
fields by 2000.248 To allay southern concerns, development projects targeted around 
the canal zone were to be implemented beginning in the mid-1970s. However, by 
1985 most of the canal had already been excavated and even the initial studies for 
these projects had not been finished.249 The abatement of southern opposition seems 
to have been a rationale for the creation of the Executive Organ for Development 
Projects in the Jonglei Area, which oversaw the region’s development. Commitments 
were made to projects such as reforestation, infrastructure, schools, cattle-raising and
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the replacement of seasonal northern workers with a permanent staff of 
southerners. However, few of these development projects had been implemented 
by the time the second war started in 1983, and all were abandoned soon thereafter. 
Projects which were scheduled to be embarked upon in conjunction with the digging
9S 1of the canal were later revised to begin after canal’s completion.
It was the re-orienting of plans around the canal area to the disparagement of local 
peoples that provided the greatest impetus to renewed violence in the south. The 
expected bridges which were to cross the canal were not built and flood embankments 
alongside the canal were built too low, resulting in the drowning of livestock and 
other animals in the region. The canal also created artificial flooding on its east 
bank, preventing water from reaching the villages it had in the past. A plan to build 
an additional smaller canal that had been promised to allow more irrigation of crops 
in this area was discarded by the time digging began on the Jonglei Canal in 1978.253
As a result, the Jonglei canal ensured minor southern resistance started only two years 
after the AAA was signed.254 The Jonglei project continued to be a source of 
contention in the second war. The SPLM/A listed its construction, without regard for 
the long-term interests of the surrounding peoples, as one of its primary grievances 
against the May Regime. John Garang had obtained his doctorate in agricultural 
economics in the study of the canal, and argued that it was too sensitive a project to 
leave its planning to Khartoum. After the SPLA took over the construction area in 
early 1984, they vowed not to destroy the expensive equipment being used to build 
the canal. Garang declared that his movement was not against its construction per 
say, but the insensitive way it was being achieved."'
"50 Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 177-181.
251 Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 205.
252 Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 205.
Yongo-Bure, The Economic Development o f Southern Sudan, 181, 182.
254 Alex De Waal. “Some comments on the militias in contemporary Sudan.” Civil War in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, 
M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993, 151. Gwado-Ayoker, “Interpreting 
the South,” 159.
255 Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan ’s Civil Wars, 64.
2:>6 Robert O. Collins. “The Big Ditch: The Jonglei Canal Scheme.” Modernization in the Sudan. Ed. M.W.
Daly. New York: Lilian Barber Press, Inc, 1985, 145. Goldsmith, Abura and Switzer, “Oil and Water in Sudan,” 
205.
2:<1 John Garang. John Garang Speaks. Ed. Khalid, Mansour. London: Kegan Paul International, 1987, 122.
290
SUDAN, THE COLLIER HOEFFLER MODEL AND RENTIER THEORY
The preceding history provides the contours around which to examine how economic 
theory relates to Sudanese conflict resolution. The Collier-Hoeffler model asserts 
that economic opportunism is at the heart of most rebellions, whether financed by 
looted resources or a relatively wealthy diaspora. The model posits that rebel 
grievances may be legitimate or imagined, but it is economic incentive that leads to 
armed rebellion.“ This theory argues that natural resources allow rebel groups to 
finance their insurgency, and also provide motivation to capture resources 
permanently if the insurgency is successful. The latter reason in particular is 
attractive to secessionists. Collier and Hoeffler therefore ‘suggest a more realistic 
characterization of secessionist movements is that their sense of political identity is 
typically a recent contrivance designed to support perceived economic advantage, if 
the secession is successful, and facilitated by a popular ignorance.’ They posit that 
secessionists create their own political communities once it is broadly realized that 
secession will create economic advantage for the region. Their analysis leads them 
to conclude that ‘civil war is better understood in terms of opportunity than in terms 
of motive. ' 262 Their analysis is a more fully developed version of the economic 
determinist argument which hypothesizes that elites of each warring faction see 
economic opportunity in conflict and this leads them to cloak these objectives in the
96Trhetoric of identity and secession.“
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This critique of the Collier-Hoeffler model as it applies to Sudan is of their 
theoretical findings, not their methodology, which may be applicable in certain other 
cases of separatist warfare. However, their understanding of the economic basis for 
war in Sudan contains several errors. In a 2002 essay, the authors touch briefly on 
the Sudanese case, conflating the impetus of both wars, ignoring the initial unitary 
objectives of the SPLM/A, and erroneously citing the discovery of large oil deposits 
in southern Sudan as occurring during the late 1960s rather than the mid-1970s.264 In 
citing examples which run counter to their theory -  separatist movements located in 
regions which are poorer than the state they which to secede from -  the only instance 
they list is Slovakia.265 This analysis neglects the reality that in the first war, the south 
was indeed considered poorer than Sudan at large as oil fields would not be 
discovered until 19 7 8.266
The second insurgency had an economic component in the form of natural resources, 
but nevertheless also fails to fit the Collier-Hoeffler framework. There is no 
significant military or economic support from the southern Sudanese diaspora, as the 
framework contends is often a factor of continuing civil war.267 The south is rich with 
oil, but has fewer resources the SPLA could rely on commercially while hostilities 
continued, or that were lucrative enough to provide an incentive for the movement to 
continue hostilities for their own sake. This is not to deny that there was an
264 Collier and Hoeffler, “The Political Economy of Secession,” 20. The paragraph concerning Sudan reads as 
follows: ‘Another long-standing secessionist movement is that of the Southern Sudan. The populations of the 
Southern Sudan do not have a common identity -  indeed, there has been civil war within the region as well as 
between it and Northern Sudan. In the late 1960s, substantial oil fields were discovered in Southern Sudan. Until 
very recently these could not be exploited because of war, but they may have provided these disparate populations 
some sense of political commonality.’
265 Collier and Hoeffler, “The Political Economy of Secession,” 23.
266 Jennifer C. Leary. “Talisman’s Sudanese Oil Investment: The Historical Context Surrounding Its Entry, 
Departure, and Controversial Tenure.” Duke University. Durham, North Carolina, 18. Berghof Foundation for 
Peace Support. “Sudan: Conflict Analysis and Options for Systemic Conflict Transformation,” 60.
267 Paul Collier. “Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and Their Implications for Policy.” Turbulent Peace: The 
Challenges of Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. 
Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 161. Yongo-Bure, interview. The diaspora in both 
wars eventually became heavily involved in drawing international attention to the insurgency’s message, but never 
provided significant funding or arms to the insurgents. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 153. The 
experience of the southern diaspora during the first war actually directly contradicts the Collier-Hoeffler 
conclusions. In August 1971, SSLM representatives in Europe, Mading de Garang and Lawrence Wol Wol, 
visited Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire in an attempt to assess the opinions of southern Sudanese in exile 
concerning potential negotiations with the May Regime. While federation was seen as preferable to the offer of 
regional autonomy, the general consensus among southern expatriates was that talks should be held.
268 Seymour, “The Oil-Conflict Nexus in Sudan,” 19. Seymour speculates that the lack of lucrative, easily 
transferable resources in the south (aside from modest gold deposits and timber) may have helped the ideological 
coherence of the SPLA for several years, the schism only developing once Khartoum hinted at allowing outright
292
economic incentive to the SPLA rebellion, but to note such an incentive does not 
necessarily indicate that rebellion is predatory: there may simply be no other stable 
economic activity by which to make a living. As Garang wrote in the early years of 
the SPLA, the continued marginalization of the south from economic activity, along 
with heavy-handed military approaches at restoring order, meant that ‘the marginal 
cost of rebellion in the south became very small, zero or negative: that is, in the 
south, it pays to rebel.’“ Southern rebellion in both wars was fuelled not by rebel 
economic opportunism but -  in part -  by anger over regional economic 
marginalization, and especially over the way any development considered in the 
region has often been implemented without regards to its welfare. The development 
surrounding the Jonglei canal serve as another significant indicator that conflict in the 
south was a result of southern dissatisfaction with the northern visualization of 
regional development and was motivated more by a desire to protect southern 
livelihood and identity rather than to horde resource wealth.
The Collier-Hoeffler economic theory of civil war does not adequately account for 
the issues of identity in Sudan’s civil wars. The majority of southerners have taken 
arms against the government not to defend subterranean resources local to their area, 
but to defend their local security and ultimately their interpretation of identity and 
culture. The marginal role national resources have played in sparking conflict in the 
south can be observed best by examining the ostensible objectives of each 
insurgency. In the first war, southern Sudan was isolated, marginalized and poor, yet 
its rebel movement opted for secession from the state. In the second war, southern 
Sudan was found to reside above significant oil deposits, and yet the primary 
insurgent group adhered doggedly to the goal of a ‘New Sudan’ -  which entailed a 
national revolution in which southerners would likely come under pressure to share 
their wealth with other remote areas of Sudan. The SPLM/A even clung to a 
modulated version of this goal after facing an internal rebellion over the matter in
secession. That development would have allowed access to oil resources in the Nuer areas, where the separatists 
of SPLA-United would prominently derive from.
269 Garang, John Garang Speaks, 21. Young, “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace,” 109. 
ICG, “The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace,” 7-8. Theft of livestock is a predatory activity 
SPLA soldiers have engaged in sporadically, but it is a tactic practiced by both sides to weaken the enemy, not a 
primary objective of war.
270 Hamid, “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy,” 127.
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1991, and in the face of strong, consistent evidence that the large majority of 
southerners wish to secede from Sudan. The fact that the southern Sudanese 
identity is even weaker among the insurgency in the second, resource-fuelled war 
than it was in the earlier war where resources played a smaller role seems to directly 
refute the Collier-Hoeffler hypothesis that the economic advantage derived from 
natural resources allows insurgents to imagine a shared identity.
In fact, it is interesting that economic incentive seemed to affect nearly all the actors 
in the first war except the Anya Nya. During that conflict, many southerners 
expected that the Obote government in Uganda would support their cause, 
considering not only the African-Arab schism of the conflict, but also the ethnic ties 
shared by certain Equatorian and northern Ugandans peoples. Instead, Obote spent 
most of his regime in the late 1960s and early 1970s coordinating with Khartoum to 
suppress the Anya Nya presence in Uganda. On the other hand, Obote did support 
Congolese rebels, likely because those rebels had access to resources such as gold 
and ivory through which they could buy support. While it is asserted that Khartoum 
may actually have channelled funds through its embassy in Kampala to bribe 
members of the Obote government to oppose Uganda’s aiding the Anya Nya, the
979Anya Nya themselves lacked access to such resources.
The search for an economic foundation to the first Sudanese insurgency began in the 
1970s. There was an economic and class incentive for separatism in the south: 
separatists were commonly the partially educated, semi-skilled southerners who 
comprised an ‘intermediary position’ linking the towns to the countryside. They 
were predominantly concerned about unemployment. ‘Southern artisans, mechanics 
and bricklayers had always prided themselves... on competence and efficiency in
271 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 41. O’Ballance, Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956-99, 
29,31. Abel Alier. “The Southern Sudan Question.” The Southern Sudan: The Problem of National Integration. 
Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank Cass, 1973, 22. Johnson, The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars, 84.
Abdel Salam M. Sidahmed, Politics and Islam in Contemporary Sudan. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1996, 160. 
"The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward." African Security Analysis Programme. 
Occasional Paper 86, March 2004, 11. Interview by the author with Cherry Leonardi, Durham, 2007. Interview 
by the author with Alex Donato, Canberra, 2009. Johnson, interview. Lobban, interview. Yongo-Bure, 2009, 
interview. Claire Metelits. “Reformed Rebels? Democratization, Global Norms and the Sudan People’s 
Liberation Army.” Africa Today 51:1 (Fall 2004), 72. Stiansen, “GOS Revenue, Oil and the Cost of the Civil 
War,” 24.
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their respective trades. The fact that they always had to have a Northern foreman of 
no better qualifications or experience, other than fluency in Arabic, naturally aroused 
resentment and suspicion; the practice was viewed as part of the government’s secret 
plan to dominate the south.’ This conclusion that the causes of the first war were 
more related to southern employment opportunities and ethnic insecurity is a more 
nuanced and realistic assessment than the Collier-Hoeffler premise that southern 
ethnic identity was fabricated out of whole cloth.
While the SPLA’s insurgency does not seem to adhere closely to Collier-Hoeffler’s 
theory, the SSDF and other southern militias, particularly in the Nuer area, appear to 
follow the model to some degree. Under John Garang’s vision of national revolution, 
it was rebels in the Bentiu area, Nuer in particular, who would be forced to concede 
that their oil deposits were national resources, thereby providing them with economic 
incentive to declare their own separatist war. Their claims to marginalization within 
the SPLA, in addition to their objectively minority status within the movement, are 
considerations which faintly resemble the Collier-Hoeffler theory of rebellion against 
the state.274 The similarities are misleading, however. The SPLM/A has never 
functioned as a state in the south in that it had the capacity to overtax oil-rich areas.2/5 
Furthermore, the separatist SSDF has also compromised with the government over 
access to southern natural resources, as in April 1996 when separatist leaders Reik 
Machar and Kerubino Kuonyin signed a Political Charter in Khartoum allowing oil 
fields, copper mines and gum arabic plantations to be transferred from the south to 
the north.276 This arrangement is hardly the act of a predatory separatist group 
interested primarily in direct revenue.
Tensions between the SPLA and rival militias are instead a mixture of tribal 
animosity, personal grudges, and the strains which arise over competition for
273 R.K. Badal. “The Rise and Fall of Separatism in Southern Sudan.” African Affairs 75:301 (1976), 470-471.
274 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. “Resource Rents, Governance and Conflict.” Journal o f Conflict Resolution 
49:625 (2005), 630. Collier and Hoeffler find that ‘if oil is present, a rebellion is almost certain to be 
secessionist.’ they recommend following this theory to the subnational level, which is the only level at which it 
corresponds to Sudan.
275 Donato, interview. The SPLA lacked the legitimacy or capacity to tax areas that they administer. Instead, 
individual soldiers would rely on periodic looting of areas under their control.
276 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 164. Roger Dean. “Rethinking the civil war in Sudan.” 
Civil Wars 3:1 (March 2000), 80.
295
traditional resources during a time of war. The most contested resource in the various 
militia wars of the 1990s and 2000s was not oil, but cattle. As war displaces cattle- 
herding people in particular, they are forced to migrate to areas where they compete 
for land with farmers and especially other pastoralists.277 As oil revenues simply 
exacerbated the wealth disparity already in existence, so they exacerbated pre­
existing ethnic tensions as well. The economic rationale for separatism is not in itself 
an adequate explanation of the history of hostility between north and south Sudan.
A theory that might explain the lack of profiteering and looting by the SPLA is that 
such insurgencies are not a result of easily transportable resources, but as Herbst 
theorizes in regard to African insurgencies generally, of weak states. Herbst 
submits that insurgencies which face a strong state must provide some ideological 
motivation, while those which do not, and have access to outside funding or 
resources, may rely less on mobilizing politics and more on profit motive to recruit 
soldiers. Even when Khartoum was at its weakest, the SPLA never faced the kind of 
weak state in Sudan that was seen in civil insurrection in places such as the 
Democratic Republic of Congo in the 1990s. While Khartoum lacked the ability to 
consistently project its power in most areas of the south, its ability to retain key towns 
such as Juba made it a constant presence in the region. In addition, the very length of 
the wars contributed to the ability of resistance leadership to provide some type of 
coherent ideology that defines what the struggle is for. In the first war, this ideology 
was only seriously being introduced right before the war’s end. In the second war, 
John Garang’s ‘New Sudan’ ideology was a constant platform, originating at the birth 
of the SPLM/A.
Theories of a ‘resource curse’ leading to separatist warfare seem of limited usefulness 
in sub-Saharan Africa generally, since there are at least as many cases of stable states 
producing resource rents. In fact, there have historically been few separatist wars in
277 Jendia, The Sudanese Civil Conflict: 1969-1985, 163. Yongo-Bure, interview. The Dinka, Nuer, and Murle 
have been well-represented in most southern militias during the 2000s, and all are pastoralists.
278 Jeffrey Herbst. States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 231-232.
279 Stefan Lindemann. “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter? A Research Framework for Understanding the 
Causes of Civil War in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Development Studies Institute. London School of Economics and 
Political Science. Discussion Paper 15 (February 2008), 7. Lindemann notes that some of the poorest states in
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sub-Saharan Africa, even in resource rich states. Instead, conflict and resources are 
more directly tied to the political environment. Whether the state turns to patronage 
or oppression depends on variables other than simply resource wealth. Instead, 
‘resource curse’ theorists often neglect to look at the broader political environment of 
states with abundant natural resources.
Reliance on natural resources is typically identified with rentierism among states, a 
concept which has been examined in detail by scholars of Arab societies in particular. 
It is useful to address how this theory relates to Sudanese society, particularly 
regarding the CPA, the only one of the two agreements to conclude a war in which 
resources were a significant element of contention. It has been proposed that Sudan 
is a classic rentier state ‘whose reliance on natural resources and external actors in 
national revenue generation fosters elite driven politics and weak state-society 
relations.’ 1 The qualifications for what determine a rentier state have accumulated 
in studies made over the last several decades. Rentier states are defined as those with
989an economy that relies on regularly received and significant external rents. 
Specifically, Luciani classifies a rentier state as one ‘whose revenue derives
98Tpredominantly (more than 40%) from oil or other foreign sources’.
By this metric, Sudan does not and has never qualified as a rentier state. Oil 
production saw an unprecedented increase during the period surrounding the 
Naivasha peace process, with revenues doubling between 2002 and 2003, and doing 
so again between 2003 and 2005. However, Sudan never neared the levels of oil 
production to qualify by Luciani’s standards as a classic rentier state. From the years 
2004 to 2008, when oil production in Sudan was at its height, it nevertheless only
Africa such as Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Burkina Faso have avoided conflict and instability, apparently 
contradicting the predation model.
280 Lindemann, “Do Inclusive Elite Bargains Matter?” 11-12.
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comprised between 10% and 14% of the GDP.285 Nor was this low percentage 
complimented by other petroleum-related areas of industry. The entire industrial 
sector, which consists of petroleum, manufacturing, electricity, water, building and 
construction, only constituted 27.8% of the GDP in 20 0 5.286 By 2008, industry in its 
entirety composed almost 35% of Sudan’s GDP.287
A more likely theory is that Sudan was not a rentier state at the time of the CPA, but 
sought to be one. This could only occur with a substantive peace agreement in the 
south. ‘The Sudan case shows that capital-intensive, non-lootable natural resources 
can provide an opportunity for peace processes because their commercialization 
depends on a certain level of security.’ This is more in keeping with a theory that 
non-lootable, highly profitable resources such as oil can be conduits to peace because 
they require foreign investment and a certain level of security for their extraction. 
Any tendencies which Sudan shares with rentier states can instead be explained by 
the neo-patrimonial structure of the state, which is only enhanced by rent-seeking.290 
Neo-patrimonialism exists in many non-rentier countries. Sudan, for most of its 
history, has been too large and too poor to be a functioning rentier state, but not too 
large to accommodate an exclusivist patronage system.291 This distribution of scarce 
resources accounts in part for the failure of nationalist projects in the country, as well 
as the failure to integrate remote regions. Patronage politics have been pervasive in 
several areas which contribute to persistent conflict. Sudan’s underdevelopment, for 
example, is due in part to the need of successive regimes to divert resources to short­
term benefactors in order to supply basic necessities and retain power.292
385 International Monetary Fund. Country Report No. 08/174. June 2008, 17.
286 “Sudan Economic and Strategic Outlook,” 1.
287 Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook.
288 Wennman, “Wealth-Sharing Beyond 2011: Economic Issues in Sudan’s North-South Peace Process,” 8.
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292 Ahmed Hassan El Jack and Chris Leggett. “Industrial Relations and the Political Process”. Sudan Since 
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CHAPTER FIVE: INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE IN THE AGREEMENTS
This chapter will concentrate on identifying the role external forces had in resolving 
both civil wars, and in impeding earlier settlements of the conflict. Post-colonial 
Sudan’s evolving significance in the region and internationally is reflected in both the 
AAA and CPA. However, in neither instance did international involvement change 
the fundamental cause of the war: the dispute over the nature of Sudanese identity.
As with the discovery of natural resources, heavy international involvement has 
helped obscure this cause, particularly in the second war. Yet an examination of the 
multiple peace initiatives and forums put forth by international actors can better 
explain the evolving objectives of the two parties. For example, the competition in 
the late 1990s between the IGAD-mediated process and the Egyptian-Libyan Joint 
Initiative demonstrated the fragility of the NDA coalition, and the subsequent 
tendency for coalition partners to revert back to their regional interests under 
pressure.
The composition of post-colonial Sudan, with its diverse, often marginalized 
population and its weak central state, has been characterized as making the 
demarcation between domestic and foreign affairs somewhat ambiguous.1 Sudanese 
foreign policy has been marked by either an imposed semi-isolationism, as under the 
Abboud regime, or protracted tit-for-tat strategies of supporting dissidents in weak 
neighboring states, with those states supporting Sudanese insurgents in return. The 
ebb and flow of such later cycles in particular has left its impact on both wars and 
both peace treaties. The larger trajectory of Sudan’s foreign affairs, at least as they 
pertain to its civil wars, has been from early post-colonial suspicion of foreign 
intrusion towards acceptance of a certain level of international involvement in 
domestic matters. Most post-independence regimes, particularly the early ones, have 
placed a high priority on defending and enhancing the centralized state and finding 
Sudan’s place among Arab states. Nevertheless, early state reluctance to recognize 
international involvement within its borders did not negate the existence of that
1 Francis Mading Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan. Washington, Brookings Institute, 
1995, 348. John Howell. “Horn of Africa: Lessons from the Sudan Conflict”. International Affairs 54:3 (1978), 
436.
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involvement. To come to terms with such involvement meant Khartoum had to 
abandon the conceit that Sudan was fundamentally an extension of Arab-Islamic 
culture in an African setting. The state’s inability to promote this identity peacefully 
inside its borders invited foreign involvement.
Throughout the first war, the various parliamentary and military regimes sought to 
minimize the role of international actors in peacemaking -  as opposed to war-fighting 
-  precisely because the recently independent, yet unintegrated, state was so insecure 
in its identity. The resulting light emphasis on international involvement in 
mediation helped legitimize the AAA as a primarily Sudanese achievement. 
Khartoum’s accommodations to southern rebels under the AAA, and its subsequent 
retreat from earlier commitments to Arab unity, were forays into the creation of an 
identity unique to Sudan. It failed in part because of continuing internal and external 
pressures on Sudan to adhere to an Arab-lslamic identity, but primarily because the 
domestic institutions established by the agreement were eventually eroded of vitality. 
A weakness of the CPA is due to another extreme. Its institutions from the outset 
have heavy foreign influence and therefore compromised effectiveness without 
external pressure. This is especially true with regard to addressing the root of the 
conflict: the unintegrated nature of the Sudanese state.
The competing visions Sudanese have of national identity have led to an erosion of 
trust in the political system, with international organizations filling the breach. 
American conflict resolution expert Chester Crocker, in referring to the heavy 
international involvement in the CPA, stated that the IGAD process was not led 
domestically because history had shown that in Sudan, ‘peace does not implement 
itself. Weaker parties especially have sought international safeguards to take the 
place of indigenous institutions, but an international environment rarely exists to 
facilitate resolution of such a difficult conflict in such a geopolitically marginal state 
as Sudan. As a result regional organizations rather than broader international ones
" Deng, War o f Visions: Conflict o f Identities in the Sudan, 351. Former Prime Minister M.A. Maghoub 
epitomized the conservative nationalist philosophy when he declared that Sudanese identity should be ‘firmly 
based on Islam, Arabic culture and African soil.’
3 Chester A. Crocker. “Sudan: Building on Peace in the South.” Chatham House in partnership with Good 
Government Group. London, 8 November 2006, 3.
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are sometimes the first multilateral bodies to become involved in conflict resolution 
in such states. In the Sudan, IGAD deviated from its initial mission of combating 
scarce water resources in 1994 to providing a forum for the war. Even with this 
forum, resolution of the conflict stalled until the new century, when the international 
focus on terrorism in the period leading up to the Naivasha process gave added 
backing to the regional institution. This new focus was complimented by the internal 
and regional environment generally, both of which had grown more conducive to 
settling the dispute than they were throughout the 1990s.
In conflict resolution, it is recognized that ‘the biggest potential liability (yet source 
of possible leverage) in managing a spoiler are member states that are patrons of the 
spoiler.’4 In the first war, Nimeiri’s reconciliation with Uganda and Ethiopia, states 
formerly amicable to Anya Nya insurgents, was instrumental in bringing about the 
AAA. To coordinate several international parties early, it is important to 
‘institutionalize’ them in the peace.5 IGAD’s composition of regional states, and their 
ability to coordinate with wealthy and powerful Western states such as the US and the 
UK, makes this theory relevant to Sudanese conflict resolution. States such as the US 
had ties to Egypt, which was helpful in assuring Sudan’s neighbor was amenable to 
the peace process.
Khartoum has always been wary about outside interference in resolving its civil wars, 
attempting to isolate rebels as much as possible in the first war to avoid 
internationalizing the issue. As this became increasingly impossible in both the 
second war and peace process, the Bashir regime sought to manipulate outside actors 
by turning them against each other, searching for new venues of mediation, locating 
powerful strategic allies such as China, and relying on its rights as a sovereign state to 
defend itself against foreign involvement primarily as a last resort. Khartoum by 
2002 was in a better position to engage the outside world than it had been 30 years 
earlier, as it has had much more experience since that time in dealing with outside 
actors via international aid and oil companies. This history gave the Bashir regime a
4 Stephen John Stedman. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security 22:2 (Autumn 1997), 16.
5 Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” 51.
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confidence about its ability to control foreign intrusion which the Nimeiri regime did 
not enjoy in the post-colonial environment of the pre-AAA period.
PRE-AAA REGIONAL TENSIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA
The maxim that civil wars usually occur in otherwise unstable regions is applicable to 
the Horn of Africa, where peace treaties have generally been unsustainable if 
concluded without the support of neighboring states.6 7Consequently, in both wars, 
Sudan has been forced to pair successful peace agreements with a broader mending of 
relations with other states, whether in the service of regional security or international 
support. Sudan’s porous borders with several other states ensures that peace could 
not be made in a vacuum but instead must be accompanied by an adjustment of 
bilateral relations with several states, either before or after the conclusion of the 
agreements themselves. Both peace treaties were actually the apexes of a series of 
foreign policy shifts by Khartoum in the early 1970s and early 2000s.
Sudan’s nationalist urge to assert Arab-Islamic credentials in the 1960s strained 
relations with its most important non-Arab neighbor, Ethiopia. Sudan’s relations 
with Ethiopia began to sharply decline after 1962, the year Addis Ababa rescinded 
Eritrean autonomy, creating a secessionist movement there supported by many Arab 
states. Khartoum needed support from other Arab states to aid its economy, but it 
was under pressure from its African neighbors to reject secessionist movements. The 
transitional government after the October Revolution was keen to assert its solidarity 
with Arab states by supporting the Eritreans, thereby provoking Ethiopia to allow 
Anya Nya to operate out of bases on its territory as early as January 1965.8
6 Stephen John Stedman. “International Implementation of Peace Agreements in Civil Wars: Findings from a 
Study of Sixteen Cases.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, 
Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 
742.
7 Richard P. Stevens. “The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s Afro-Arab Policy.” The Journal of 
Modern African Studies 14:2 (June 1976), 258.
* Mohammed Beshir Hamid. “Aspects of Sudanese Foreign Policy: ‘Splendid Isolation’, Radicalisation and 
‘Finlandisation’.” Sudan Since Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo 
and Peter Woodward. Dorset: Gower Publishing, 1986, 166. Robert O. Collins, Shadows in the Grass: Britain in 
the Southern Sudan, 1918-1956. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 1983, 405.
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In stark contrast to Bashir’s confidence in his ability to manipulate international 
actors in the second war, Nimeiri viewed the unavoidable internationalization of 
Sudan’s first internal conflict as a strong incentive to end it with a negotiated 
solution. By 1971, both Khartoum and Addis Ababa had reason to look to each other 
to end their respective civil wars, which were moving beyond regional affairs as they 
gained international interest: Anya Nya from the Israelis and Eritrean secessionists 
from Arab states, respectively.9 Nimeiri realized that improving relations with 
Ethiopia would be the key to pressuring the Anya Nya. In addition to its hope to 
resolve the Eritrean problem, a key motivation for conservative, Christian Ethiopia to 
respond positively to Nimeiri’s gestures was to avoid being surrounded by hostile, 
socialist-oriented governments in Muslim states.10 The March 1971 rapprochement 
between Ethiopia and Sudan was therefore a crucial precedent for what would 
become the AAA.* 11
The meeting between Nimeiri and Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie seemed to 
confirm a new cooperation between the two leaders regarding security. Sources of 
arms and ammunition flowing into the Upper Nile Province from Ethiopia, which the 
rebels had relied on, began to dry up. In the agreement, the two states also 
committed to increasing trade and communication through land and water routes and, 
most importantly, to settling all outstanding border disputes. Aside from using it as 
a stage to reaffirm cordial relations between the two states, Addis Ababa now became 
a feasible venue for secret negotiations between parties in the lead-up to the AAA. 
Since Addis Ababa was the site of the Organization of African Unity and the UN 
Economic Commission for Africa, and thus a hub of traffic for officials from all over 
the continent, travel there by Sudanese government officials or southern politicians 
with ties to the Anya Nya would raise no suspicion.14
9 Howell, “Horn of Africa,” 432. Telephone interview by the author with Peter Woodward, Reading, 2007.
10 Stevens, “The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s Afro-Arab Policy,” 259. A leftist regime had also 
come to power in Somalia in 1969.
11 Stevens, “The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s Afro-Arab Policy,” 259. Alexis Heraclides. 
“Janus or Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan.” Journal o f Modern African Studies 25:2 (1987), 221.
12 Howell, “Horn of Africa,” 433.
13 Cecil Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972. London: David & Charles, 1974, 143.
14 Abel Alier. The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured. Exeter, Devon, UK: Ithaca Press, 1991, 
79.
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Nimeiri also realized Sudan would need to work more closely with Uganda to control 
the insurgents, who straddled the border between the two states. In January 1971, 
Ugandan army chief-of-staff Idi Amin staged a coup against President Milton Obote. 
Amin had maintained close personal ties to leaders in Lagu’s Madi tribe in Equatoria, 
and had been channelling Israeli aid to the Anya Nya for months before the coup}5 
When Obote escaped to southern Sudan and began planning attacks to destabilize the 
Ugandan junta from there, Amin realized he would have to end support for the Anya 
Nya if he wanted Sudan to expel the former president.16 As a result, Amin also 
became conducive to a negotiated settlement in the south, even offering Uganda as a 
venue for negotiations.17 In this regard, the AAA served Khartoum well to realigning 
the region towards Sudan’s anti-Israeli interests. In April 1972, only a month after
1 o
the AAA, Amin cut off relations with Israel and expelled all Israelis from Uganda.
FOREIGN SUPPORT AND THE EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY IN THE 
FIRST WAR
The role of self-sufficiency in ideologically-motivated insurgencies can be a difficult 
one to reconcile with the practical demands of guerrilla warfare. Heavy reliance on 
outside forces can serve to delegitimize a movement as being a pawn in the service of 
a foreign power, or it can demonstrate the respect a movement commands
15 Woodward, interview. Interview by the author with Douglas Johnson, Oxford, 16 December 2007. Douglas H. 
Johnson and Gerard Prunier. “The Foundation and Expansion of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” Civil War 
in The Sudan. Eds. Daly, M.W. and Ahmad Alawad Sikainga. London: British Academic Press, 1993, 119. 
Heraclides, “Janus or Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan,” 224. Amin’s ties to Lagu would lead him 
initially to openly support the SSLM leader, declaring Khartoum’s war effort ‘barbarous’ and akin to South 
Africa’s apartheid policy. Joseph Lagu. Sudan: Ody’ssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope). Khartoum: 
M.O.B. Center for Sudanese Studies, 2006, 217, 219. Lagu notes that with Amin’s ascension to the presidency in 
Uganda, the Israelis could stop the expensive airlifts running to southern Sudan out of Uganda in favor of land 
transfers of weapons until Amin turned away from the Israelis several months later.
16 Peter Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, Boulder, Colorado: L. Rienner Publishers; London: L. 
Crook Academic Pub, 1990, 142. Heraclides, “Janus or Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan,” 221. El 
Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 125-126.
17 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 143.
18 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 143. Woodward, interview. Nelson Kasfir. “Sudan’s Addis 
Ababa Treaty: Intraorganizational Factors in the Politics of Compromise.” Post-Independence Sudan. Ed. C. 
Allen. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981, 148. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To 
Hope), 219-220. Amin had apparently been attempting to form an alliance with Sudan in 1971 to secure his own 
rule, uniting the forces of both states against the Anya Nya rebels in Uganda and the Obote rebels in southern 
Sudan. Lagu notes that in a conversation to northern Sudanese General Mohammed el-Baghir Ahmed that the 
May Regime did not trust Amin enough to accept this offer, and instead continued to explore peace options with 
the Anya Nya. Hizkias Assefa. Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict. 
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987, 160. Amin and Nimeiri did, however, sign an agreeement in which 
Sudan would abandon support for Obote and Amin would halt Anya Nya access into Uganda.
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internationally.19 Prior to the supplies received or pilfered from outside sources, most 
early resistance after the August 1955 mutiny did not rise above the level of banditry 
in rural Equatoria.20 The Anya Nya at this time were what has been referred to as 
‘enclave formations’, groups which hide in the countryside and have neither a formal 
hierarchy nor a set of objectives but were instead ‘based on narratives of betrayal and
exile’. They were more than simply predatory groups, but lacked the organization or
22ideological foundation necessary to attract foreign support.
Initial foreign aid to insurgents in both wars was often simply a reaction to Khartoum, 
not borne out of any ideological allegiance to the rebels themselves. This is 
especially true in the first war, where the Anya Nya received aid either accidentally, 
as in its 1965 interception of weapons being sent to the Congo, or purposely, as when 
it began receiving airdrops from Israel. While Sudanese leaders had been persistent 
in framing the conflict as an attack on Arabs, during the early ideological period of 
the May Regime the conflict was also perceived as being a counter-revolutionary
19 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 139. The Anya Nya often vacillated over the role Israeli arms 
played in aiding their struggle. During the war, some leaders would deny reports of Israeli aid, despite evidence to 
the contrary, no doubt in part because it would compromise their image as an indomitable, indigenous fighting 
force. A.G.G. Gingyera-Pinycwa. “The Border Implications of the Sudan Civil War: Possibilities for 
Intervention” The Southern Sudan: The Problem of'National Integration. Ed. Wai, Dunstan M. London: Frank 
Cass, 1973, 128. Reports of Israeli aid also could be advantageous to a secessionist cause since internationalizing 
the conflict seemed an obvious step to take towards legitimizing an incipient southern state, even if such aid was 
seen by some as contrary to the pan-African, anti-colonialist ideal. Voll and Voll, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity 
in a Multicultural State, 125. On the other hand, heavy reliance on outside powers by «o«-separatist groups could 
lead to charges of inauthenticity and subversion from Khartoum, as when the early May Regime painted northern 
dissidents such as Sadiq Al-Mahdi as pawns of unfriendly states such as Libya.
20 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 95. Edgar O’Ballance. Sudan, Civil War and Terrorism, 1956- 
99. New York: St Martin’s Press, 2000, 18. The years from 1955 until the early 1960s were generally considered 
the ‘guerrilla survival’ period of the war. There was no way to replenish or maintain weapons and the group had 
no specific political aims. Guerrillas initially had about 200 rifles, but were relying primarily on spears and 
machetes. Mohamed Omer Beshir. The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace. London: C. Hurst &
Company, 1975, 51. In May 1956, the number of mutineers who had refused to surrender was estimated to be 
between 400 and 500, with a substantial amount of arms and ammunition. Douglas H. Johnson. “The Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism.” African Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher Clapham. 
Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998, 54. Johnson also considers the period from the end of 1955 into the early 1960s 
to be a ‘dormant insurgency’. Dunstan M. Wai. The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan. Teaneck, New Jersey: 
Holmes & Meier Publishers Inc, 1981, 136. Wai stresses the degree to which the early Anya Nya were 
unsupported by other governments: ‘those southerners who sought refuge in Uganda, Kenya and Zaire had to 
surrender their arms to the then colonial authorities in these states and their arms eventually were handed over to 
the Khartoum government’.
21 Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn. “African Guerrilla Politics: Raging Against the Machine?” African 
Guerrillas: Raging Against the Machine. Eds. Boas, Morten and Kevin C. Dunn. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne 
Rienner, 2007, 34.
22 Elias Nyamlel Wakoson. “The Southern Sudan: the Political Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement.” Post- 
Independence Sudan. Ed. C. Allen. Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981, 94. Wakoson makes a 
distinction between a ‘resistance’ movement and a ‘revolutionary’ movement, noting that the Anya Nya, which 
had few agreed upon political objectives until late in the war but served as a depot for frustrated, violent 
southerners. By contrast, the SPLA was a revolutionary movement which had a cause and a manifesto stating its 
objectives almost upon formation.
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movement supported by foreign imperialists, especially with perceived reactionary 
states such as Israel, Ethiopia, and Congo implicated.“ Israel was by far the dominant 
foreign supporter of southern resistance, though its full complicity with the SSLM is 
not known, in part because the files of the SSLM were destroyed following the AAA. 
However, soon after the Six-Day War of 1967, some Anya Nya insurgents began 
receiving small arms and other aid through periodic airdrops in Ethiopia.“4 Beginning 
in January 1971, Anya Nya would arrive in Israel for weapons, communications, 
management and medical training. Israel became the Anya Nya’s most valuable 
state ally, providing sufficient weapons to the rebels to sustain their attacks on the 
Sudanese army, but not enough to engage it in conventional warfare or to make any 
major territorial gains.“ There appears to have been no ideological reason for the 
Israelis to support Lagu over the several other political factions in the south during 
the late 1960s. Nevertheless, Lagu’s dominance in receiving Israeli aid helped him 
and the SSLM consolidate his control of the Anya Nya.
23 Woodward, interview. Mansour Khalid. The Government They Deserve. London: Kegan Paul International, 
1990, 268. Gabriel Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society. London: Frank Cass 
& Company, 1978, 158. Minister for Southern Affairs, Joseph Garang, would accuse the US, West Germany and 
the Catholic Church of ‘trying to create another Biafra’. Mohammed Beshir Hamid and John Howell. “Sudan and 
the Outside World, 1964-1968.” African Affairs 273 (October 1969), 302. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State 
(From Ruin To Hope), 152. Congo was a primary early Anya Nya ally up until the 1965 general election of 
Sudan. At that time, the ascent of Maghoub to the premiership was seen as a positive sign by the West in the 
context of Cold War politics. Congo, a Western client, accordingly began halting airdropped aid to Sudanese 
insurgents in southern Sudan, though it continued to host the insurgency.
24 Heraclides, “Janus or Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan,” 223. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a 
State (From Ruin To Hope), 202-203. Lagu confirms that he and Gordon Muortat initiated contact with the 
Israelis at their embassies in Kampala and Nairobi in the months following the Six-Day War of 1967. Lagu, 
Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 206-207. Lagu visited Israel in 1968, in order to futher 
coordinate efforts.
25 Robert O. Collins. “Civil Wars in the Sudan.” History Compass 5:6 (2007), 1782.
26 Woodward, interview. J. Bowyer Bell. “The Conciliation of Insurgency: The Sudanese Experience.” Military 
Affairs 39:3 (October 1975), 108-110. Collins, “Civil Wars in the Sudan,” 1783. By January 1971, the Anya Nya 
had captured the Pochalla station in Equatoria, and ‘a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and even 82 mm 
cannons. In the Bahr Al-Ghazal, Anya-Nya systematically mined the major roads to Wau, ambushed an armored 
column at Tead-Adhol, and ripped up the rails of the strategic railway line to Wau. This startling resurgence by 
the Anya Nya, now some 13,000 men, was not sufficient, however, to capture the heavily fortified towns in the 
South.’ Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 92-93. Beshir surmises it is possible that Israel had 
larger geopolitical considerations to its aid aside from merely occupying Arab troops so that they could not be 
used to fight Israel directly. West German mercenary Rolf Steiner was involved in the insurgency effort and 
surmised on his capture by Uganda that Israel wanted to avoid being outflanked by both the Arab states and the 
Soviets in the Red Sea. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 138. Israel’s sole concern was strategic: 
after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, more Sudanese troops occupied with insurgents in the south of their own country 
meant less to come to the aid of Egypt in the event of another war.
2 Peter Woodward. “Nationalism and Opposition in Sudan.” African Affairs 80:320 (1981), 382. Woodward, 
interview. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 138.
28 Heraclides, “Janus or Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan,” 223. Woodward, interview. William 
Reno. “Economies of war and their transformation: Sudan and the variable impact of natural resources on 
conflict.” Money Makes the War Go Round: Transforming the Economy o f War in the Southern Sudan. Maison 
International, Brussels, 12-13 June 2001, 22. Christopher R. Mitchell. “Conflict Resolution and Civil War: 
Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972.” Center for Conflict Analysis and Resolution. George Mason
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By 1971, Lagu’s consolidation of his control over Anya Nya forces led to more focus 
in both leadership and message. Isolating the Anya Nya from international attention 
for most of the war had been its lack of a consistent, reliable propaganda apparatus to 
disseminate its message internationally -  as the Biafrans had used in their separatist 
war against Nigeria, for example. For most of its duration, the conflict did not receive 
regular media coverage outside of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya and 
Uganda. However, by the time of the AAA, the SSLM had emissaries in London, 
Washington, Paris, Addis Ababa and Kampala.30 The London office of the SSLM 
was especially valuable, as it put the movement in contact with former Labour MP 
Sir Dingle Foot, who would later help the SSLM negotiating team during the drafting 
of the AAA.31
Outside assistance to the Anya Nya was never substantial enough to help the 
movement achieve its professed goal of secession. This was primarily because, while 
other states saw the rebel movement as a vessel through which to attack the Sudanese 
government, none of them supported its ultimate objective. Those external actors 
most committed to the secessionist cause of the Anya Nya were non-state actors:
'X'yfellow-travelling dissident exiles, for example. In addition, no African state viewed
University, Washington DC. August 1989, 14. Telephone interview by the author with Benaiah Yongo-Bure,
Flint, 2009. Douglas Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan ’s Civil Wars, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
2003,37. Charles Gurdon. Sudan at the Crossroads. Cambridgeshire: Menas Press Ltd, 1984, 20. Arop Madut- 
Arop. Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace: A Full Story o f the Founding and Development o f the SPLM/SPLA. 
Charleston, South Carolina: Booksurge, 2006, 7.
29 Gingyera-Pinycwa, “The Border Implications of the Sudan Civil War: Possibilities for Intervention,” 134.
Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 55. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 140.
30 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 99. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and 
Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 158. In addition, the London-published Anya Nya organ, The Grass Curtain, had 
an increasing circulation throughout Europe.
31 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 74. Khalid, The Government They Deserve, 
269. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 121, 133, 177. Foot, a 
former Solicitor General who had counciled African nationalists such as Kenyatta and Nkrumah during their 
battles against colonialism, was barred from sitting in the actual Addis Ababa negotiations based on objections 
from the Khartoum delegation.
32 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 91. Beshir implicates a series of non-govemmental 
organizations and individuals whom he charges with directing aid to the Anya Nya, or at least providing publicity 
for it, including missionary organizations such as the Verona Fathers. West German mercenary Rolf Steiner was 
involved in the insurgency effort and surmised on his capture by Uganda that Israel wanted to avoid being 
outflanked by both the Arab states and the Soviets in the Red Sea.
32 Woodward, “Nationalism and Opposition in Sudan,” 382. Woodward, interview.
32 Heraclides, “Janus or Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan,” 223. Woodward, interview. Reno, 
“Economies of war and their transformation,” 22. Mitchell, “Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on 
the Sudanese Settlement of 1972,” 14. Yongo-Bure, interview. Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan’s Civil Wars, 
37. Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, 20. Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 139.
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the war as a crusade: Christianity had not been a strong enough ideological force to 
compel Christian-led regimes to intervene on behalf of the Southern Sudanese, even 
in sub-Saharan Africa.
Even the still-potent ideology of African liberation did not mobilize the continent to 
the Anya Nya cause. No African state, especially not those in the region, would 
easily recognize a movement to create a Southern Sudan state. This became an even 
firmer rule after the experience of the Biafra secessionist movement in Nigeria, which 
overshadowed the Sudanese insurgency until its collapse in 1970, when it became a 
case study of the folly of secessionist wars.34 That conflict had split the OAU states, 
but those who had supported the doomed Biafran campaign were now chastened.35 
Even liberation-minded states such as Tanzania, which had supported the Biafrans, 
did not support southern Sudanese secession.36 Uganda, Ethiopia, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo were among the most sympathetic of all states to the Anya 
Nya by 1971, but none of them wished to encourage separatism in Africa. Ethiopia 
and the Congo were fighting their own secessionist rebels, while Kenya had concerns 
about separatist potential among ethnic Somalis in the north and Uganda did not wish 
to encourage small kingdoms like Buganda to seek self-determination.37
TRACK TWO DIPLOMACY AND THE AAA
Track one actors -  states -  can raise the profile of both war and peace efforts, 
internationalizing conflict in ways governments waging civil war often are cautious 
of doing, especially if those governments are strongly nationalist, as was the case
32 Gingyera-Pinycwa, “The Border Implications of the Sudan Civil War: Possibilities for Intervention,” 134. 
Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 55.
32 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 99. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and 
Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 158.
32 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 74. Assefa, Mediation o f  Civil Wars: 
Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 121, 133.
33 Gingyera-Pinycwa, “The Border Implications of the Sudan Civil War: Possibilities for Intervention,” 130.
34 Howell, “Horn of Africa,” 427. Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 137. Assefa, Mediation o f 
Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 161. The contrast between the Biafran struggle and 
that of southern Sudan forced the Anya Nya to attempt a more articulate version of its southern nationalist 
rhetoric, declaring that the struggle in Sudan differed from that in Nigeria as the southern Sudanese were not 
fighting to split an African country, but to protect African culture from the oppressive forces of Arabism and 
imperialism.
35 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 161.
36 Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan 's Civil Wars, 31. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 133.
37 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 71-72.
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• • i qwith regimes during the first war. At the end of the first war, negotiations relied on 
elements of multi-track diplomacy, in which the discretion and understanding of the 
problem of non-governmental organizations were backed by the resources of 
governments, both in the region and on an international level. The World Council of 
Churches/All Africa Council of Churches mediation efforts in the first war 
demonstrate the usefulness of a non-governmental body in establishing informal 
communications between warring parties and bringing them together without 
compromising the interests of the parties or formally obligating them to put those 
interests at risk in the future.
According to Dixon and Simmons,
‘track two can be broadly understood to mean unofficial, non-governmental 
interventions to prevent or resolve violent conflict. Such efforts can attempt to 
mediate conflict directly in the absence of official mediation, prepare the way for 
such official efforts or work alongside formal talks to improve the climate and 
contribute to a successful outcome to negotiations. The focus is on unofficial work in 
support of official diplomatic negotiations that address civil war, as distinct from 
other activities.’40
Track two mediators ideally are seen to be impartial, without agendas, and able to 
facilitate trust between parties. They can also provide a conduit for representatives 
from the full spectrum of society, giving an agreement wider legitimacy.41
An example of the difficulties of relying on a mediator that is not seen as neutral by 
both parties occurred in 1970. Due to the early leftist composition of the May 
Regime, it was not surprising that an international track two precursor to 
WCC/AACC involvement was that of the Movement for Colonial Freedom (MCF), a
38 Fen Osier Hampson. “Parent, Midwife, or Accidental Executioner? The Role of Third Parties in Ending 
Violent Conflict.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester 
A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 391. 
Crocker, Hampson and Aall 2003, 508.
39 Crocker, Hampson, Aall 1999, 30. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan 
Conflict, 184. Assefa notes the strange environment of the spirit of reconciliation, in which ‘the mediators were 
able to create this atmosphere perhaps because of the moral authority ascribed to them by their representing 
religious rather than political organizations, and because they were perceived as legitimate organizations to be 
concerned about reconciliation and compromise.’ Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  
The Sudan Conflict, 205. WCC mediator Leopoldo Niilus insists the moderators tried to take as invisible a role as 
possible, especially when it comes to credit for those who facilitated the agreement. They used terms such as ‘go- 
between’ rather than ‘mediator’.
40 Peter Dixon and Mark Simmons. “The Role of Track Two Initiatives.” Peace by Piece: Addressing Sudan ’s 
Conflicts. Accord 18 (2006). London: Conciliation Resources, 2006, 60.
41 Dixon and Simmons, “The Role of Track Two Initiatives,” 61.
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leftist British society not connected to government, though affiliated with several 
hundred British politicians, dominantly of the Labour Party. In 1970 it established 
contacts with both the May Regime and the SSLM’s representatives in London. 
However, southerners at this point did not trust the new regime, particularly while its 
peace overtures were being made during the May Regime’s early, Soviet-backed 
assaults on the Anya Nya.42 The middleman between the MCF and other leftist 
groups which could have proved potential mediators, was with Joseph Garang, and as 
the influence of his clique waned throughout the course of 1970, contact between the 
regime and such groups was suspended.43
The WCC/AACC role as a facilitator of the AAA was somewhat unexpected given 
the contentious nature of churches in the south versus Sudan’s early post­
independence regimes. Abboud’s expulsion of missionaries from the south, along 
with the regime’s push to Islamize the region, led to exiled southern leaders 
convincing international Christian organizations of religious persecution.44 Though 
exiled southerners were not able to translate this concern into high-profile political 
action, it was at least one form of international attention. Sudan was loath to rely on 
international or regional organizations to mediate the conflict, but the WCC/AACC 
was able to build up a level of trust with post-Abboud governments by staying 
politically neutral. The WCC/AACC had another advantage over other mediating 
bodies in that it had access to leaders across Africa, including in Sudan.45 When 
Sadiq Al-Mahdi became Prime Minister in 1966, he welcomed a large delegation of 
the AACC on their first visit to the country.46 This meeting did much to establish the 
organization’s credit with northerners and created some apprehension on the part of 
southerners, as the AACC was seen in the south as having accepted Khartoum’s
42 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 138-140.
43 Abu Baker El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement. Stockholm: Liber Tryck, 1980, 
93, 109-111.
44 Mohammed Beshir Hamid. “Devolution and National Integration in the Southern Sudan.” Sudan Since 
Independence. Eds. Abd Al-Rahim, Muddathir, Raphael Badal, Adlan Hardallo and Peter Woodward. Dorset, 
UK: Gower Publishing, 1986, 184. Telephone interview by the author with Richard Lobban, Providence, 2009.
45 Mitchell, “Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972,” 21. Assefa, 
Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 208. The WCC had several tiers it 
could call upon for negotiation, such as the regional group, the AACC. It could also use the national organization, 
the Sudan Council of Churches, and even turn to local churches if it needed to.
46 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 77. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the 
Sudan, 143.
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version of the war, and not having even attempted to make contact with insurgents.47 
The May Regime had less reason to be concerned about NGO freedom in the south, 
as the isolated nature of the first war meant that any NGO involvement there would 
generally pass through Khartoum, making it easier for the government to manage 
than it would become in the second war.
Khartoum’s willingness to work with the WCC/AACC highlights the importance of 
nationalist aspirations during this period, devoid of the inflexible political 
commitment to Islam which would define the late Nimeiri regime and the NIF 
regime. Importantly, the relationship between Sudan and the church organization was 
established under Sadiq Al-Mahdi, demonstrating the flexibility nationalist 
parliamentary leaders had when dealing with secular or non-Islamic religious 
institutions, so long these institutions had no direct connection to former colonial 
powers/0 It was significant that both AACC mediators were fellow Africans; Burgess 
Carr was Liberian and fellow mediator K. E. Ankrah was from Ghana. Sudan 
Council of Churches delegate Samuel Athi Bwogo, a participant in preparatory work 
for the negotiations, was from southern Sudan.49 In this sense, the WCC/AACC as it 
was represented was less an international church organization than a regional body, a 
prototype for the role IGAD would serve in the peace process resulting in the CPA, 
but without the direct involvement of other states that made the nationalists of the 
1970s uneasy. As yet another example of war eroding the integrity of national
47 Mitchell, “Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972,” 20. Johnson, 
interview. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 143. Assefa, Mediation o f  Civil Wars: Approaches and 
Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 110, 168. While the Anya Nya could be skeptical of the AACC, it had a very
-  The Sudan Conflict, 96, 166, 175. WCC 
mediator Leopoldo Niilus speculated that ‘the government and other forces in the country began to trust us as they 
became convinced that we had no personal stake in the matter, that we could not be linked with any outside 
colonial or neo-colonial manoeuvre’. Strengthening its credentials among nationalists was the WCC/AACC’s 
commitment to ensuring that Sudanese were the primary participants in the agreement. To this end, mediator K.E. 
Ankrah made a point to repeatedly warn the parties during the talks in late 1971 to question the motives of their 
foreign supporters of the war effort.
49 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 128-129. Assefa, Mediation o f  Civil Wars: Approaches 
and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 131, 170. Ankrah had worked for years in southern Sudan with refugees, as 
the WCC Refugee Secretary for Africa, and was greatly trusted by the SSLM delegation. Assefa, Mediation o f 
Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 171. Carr was adroit at taking advantage of African 
pride in the talks, stressing the African context of negotiations. He was expert at asserting his own authority this 
way, making it difficult for parties to turn him down when he made a suggestion. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil 
Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 173. Samuel Athi Bwongo, though a Sudanese, was not 
always trusted by the delegates. Northerners were suspicious of him because he was a southerner, while 
southerners were skeptical of him because he lived in the north.
good relationship with the WCC.
8 Assefa, Mediation o f  Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies
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institutions, during the second war the Sudan Council of Churches would split into 
two branches as the pressure of the conflict made a national council unsustainable.50
The international legitimacy bestowed on an insurgency coming into negotiations can 
also affect the conduct of those negotiations. During the AAA talks, the government 
delegation was happy with a casual approach to mediation, while the SSLM sought to 
formalize roles as much as possible. Carr believes that this was in order to gain the 
official recognition which had been denied them for so long by the government.51 The 
negotiators set up the agenda so that the most easily resolvable issues of contention 
would be tabled first.52 In addition, the team of Carr, Ankrah, Bwongo and Niilus was 
ideal because they could break down the delegations into smaller groups, detaching 
more specialized areas of governance and economics from the broader negotiations as 
needed.53 This way, mediation could enter into technical details while still 
maintaining some consistent element of mediation under the umbrella of the 
WCC/AACC.
In her analysis of track two diplomacy as discussed with American diplomats, 
Chataway concludes that ‘it will be important to maintain some distance between 
Tracks I and IT in order for each to be effective in contributing to conflict 
resolution.54 However, relations between the WCC/AACC and the official peace 
process became more successful as they grew closer. The church organization was, 
in fact, a track two body that officially entered the track one process of mediation.
The WCC/AACC began its involvement in the conflict resolution process by 
concentrating on the humanitarian dimension. It is possible that as early as December 
1970 the church organization had considered bringing the parties together, but the 
preparatory work done in Addis Ababa in January 1971 concerned humanitarian 
issues specifically. There were early hurdles to switching out of this realm into that 
of peace negotiations. Church organizations remained cool to the idea of basing with 
Khartoum to help facilitate a negotiated peace while the Minister for Southern Affairs
50 Kelleher, “A Small State’s Multiple-level Approach to Peace-making,” 301-302.
51 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 133.
52 Assefa, Mediation o f  Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 175.
53 Assefa, Mediation o f  Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 170.
54 Cynthia J. Chataway. “Track II Diplomacy from a Track I Perspective.” Negotiation Journal 14:3 (1998), 16.
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was the ardently anti-missionary communist leader Joseph Garang.55 The OAU’s 
principles o f ‘non-interference’ in the internal affairs of African states also inhibited 
the AACC from deviating from humanitarian issues.56
However, over the course of 1971, tentative steps were taken towards a mission 
change. In March 1971, the WCC/AACC delegation arrived at Kampala, meeting 
church groups there which were active in channelling money and humanitarian aid to 
the Anya Nya. These groups asked the WCC/AACC to concentrate more on 
mediation than on channelling aid to the south through Khartoum, as it had
cn
previously been attempting. WCC/AACC representatives had by then become 
convinced that the obstacle to peace was not religion but ‘a complexity of reasons -  
which might include religion, race, political, social and economic factors, combining
c  o
to create a political problem.’ In May, the delegation told government officials in 
Khartoum it would try to establish contact with Anya Nya leaders as a precursor to 
formal negotiations. By October, the southerners indicated they were receptive.59 In 
the interim, the coup attempt by leftist hardliners had resulted in Nimeiri’s eventual 
execution of communist Joseph Garang; his replacement as Minister of Southern 
Affairs by the more moderate Abel Alier might also have facilitated better 
communication with the church delegation.60 Alier had told the AACC delegation
55 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 56. Kasfir, “Sudan’s Addis Ababa Treaty: 
Intraorganizational Factors in the Politics of Compromise,” 147. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches 
and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 111-112, 114.
56 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 101. Heraclides, “Janus or 
Sisyphus? The Southern Problem of the Sudan,” 215. Jeffrey Herbst. States and Power in Africa: Comparative 
Lessons in Authority and Control. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000, 104. Organization o f 
African Unity Charter, Article II, Section lc, Article III, Sections 2 and 3. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: 
Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 116. So concerned were the WCC about violating this tenet that 
there was a dispute over facilitating the travel of SSLM figures to and from Europe in order to correspond with the 
insurgent hierarchy. Such moves were necessary to facilitate negotiations, but could be construed as a 
compromise of the organization’s neutrality.
57 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 103. Mitchell, “Conflict 
Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972,” 18.
58 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 81.
59 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 107, 110-111. Mitchell, 
“Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese Settlement of 1972,” 7.
60 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 63. Dunstan M. Wai. “The Sudan: Domestic 
Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimeiry.” African Affairs 78:312 (July 1979), 305. Johnson, interview. 
Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 114, 116-118. Alier was also 
the first southern minister to begin outlines for regional autonomy for the south, a goal for the region laid out in 
Nimeiri’s June 1969 declaration, but resisted by the former minister for the south, Joseph Garang. These plans 
were relayed in September 1971 to SSLM representative in London Mading de Garang via the WCC/AACC as an 
example of the government’s thoughts on what a regional autonomy proposal would consist of. Mom Kou Nhial 
Arou, “Devolution and the Southern Problem in the Sudan.” Post-Independence Sudan. Ed. C. Allen.
Edinburgh, University of Edinburgh, 1981, 131-132. The government delegation used the secret talks to lay out a
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that Khartoum was ready to conduct talks, but only on the basis of a unified Sudanese 
state. In stark contrast to the government’s practice in the second war of making 
peace with smaller militias in order to weaken the larger force of the SPLA, Alier 
demanded that the exiles Khartoum talked to must not represent splinter factions, but 
the bulk of Anya Nya fighters inside the south, so they would therefore abide by the 
final outcome of negotiations.61 The WCC/AACC also relayed a message from Alier 
and El-Baghir that the government and the SSLM should have a preliminary meeting, 
which they did in early November 1971.62
In keeping with Khartoum’s reluctance to allow external organizations to be 
represented in the negotiations, WCC/AACC delegate Burgess Carr was kept on as 
the primary ‘moderator’ for the talks, but served as an individual and not a 
representative of the church ‘or any other foreign entity’, with no power to force 
rulings on either side. However, foreign observation was useful to both parties in 
observing the formal conclusion of the Addis Ababa negotiations, as the agreement 
was witnessed and signed by Haile Selassie, and the WCC/AACC representatives.64 
The agreement also allowed a small amount of UN involvement in dealing with what 
was generally regarded as a field of its expertise; the coordination of efforts to 
repatriate refugees.65
program of regional autonomy which assured general amnesty for all insurgents, the participation of southerners 
in national and regional administration, even in sensitive areas of employment such as the army and police force. 
Arou notes that this was the first time during the war that Khartoum had approached the rebels with any plan for 
regional autonomy.
61 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 77.
62 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 121. Wai, The African-Arab 
Conflict in the Sudan, 154. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 15. Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too 
Many Agreements Dishonoured, 79. Mitchell, “Conflict Resolution and Civil War: Reflections on the Sudanese 
Settlement of 1972,” 22. The four church representatives at that meeting were called in twice to resolve 
deadlocks, including on the issue of whether talks should be conducted on the basis of a unified state.
63 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 98. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State 
(From Ruin To Hope), 252. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 
131, 148. Carr was also useful in his capacity as a moderator after the agreement had been concluded: it was he 
who convinced Lagu to dramatically come to Khartoum after the AAA signing, rather than return to the bush 
immediately to demobilize his troops.
64 Addis Ababa Agreement: Protocols on Interim Arrangements, Chapter IV, part II, article 6. Chapter IV, part I, 
Article 2. Addis Ababa Agreement: Agreement on the Ceasefire in the Southern Region, Article 6. The UN High 
Commmisioner for Refugees was also consulted on cease fire questions, as was the Red Cross and the 
WCC/AACC. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 157. It was thought by both parties initially that 
Haile Selassie was to chair the negotiations, but the emperor reasoned that if the final agreement produced 
significant autonomous status for southern Sudan, he might be put under pressure to emulate the example in 
Eritrea.
65 Addis Ababa Agreement: Protocols on Interim Arrangements, article 2.
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Foreign actors were not able to apply much pressure on the two parties in the Addis 
Ababa negotiations, but could curb their ambitions, as the following examples 
demonstrate. A major point of dispute about the AAA negotiations among some 
insurgents who were critical of it was that the agreement instituted regional 
autonomy, but not federation. Dingle Foot disputed the significance of this, noting 
that the SSLM delegation had achieved everything short of formal federation.66 Lagu 
masked his inability to concede the AAA as originally negotiated by stating that the 
original delegation did not sufficiently inform him about what concessions were 
being made on his behalf. However, Ethiopian intelligence head Nebiyelul Kifle, had 
access to the telex machines the insurgent delegation in Addis Ababa had used to 
confer with headquarters. When he produced several telexes on 27 February 1972 
contradicting Lagu’s story, the SSLM leader dropped his opposition to the signing of 
the treaty.67 On two occasions the WCC warned the Khartoum delegation that if the 
government did not end its anti-Anya Nya propaganda during the talks, and if it did
• • • • • /conot stop the December 1971 military offensive, the mediators would withdraw. As a 
result, Vice President Alier persuaded Foreign Minister Mansour Khalid to recall all 
Sudanese ambassadors to Khartoum to brief them on the state of negotiations and 
instruct them to cease anti-Anya Nya propaganda.69
NIMEIRI’S REVERSAL OF ALLIANCES
Sudan’s success with peace agreements in both cases followed or instigated a much 
larger shift of Khartoum’s ideological priorities. The 1967 Arab-Israeli war and its 
fallout made conditions ill-suited towards peace talks for the rest of the decade and 
precipitated Sudan’s reliance on Soviet patronage. After the 1967 war, the Soviets 
began providing what would amount to US$150 million in aid to Khartoum. The 
deal was consummated in January 1968, when a US$100 million agreement was 
reached between the states.71 However, it was not until the Nimeiri regime that Soviet
66 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 145.
67 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 146-147.
68 Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and Strategies -  The Sudan Conflict, 175.
69 Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 157.
70 Korwa G. Adar. “A State Under Siege: The Internationalisation of the Sudanese Civil War.” African Security 
Review 7.1 (1998). Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 135.
71 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 103. International Crisis Group. God, Oil and Country: 
Changing the Logic o f War in Sudan. 10 January 2002, 10.
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backing became most obvious, with Soviet military advisors entering Sudan in 
1970. “ Dependence on Moscow might have begun as an obvious alliance to the early 
leftist-oriented May Regime, but it eventually became an embarrassment. Much of 
the state’s high-grade cotton was chartered to Eastern Bloc states in return for 
support, and Khartoum was also dependent on Moscow for spare parts needed to 
maintain Soviet military equipment/ ' By conspicuously filling up technical posts on 
the rationale that there were not enough trained Sudanese to do so, Soviets earned 
disdain from some nationalists as exploiters of the Sudanese.74 The practice revived 
memories of the pre-Sudanization period of British rule during which Sudanese were 
similarly locked out of administrative positions.
Nimeiri’s promotion of socialism and dalliance with the Eastern Bloc ended after the 
failed coup attempt of 1971, and relations with the US would resume just months 
after the AAA. J While there is little doubt that the failed coup attempt against him 
instigated this shift, Nimeiri had other incentives to couple switching alignment to the 
West with ending the war. In addition to being a drain on Sudan’s financial 
resources, Western European states -  a major source of aid and development for 
Africa -  were hesitant to give assistance to Khartoum while hostilities in the south 
continued. A further economic incentive for the switch was that through its 
influence at the World Bank, the US could help Sudan finance the major agricultural
72 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 103-106. Soviets trained Sudanese pilots to bomb rebel targets 
in the south throughout early 1971. Lagu, Sudan: Odyssey Through a State (From Ruin To Hope), 221. Lagu 
notes that by 1970, Soviet military equipment such as T-55 tanks and Anatov aircraft was also being delivered to 
Khartoum. Wai, The African-Arab Conflict in the Sudan, 134-135. Wai gives details such as the fact that over 
1000 Soviet advisors served in Sudan, over 100 of these in the south. Tanks, howitzers, artillery, helicopters and 
their corresponding crews were all sent to Sudan from Moscow. Wai, “The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign 
Relations under Nimeiry,” 301. By 1970, there were 2000 Soviet and East European technical advisors stationed 
throughout Sudan.
73 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 32, 120. Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution ofDis-may, 299. 
Wai, “The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimeiry,” 300-301, 309. After the 1971 coup, 
Khartoum halted Soviet imports, accusing the Soviets of overcharging Sudan for goods and equipment such as 
tractors, while selling Sudanese cotton at discounts to traditional Sudanese customers.
74 Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, 26.
77 Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan ’s Civil Wars, 57. Lobban, interview.
76 Lobban, interview. Warburg, Islam, Nationalism and Communism in a Traditional Society, 133. While it 
cannot be proved that the communists knew about the coup in advance, they supported it after Colonel Hashim 
Al-Ata assumed power. Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 120-121. An early dignitary to 
recognize the new regime was Soviet Ambassador to Khartoum, Anatoly Nikolayev. Nikolayev’s move, which, 
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77 Beshir, The Southern Sudan: From Conflict to Peace, 130. Assefa, Mediation o f Civil Wars: Approaches and 
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projects the May Regime had planned for Sudan in the 1970s. In March 1972, 
Nimeiri declared that, since the Soviet Union was withholding replacement parts for 
Sudan’s weaponry after the execution of leading Sudanese communists in the wake of
7Q
the July 1971 coup attempt, Sudan would seek out other patrons.
From the outset, the May Regime sought to be viewed as a legitimate nationalist 
movement by other African states, even hosting a summit meeting in Khartoum of
or\
East and Central African states as early as January 1970. It was not until after the 
AAA, however, that Sudan fully established its reputation as a moderator in both
o 1
Arab and African spheres, as well as a Western ally. The warming of relations 
between Sudan and Ethiopia was also in line with Nimeiri’s shift to the Western 
Bloc. Imperial Ethiopia -  a conservative, non-Muslim state, was hostile to Arab
o n
socialism and a close ally to the US and Israel. Relations between Chad and Sudan 
were solidified after the AAA, when Khartoum ended its support for Frolinat, a 
Chadian Islamist insurgent group. Throughout Africa, Nimeiri would now recraft 
his image as that of a bold African peacemaker. Sudan’s often tense relations with 
more conservative Arab states were also thawing. By late 1971, relations between 
Khartoum and Riyadh were on the mend. The Saudis had been unhappy with 
Sudan’s ties to the Eastern Bloc states, and retaliated by staying on friendly terms
oc
with much of the northern opposition in exile. Nimeiri made his first official visit to 
Saudi Arabia in April 1972, immediately after the AAA, and two years later both
78 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 306, 312.
79 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 122-123. China had already begun petitioning to pull Sudan 
away from its Soviet rival, offering to make up for any reduction of trade and aid from the USSR and double 
Chinese trade.
80 Stevens, “The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s Afro-Arab Policy,” 253. The meeting was 
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83 Stevens, “The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s Afro-Arab Policy,” 254.
84 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 59-60. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, a famous 
advocate for African nationalism who had been suspicious of the May Regime before the AAA because of its 
ostensible Arab socialist character, felt that the peace agreement demonstrated Nimeiri was a genuinely African 
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states would agree to jointly explore the Red Sea’s mineral resources, ending a long 
dispute between them.86
On the other hand, the AAA was not greeted with great enthusiasm by more radical 
Arab states as it meant Sudan would never be able to fully commit to the eventual 
goal of an Arab federation. It became clear that a united Arab federation of states 
was not to be salvaged when Sudan began to pull away from the idea in mid-1971,87 
Cairo was dismayed with Khartoum’s new hesitancy concerning federation, and a 
pro-Egyptian Lebanese paper accused Sudan of moving ‘away from African unity’
o o
and now ‘preferring to work with reactionary African states and the West.’ The 
erosion of the exclusively Arab component of northern nationalism helped facilitate 
peace with the south and contributed to its cohesiveness during the early post-war 
years. Personal relations between Nimeiri and Muammar Qaddafi of Libya in 
particular would begin to deteriorate after the AAA. Their atrophy was not primarily 
because of the signing of that agreement specifically, but because of Nimeiri’s 
reorientation away from federation and toward the wealthy, conservative Arab states. 
Libya, like Egypt, had aided Nimeiri in fending off the 1971 coup attempt against
86 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 332. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, 120.
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Leadership of the Anya-Nya Movement,” 93. Stevens, “The 1972 Addis Ababa Agreement and the Sudan’s Afro- 
Arab Policy,” 254. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 166. ‘The abandonment of union... was a 
prerequisite of the Addis Ababa Agreement.’ Dunstan M. Wai. “Revolution, Rhetoric, and Reality in the Sudan.” 
The Journal o f Modern African Studies 17:1 (1979), 83-84. Wai notes that while the pan-Arabists in the May 
Regime had succeeded in securing Nimeiri’s commitment to joining a federation with Egypt and Libya in the 
summer of 1970, as the war in the south continued, that faction lost influence with Nimeiri. Oluwadare Aguda. 
“Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics.” The Journal o f Modern African Studies 11:2 (1973), 178. 
Sudan’s refraining from joining the Arab union also had internal repercussions, as many Sudanese, especially 
those aligned with the Khatmiyya sect, were more sympathetic to stronger ties with Egypt. Defense Minister and 
Army Commander-in-Chief Khalid Hassan Abbas resigned his post ‘for health reasons’, as did others. The end of 
the federation option with Egypt therefore provided further motivation for the Khatmiyya faction’s hostility to the 
May Regime. Aguda, “Arabism and Pan-Arabism in Sudanese Politics,” 186. Another reason it was difficult for 
northern Sudanese to federate with Egypt was the traditional moral superiority many northerners felt towards 
Egypt. This was felt most strongly in the Mahdiyya tradition, which held Egyptians as being more corrupted and 
compromised by Western influence than the Sudanese.
88 Eprile, War and Peace in the Sudan 1955-1972, 138. Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 170. 
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Southern Sudan,” 169. El Obeid, Political Consequences o f the Addis Ababa Agreement, 120. Wai, “The Sudan: 
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89him. Qaddafi took Nimeiri’s warming to reactionary states such as Saudi Arabia as 
an unnecessary insult after the rejection of federation.90 However, while Qaddafi 
found Khartoum’s need to appease its non-Arab minority distasteful, he did not 
denounce the AAA or actively seek to undermine it immediately.91
The fluid environment created by the period it took for Nimeiri’s regime to pivot 
towards the West was in itself conducive to the talks. In late 1971, during the 
preliminary talks in Addis Ababa, Alier warned SSLM leaders and other southern 
exiles that the conditions which had allowed the insurgency to continue throughout 
the 1960s would soon be less favorable: as Khartoum sought to improve relations 
with the West and its regional allies, it would ask in exchange that these states end 
even tacit support for southern insurgents. As foreign military assistance had helped 
consolidate and empower the Anya Nya, the movement became more heavily reliant 
on the external aid, especially for ammunition, mines, and medical supplies.93 Losing 
access to this equipment would return the Anya Nya to its pre-1960s status as little 
more than organized banditry, reducing any leverage it had for negotiations with 
Khartoum.
While the AAA did not have as formalized a role for foreign influence on its crafting 
and implementation as the CPA did, it was not immune to outside pressure. A
x9 Wai, “The Sudan: Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations under Nimeiry,” 304.
90 Khalid, Nimeiri and the Revolution o f Dis-may, 23. Gurdon, Sudan at the Crossroads, 28.
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weakness of the implementation of the earlier agreement was its reliance on outside 
sources of aid. Some of the main sources of funds for the institutions set up by the 
AAA, and the employment opportunities they provided for former Anya Nya, were 
provided by aid organizations or friendly governments. However, as the world 
economy stumbled after 1973, sources of revenue for the government became 
scarcer.94 This highlights a problem faced by international intervention into civil 
wars. The superficially controlled negotiating environment created by outside actors 
who will not remain continually invested in maintaining the peace agreement means 
and who derive little authority from the rank and file of warring factions means that, 
in a worst case scenario, peace agreements can be formed that are both weakly 
enforced and of dubious legitimacy.
Despite its weak international support financially, the AAA benefited from both its 
being seen as an innovation in African conflict resolution and because it appeared to 
fit in the context of post-colonial Africa in a way the southern insurgency did not: 
reconciliation between Africans of different ethnicities within the same state was a 
more appealing and optimistic vision of the continent’s future than yet another war 
fought over colonially imposed boundaries.
SOVEREIGNTY AND FOREIGN INTERFERENCE
Sudan’s earlier post-independence regimes often displayed ambivalence about the 
nation’s role in world affairs. The buoyancy of early northern nationalism and the 
need to focus on state integration led to a reluctance to engage even in the few foreign 
policy dilemmas of the isolated colonial age, as epitomized by the rapid dissolution of 
the Nile Valley Unity movement in the mid-1950s.95 This trend towards withdrawal 
continued into the first military junta, a regime whose only major foreign policy 
achievement was negotiating a new Nile Waters Agreement with Egypt.96 Suspicion
44 Alier, The Southern Sudan: Too Many Agreements Dishonoured, 169-170. Alier notes that the first cutbacks in 
AAA-provided jobs were in areas such as the forestry service, whose size was reduced by a third as early as 1975. 
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of foreign involvement in the internal affairs of post-colonial states was widespread 
among regimes across the continent, even in matters of conflict mediation. In May 
1961, Sudan participated with most other
African regimes in a conference held in Liberia in which the attendees pledged ‘non- 
interference’ in the domestic issues of post-colonial African states. Abboud’s Sudan 
sought to remain unaligned in the Cold War, primarily to retain goodwill and
n o
economic aid from all parties.
The caretaker government brought to power after the 1964 October Revolution 
sought to deliberately contradict what it considered Abboud’s ideological 
indifference. Its more Arab socialist, anti-imperialist agenda involved reengaging the 
world through support of liberation movements in the region, namely backing Nasser 
and the republicans in the North Yemen Civil War, the Eritrean secessionists in 
Ethiopia, and the Simba rebels in the Congo." The consequence was Sudan’s post­
colonial introduction to the regional cross-border intrigue which would contribute to 
its domestic instability and the tenacity of the southern insurgency. Ethiopia and the 
Congo began their support for the Anya Nya as a result of Sudan’s interference 
within their borders.100
Early concentration on establishing the legitimacy of the post-colonial government 
led to a tendency to use domestic processes to resolve the war. During Sudan’s first 
attempt at seeking a non-military solution, the Round Table discussions of 1965, 
heavy emphasis was placed on keeping the conflict internally mediated, with
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representatives from friendly states relegated to observer status. Northern parties 
rejected the involvement of OAU or UN observers in what became the Round Table 
talks, since they believed their presence might internationalize the war. They also 
demanded the exclusion of Ethiopia and Congo as observers because of those states’ 
support for the Anya Nya.101 With observers sent from such states as Kenya, Uganda, 
Ghana, Nigeria, Algeria and Egypt, the northern delegation was under pressure not to 
declare the Round Table conference a failure, a factor in the delegation of the
1 0?Twelve-Man Committee appointed to recommend solutions after the conference.
However, none of these proposals were implemented when the report was issued in
1966. By that period, the conservative nationalist Maghoub government had taken
power and showed little interest in a negotiated solution, and absolutely none in
1
allowing international involvement in the conflict.
The stability brought about by the AAA actually helped create conditions which led 
to its undoing, as the international focus exacerbated Sudan’s patronage politics. 
Increased Arab investment in post-war Sudan over time renewed the strong 
gravitational pull in the north towards Arab identity and interests. With both peace 
and a permanent constitution, Sudan embarked on its next goal of the early 1970s: 
national development. Two significant fields of achievement under the May Regime 
in the 1970s were in infrastructure and food production. The decade brought fast 
economic growth and major improvements in the transportation system, with an 
emphasis on roads over rails.104 Increased road usage meant increased oil demand, 
but that commodity was actually more easily attainable for Sudan after the 1973 
Arab-Israeli war. Arab states, concerned that the West might retaliate against the 
Arab oil embargo with a food embargo, sought to invest in agricultural projects which
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might make Sudan the ‘breadbasket of the Arab world’.105 Consequently, Sudan 
became a state with access to an enormous amount of petrodollars beginning in the 
1970s.106
Sudan’s new international ties contributed to the neo-patrimonial decay within the 
state. In 1977 a government inventory committee had already noted that there was a 
lack of funds, and a deficiency of leadership, problems it would be necessary to 
address to keep the Sudanese economy afloat.107 Nepotism and corruption were also 
on the rise and the resulting lack of meritocracy created a ‘brain drain’ -  a case in
1 AO
which skilled and educated Sudanese were seeking employment outside Sudan. 
Bratton and van de Walle describe how neo-patrimonialism’s reliance on ‘systematic 
clientelism’, the distribution of personal favors such as public sector jobs, can create 
an incentive for talented yet unconnected professionals to seek employment 
elsewhere.109 ‘To regulate and control rent-seeking, to prevent rivals from developing 
their own bases, and to demonstrate power, rulers regularly rotate officeholders.’110 
The May Regime’s excessive reliance on this practice -  Sudan saw eight finance 
ministers in eleven years -  made it impossible to stabilize economic policy.111
It was not simply southern tribalism and northern Islamists that conspired against the 
AAA, but Sudan’s increased reliance on the international economy. Leaning so 
heavily on agricultural export as the road to prosperity during the 1970s meant Sudan
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eventually became reliant on the unstable world market. During the 1950s and 
1960s farm production had been primarily staple goods for the internal market. 
Consequently Sudan was able to withstand severe drought from 1972 to 1975 without
i i  o
any severe accompanying starvation. The environmental consequences of 
incorporating enormous swaths of central and southern Sudan into rain-fed 
mechanized, often monoculture, cotton cultivation were not fully explored by the 
time the drive towards such development had begun.114 These hastily developed, rain 
dependent schemes were severely vulnerable to drought.
Defense of the sovereignty of Sudan had been a defining principle of Sudanese 
nationalism, shared across the political spectrum. Nimeiri and Sadiq el-Mahdi were 
able to reconcile, however temporarily, in 1977 due to a shared concern that a divided 
Sudan opened itself to potential foreign manipulation.115 During the 1980s 
parliamentary era, several OAU-sponsored peace initiatives from neighboring states 
such as Egypt, Kenya, Uganda and Zaire were put forth, but all foundered.116 It was 
only with the erosion of northern nationalism as an organizing principle and the rise 
of political Islam that Sudan became less wary of foreign interference, particularly in 
the resolution of its internal conflicts. In addition, it was becoming clear that 
internationally, states would maintain an advantage over insurgents. The cause of 
southern Sudanese and other marginalized peoples who turn to violence is hindered 
by the fact that the international system is established to favor regimes, not 
insurgencies. Sovereignty is an enormous advantage in the quest for international
117legitimacy.
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The Islamist-military coalition which ascended to power in 1989, viewed sovereignty 
as less a principle in its own right than a tool with which to defend the seat of its 
Islamic revolution and, most importantly, the regime itself. However, while the early 
post-colonial regimes went through a relatively slow process of acknowledging the 
limits of sovereignty in internal conflict, the NIF regime did not have the luxury of 
keeping the international community at bay, especially as regional security and 
humanitarian issues began to concern an ever-growing circle of states. As a result, 
the regime often relied on the principle of sovereignty as a last resort in negotiations, 
not a first one. At the Abuja 2 talks in 1993, for example, Khartoum did not resist 
mediation; instead it argued that the Nigerians were interfering with Sudanese 
sovereignty only when pressed for concessions on Sharia law and the strict security
1 1 o
measures in the south. The regime invoked the same concern in mid-2004 to avoid 
a premature conclusion of the Naivasha process. At that time, Khartoum argued that 
it was unable to conclude the agreement with the SPLM/A because it was too 
preoccupied with the insurgency in Darfur, a more recent conflict which it refused to 
incorporate into the IGAD mediation efforts.119
While the Bashir regime was eventually willing to rely on the UN for CPA 
implementation, it objected to that body’s involvement in the actual negotiations. In 
fact, a reason for IGAD’s primary role in mediation was the complete antipathy the 
Sudanese government had for any UN role, especially early in the process. That the 
monitoring of the CPA was left under control of the UN and not the regional body 
was due to the reluctance of IGAD members to enforce the agreement under their
sovereign, not its competitors. Bereft of legal protection, underwriters and investment rating services shy away 
from such deals to avoid liability. Thus southern Sudanese groups pursue legal action against firms doing 
business in Sudan not as members of a southern organization with a rival claim to governance or as a separate 
authority. Instead they must present themselves in US District Court under the US Alien Tort Claims Act as 
citizens of Sudan. Their claims would have no standing in US courts if they approached this issue based upon a 
claim to be an alternative sovereign over the disputed territory. Thus they approach the court, and by extension 
the international system, as citizens of the state from which many southern Sudanese wish to secede.’
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Press, 2003, 163. In the mid-1990s, Sudan even succeeded in aborting a US attempt to produce a UN Security 
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negotiations. Waithaka Waihenya. The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace 
Process. Nairobi: Kenway Publications, 2006, 91. The UN was only allowed observer status by Sumbeiywo to 
the post-Machakos mediation process, along with the AU.
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1 9 1own authority. The arrangement also fit the UN’s general preference for a detailed 
peace agreement between warring factions before its intervention into the monitoring 
process. Nevertheless, it is highly unusual that a sovereign government which has 
not lost a war would submit to this level of UN involvement internally, indicating the 
pressure Sudan was under to have the agreement implemented. Elections were to 
be internationally monitored, and the early implementation of the agreement over the 
interim period would be evaluated by representatives from IGAD members and other 
regional or international bodies as agreed by both parties.124
The reason this pressure was successful was that, throughout the peace process, the 
Bashir regime was unable to translate potential oil wealth into broad popularity 
domestically. A dilemma for the regime, considering how closely it veered to 
international pariah status in the mid-1990s, has been that its narrow domestic base 
has forced it to rely on international partners. During the 1990s, Khartoum sought 
stronger economic relationships with states such as China in part to avoid making the 
dramatic concessions in power-sharing that Nimeiri was forced to make in the AAA 
and in the National Reconciliation of 1977. Nevertheless, the regime’s inability to 
reconcile with rivals has tainted the integrity of agreements it has tried to craft 
domestically, such as the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. The regime’s frail base 
impacted not only the crafting but also the implementation of the CPA. This 
arrangement in turn has affected the relationship between Khartoum and the 
international community, in which the government needs international guarantees
121 International Crisis Group. “A Strategy for Comprehensive Peace in Sudan.” 26 July 2007, 6. Justice Africa, 
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that regional organizations actually manage peace enforcing, with the AU presence in Darfur being more an 
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Respect 2 (March 2006), 11. The UN officially replaced the monitoring bodies established throughout the peace 
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1more than a parliamentary government with a large base might. “ By the period of 
the Naivasha process, international donor support had become another incentive for 
both parties to resolve the conflict.126 The promise of foreign support led the 
government to establish a multi-donor trust fund, and the SPLM to establish its own
i
corresponding body.
FOREIGN SUPPORT AND THE EVOLUTION OF INSURGENCY IN THE 
SECOND WAR
The SPLM/A’s goal of national revolution allowed it to make more ideologically 
committed alliances in its foreign support than the Anya Nya. Its early backing by 
Ethiopia’s Marxist regime reflected in part its leftist pretensions. With the overthrow 
of the Haile Selassie monarchy in 1974 by the Marxist Mengistu, the Eritrean 
question would darken Khartoum-Addis Ababa relations again, as Sudan once more 
felt pressure from the Arab world to support the Eritreans during their hostilities with 
Addis Ababa in the late 1970s. As a result, Ethiopia became more inclined to 
support Anya Nya 2 forces in south Sudan, and to support the SPLA from 1983 
onwards. Early in the second war, the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia allowed the 
SPLM/A to transmit a radio station from Ethiopian territory into Sudan. This was
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access to technology the Anya Nya had never known during the first war and a 
crucial method by which to counter Khartoum’s propaganda that the SPLM/A was a 
similarly separatist movement. However, while the SPLM/A attracted some left­
leaning insurgents, the movement’s early identification with socialism was more a 
tactical consideration to obtain Ethiopian backing than an ideology the movement 
planned to export to Sudan.131
On a practical level, a pledge to national unity ensured Garang received early support 
from Ethiopia and, at least until 1985, Libya. Securing Ethiopia’s support allowed 
the SPLA a safe haven from which to centralize its power and train recruits in much 
more favorable conditions than those the original Anya Nya had faced. The previous 
insurgency had used Ethiopian territory to attack inside Sudan, but had not been 
allowed access to the Ethiopian security apparatus, as Garang’s movement was. In 
its formative period, when animosity between the Nimeiri regime and Sudan’s 
neighbors was at its height, SPLA recruits were trained by the Ethiopian army and 
supported by Cuba and Libya.134
Support from Uganda after 1986 for the SPLA was primarily a result of the personal 
and ideological camaraderie between Garang and new Ugandan president Yoweri 
Museveni, who had been long-time compatriots.135 However, it was a continuation of 
the tit-for-tat approach to state funding for insurgency in the region. With Khartoum 
providing exile status to the government he had toppled, Museveni aided the SPLA 
by occupying parts of Equatoria with 14,000 Ugandan troops throughout the late
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1980s. The support of both states was crucial, since insurgencies in the Horn of 
Africa traditionally have not gained traction unless provided with a base in 
neighboring states. Ideologically, Museveni was also critical of the post-colonial 
concept, embraced by the OAU, that allowed advantages for centrally located, 
internationally recognized governments over insurgent movements, no matter how 
tyrannical the former. Fellow insurgent-tumed-president Afewerki of Eritrea shared 
the same criticisms.138
Post-Nimeiri governments urged the SPLA to end its campaign, but were reluctant to 
make the necessary concessions to the insurgents. The SPLM/A felt the Transitional 
Military Council had nothing to offer them except a reinstatement of the AAA, and 
remained unimpressed with Al-Mahdi’s increasingly conservative government 
positions and policies.139 There was much resentment after the overthrow of Nimeiri 
among northerners that the SPLM/A were impossible to satisfy and might really be a 
separatist movement in disguise.140 After the SPLA capture of the town of Kurmuk 
and Gayson in Southern Blue Nile province in late 1987 and the government’s 
subsequent accusation of SPL A patron Ethiopia of attacking the Arab world, states 
such as Libya and Iraq began sending assistance to the Bashir regime.141 Politicians 
who had reached accommodation with the SPLM/A, such as the trade union-oriented 
National Alliance for National Salvation and various southern parties, were viewed 
with disdain throughout the north.142
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As the SPLA became more successful by the end of the 1980s, some allies worried 
that its legitimacy nationwide might be diminished by such heavy foreign support. 
After consolidating power in Kampala, Museveni withdrew Ugandan armed forces by 
1990 and replaced them with military advisors. This was apparently done out of a 
concern that heavy Ugandan involvement in Sudan’s civil war could compromise the 
legitimacy of an SPLA victory in the south.14j Museveni’s concern over diminishing 
amount of self-reliance in the SPLA was shared by some of the insurgency’s top 
commanders. As the Mengistu regime became increasingly unstable, some of 
Garang’s lieutenants such as Kerubino Kuanyin argued that the strong SPLA 
dependency on Addis Ababa was an ideological and practical error. The collapse of 
that regime in 1991 helped lead to the violent split in the SPLA, in which Kerubino 
would join the breakaway SPLA-United faction.144
The assumption of power by the National Islamic Front-aligned regime of Omar 
Hassan Al-Bashir in 1989 saw a dramatic internationalization of the war, and 
therefore of the mediation efforts. It was as a result of this sustained international 
pressure that the Bashir regime was forced into consenting to peace. Establishing 
good foreign contacts early was crucial for the NIF regime, which had been brought 
to power through a hastily organized coup and would need to cement its authority, 
partly by gaining the recognition of other states that it was the legitimate government 
of Sudan. Sudan’s poor standing among key states at the time made this possible: 
both Egypt and the US had become disillusioned with Al-Mahdi’s government, and
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made few protests against its overthrow.145 Turabi’s notoriety as an Islamist meant 
his role in the 1989 coup had to be concealed in order for the new regime to be 
recognized by Egypt, Libya and Saudi Arabia, Sudan’s important Arab neighbors.146 
As a result, the NIF was banned along with all other political parties, and Turabi 
jailed.147 By March 1990, Bashir was having success convincing Egypt that he would 
distance himself from the more radical strain of Islamism and make peace with the 
still formidable SPLA. So encouraged was Hosni Mubarak on hearing that Bashir 
vowed to end the war and negotiate with SPLM/A leader John Garang directly, that 
the Egyptian President met with Garang at an OAU summit that year and urged him 
to accept Bashir’s offer.149 Maintaining good relations with Sudan’s Arab neighbors 
was crucial to the new regime’s stability. As it relied on Egypt’s recognition for 
legitimacy among many northern Sudanese, it turned to Libya for aid. Soon after the 
coup, Bashir travelled to Tripoli where he promised his commitment to Arab unity.150 
In return, Qaddafi supplied both the legitimacy of an Arab state recognizing Sudan’s 
new leadership and subsidized oil shipments, both crucial to a new regime with a 
narrow base trying to hold on to power. It would be months before Qaddafi realized
145 Interview by the author with Ahmed Al-Shahi, Oxford, 2007. Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam,
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Cairo: El Dar El Thaqafia, 2001, 17. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn of Africa, 42. Woodward notes 
that Egypt generally had poor relations with Sudan’s parliamentary regimes, at least until the 1990s preferring the 
stability of military dictatorships in Khartoum.
146 Al-Shahi, interview. Al-Mubarak, Turabi’s “Islamist” Venture, 17. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the 
Sudan 1985-1995, 101. Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe, 67. De Waal, Islam 
and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 183. Madut-Arop, Sudan 's Painful Road to Peace, 224. Kok, Governance 
and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 100. The mid-ranking coup plotters were also successful in convincing 
their comrades to join the revolt by deceiving them to believe that the order to topple the regime came from the 
army brass.
147 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 184. The new junta exaggerated its distance from the 
NIF, even putting Hassan Al-Turabi in jail. The NIF was also banned, along with all other parties. De Waal lists 
three reasons the NIF role had to be hidden. 1) The NIF had a smaller base of support than the two parties in the 
government it had overthrown. 2) It would have looked opportunistic for destroying a democratic system it had 
itself shared power in at one point. 3) Early recognition was needed from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, to establish 
legitimacy. Neither of those states, each with their own radical Islamist threat, could be counted on to support 
such a regime.
148 J. Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins. Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989- 
2000. Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2003, 45. Al-Shahi, interview. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985- 
1995, 172-174. The government delegation was so ill-prepared for the first talks with the SPLA in August 1989, 
the author and SPLA delegate Mansour Khalid suspect the talks served only to provide the appearance that the 
new regime was seeking peace with the south. This would have been necessary for the junta to appease Egypt and 
Ethiopia, which supported the talks.
149 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 184. Al-Mubarak, Turabi’s “Islamist” Venture, 108. 
Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000, 36-37. Sidahmed 
and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 57, 72. Cairo also approached leaders of the G-7 
economic conference in Paris, and specifically asked Washington to waiver its policy of not supplying economic 
aid to regimes which overthrow democratic governments.
150 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000, 4, 8. Bashir also 
appeared on Sudanese television to announce that the country was forming a union with Egypt and Libya.
331
how closely connected Turabi was with the regime, or that its guiding ideology was 
not so much pan-Arab as it was pan-Islamist.151
Continued SPLA victories, especially those in areas of Sudan outside the south, 
allowed the new regime to appeal to a nationalist cause which masked the tension 
between its revolutionary and conservative wings. Schisms in the military-Islamist 
coalition which formed the regime could be seen during early crises such as the 1990- 
91 Gulf War. Bashir had been leaning towards supporting the Saudis and Egyptians, 
even sending troops to defend Saudi Arabia, and had voiced support for the Arab 
League’s resolution on 10 August 1990 condemning Iraq’s invasion. Al-Turabi, 
representing the more ideological wing of the regime, openly declared his support for 
Saddam Hussein. “ His considerable influence in the government resulted in the 
Sudanese delegate to the Arab League abstaining from the 10 August vote, a move 
that appalled Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Iraq’s defeat ended its capability to supply 
Sudan with arms, and Sudan’s position on the Gulf War ended significant aid from 
other Arab states.1' 3 The SPLA, on the other hand, had been receiving supplies from 
other African states and was well positioned militarily by early 1991.154
By the mid-1990s, Khartoum would strain relations with almost all its neighbors, 
even those such as Libya, Eritrea and Ethiopia which had earlier been amicable to the 
regime. The Ethiopians and Egyptians were angered by the assassination attempt 
against President Mubarak in Addis Ababa in 1995, a trail of evidence which led to 
some within the Sudanese government.155 Eritrea ended relations with Sudan in 1995
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for supporting an Islamist jihad against its government and for trying to create 
divisions between Christian and Muslim Eritrean nationalists.156 Uganda was furious 
that Khartoum supported insurgencies within its borders and also severed relations 
with Sudan in 1995.1 Sudan was also insensitive to pressure from its neighbors 
concerning the sharing of the Nile waters and its recalcitrance upset Ethiopia and 
Uganda in their attempts to begin major dam building projects on the Blue Nile and 
Atbara rivers. Kampala and Addis Ababa argued for a revision of the Nile Waters 
Agreement of 1959 to include the needs of other riparian states aside from Egypt and 
Sudan. Relations with Libya also deteriorated, as Tripoli held Khartoum 
responsible for attempts to destabilize Qaddafi’s regime from 1993 to 1995.139
At the same time the NIF regime was earning a reputation as a radical, destabilizing 
element in the region, the SPLM/A was establishing itself internationally as a cause 
worth championing. The southern movement had learned lessons from Anya Nya 
and the southern parties in the 1960s which had failed to establish themselves 
regionally. Years before IGAD turned to conflict resolution, southern Sudanese 
political parties were already attempting to include Sudan’s neighbors in the conflict, 
if only to gain international legitimacy. In late 1987, several smaller southern groups
Islamist State, 1989-2000, 189-190. The plotters of the assassination attempt had met in Khartoum in late 1994. 
The Ethiopian government charged the NIF regime with providing them both Sudanese and Yemeni passports. 
Their weapons had been delivered to Addis Ababa via Sudanese Airways. Turabi had met with A1 Qaeda leader 
Ayman Al-Zawahiri in Geneva not long before the attack, and Cairo immediately denounced him as 
masterminding the plot.
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Sudanese Civil War,” 117. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 73.
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Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 73. Korwa G. Adar. “A State Under Siege: The 
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Army and the West Nile Bank Front, were the two insurgencies which Kampala charged Khartoum with 
supporting. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 185. Lesch notes Khartoum’s use of a March 1995 
cease fire initiative by Jimmy Carter to both bypass IGAD monitoring and prepare for a major offensive against 
the SPLA. Sudan’s subsequent breaking of the cease fire included bombing inside Ugandan territory, which led to 
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joined up to become the United Sudan African Parties, opening communications with 
the SPLM/A in the friendly states of Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda, a move supported 
by those governments.160 Such early attempts to involve regional neighbors would see 
fruition in the following decade.
In the 1980s, events such as the Koka Dam Declaration and the Sudan Peace 
Initiative had been more exclusively Sudanese initiatives than even the AAA. 
However, as the conflict wore on, other states in Africa would become involved in 
mediation efforts, Nigeria most notably. The Abuja conferences of 1992 and 1993 
were the first serious international efforts to end hostilities in the second war. After 
the initial SPLA split, Nigerian president Ibrahim Babangida, sympathetic to the 
SPLM goals of racial and religious tolerance and self-determination, feared the 
movement’s defeat by a resurgent Khartoum. He and Bashir agreed to convene a new 
round of talks in the Nigerian capital of Abuja in May 1992.161 The talks achieved 
little, since the Sudanese government felt it was in too strong a position to make 
concessions. “ Babangida convened a second round of talks a year later, but by that 
point the SPLA was even weaker. Khartoum proposed that the SPLM/A accept its 
federal model with some exceptions, such as exemption from certain elements of 
Sharia. The SPLM/A rejected this, called for a confederation and secular democracy, 
under the title ‘New Sudan’. Again, the conference ended in a stalemate. However, 
by 1994 the Abuja talks and the subsequent IGAD process had raised the SPLM/A 
profile in the region just as Khartoum’s Islamic radicalism was turning it into a pariah 
throughout East Africa.164
160 Woodward, Sudan, 1898-1989: the Unstable State, 212. Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan’s Civil Wars, 84. 
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An Evaluation.” Institute o f Governance Studies, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver. 30 May 2007, 8. Kok, 
Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 1985-1995, 177. Ronen, “Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudanese Civil 
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As the radical nature of the NIF regime became more apparent, several states began 
to establish communications with the SPLM/A. The Ethiopian regime which had 
toppled Mengistu in 1991 had been hostile to the SPLM/A, a Mengistu ally.
However, as Garang’s movement grew weaker throughout the early 1990s, Addis 
Ababa decided its collapse would not be in Ethiopia’s interests after all. Ties were 
re-established in 1993 and Ethiopia sent military advisors to assist the SPLA.165 After 
the 1995 assassination attempt, Ethiopia and Uganda stepped up political and military 
support for the SPLM/A.166 The NIF regime’s aggressive Islamic identity also led to a 
growing sense of affiliation for non-Arab African states with the SPLM/A. By the 
mid-1990s, the SPLA was receiving support throughout sub-Saharan Africa, from
i /: o
states as distant as Namibia, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.
THE IGAD COALITION AND SOUTHERN SELF-DETERMINATION
As mediation became internationalized in the second war, the topic of southern self- 
determination became more widely discussed. Notably, it was Sudan’s neighbors, 
using the offices of IGAD, who played a large role in the advancement of the 
principle of self-determination. In a state in which instability has no serious affect on 
other states, there is less likely to be any immediate intervention from other states, or 
‘track one’ diplomacy.169 This is a sound analysis of the first war, which posed little 
threat of serious destabilization to the region. On the other hand, the threat to 
stability and security the second war posed to the region was the impetus for IGAD’s
165 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 203.
166 Johnson, The Root Causes o f Sudan ’s Civil Wars, 102. Rogier, No More Hills Ahead? 30. Abdelwahab El- 
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168 Yongo-Bure, interview. Yongo-Bure credits Garang’s roving ambassador to sub-Saharan Africa, Benjamin 
Mariel, with popularizing the SPLA cause among these regimes. Significantly, other southern militias, such as the 
SSDF, received little support from foreign backers, especially as the prospect of a peace agreement between 
Khartoum and the SPLA became a more likely event. Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and 
Catastrophe, 172. Adar 1998. The Central African Republic also began standing up to Khartoum, refusing to let 
a battalion of the Sudanese Army attack the SPLA from its territory in 1996.
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Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 184. Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in Peace 
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involvement in resolving that conflict.170 As the circle of international participation 
gradually expanded while Khartoum slipped out of favor with many involved states, 
support for self-determination in the south grew.
IGAD’s interest in conflict mediation was borne of its inability to pursue its main 
objective: environmental development so long as the Horn of Africa remained a 
politically unstable environment. The initiation of IGAD as a mediation forum 
began with the end of Nigerian participation in 1993, as the fall of the Babangida 
government in Nigeria made an Abuja 3 round of talks unworkable. " Instead, 
Nigeria passed the torch of mediation to East Africa, arguing that Sudan’s neighbors 
such as Uganda and Kenya should be included in the ‘circle of mediators’, since those 
states had an interest in the regional instability the conflict was causing. Khartoum 
was amenable to allowing IGAD’s take over of mediation efforts from Nigeria after 
September 1993, reasoning that its neighbors might pose a somewhat more 
‘sympathetic forum’: Eritrea and Ethiopia were still on cordial terms at the time with 
the N1F regime and Kenya remained neutral throughout the war.174 Ethiopia’s 
presence was especially reassuring to Khartoum, since even though it never had a 
high profile in the mediation, Addis Ababa seemed to support a united Sudan and was 
therefore an important counterweight to both Eritrea and Uganda, who were less 
reliable on that point.175 Most significantly, IGAD was the only forum containing
170 "The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward," 16.
171 Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f  Africa, 118.
172 El-Affendi, “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for Sudan,” 585. Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National 
Identities, 186. Francis Mading Deng and Mohammed Khalil. Sudan ’s Civil War The Peace Process Before and 
Since Machakos. Pretoria: African Institute of South Africa, 2005, 4. Kok, Governance and Conflict in the Sudan 
1985-1995, 197. Talks had been scheduled to resume in June 1994.
173 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 179.
174 Woodward, interview. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 76. Ronen, 
“Ethiopia’s Involvement in the Sudanese Civil War,” 115-116. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 375. 
De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 203. El-Affendi, “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process 
for Sudan,” 585. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 9. Kenya was only a peripheral corridor 
for the weapons traffic to south Sudan, and Nairobi had established little contact with SPLA leaders. Madut-Arop, 
Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 375. Bashir contacted Moi during an IGADD meeting in Djibouti in 1993 and 
requested that he personally mediate now that Babangida was no longer involved.
17:1 De Waal, “Sudan: international dimensions to the state and its crisis,” 19. Maundi, Zartman, Khadiagala and 
Nuamah, Getting In: Mediators ’ Entry into the Settlement o f  African Conflicts, 146, 148-149. During the 
preparations for Abuja 2 in 1993, Nigerian mediators had wanted to include Sudan’s regional neighbors, but 
Khartoum objected to both Kenya and Uganda at that time, alleging they were both SPLA supporters.
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states which had enough influence in the south to convince the SPLM/A to accept any
1 7terms of peace -  or to coerce the insurgents, if necessary.
However, Khartoum’s faith in the new mediation forum was to be shaken. At Abuja, 
Nigeria opposed the SPLM demand for a referendum on self-determination, arguing 
that the constitutional conference the SPLM demanded was sufficient to voice 
demands for southern autonomy. Conversely, IGAD’s Declaration of Principles 
was built on the SPLM/A platform presented during the Abuja 2 talks of 1993, which 
called for a qualified right to self-determination. This principle had been rejected by 
both Khartoum and the Nigerian mediators, who considered a unified state a 
necessity. IGAD, on the other hand, considered unity to be conditional on the basis 
of a secular state. IGAD may have been an optimal organization to help resolve the 
second war because it was uniquely attuned to the realities of the Sudanese problem, 
and had a much more immediate interest in the security challenges the war posed to 
Sudan’s neighbors. The organization was not initially set up for conflict resolution, 
but to deal with water problems in the Horn of Africa.179 The shift of mission 
occurred primarily because, by the early 1990s, Sudan’s war was seen as a 
destabilizing influence in the region. As Sudan’s second war dragged on 
throughout the decade, IGAD became the regional organization through which almost 
all mediation would continue.
One of the difficulties the IGAD coalition faced was that, as it gained credibility as 
the forum through which the war was to be mediated, it had to come to terms with the
176 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 9. Young writes that, in part because most IGAD 
members were on good terms with the West in the 1990s, Khartoum also hoped regional involvement could 
deflect the ire of an increasingly hostile US.
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adhere closer to the SPLA position than Khartoum’s. Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle 
East, 77. The government’s rejection of the Declaration of Principles was in keeping with the Islamist fervor still 
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government could not allow an autonomous settlement for the south, as its mission was to spread Islam throughout 
that region and the whole of Africa.
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fragile nature of its composition. Throughout the 1990s, the IGAD process was 
defined by a series of fits and starts, as the various member states balanced their 
security interest of ending the Sudanese war against other national interests. The 
strained relationships between Sudan and various IGAD states in the mid-1990s 
contributed to the stalling of peace talks. After Asmara broke off diplomatic relations 
with Khartoum in late 1994, Sudanese officials declared they would not participate in 
the forum while Eritrea was still an IGAD member. Poor relations with other 
IGAD member states during this period were common and at times compromised 
IGAD’s image of being a neutral body.
Walter concludes from her research on civil wars throughout the twentieth century 
that in civil war mediation:
‘Strict neutrality by the third party also does not appear necessary. The outside 
guarantor in most cases was not a wholly unbiased participant, yet this did not seem 
to reduce their effectiveness. In fact... when an enormous power disparity exists 
between the adversaries, a somewhat biased third party in favour of the minority
i  o 7
group can actually enhance feelings of security.’
Following this logic, the hostile actions of IGAD’s individual members towards 
Sudan during the 1990s paradoxically seem to have contributed to the organization’s 
later effectiveness as a forum of mediation. Khartoum’s poor relations with its 
neighbors allowed IGAD the license and will to use sticks, in addition to carrots, a 
freedom no other forum would be favored with. Ethiopia in particular was able to put 
sustained pressure on Khartoum, extracting concessions that would later form the 
basis of the Naivasha process. During the period from 1995 to 1998, Sudan began to 
improve its international image, expelling Islamist terrorist Osama Bin Laden, and 
finally submitting to sign both the Khartoum Peace Agreement and the Declaration of 
Principles, two documents which consented to the right of southern self-
1X1 Donald Petterson. Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe. Boulder, Colorado: Westview 
Press, 2003, 185. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 49.
1X2 Barbara F. Walter. “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International Organization 51:3 (1997), 
361-362. Walter cites as an example the 1979 Lancaster House Agreement which ended the conflict between 
white Rhodesians and black Zimbabweans, negotiated by the United Kingdom, the former colonial power. ‘The 
fact that Britain was viewed as prejudiced in favor of the white Rhodesians seems to have increased white 
confidence in their own survival.’
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determination. Without Ethiopia’s consistent pressure during this period, 
particularly its support of the SPLA, such concessions which formed the basis for the 
Naivasha process might not have been possible. Getting both parties to adhere to the 
Declaration of Principles was the only significant achievement of the IGAD process 
by the time Khartoum finally ratified the document in 1997, but it was nevertheless a 
significant step forward.184
It is likely that the success of regional states in making such progress through 
coercion where larger states such as the United States were unable to -  despite the 
Clinton Administration’s best efforts -  led the US to increasingly rely on the IGAD 
forum. The Clinton Administration had initially sought to aid the regimes in their 
continued hostility towards the Bashir regime. In late 1996 and early 1997, the 
Clinton administration transferred US$20 million in military aid to Uganda, Eritrea 
and Ethiopia, three IGAD members which were on poor terms with Khartoum. It is 
widely assumed that this aid was funnelled to the SPLA. However, by the end of 
the 1990s it seemed Washington abandoned its financial support for regime change.
Multilateral organizations tend to rely on a ‘top down, externally guided, supply 
driven, elitist and interventionist’ approach to conflict resolution, and IGAD by the 
turn of the century would begin to follow this model.187 By 1999 the forum, still only 
marginally effective, began more intense efforts to formalize the process of 
negotiations and make it routine. That year the position of an IGAD secretariat was 
created with a mandate for a process of continuous negotiations between the two
183 De Waal, “Sudan: international dimensions to the state and its crisis,” 12. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and 
the Horn o f Africa, 100. Madut-Arop, Sudan ’s Painful Road to Peace, 401.
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Dagne, “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and US Policy,” 9. El-Affendi, “The Impasse in the 
IGAD Peace Process for Sudan,” 588. El-Affendi writes that the positive reception the Khartoum Peace 
Agreement signed with various rival militias to the SPLA in April 1997 gave Khartoum the confidence to finally 
agree to the Declaration of Principles, and may also have acted as a precedent since both agreements concerned 
similar issues of secularism and self-determination.
185 Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 43, 45. Woodward notes that USAID, operating in the 
south without reliance on Khartoum during the 1990s was an early influence on Clinton Administration policy.
For most of the decade USAID was hostile to Khartoum, and supported the IGAD forum in 1994, two precedents 
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parties.188 By this time, IGAD’s European partners had become willing to provide 
more funds to the process in Nairobi. The new emphasis on organizational 
structure, along with invigorated external backing, marked the start of that forum’s 
increased usefulness.
With a new tier to IGAD’s composition however, new tensions arose. There would 
remain disputes about the roles Western partners were to play in mediation by the 
turn of the century. Concerns existed among some observers that the Western 
sponsors of the IGAD process were either too ignorant of the conflict or too 
concerned with their own interests to play a very active role in mediation. An early 
example came in May 2001, when the National Democratic Alliance charged the 
European Union with being too lenient on Khartoum. By reducing its analysis of the 
conflict to a simple north/south dilemma, the NDA believed the EU was forgetting 
the tensions which led to northern resistance, in addition to that in the south. The 
NDA were also concerned with what they saw as the EU’s acquiesce to Khartoum’s 
preference for a cease fire before negotiations.190
By 2001, the second war had reached its ultimate moment of stalemate: while 
regional and international opinion was becoming increasingly sympathetic to the 
SPLM/A, the Bashir regime was able to use its new oil revenues to buy enough 
weapons and political support to ensure it could not be dislodged from Khartoum.191 
The deadlock would be broken with the entry of the US into direct mediation in late 
2001. As the United States became involved, it also brought its own understanding of 
the conflict. President Bush’s special envoy to the region John Danforth had begun 
his work in Sudan by advocating a cease fire in the Nuba Mountains, an area with 
much hostility to Khartoum but very little demand for self-determination. At one 
point Danforth told Kenyan mediator Lazaro Sumbeiywo that the problem could be
188 Waihenya, The Mediator, 41.
189 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turahi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000, 264.
190 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 66.
191 Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f Africa, 118-119. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An 
Evaluation,” 32. Young writes that Khartoum believed the US intervened in mid-2001 because the tide was 
turning against the SPLA at that point, though the uprising in Darfur in 2003 demonstrated that this would not 
remain a constant pattern. Malik Agar, the SPLM/A governor of the South Blue Nile, stated in March 2001 that 
unless Khartoum’s access to oil revenues was stopped, the SPLA could only hold out fighting for another three or 
four years.
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solved if the government would simply ‘divide the oil’. “ The inference was that 
solutions which worked in the Nuba Mountains might be appropriate for the larger 
war, bypassing questions of southern identity and accepting instead the theory of 
economic grievance.
By 2002 the United States was attempting to involve itself in the mediation process 
more than the regional moderators, especially Kenya, thought was necessary. In the 
period leading up to the Machakos protocol, the US and Kenya were competing for 
rights to host the process. When the US tried to set up an IGAD meeting in 
Washington, including the NDA, Kenya blocked the move. Only the eventual US 
acquiescence to regional mediation as led by Kenya would end this competition.194 
Once the US had agreed to allow Kenya to preside over mediation efforts, few other 
states would challenge it for that role. Soon a troika of the US, UK and Norway had 
stepped forward as the leading Western sponsors of the peace process. These states 
formed the second circle of participants in the negotiations, the first circle consisting 
of the two parties and the IGAD mediators, especially Sumbeiywo. Over 2001 and 
2002, this troika would emerge from the IGAD Partners Forum, a collection of 
Western states with conflicting interests that had been difficult to manage because of 
its general reliance on consensus.195
Dixon and Simmons describe ‘track one-and-a-half initiatives, which are more 
closely linked to official processes than other track two initiatives, but involve the
192 Waithaka Waihenya. The Mediator: Gen. Lazaro Sumbeiywo and the Southern Sudan Peace Process.
Nairobi: Kenway Publications, 2006, 89. Johnson, interview. Johnson also believed that Danforth initially 
oversimplified the war, but as a north/south, Muslim/non-Muslim conflict, not taking notice of the fact that there 
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but within the SPLA itself. Nor did Danforth understand the conditionality of SPLA demands for self- 
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2009. O’Fahey notes that the IGAD partners -  the US, UK and Norway -  all thought they could use the self- 
interest of the parties to exploit the oil. Kelleher, “A Small State’s Multiple-level Approach to Peace-making,” 
291. Danforth received much of his early, on-the-ground information about the conflict in Sudan from the 
delegates of Western states such as Britain and Norway. Charles Snyder. “Remarks on the Signing of the 
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same individuals and institutions.196 This concept would seem to apply to the 
Naivasha process, which was certainly not a track two process. Particularly in the 
later stages, the personal negotiations between Garang and Taha precluded any 
outside intervention at all. Instead, the parties relied on several resource people who 
were unaffiliated with either party, including workshops on constitutional and 
economic matters, oil revenues and banking systems.
THE EGYPTIAN-LIBYAN JOINT INITIATIVE
The competition between an initiative introduced by Sudan’s Arab neighbors and the 
IGAD process is a prime example of the difficulty posed when states tailor their 
involvement in a peace process to advance their own interests, as both initiatives, 
when presented together, had the potential to intensify hostilities. Northern 
opposition could rally around the unified vision of Sudan in the Egyptian-Libyan 
Joint Initiative while southerners could support the self-determination components of 
the Machakos Protocol. Rogier says that for this reason the two initiatives 
‘exacerbated’ the conflict, but US intervention on the side of the IGAD process -  
with an eye towards Egyptian interests- may have kept the tension from getting out 
of hand.199
The Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative began gestating during a long period where 
Egypt had felt sidelined in the region. From 1990 to 1998, Cairo had no influence in 
any of the states of East Africa, possibly for the first time in its modem history.200 
While Egypt retained observer status in the IGAD mediation process, Ethiopia in 
particular was suspicious of Egyptian influence in the Horn of Africa, and pushed for 
the Arab nation’s exclusion as formal IGAD member. Egypt’s disapproval of the
196 Dixon and Simmons, “The Role of Track Two Initiatives,” 61-62.
197 Dalai Mohamed Raj ab. “Naivasha Peace Agreement: Analysis and Evaluation Part I.” Respect 2 (March 
2006), 18.
19x Rogier, No More Hills Ahead? 43.
199 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 186. The report surmises that Egypt did not seek a leadership role in mediating 
the conflict, but wanted its interests protected, primarily its concerns about sharing Nile Water with yet another 
upstream state. Stepped up US involvement after 9/11, especially in the form of the anti-separatist John Danforth, 
might have mollified them somewhat.
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manner in which successive Sudanese governments handled the new war during the 
1980s, especially Sudan’s insistence on nationwide Islamic law, led to Cairo taking a 
somewhat impartial stance during most of the war, a tacit acceptance of the SPLA as 
an inevitable by-product of poor leadership in Khartoum. Despite generally poor 
relations with the NIF regime throughout the 1990s, Egypt never gave any funding to 
the SPLA, and sought to avoid getting drawn into the conflict, unlike other states in 
the region. Even after the 1995 assassination attempt on Hosni Mubarak, when 
Egypt’s US ally was pushing for severe sanctions on Sudan, Cairo fought against an 
arms embargo, declaring that northern Sudanese had the right to defend themselves 
during a civil war.“ Nevertheless, Egypt’s hesitant relations with the SPLM/A were 
better than their nonexistent relations with Anya Nya in the previous war. The more 
outright separatist nature of the earlier movement and its relative lack of strength 
gave Egypt little reason to establish communications.204
During this period, Sudan was also straining its relations with Arab states. Egypt 
considered overthrowing the regime after Sudan’s connections to the assassination 
attempt on Mubarak were discovered in 1995, but eventually it shifted to a policy of 
engagement of the regime, as the US would also do years later. Cairo’s relations 
with Khartoum would remain poor throughout the 1990s, only mending when Bashir 
split from Turabi at the end of the decade. Egypt then declared strongly that it was 
against southern self-determination, and worked with Libya to advance a peace 
initiative more favorable to northern interests. Despite its vigilant desire to protect 
its own interests, there is little evidence to suggest Egypt was hostile to a successful 
peace process in the second war. Kalpakian, based on Cairo’s feckless history with 
the various Sudanese regimes, suggests that Egypt sought perpetual conflict in Sudan. 
However, this analysis neglects Egypt’s desire to keep the region stable so the Nile 
waters would not be tampered with. Kalpakian further, incorrectly, suggests that
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Egypt could not live with a federal, secular Sudanese government. In his 2000 
analysis of the civil war, Roger Dean also stated that Egypt had an incentive to keep 
the second Sudanese civil war active, citing Cairo’s desire to avoid the development 
in the south which peace might bring, as well as the possibility of the south’s 
secession and another independent state controlling the headwaters of the Nile, so 
vital to Egypt.208 This analysis downplays the tension between Cairo and Khartoum 
throughout the 1990s, and overstates Cairo’s skepticism of the SPLM/A, which by 
the middle of that decade had formed ties with northern factions in the National 
Democratic Alliance that had Egypt’s sympathy, such as the DUP.
By 1997, as Khartoum consented to the Declaration of Principles and the possibility 
of southern self-determination being a solution to the conflict, both of Sudan’s Arab 
neighbors had become more concerned about the direction the IGAD process was 
taking. In 1999 they launched the Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative, a new proposal 
calling for the inclusion of other NDA members in the negotiation process, and 
excluding southern self-determination as a key principle for resolution of the 
conflict.209 The ELJI favored holding a constitutional conference and setting up an 
all-party transitional government, an arrangement which met some of the key 
demands of Sadiq Al-Mahdi, who was considered a force behind the forum.210 Al- 
Mahdi’s frustration with the SPLM/A and other NDA elements who expressed some 
hesitancy about the initiative led him to return to Khartoum to make his own peace 
with the government, declaring that the remaining opposition was not serious about 
negotiations.211 Egypt, in seeking to advance an initiative which protected its security 
interests, had succeeded only in fracturing the NDA, which had been attempting to
9 0 7
207 Jack Kalpakian. “War Over Identity: the case of Sudan.” Big African States. Eds. Clapham, Christopher, 
Jeffrey Herbst and Greg Mills. Johanesburg: Wits University Press, 2006, 52.
208 Dean, “Rethinking the civil war in Sudan,” 77-78. The article further asserts that Egypt’s interest in the Jonglei 
canal project throughout the 1970s was not simply meant to increase the flow of Nile waters downstream, but to 
ease the assimilation of southerners into Arab culture. This is dubious, and the Egyptian intelligence cited by 
Dean seems to reflect more a political objective of northern factions within Sudan than of Egypt, which has had no 
serious involvement in attempting to assimilate the south since the 1950s.
209 Prendergast and Mozersky, “Love Thy Neighbor.” Kelleher, “A Small State’s Multiple-level Approach to 
Peace-making,” 294.
210 "The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward," 9. De Waal, “Sudan: international 
dimensions to the state and its crisis,” 17. Telephone interview by the author with Richard Barltrop, London,
2009.
211 Burr and Collins, Revolutionary Sudan: Hassan Al-Turabi and the Islamist State, 1989-2000, 269. Woodward, 
interview. Barltrop, interview.
344
forge strong enough ties between its various members over the previous five years to 
act as a coherent govemment-in-exile.
Khartoum may have seen the initiative as a new weapon by which to force a wedge 
between opposition groups, but it was of limited usefulness in this regard. After the 
initiative’s 1999 launch, the Secretary General of the ruling National Congress Party 
(NCP) said Khartoum might consider bypassing the SPLM/A if it boycotted a 
prescribed peace conference. This was an empty threat, as both the government and 
the northern opposition in the NDA realized that the failure to address the southern 
demand for self-determination was a serious flaw of the initiative. Self-determination 
had become a non-negotiable point for the SPLM/A, and its omission is probably 
what led to the ELJI’s relegation to the periphery. Without the SPLA’s full 
participation, the usefulness of the forum was compromised. As the failure of the 
1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement proved, no serious peace could be made in the 
south without the inclusion of Garang’s powerful group. Additionally, neither the 
SPLA nor the NDA would commit to a plan which did not honor the importance of 
the separation of religion and state, even if the dissidents accepted power-sharing and 
unity in principle.
The slow process after the forum’s initiation also contributed to its irrelevance. Five 
verbal points were issued in Tripoli in September 1999, but a response from the NDA 
was only requested ten months later. The first written proposal was not drafted by the 
sponsors until a year after that.214 Most importantly, the SPLM/A and Khartoum 
never met for negotiations under the Egyptian-Libyan forum. The government by 
this point had neither the power nor the interest in the initiative to fight to retain it. 
The SPLM/A was also wary of the initiative because it doubted the commitment of 
either of the sponsoring parties to democracy or human rights, which would become a 
priority without the option of southern self-determination. They also recognized its
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potential to allow the government to forum-shop. However, because of their Arab 
constituencies, neither the government nor most parties to the NDA from northern 
Sudan could afford to ignore the initiative even if they would have preferred to.
By 2001, impatience with IGAD had driven the NDA to call for a merging of the 
ELJI and the IGAD process. It is possible the NDA was pushed to the ELJI forum 
not only because it sought to address concerns of northern dissidents such as Sadiq 
Al-Mahdi and other Umma members, but because the northern exile movement was 
allowed such a minimal role in the IGAD process. By 2001, the group was having 
difficulty even getting appointments scheduled with IGAD mediators. When its 
representatives showed up to the Machakos negotiations in July 2002, the SPLM/A 
did not allow them a seat at the negotiating table.218 The exclusion of the NDA and 
others from the Naivasha process was a result of IGAD mediators’ belief that the 
parties with the main grievances and the main military capacity should have their 
concerns addressed first, then other parties could be included. The two main parties 
would accept this because it gave them the opportunity to form a temporary alliance, 
sanctioned by a broad portion of the international community as represented by 
IGAD partners. IGAD’s narrow focus on resolving differences between the NCP and 
SPLM/A before other parties -  backed by the troika of Norway, the UK and the US -  
gave the Bashir regime an excuse to delay any negotiations in Darfur by delaying the
# O 1 Q
Naivasha process, during which it continued its military campaign in the west."
The Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative could not be completely ignored, as its sponsors 
were both too powerful regionally to have their interests disregarded. Instead, IGAD 
mediators made more efforts to ensure those states felt their concerns were addressed 
in the IGAD process. By seeking to fold the Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative into 
the IGAD process, US Special Envoy John Danforth also may have been attempting
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not to sideline Egypt, a more crucial US ally than any of the IGAD states.221 The 
United States had no formal relations with Libya, but the United Kingdom did, and 
London was able to help ensure Tripoli would not play a spoiler in the process. In a 
2003 interview, IGAD mediator Lazaro Sumbeiywo stressed that he had been to 
Egypt often to ensure they were aware of the status of negotiations and that they now 
supported the IGAD process.
THE UNITED STATES COMMITS TO PEACE
The United States became one of the first parties the Bashir regime would turn to in 
early efforts to control the peace process, approaching Washington to mediate in 
March 1990.224 That initiative was scuttled after Sudan supported Iraq during the 
1990-1991 Gulf War, and animosity between the parties increased throughout the rest 
of the decade. The government’s successful effort to thwart Garang’s 1992 assault on 
Juba shortly after the first Abuja conference in 1992 further alienated Khartoum 
internationally as it involved such measures as retaliations against the civilian 
population of Juba, including the execution of two Sudanese employees of USAID.
It was condemned by the US Congress, the British Parliament, and the UN 
Commission on Human Rights by mid-1993.“"
The American-Sudanese relationship typically remained icy following the end of 
Nimeiri’s reign, but became outright hostile by the late 1990s. In November 1997,
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the Clinton Administration imposed trade and economic sanctions. A nadir in 
relations was reached with the August 1998 bombing of a pharmaceutical plant in 
retaliation for what the US considered Sudan’s involvement in terrorism.227 By the 
turn of the century, support for the Clinton Administration’s hardline policy had 
collapsed in Europe. Only a few states, primarily Norway and the Netherlands, 
supported continuing the policy over renewed calls for engagement, and Khartoum’s 
cooperation with Canadian and Chinese oil companies led states such as Germany, 
France and the United Kingdom to believe isolation was increasingly 
counterproductive.“" The Khartoum Peace Agreement of 1997 had allowed 
Khartoum access to oil fields, gaining the interest of European oil companies and 
fracturing any Western consensus over isolating Sudan."“ Khartoum has sought to 
balance US influence with that of Europe, especially France, using the prospect of 
increased French oil exploration as an incentive. The government, and even some 
parties in the northern opposition, had come to consider the European Union to be a 
more even-handed mediator than the US, which was seen as too sympathetic to the 
SPLM/A.231
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By the end of its second term, the Clinton Administration began changing its strategy 
of isolating Sudan and seeking regime change towards one of engagement, a policy 
pursued with even more vigor by the incoming Bush Administration. The old 
strategy was no longer working: as former US ambassador to Khartoum Donald 
Petterson notes, Sudan’s neighbors were indeed hostile to it by the end of the century, 
but due to its own destabilizing actions, not those of Washington." In May 2000, 
both governments agreed that a counter-terrorism team from Washington would 
begin work in Khartoum. It completed its report in February 2001. Clinton’s 
special envoy to the region, former congressman Harry Johnston, as well as some US 
security agencies were by July 2000 already pushing for the US to change its strategy 
for the purpose of gaining access to Sudan’s intelligence on al Qaeda and other 
terrorist organizations.234 The Bush Administration would continue this change of 
policy after January 2001.
When the Bush Administration entered office, it sought to streamline the role of the 
US and other states involved in the war, as well as simplify its demands on 
Khartoum. Danforth in particular saw the American role as bringing together its 
regional allies in the process, and coordinated visits to the Egyptian, Ugandan and 
Kenyan presidents to that effect. He also stated that ‘exaggerated differences in 
approaches between the US and Europe have had an impact upon the Sudanese to the 
detriment of peace efforts.’ The Bush Administration began to work with its allies 
towards the goal of ending the war. In addition, Washington modified its bilateral 
approach with Khartoum. A July 2001 delivery of 40,000 tons of wheat from USAID 
to Sudan was an early attempt by the Bush Administration to improve relations with
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Khartoum after they had fallen to their nadir during the 1990s.237 Gestures such as 
this paved the way for John Danforth’s involvement later that year.
Given Khartoum’s compliance on security and the peace process after the 11 
September 2001 terror attacks, Washington would have difficulty opposing the lifting 
of sanctions. However, the US soon established a link between sanctions and 
Sudan’s commitment to peace efforts that was not apparent when sanctions were first 
imposed. New conditions had now been drawn up just as Khartoum had complied 
with the previous ones. Khartoum was not rewarded when it complied with US 
demands on terror, but would be removed from the list of states sponsoring terror 
when Sudan signed a peace agreement.“ This shift of policy was inconsistent, but in 
keeping with the recommendations made to the White House by a Center for 
Strategic and International Studies report in early 2001, which focused on ending the 
war instead of the multiple goals of the Clinton Administration. This helped 
Khartoum understand that ending the war was to be the US’s overriding objective 
from then on, despite Washington’s earlier inconsistency. The CSIS report 
suggested bypassing competing initiatives such as the ELJI in favor of joining 
Norway and the UK in advancing the languishing IGAD process.240 It noted that for 
the US to re-establish a relationship with Sudan would be a strong incentive for 
Khartoum to commit to peace, as the US could remove UN Security Council 
sanctions and support World Bank and IMF involvement in Sudanese finances.241 
The report also addressed the internal divisions among the regime, declaring that 
‘ironically, despite its burgeoning oil wealth, the present government in Khartoum is 
arguably weaker than in earlier periods and for that reason less able to act coherently
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and deliberately: President Bashir’s break with Turabi in late 1999 divides the 
Islamist movement, and Bashir is still unable to broaden his domestic power base.’242 
Significantly, the report did not suggest using these internal rifts to destabilize the 
regime, but to persuade it to commit to peace, an approach the administration would 
emulate.
The focus on ending the war above other goals allowed Danforth to implement 
benchmarks that were less a separate American peace initiative than tests of good 
will. The test to implement a cease fire in the Nuba Mountains, one of the areas 
which had seen the most fighting throughout the war, would be a positive first step 
which would facilitate further involvement by the US.243 It would also indicate that 
the government was ready to allow foreign peace observers within its borders, an 
event which had never occurred in the post-colonial history of the conflict-ridden 
state. This initial test was to be followed by three additional ones: an inquiry into the 
resurgence of slavery in the region, further short-term cease fires throughout the south 
to allow humanitarian aid in the region, and an end to attacks on civilians.244 While 
the tests were not met with exemplary results across the board, enough action was 
taken that Danforth could report to the president in April 2002 that both sides were 
negotiating in good faith, and the US should therefore aid the peace process.245
Ending hostilities in the Nuba Mountains may not have directly contributed to the 
IGAD process, as Dagne asserts, nor did that area see fighting as intense as was
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occurring simultaneously in Bahr Al-Ghazal and Western Upper Nile.246 However, 
the episode significant in that it demonstrated to the warring parties that the US was 
ready to assist in resolving the conflict. It demonstrated to the Bush Administration 
that devoting US resources and prestige to the negotiation efforts need not be a vain 
gesture. Additionally, it ended hostilities in one of the disputed north-south border 
regions, thereby making it easier to discuss a permanent settlement for the region 
without negotiation being dictated by new hostilities on the ground. With this in 
mind, the Nuba Mountains settlement contributed significantly, if indirectly, to the 
greater IGAD process.
The prevailing international attention paid to terrorism and its state sponsors also 
affected the US role in negotiations. Khartoum’s unease at being a potential target of 
US military action in the months soon after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks 
was an incentive to abide by Danforth’s relatively mild tests of good faith.247 It is 
possible that the peace process would have fallen apart without the increased 
international pressure, especially from the US. An attempt by the IGAD mediators to 
revive their process in June 2001 brought Bashir and Garang to talks in Kenya, 
hosted by Kenyan President Moi, but made no other significant headway. Soon 
thereafter, the SPLA captured Raga, a town on the Chadian border in Bahr Al- 
Ghazal, and for the following three months the war became just as intense as ever. 
However, American involvement was not an unqualified blessing in moving 
negotiations forward. As the US became less popular throughout the Middle East 
after the Iraq invasion of 2003, the Sudanese government felt more freedom to stall 
negotiations while it tried to improve its bargaining position. Khartoum began to
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ignore suggestions from the US that the Darfur crisis could be resolved by a process 
similar to the CPA, or that a resolution could be integrated into the CPA.249
Danforth made clear in his April 2002 report to the president that, even though he 
took Egyptian wariness of southern self-determination to heart, he believed the US 
should back the IGAD process exclusively. He recommended that the US should 
not initiate its own peace process, instead opting to test whether peace was achievable 
by monitoring human rights in the area and applying confidence building 
measures. As these were implemented, the US began to more strongly back the 
IGAD forum. By December 2002, long-term US backing of IGAD mediation seemed 
inevitable when Sumbeiywo and Moi met President Bush in Washington and were 
assured US support for the IGAD peace process.252
The schizophrenic approach the US took to the peace process was evident with the 
introduction of the Sudan Peace Act. The act could be seen as a constraint on the 
power of the executive concerning Sudan. The act declared that sterner measures 
were necessary in dealing with Khartoum, as ‘the disengagement of the front-line 
states of Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, fostering the belief among officials of the 
Government of Sudan that success on the battlefield can be achieved.’254 The State 
Department preferred to keep the delicate operation of negotiations within its own 
realm, and resented the challenge posed by the act.255 The act passed in October 2002,
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was seen as contradicting his support for IGAD, and may have made some southerners more hesitant of increased 
US involvement in the process. El Obeid, Chronique Politique du Soudan 2003, 58. To ensure Cairo and 
Washington presented a united front concerning the need for continued negotiations, Danforth met with Egyptian 
Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher in July 2003 following the collapse of talks after disagreement over the Nakuru 
document.
251 Euler, “Human Rights in Sudan,” 47. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 13. ICG, God, 
Oil and Country, 178. Egypt’s opposition to the formation of another initiative may have been a reason Danforth 
did not recommend the US launch its own.
2:12 Waihenya, The Mediator, 100.
2:>3 De Waal, Islam and Its Enemies in the Horn o f Africa, 241. US branches of government were often at odds 
with each other. State Department messages of neutrality could be undermined by congressional vows of support, 
perhaps giving the SPLA false hopes that the US might aid it militarily, as it had the Northern Alliance in 
Afghanistan.
254 Sudan Peace Act, 2002, section 2(15).
255 Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 13. Woodward, US Foreign Policy and the Horn o f 
Africa, 128. Dagne, “Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and US Policy,” 11. Rogier, No More 
Hills Ahead? 81, 84. The act was finally passed by the US House of Representatives in June 2001 with an
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and promised farther sanctions if Khartoum was not seen to be acting in good faith in 
peace negotiations.256 It made available to the president up to US$100 million per 
year from 2003 to 2005, to prepare the southern areas outside the control of 
Khartoum for peace. Khartoum would also be threatened by a blockade of loans from 
the IMF or World Bank and damage to diplomatic relations if Bush did not, every six 
months, certify that the regime was cooperating with the peace process.
By the later period of the peace process, Washington was running out of economic 
disciplinary measures to pressure Khartoum. Of the various types of sanctions 
threatened in the Sudan Peace Act, most had already been enacted and the rest, 
especially a proposed arms embargo, would require the cooperation of Russia and 
China.258 Nevertheless, Bush’s reaffirmation of the peace process would sometimes 
serve as a useful way to provide momentum to the talks when they appeared stalled, 
as in April 2003, when his reaffirmation even during a period of apparent stalemate, 
allowed the parties time to conclude the September 2003 Security Agreement.259
Sanctions are a conflict management tool more than a conflict resolution one, and as a 
result the effectiveness of the Sudan Peace Act became suspect once Khartoum was 
fully engaged in negotiations. As it became more apparent that the parties were 
locked into the mediation process and could no longer credibly pull out or shop for 
forums, the US became less concerned about how Khartoum would react to sanctions. 
On 22 July 2004, the US congress passed resolutions declaring that the campaign in 
Darfur was genocide, based on the five criteria for genocide in Article 2 of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.“ On 23
amendment stopping oil companies which did business with Sudan from trading on US stock exchanges. The 
version reintroduced in 2002 lacked this amendment.
256 "The Sudan-IGAD Peace Process: Signposts for the Way Forward," 16. Ulf Terlinden and Tobias Debiel. 
“Deceptive Hope For Peace? The Horn of Africa Between Conflict Diplomacy and Obstacles to Development.” 
Peace, Conflict & Development 4 (April 2004), 10. El Obeid, Chronique Politique du Soudan 2003, 49. Barltrop, 
interview.
257 Sudan Peace Act, 2002, sections 5(b)(1), 6(b)(1) and 8. Terlinden and Debiel, “Deceptive Hope for Peace?“
10. Kevane, “Sudan: 2001-2002,” 24.
258 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead? 85.
259 Sidahmed and Sidahmed, Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, 80.
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December 2004, Bush signed the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act, which 
advocated sanctions against Khartoum for atrocities committed in Darfur.“61
The US was especially interested in enacting a final agreement as quickly as possible. 
By early 2004 US officials were rallying for a quick push to wrap up the peace 
process, but Sumbeiywo, backed by the Norwegians, sought to take the additional 
time necessary to lock in an implementation process. He felt this was one of the 
critical failures of the AAA. The US allowed the prospect of an official ceremony
at the White House marking the agreement, but the State Department admitted that 
this was more to raise the prestige of the agreement than to convince the two parties 
to make peace.261 Khartoum eventually also became wary of such a ceremony.264
INTERNATIONAL ATTENTION AND IGAD FOCUS
The great difficulty of resolving the conflict throughout the 1990s was that there were 
an increasing number of uncoordinated efforts by several potential mediators to push 
the warring parties towards an agreement. This was particularly the case when one of 
those parties, usually the government, preferred to look for a military solution. Such 
disjointed efforts by intermediaries can be counterproductive, and reluctant parties to 
negotiations tend to play mediators off each other. This forum-shopping can be 
used either to maximize a party’s negotiating leverage or to stall a peace process until 
military victory can be achieved.
261 Rogier, No More Hills Ahead? 88.
262 Waihenya, The Mediator, 134. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace Process: An Evaluation,” 34. Young quotes one 
of the mediators in the process as saying that the US had been hoping to have the final agreement concluded in 
time for President Bush’s January 2004 State of the Union address to congress. While the US was unsuccessful in 
speeding up the talks, it was able to persuade Sumbeiywo to get two of the principle leaders, Taha and Garang, to 
speak to each other directly. O’Fahey, interview. O’Fahey says contacts of his involved in the negotiations said 
the Wealth Sharing Agreement was settled between Taha and Garang in a matter of weeks, but the details and 
presentation kept if from being drafted for several months. Barltrop, interview. Barltrop, who also attended some 
of the meetings in Naivasha, notes that though US representatives such as Roger Winter were pushing for faster
” It is likely the increased conflict in 
Darfur throughout 2004 made a White House signing of the agreement untenable, as ending hostilities in that 
region was a condition for such a ceremony.
264 Antwi-Boateng and O'Mahony, “A Framework for the Analysis of Peace Agreements and Lessons Learned,”
172. ‘Consequently, when the idea of exchanging the signed agreements at the White House was broached, the 
government rejected it.’
265 Louis Kriesberg. “The Growth of the Conflict Resolution Field.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f 
Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington 
DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003419. Crocker, Hampson, Aall 2003, 507.
progress in the talks, they were at most a ’sporadic presence’.
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The latter was often the case for the NIF regime during the second war. Benjamin 
counts ten distinct peace talks or forums which Khartoum participated in during the 
first seven years of the NIF regime alone, including two meetings in Barcelona and 
The Hague in 1992." Even when it felt it had a relatively free hand in the mid- 
1990s, Khartoum would rarely pull out of negotiations unilaterally, aware that it 
could invite further international involvement in the war by appearing overly 
bellicose. Instead, Khartoum would seek out new forums in which to discuss 
ending the war, often complaining that previous ones had reached the limits of their 
usefulness. After September 1995, for example, Khartoum declared that the IGAD 
talks had reached a dead end and began searching for alternative forums in which to 
mediate, primarily to keep up the image of a peacemaker while completing military 
operations on the ground. By m id-1996, Bashir was calling for face to face talks, 
arranged by either Kenyan president Moi or South African president Mandela, 
between himself and Garang, in another early attempt to step outside the IGAD
269process.
Forum-shopping would become more difficult for Khartoum as IGAD began to 
maximize its strengths and improve its organizational structure. Crocker, Hampson 
and Aall describe the fundamental conundrum of organizational versus great power 
mediation addressed here. Organizations such as IGAD can more easily gain enough 
legitimacy to initiate mediation, but lack the ability to provide ‘carrots and sticks’ to 
steer parties through especially difficult areas of negotiation. Major powers, on the 
other hand, possess sufficient means of coercion and incentive, but often lack the 
legitimacy of a regional or international organization.270 Powerful international actors 
also lack the immediate focus on regional conflict which neighboring states often 
have, as demonstrated by the scattered, hesitant approach of the US towards peace in
266 Bamaba Marial Benjamin. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army and the Peace Process,” The 
Sudan Peace Process: Challenges and Future Prospects, Ed. John G. Nyuot Yoh and Eddy Maloka. East 
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2005, 50.
267 Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe, 162. Barltrop, interview.
268 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 184. Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and 
Catastrophe, 162.
269 Lesch, The Sudan: Contested National Identities, 207.
270 Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. “Muli-Party Mediation and the Conflict Cycle.” 
United States Institute of Peace, 1999, 29.
Sudan. As a result, the best hope for mediating a protracted conflict might be a 
concert of regional and international actors, the exact arrangement which would 
define the late IGAD process.
Several events within the IGAD organization helped it progress from a languishing, 
unused forum at the end of the century into one through which the Sudanese conflict 
could be mediated. Kenyan president Moi’s appointment of Sumbeiywo to head 
IGAD mediation, plus the renewed efforts of the US, UK, and Norway in providing 
assistance to the regional organization, contributed to its resurgence by 2002. As 
those three actors came to the forefront, other Western states endorsing the IGAD 
process became less involved. Likewise, as IGAD’s task switched from providing a 
forum for mediation to actual mediation, Kenya rose in prominence above other 
regional partners.272 This was primarily because of advocacy by the new troika of 
supporters, and because Kenya had been seen as relatively neutral by both the 
warring parties. With fewer players directly involved in the process, the mediators 
could move into areas of negotiation which involved confidentiality and discretion. 
Such maneuvers was not possible earlier in the IGAD process or the Egyptian-Libyan 
initiative, when the parties were more interested in ‘negotiating by press release’, a 
process which kept members of both factions fully informed but made compromise 
difficult.274
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Khartoum attended Machakos in 2002 partly out of fear of being labelled a 
‘renegade’ and being viewed as unreceptive to peace efforts. However, as the 
IGAD process picked up steam after the initial 2002 protocol, the government would
271 Petterson, Inside Sudan: Political Islam, Conflict, and Catastrophe, 242-243. An international delegation 
under Norwegian leadership was tasked to monitor the Nuba Mountains cease fire. A US team of roughly 20 
people was inserted on the ground in Khartoum and Rumbek to monitor operations there.
272 Young, “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace,” 104. Young, “Sudan IGAD Peace 
Process: An Evaluation,” 14, 40. Young notes that the heightened coordination between the US and Kenya in the 
late IGAD process amplified the significance of both those states’ involvement. Waihenya, The Mediator, 109. 
The US was foremost among states which successfully petitioned incoming Kenyan president Kibaki in late 2002 
to retain Sumbeiywo in his position as IGAD negotiator, despite the fact that his appointment by previous 
president Daniel arap Moi left his standing in doubt. El-Affendi, “The Impasse in the IGAD Peace Process for 
Sudan,” 592. Renewed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo also dominated Uganda’s attention after 
August 1998, reducing its role in the IGAD process.
273 Young, “Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace,” 101. Rajab, “Naivasha Peace 
Agreement: Analysis and Evaluation Part I,” 12. Euler, “Human Rights in Sudan,” 32. Kenya was the only IGAD 
member state to constantly maintain diplomatic relations with Sudan throughout the Naivasha process.
274 ICG, God, Oil and Country, 181.
275 Waihenya, The Mediator, 83.
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continue to search for alternative forums each time it was on the verge of being 
forced to make a major concession. In 2003, after the government delegation angrily 
rejected Sumbeiywo’s Nakuru document, Khartoum again asked South Africa to take 
over mediation. By 2004, the government was using international involvement to 
stall the mediation process, announcing in March that it would not finalize a 
comprehensive agreement until 2005 so that it would have time to familiarize itself 
with any incoming US administration. However, with so much international 
support for the IGAD forum, it became harder for Khartoum to derail or suspend 
negotiations.
Khartoum’s reluctance to commit to a single mediation forum was not unanticipated. 
One of the primary early reasons IGAD members attempted to rally Western 
governments behind their mediation efforts in the 1990s was not for funding or even 
basic technical support, but to keep these states (Australia, Britain, the Netherlands,
970
Canada, Italy, Norway and the US) from becoming, or backing, rival mediators.
This coordination was crucial to combating the forum-shopping efforts of the parties. 
Another reason for IGAD’s early attempts to reach out to industrialized states was 
that it further pulled the United States in particular into backing the forum as the only 
avenue for negotiations. The presence of so many Western allies of the US in the 
‘Friends of IGAD’ club (later known as the IGAD Partners Forum) was an advantage 
no other peace initiative being put forward at the time could boast of. American 
hesitancy to back the forum, or a choice to reinvigorate the initiative sponsored by its 
crucial Egyptian ally, might have stalled the process once again.
276 Waihenya, The Mediator, 114-115. South Africa, like Egypt, deferred to IGAD’s mediation, a testament to the 
organization’s growing stature in this sphere.
277 ICG, “Sudan’s Dual Crises,” 7.
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Financing was another contribution developed states were able to make to the peace 
process. IGAD Partners such as the US contributed significantly to costs such as 
travelling and residence expenses, as well as workshops and communications abilities 
which IGAD itself was unable to fund.280 From February 2002 on, the UK helped 
finance the Joint Military Commission which monitored the implementation of the 
Nuba Mountains cease fire. After amendments in February 2003 to the
Memorandum of Understanding between Khartoum and the SPLA, the UK also
281would devote many funds to the Verification and Monitoring Team.
Norwegian delegates from the IGAD Partners Forum coordinated heavily with the 
IGAD Secretariat in the first half of 2002 during the build up to the Machakos 
Protocol. Much of their involvement consisted in providing technicians to help draft 
proposals, lending their credibility as a successful international mediator to the peace 
process, and reassuring Egypt that its interests would be taken into consideration 
despite the failure of the Egyptian Libyan Joint Initiative to gain momentum." " A 
Norwegian Brigadier General assumed command of the international team sent to 
monitor the Nuba Mountains cease fire in 20 02.283 The Norwegian-headed Joint 
Assessment Mission Core Coordinating Group had representatives from the 
government, the SPLM, the UN and the World Bank.284
International agencies were able to keep momentum going even during long stalls in 
the peace process, such as that between the Machakos Protocol of July 2002 and the 
Security Agreement of September 2003. In May 2003, the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme and the two parties set up a Joint Assessment 
Mission to determine the needs of Sudan throughout the interim period and to prepare
2X0 Rajab, “Naivasha Peace Agreement: Analysis and Evaluation Part I,” 18.
2X1 Brusset, “Evaluation of the Conflict Prevention Pools: Sudan,” 11-12, 17-18, 22. The Verification and 
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zones, and slowly got into humanitarian issues such as food distribution as well. Brusset stresses that early 
mechanisms in the IGAD peace process were not in themselves enough to keep the peace; rather, they gained 
strength from the momentum of the peace talks throughout 2002-2005. However, though the JMC operates within 
international law, it does not have legal authority. ‘Legitimacy derives from the pressure of a few foreign 
Governments.’ The Verification and Monitoring Team, on the other hand, is to be staffed by persons from 
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for the pre-interim requirements.285 By mid-2003, Arab states had also begun 
promising to contribute to the reconstruction of southern Sudan, with Libya 
contributing US$1 million, and Qatar and Syria each offering US$500,000. Such aid 
was another indicator that all areas of the international community anticipated the 
conclusion of the war very soon.286
Of negotiated settlements of civil wars in the late twentieth century, only half were 
conducted with a third party mediating. As a result, Walter suggests that warring 
parties turn to outside mediation primarily because ‘the appearance of mediators 
frequently coincides with the offer of outside security guarantees’.287 It is these 
security guarantees which often solidify settlements that might otherwise not have 
held. As one comprehensive study of twentieth century conflict demonstrates, ‘in 
every case in which a guarantee was offered, the two sides managed to reach and 
implement a lasting negotiated settlement. When no guarantee was offered,
o o o
negotiations almost always broke down.’ In his report to President Bush 
advocating increased US involvement in the IGAD peace process, Danforth seemed 
to recognize this shortcoming as it applied to implementing the cease fire. Danforth 
noted that ‘previous agreements did not provide for international involvement and 
often collapsed because of the intense distrust of the parties who could not monitor 
compliance and verify implementation. Our proposals were designed to avoid this 
failure.’ The Civilian Protection Monitoring Team was established in September 
2002 to ensure cease fires were upheld and atrocities against the civilian population 
were reported.290
Ultimately, the final contribution of international actors to the Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement was a maneuver by Sumbeiywo and Danforth to put pressure on the two
285 Rajab, “Naivasha Peace Agreement: Analysis and Evaluation Part II,” 13.
286 “Sudan Report.” News From Africa. 15 May 2003 - 14 June 2003
287 Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” 356.
288 Walter, “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement,” 358. ‘Military stalemate proved the only variable other 
than security guarantees that helped predict successful outcome in cases where negotiation occurred.’ Stephen 
John Stedman. “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes.” International Security 22:2 (Autumn 1997), 6. Stedman 
concurs that ‘the crucial difference between the success and failure of spoiliers is the role played by international 
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289 Danforth, “Report to the President of the United States on the Outlook for Peace in Sudan,” 6.
290 Kevane, “Sudan: 2001-2002,” 11. The CPMT was funded by the US government, but consisted of private 
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parties to finalize the outstanding modules of implementation, declare a final cease 
fire, and sign the comprehensive treaty. By November 2004, the talks had stalled 
over these issues. To break the impasse, Sumbeiywo contacted John Danforth, now 
US Ambassador to the UN and chair of the Security Council. The former special 
envoy to Sudan organized a convening of the Security Council in Nairobi on 18-19 
November 2004 in order to encourage the parties to conclude the talks. Sumbeiywo 
was able to use the imminent arrival of the UN Security Council to coax the parties to 
agree to sign the documents necessary to conclude the peace process.
COERCION AND EXPERTISE IN MEDIATION
In her essay supporting non-state conflict mediation over efforts made by state actors, 
Nathan writes that multi-national bodies are less than ideal mediators because when 
peace efforts ‘are subject to decision-making by member states, the organizations 
function less as unified corporate actors than as diplomatic arenas in which the 
conflict plays out in adversarial faction... In addition, disparate interests within the 
mediating body can be exploited by the parties and exacerbate the conflict.’“
However, the IGAD process demonstrates that rather than member states competing 
with each other and therefore disrupting the process, the opposite can occur: a well 
coordinated peace initiative, which seeks to include a wide number of actors both 
regionally and internationally in limited roles, will have enhanced legitimacy to 
conduct a peace process. In addition, the endorsement of participating states in the 
peace process makes it more difficult for insincere parties to the conflict to seek other 
forums for mediation, the ‘forum-shopping’ dilemma. However, this seems to be a 
more likely phenomenon to occur in regional organizations rather than larger ones 
such as the UN, in which participation in the organization by no means assumes 
endorsement of each initiative undertaken by that body.
Nathan submits that coercive measures taken against an intra-state warring party are
291 Waihenya, The Mediator, 135-136. Barltrop, interview. Barltrop notes the stalling which had come to define 
the peace process by 2004, an atmosphere in which many participants and observers felt the agreement was on the 
verge of conclusion. However, he believes that without the intervention of the Security Council to advocate a 
final resolution, the negotiations would have gone on much longer.
292 Laurie Nathan. “When Push Comes To Shove: The failure of international mediation in African Civil Wars.” 
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likely to make that party ‘insecure, and therefore even more radical. Hardline leaders 
may be able to improve their position and weaken that of moderates. However, in a 
negotiated settlement, which typically requires significant concessions from both 
sides, this is an existing risk anyway. Nathan’s near absolute rejection of the use of 
coercion in mediation presupposes the good faith of both parties, and overlooks the 
ability of a mediator to work in concert with actors willing to apply pressure to one or 
both parties in order to advance dialogue. A key example is Lazaro Sumbeiywo’s 
ability to coordinate the activity of the United States, a country whose congress had 
been pressuring the president to become more assertively involved in the process, 
cutting aid to Khartoum if it felt the regime was being insincere regarding its 
commitment to peace. This initial pressure nevertheless resulted in an agreement 
concluded in a large part between elites of either side, negotiating with almost no 
mediation at all.
Nathan considers the initial failure of the Bashir regime to accept the 1994 
Declaration of Principles to be an example of a non-neutral organization (IGAD) 
attempting to force the direction of the negotiations, to counterproductive affect. She 
cites a Kenyan diplomat familiar with the process as stating that IGAD should have 
circulated a draft of the paper for discussion, rather than making a declaration 
including elements such as the right to self-determination to the south.294 This 
analysis assumes good faith on Khartoum’s part and does not address the fact that by 
1997, under increased military pressure from regional states and the US, Khartoum 
did consent to the Declaration of Principles, an event which would appear to 
undermine her argument about the value of coercion. Nathan dismisses IGAD efforts 
in the 1990s as ‘partisan’, but does not note that Khartoum accepted the IGAD 
mediation forum because it assumed its regional neighbors would be sympathetic to 
its objectives.295
Nathan allows that ‘punitive action against those responsible for oppression and 
atrocities is not intrinsically inappropriate... rather... where it is deemed necessary, it
293 Nathan, “When Push Comes To Shove: The failure of international mediation in African Civil Wars,” 17.
294 Nathan, “When Push Comes To Shove: The failure of international mediation in African Civil Wars,” 10.
295 Nathan, “When Push Comes To Shove: The failure of international mediation in African Civil Wars,” 16.
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should be applied by some agency other than the active or prospective mediator. ’296 
However, if such punitive action is taken in coordination with the mediator, it is 
effectively an endorsement by the mediator of the agency’s legitimacy, if not of its 
every action. Action that is not coordinated with the mediator is essentially a 
liability, since it has the potential to disrupt mediation efforts. In addition, the 
dilemma is raised of whether action should be taken against ‘oppression and 
atrocities’ if that action disrupts mediation efforts. The question remains unanswered 
as to as to why punitive action should be taken against parties committing 
‘oppression and atrocities’ but not against parties which are negotiating in bad faith. 
After all, it is the latter practice which blocks progress in peace settlements, thereby 
allowing oppression and atrocities to continue. Nathan's assertion raises more 
complex questions than it answers.
Nathan makes the generalization that states and multinational bodies prove 
ineffective mediators because they ‘do not view international mediation as a 
specialised enterprise.’“ Nathan concedes that heads of state might have inter­
personal skills and access to ‘carrots’, but that they would be even more effective if 
they ‘were proficient in mediation techniques’ .298 The notion that mediation 
techniques improve mediation skills, however, is not a controversial one. In fact, it 
seems to contradict an earlier point of Nathan’s: the WWCC/ACC, which mediated 
the AAA, was a religious organization not composed of professional mediators. They 
understood Sudan very well, but were not well-versed in mediating civil conflicts. In 
addition, Nathan overlooks attributes of legitimacy which may be associated with 
state actors as opposed to neutral professional mediators: in Sudan’s case, the 
mediator was a high-ranking former Kenyan general whose authority was accepted, 
sometimes grudgingly, by both parties’ leaders.299 Sumbeiywo retained this 
legitimacy as a mediator even though he lacked formal experience in conflict 
resolution.
2% Nathan, “When Push Comes To Shove: The failure o f international mediation in African Civil Wars,” 12.
297 Nathan, “When Push Comes To Shove: The failure o f international mediation in African Civil Wars,” 13.
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299 The fact that Bashir and Garang also came from a military background may have made Sumbeiywo’s
experience a bonus.
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Nathan appears to argue that ‘external manipulation’ also will not work because 
warring parties in civil conflicts are not rational actors and bent on destroying each 
other. ‘A settlement is viewed as synonymous with defeat’ .300 This assumption 
rejects the premise that rebels might have limited demands (separation, regional 
autonomy, more political freedom, wealth or power sharing arrangements, for 
example) which warring states can be induced to grant with enough pressure from 
outside actors. In fact, impartial mediation, in concert with access to the sticks and 
carrots provided by state actors, uses all the tools available to mediators. It would be 
easy for these two assets to clash, but they can also complement each other. In most 
circumstances therefore, mediators should attempt to retain neutrality, but not at the 
expense of a broad and well-organized coalition of states which support mediation 
efforts.
Lake and Rothchild provide a series of instances in which coercive diplomacy 
worked and did not work, and established a theory that ‘if external powers are going 
to intervene in ethnic conflicts, either alone or in concert with others, they must do so 
in a way that is credible to the groups involved. ’301 This appears to be a sounder 
theory than that which shuns coercion outright. The US and other Western states 
made clear to both parties during the IGAD process what its priorities were. None of 
these states were openly working in the interest of either party, but the US had in the 
past supported the SPLA, and stressed coercive measures to be implemented against 
the regime in the form of sanctions. Despite the US’s obvious history of favoritism to 
the insurgents, its newfound consistency in policy towards Sudan and its support of 
the IGAD mediation process prevented Khartoum from continuing its forum­
shopping endeavors, by which it could turn to the kind of disinterested mediation 
Nathan supports with no intention of actually agreeing to a deal.
300 Nathan, “When Push Comes To Shove: The failure of international mediation in African Civil Wars,” 16.
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CONCLUSION
Sudanese conflicts do not adhere easily to consistent theory about conflict resolution. 
The size of Sudan and the inability of southern rebels to take the capital by force 
means that insurgencies have continued regardless of any change of regimes in 
Khartoum. The state is so unintegrated that many models of conflict resolution 
simply do not seem applicable. Conflicts have continued under both parliamentary 
and authoritarian regimes. They have been fought when the south was considered a 
financial drain and when it was considered a bounty of natural wealth. They have 
been fought as both national revolutionary and separatist wars. Ideologically, 
southern insurgencies have been fought by both leftists and ardent anti-communists, 
and under both Equatorian and Nilotic leadership.
One consistency in both wars was the prominent role given to the definition and 
preservation of cultural identity. While cultural identity may itself be mutable, in the 
post-colonial world it is often the most intractable of issues to fight over. Unlike 
ideological conflicts, conflicts over identity, especially separatist conflicts, are often 
existential, and not resolvable via formal mediation or outright conquest.1 Such 
conflicts can heighten awareness of identity in individuals who had not previously 
felt ethnic, religious or factional insecurity: that is, how they perceive themselves and 
how they feel others perceive them. These conflicts are often more difficult to 
reconcile than contests over natural resources or power-sharing arrangements. 
Conflicts of identity ultimately become violent when members of a group believe that 
the assertion of another group’s identity threatens its own.
Accordingly, agreements could only be reached between the parties when one side 
had dropped its nationalist vision for Sudan. The AAA was drafted while the SSLM 
insurgency had adopted the machinery of a nationalist movement, but had yet to
1 Roy Licklider. “Obstacles to Peace Settlements.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing International 
Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 698. Harold H. Saunders, “Prenegotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the 
Multilevel Peace Process.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing International Conflict. Eds. Crocker, 
Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 
484.
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become so ideologically rigid that it could not agree to significant concessions 
concerning that goal. The CPA was adopted when the Bashir junta had dropped its 
pretences at nationalism and became willing to at least officially allow secession for 
the southern part of the state. The constant tactical alliances made by both parties in 
the second war had different results. In the case of the insurgent SPLM/A, it allowed 
the formation of partnerships with other groups and the opportunity to become a truly 
nationalist movement, an opportunity that receded due to the inability of the 
insurgency to overthrow the Bashir regime. On the other hand, Khartoum’s 
coalitions were not only less inclusive than the SPLM/A’s but locked the government 
into compromises and precedents such as self-determination and sharing of oil 
revenue.
Although the war became a complex political web, no coalition or ideology was able 
to mask the north/south schism which rested at its core. This was true even though 
the insurgency in the second war was ostensibly committed to national revolution 
across Sudan. As Douglas Johnson writes, ‘the debate within the SPLM/A over 
whether the South is best served by restructuring the whole country, or by separating 
from the rest of the Sudan, is still a debate about how best to defend the South.’ This 
is in part because the south has never been fully integrated into the synthesis of 
Sudan’s national identity, the dominant cause of both civil wars. This problem has 
been dealt with in two opposite ways by the agreements: the significance of the AAA 
is that it ended a war by seeking to resolve the conflicts in Sudan’s national identity. 
The CPA ended a conflict by seeking to more clearly define the differences in 
Sudanese identity.2 3 With the CPA, the principle of southern uniqueness has evolved 
since independence from a preference for federalism to regional autonomy to self- 
determination and possible secession. Yet as the potential outcome becomes more 
drastic, the rhetoric becomes more accommodating, with concessions made to federal
2 Douglas H. Johnson. “The Sudan People’s Liberation Army and the Problem of Factionalism.” African 
Guerrillas. Ed. Christopher Clapham. Oxford: James Currey Ltd, 1998, 71.
3 Lobban and Ibrahim concur with this conclusion. Lobban, interview. ‘The more they struggle for unity, the 
more division takes place because there is not a common charter or identity shared across a large space.... The 
ultimate goal of the AAA was to put the country together again. The ultimate objective of the CPA is to allow for 
the country to become two. One is a mediation of two spouses to get them married again, the other is a trial 
separation which could lead to divorce.’ Ibrahim, interview. ‘If you look at both agreements, the first was to 
unify, the second is to disintegrate the country.’
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democracy and individual and group rights in the CPA which were not present in the 
earlier agreement.
The decades of war have first exaggerated, then hardened the divisions between 
northerners and southerners over the issue of national identity. The first war was 
directly related to grievances southerners felt over economic opportunities and 
cultural insecurity. The second war concerned similar problems, but in the context of 
a more aggressively radical reinterpretation of national identity on both sides of the 
conflict. Yet the years of war have conglomerated neither north nor south Sudan into 
more cohesive national units individually. Southerners have sought regional 
solidarity with each other throughout the history of independent Sudan, as evidenced 
by political parties such as the Southern Front and the AAA compromise of a 
Southern Region, but deep ethnic differences remain, and may be as severe as they 
were at independence. The northern identity may be even more fractured, as 
uprisings throughout the state in the 1990s and 2000s demonstrate, and as 
exemplified by the NDA alliance with the southern insurgency against an Arab 
Muslim government. Indeed, the Bashir regime also relies on Arabist discrimination, 
as demonstrated in its conflict in Darfur. However, it is the Islamist component 
which is most rejected in the south, as opposed to the first war when it was the Arab 
identity, with Islam as an identifier, that was most resented.
By the early 1970s, southern identity was so inchoate that the AAA was able to 
address its concerns simply by promising to protect indigenous culture and allowing 
southerners more autonomy and access to central power. The agreement provided 
some benefits to marginalized southern elites without weakening the position of the 
national government domestically or abroad. To the degree that Khartoum did not 
fulfill its promises, particularly in the area of employment (primarily army positions), 
militancy continued against the central government in the form of a continued low- 
level insurgent campaign and mutinies at southern garrisons throughout the 1970s.
By 1972, what southerners really sought was for northerners en masse to leave them 
alone. They did not want interference from the northern army, or to be forced into
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the assimilation of northern culture and language. Significantly, southerners fought 
for the right to determine the nature of education in their region, and the freedom to 
pursue more of it nationally and internationally. These cultural freedoms were the 
real gains of the AAA, not the democratic institutions which, as the peaceful interim 
between wars continued, so often foundered along tribal lines. Education, as a result, 
led to not so much a rejection of the southern identity as a desire to transcend it, a 
theme that would carry on in the next insurgent movement.
However, the lesson of Sudanese conflict resolution is not that southerners do not 
appreciate formal democratic institutions, but that they do not see them as imperative 
to protecting southern culture from national interference. To the degree southerners 
have fought for democracy, it appears to be as a conduit for cultural preservation. It 
must be remembered that some of the elements which compose southern Sudan, and 
have done so for years before even independence, are not easily conducive to modem 
democratic institutions. Some of the currents of tribalism in the south were 
antithetical to the purely democratic arrangements a nationalist cause might fight for: 
southerners might not have wanted to be dominated by the north, but neither did the 
Shilluk, Nuer, or Equatorian peoples wish to be dominated by the more populous 
Dinka.
John Garang’s movement was by almost any standard a more formidable insurgent 
movement than the Anya Nya. It was the result of an all-encompassing Sudanese 
nationalism, yet it was also unable to achieve its objectives. Even a concept as 
egalitarian as the SPLM/A’s ‘New Sudan’, which had broad support among even 
northern Sudanese opposition, was compromised to the point where it was made 
obsolete by the CPA. Under the IGAD mediation process, the SPLM/A was forced to 
abandon large parts of its vision and instead debate the highly charged issue of self- 
determination for the south, which was a significant change of agenda for the group.4 
Garang, unlike Lagu, had been a politically experienced and engaged actor, 
advocating radical measures to address the economic and political imbalance across
4 Lobban, interview. ‘Southern nationalism existed in a prototype before independence. Anya Nya wanted 
separation and had a democratic secular approach. Garang and the SPLA wanted a unitary pan-Sudanese 
government to rival the Islamists. So there are multiple agendas that in some way intersect and some ways 
contradict.’
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Sudan. Nevertheless, like Lagu he was compelled to settle for a power-sharing 
arrangement with himself representing the south and the government as a dominant 
partner, if not a client of, Bashir.
The internal political dynamics of Sudan’s attempts at conflict resolution have also 
been defined by the difficulty actors have in challenging the patronage state, the 
tendency towards exclusivist coalitions, and the destruction of institutions which 
make broad-reaching, multilateral peace agreements possible. This inter-feeding 
troika of conditions has existed throughout Sudan’s history regardless of natural 
wealth, ethnic composition and dominating visions of national identity, or 
engagement with international actors.
Sudan’s inability to form an integrated state has caused it to diverge somewhat from 
Levy’s theory of exclusivist coalitions under authoritarian regimes: In Sudan, the 
patronage dynamic has actually continued under parliamentary regimes, which have 
also proved unable to sustain broad-based coalitions. This explains the increased 
reliance on lightly armed militias raised in remote areas of the state to fight the war, 
even under ostensibly democratic regimes such as Sadiq Al-Mahdi’s government of 
the 1980s. It also explains the neglect of civil society, and its corresponding set of 
institutions vital to popular democracy but not as significant to patronage networks in 
addition to perpetuating patronage politics. Parliamentary governments were forced 
to be more transparent in their transition of coalitions, and therefore left themselves 
vulnerable to takeovers such that of 1989.
The need for various regimes to form exclusive coalitions to retain power has led to 
an emphasis on the oversize personalities of individual elites. Sadiq Al-Mahdi, 
Hassan Al-Turabi, Jaafar Nimeiri and John Garang all left their imprint on the state 
through their attempts at exclusive deal-making. SPLA splinter factions were 
similarly personality-based. The inability of Sudanese elites to agree on a way to 
integrate the state has resulted in an increased reliance on the patronage politics of a 
handful of individuals, nearly the only constant in the history of the administration of 
post-independence Sudan. The focus on individual personalities is especially notable
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in the first war, where the ideological differences were less pronounced. There are 
parallels to the way the two military leaders emerged in the first war. Nimeiri 
crushed rightist and leftist challenges, but was still feeling vulnerable and needed to 
consolidate a base. Lagu was able to extend his control over the various political and 
military factions that composed the southern insurgency, but recognized the need to 
make peace quickly because of the changing international climate. However, while 
both leaders had internal and external pressures, it is very likely that what made the 
Addis Ababa Agreement work was that neither side felt constrained by a 
constituency. Nimeiri prevented any attempt to mobilize against the settlement from 
the north and Lagu, by virtue of being in command of the broadest part of the 
insurgency, was able to wean control away from his potential rivals.
Similarly, inducting enemies into exclusive coalitions is really the only form of 
political compromise the NIF regime had known by the time of the IGAD peace 
process. Consequently, the junta has struck an exclusive partnership with every 
faction in the country, beginning with Islamist-military coalition which formed the 
regime in 1989 and continuing on until the coalition with the SPLM/A in 2005. The 
NIF regime’s most significant success in tactical manipulation was that it created 
enough of a rift in the SPLA to dilute the insurgent movement’s uncompromising 
goal of national revolution. It further was able to lure away temporary SPLM/A 
allies such as Umma, making an already weak northern opposition even weaker and 
exacerbating the north/south divide in Sudan. The ease with which Khartoum was 
able to pull some factions of the NDA into its fold compromised the effectiveness of 
that opposition movement, and gave both parties to the CPA reason to sideline it.
The decision to avoid being inducted into the neo-patrimonial system as a subservient 
client of the national government was perhaps the only ideological consistency of the 
SPLM/A, and what makes the CPA a singular agreement in Sudanese history.
The tactical, asymmetrical partnerships which have defined Sudan’s history have 
limited the ability of parties to seek peace with outside factions. As Nimeiri had 
attempted to do with his unwieldy coalition of southerners, Islamists and the military, 
Bashir sought to keep sectarians, militias, and Islamic financiers all reliant on him
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personally, primarily through largesse. However, he was not able to make peace with 
NDA members such as Umma leader Sadiq Al-Mahdi until his coalition with Turabi 
collapsed. Neither he nor Nimeiri could reach a peace agreement with the dominant 
southern insurgency group until their regimes had ended the coalition with radicals 
which they had until then relied upon to maintain their positions of power.
The center-periphery patronage system in Sudan is constantly working against 
inclusive nationalist ideologies and national institutions: those which come to be in 
opposition to the patronage system are eventually compromised, co-opted, or simply 
destroyed. This pattern is apparent not only when analyzing the underpinnings of 
political agreements, but even when examining the integrity of such institutions as 
vital to the state as the army and the banking system. This phenomenon, coupled 
with the need to re-orientate state institutions to serve the purposes of whichever 
exclusivist coalition is currently in operation, demonstrate a trend towards shallow 
institutions in Sudan which can easily be challenged by force or coercion. Most 
importantly, it has also buttressed southern demands during the Naivasha process for 
independent institutions not as easily compromised by Khartoum.
In both the CPA and AAA, issues of identity were paramount. Only once they had 
been resolved could the parties turn to security matters and the division of wealth.
The importance which southerners have placed on taking control of their own 
security has grown proportionate to Khartoum’s willingness to compromise the unity 
of the Sudanese army. This process began with the AAA, which marks the first 
compromise of the military as it allowed insurgents who had been former enemies to 
be integrated within it. The process continued with Nimeiri’s building up of the 
security services in the late 1970s, creating a rival to the military with regards to 
preserving state security. The reliance on various militias throughout the 1980s and 
1990s continued the trend of outsourcing the military’s monopoly on violence.
As the post-nationalist NIF regime began to rely less on state institutions such as the 
military to fight the war, the southerners began to push for their own separate army in 
any peace agreement, a longstanding objective from the first civil war. The status of
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the southern army, its right to defend southerners from state aggression, has been a 
continuous though little commented-upon theme of both wars and both treaties. It 
was not administrative intrusion from Khartoum or authoritarianism which started the 
hostilities of the second war, but the plan to remove southern troops from southern 
soil.
The 2003 Security Agreement, with its focus on two separate armies and a small 
amount of integrated units, was the SPLM/A’s preferred model for most national 
institutions. Though it finally conceded the point, the government was less willing to 
agree to a similar arrangement for banking as an Islamist banking system was a 
priority of the Bashir regime. The NIF insisted on setting up a Sharia-dominant 
banking system primarily because Sharia was the regime’s raison d ’etre, as 
preserving Islamic law was the reason for the regime’s 1989 coup in the first place.
In addition, control over the banking system was an effective weapon of the regime 
throughout then north. Islamic banks were simultaneously an instrument of 
patronage, a tool of economic power, and a key element of the Islamist identity. The 
Bashir regime used Islamic banks, tax cuts and other economic incentives to advance 
the war effort in the north. While it had few pretensions of nationalism by end of the 
war, it was vital that the regime retain its post-nationalist ideological core. Turabi’s 
ejection from the regime ensured that Bashir cling even more tightly to fundamental 
Islamic principles, as he no longer had the legitimacy of the state’s most renowned 
Islamist to prop up his regime.
The erosion of nationalist ideology by patronage state dynamics has a direct effect on 
the crafting of both treaties. Ultimately, the sheer exhaustion from war probably bore 
a large responsibility for concessions made by each side in both the 1972 and 2005 
agreements. This is to be expected, since peace treaties are not concluded in a 
vacuum where parties can ignore the realities of war’s slow destruction of prosperity 
and society in favor of discussing the relatively abstract concept of ‘national identity’. 
It is not generally assumed that with the conclusion of a negotiated settlement in a 
civil war, two parties must necessarily commit to any broader united vision of a 
state’s future. In fact, many peace treaties are implemented to buy time for peace, in
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the hopes that deeper structural and ideological foundations can grow after the parties 
involved have tasted the prosperity and security peace presumably provides.5 What is 
significant is the slight degree to which the traditional respective versions of national 
identity have been represented in the conclusion of these peace treaties, even in the 
fervent ideological climate of the second civil war. This analysis seems to support 
the conclusions not only that Sudan is a difficult state for the state to physically 
control in its entirety, but also that there is no synthesis of national identity to 
accommodate the cultural and religious schisms in the state. Peter Woodward 
describes how, in the period following the Naivasha process, Sudanese he 
encountered focus increasingly on the concerns of their specific region than the 
wellbeing of the state as a whole. They often cite the Bashir regime itself as 
highlighting these differences, in contrast to the nationalist movements of the 1960s.6 
Given the brutality of these two civil wars, it is likely that attempting to create such 
an identity now would be an even more difficult task than it would have been at 
independence.
Economic incentive has also played a role in Sudan’s attempts at conflict resolution. 
Peace in both conflicts did not come primarily from trust between parties that their 
objectives could be met through cooperation but because of the futility of their war 
efforts. In the first war, the regime could not meet its national economic objectives 
with a large amount of each annual budget devoted to military expenditures. In the 
second conflict, a significant amount of Khartoum’s economic priorities were focused 
on the south or disputed areas along the north-south border. Hence, the north in both 
wars faced some economic incentive to end hostilities. On the other hand, southern 
rebels, separatists and national revolutionaries alike were nowhere near achieving 
their objectives in either peace agreement. Southerners in the second war particularly 
settled for peace not because it was potentially lucrative, but because the cost of 
fighting was becoming prohibitive. This was primarily a consequence of the
5 Roy Licklider. “Obstacles to Peace Settlements.” Turbulent Peace: The Challenges o f Managing International 
Conflict. Eds. Crocker, Chester A., Fen Osier Hampson and Pamela Aall. Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2003, 713. ‘A successful settlement is precisely one that makes its own issues less 
relevant and thus makes itself obsolete. Thus there is a paradox: a civil war settlement must seem permanent but 
in fact should probably be temporary.’
6 Woodward, interview.
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government’s growing oil wealth, which it used to stabilize itself while continuing 
the war.
Sudan may lack the oil reserves to evolve into a true rentier state, but it has been able 
to integrate the oil economy into the patronage politics which define the political 
economy. Southern wealth, however, has not fundamentally changed priorities for 
either the government or the rebels in the second war. It simply adds another lens 
through which to view an already intricate conflict.
Sudan’s poor integration as a state defies the Collier-Hoeffler model and 
greed/grievance dichotomies generally. The diverse, tribal nature of the south has not 
allowed the region to seek a common opportunist goal of seceding in order to more 
exclusively enjoy economic resources, as according to the Collier-Hoeffler model. 
Southern rebel groups have animosities and tactical alliances which cannot be 
explained broadly by any single economic-rationalist model, but by deeper concerns 
about security and culture. While this is not to suggest that Khartoum is unable to 
use natural wealth to retain power or exploit divisions among insurgents, such models 
do not strike at the heart of the rebellion and insurgency.
Oil wealth in the second war changed tactics of the insurgency, but not the ultimate 
objective. A lack of oil wealth in the first war allowed greater trust among parties, as 
demonstrated by a comparison with the cease fire process in the second war. In that 
conflict, the southern tactic of negotiating without implementing a cease fire was 
primarily a tool by which to keep the government from profiting from oil wealth: not 
simply because southerners felt the oil was rightfully theirs, but, more urgently, 
because they knew that Khartoum would use that wealth to buy more advanced 
weaponry with which to prosecute the war. The promise of increased oil revenues 
drove the government to sustain the war effort throughout the 1990s, even as it was 
straining the financial seams of the state.
Though the SPLM took precautions in the wealth-sharing agreement to keep 
Khartoum from siphoning off all of the south’s resources, it seems clear that
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benefiting from oil wealth was not the movement’s top priority. Instead, the primary 
southern concern was that oil issues not pose an excuse for central control of the 
southern region, nor that extracting resources from the earth pose problems for the 
local populations in the oil areas. As with water during the post-AAA period of 
Jonglei canal construction, the primary interest of southerners seems to be as much 
about controlling the development surrounding resources as it was about controlling 
resources themselves. As a result, the SPLM in the Naivasha process could leave 
ownership of underground wealth unresolved as long as they received an agreed 
amount of revenue. They would not make similar compromises on surface land 
rights however, since that might mean an inability to contain development 
implemented in part by oil production. Southern Sudan’s lack of infrastructure and 
remoteness prohibit insurgents in the region from significantly profiting even from 
the few resources they had easy access to, such as timber.
In negotiations, the SPLM faced a difficult task as it sought to protect the interests of 
its southern base as well as those of the contested areas of Abyei, the Nuba 
Mountains and South Blue Nile. Areas that would later be contested because of their 
oil wealth, such as Abyei, had been beset by intractable problems of identity even 
before such wealth made them even more prominent. This also contradicts economic 
determinist theories of predation arising independently from cultural and ethnic 
grievances.
While the nature of Sudanese identity was at the heart of both treaties, its significance 
may have been disguised by the heavy international involvement of the second 
agreement. In contrast to the 1970s, when the Organization of African Unity 
discouraged its members from becoming too deeply involved in each other’s internal 
affairs, by the 1990s regional organizations such as IGAD were often the first 
multilateral bodies to become involved in conflict resolution. The organization did 
not have the powers of coercion to force a peace agreement during the 1990s, but was 
able to lay groundwork such as the 1994 Declaration of Principles that could be built 
upon as the forum received increased international support in the new century. The 
Bashir regime’s retreat from nationalism actually allowed even more foreign
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influence within Sudan. The regime’s constant forum-shopping and destabilization 
of the region widened the circle of involvement in its civil war to the point where 
Khartoum was unable to impede the introduction of issues such as self-determination. 
The Nimeiri regime, which still retained Sudan’s early post-colonial insecurity about 
international involvement in Sudanese affairs, was better able to control the process.
Gradually international actors became involved in all aspects of monitoring and 
implementation of the CPA, including the US. The incompatibility of nationalist 
versus post-nationalist objectives and the refusal of the SPLM/A to be made a patron 
in the traditional sense of militias meant the warring parties had simply exhausted the 
trust necessary to implement that agreement free of outside influence, in no small part 
because of the collapse of the AAA, an agreement which had not relied as heavily on 
international guarantees. As war took its toll on the Sudanese population, 
international aid would also become a conduit to conflict mediation. In both 
agreements, outside mediators became involved in conflict resolution nationally after 
initially pursuing more modest humanitarian objectives, as demonstrated by the early 
contributions of the World Council of Churches and John Danforth via his work in 
the Nuba Mountains.
The inclusion of a variety of international actors can complicate the goals and 
methods of conflict resolution. Outside actors sometimes do not understand issues at 
stake, or merely seek to advance their own interests. In the case of the AAA, 
Ethiopia’s interests were similar enough to Sudan’s that this posed no threat to an 
agreement. With each new tier of mediators in the IGAD process, however, there 
were new opportunities for confusion. The IGAD forum was able to avoid distraction 
by issues of primary concern to outside parties, such as terrorism or natural resources, 
by restoring focus in 2001 to the overriding goal of ending the war. The increased 
focus on Kenya as the dominant mediation authority also lent clarity to the process.
As IGAD grew from a regional to an international concert, outside actors in the 
IGAD process were often focused on security and resource concerns, sometimes 
without a clear understanding of the deeper conflicts within the state. The
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complicated system of compromises and power-sharing which make up the CPA is 
not just a result of the wariness of the two parties towards each other and their 
opposing interests concerning resources and ideology: it is a testament to the 
fundamental difficulties of a peace process dominated by the interests and offices of 
external actors. Outside actors have contributed to the peace process by providing 
institutions, mediation, good offices, donor support, and sometimes by resorting to 
pressure and coercion. However, such actors are not equipped to foster an integrated 
national identity, or even to create viable domestic institutions by which an enduring 
peace can be achieved. As a result, the legitimacy of agreements was in danger of 
being compromised not only by an internal lack of viable institutions, but by an 
unbalanced amount of outside involvement.
An example of the potential disharmony which international involvement can cause is 
the tension between the Egyptian-Libyan Joint Initiative and the IGAD peace process 
during the early 2000s. Both emphasized different priorities which each of the parties 
placed value on. Self-determination had become for many southerners the ultimate 
contribution an agreement could make to southern identity, and the contest between 
Egyptian initiative and the IGAD forum demonstrated the differences southern and 
northern dissidents have concerning its importance. Significantly, Khartoum agreed 
to back away from the ELJI in favor of the ongoing Naivasha process. Such an Arab- 
led proposal might have carried more weight under a democratic government or a 
more nationalist dictatorship, but it did not with the Bashir junta, which was neither. 
Neither did the IGAD call for southern self-determination stop the regime from 
backing the process.
The AAA and the CPA chart an evolution of Sudan’s retreat from forming an 
integrated state. The AAA was a nationalist project which could not withstand the 
strain of the patronage dynamics of the state. The need for the regime to preserve its 
own survival demanded subsequent exclusive coalitions which prevented any 
inclusive nationalist identity from being built in the years of peace during the 1970s
7 Licklider, “Obstacles to Peace Settlements,” 714. Karin von Hippel has determined five sectors in which 
international actors can operate: donor governments, militaries, multilateral organizations, the private sector, and 
non-governmental organizations. Each o f these communities has been involved in Sudan’s conflict in some 
capacity.
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and 1980s. The parliamentary governments were unable to halt this dynamic. The 
CPA, as a result of internal and external pressures placed on the government, in 
addition to the government’s own incentives for survival and the continuation of a 
diminished Islamic project, has challenged both the attempts at a Sudanese nationalist 
project and the patronage state as it has existed nationally in Sudan. The SPLM/A 
has compromised its nationalist agenda thoroughly by fighting for and achieving its 
own sanctioned standing army in the region and the right to southern self- 
determination.
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APPENDIX II: ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
CPMT -  Civilian Protection and Monitoring Team
DUP -  Democratic Unionist Party
ELJI -  Egyptian Libyan Joint Initiative
GOS -  Government of Sudan
GOSS -  Government of South Sudan
HEC -  High Executive Council
IGADD/IGAD -  Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and
Desertification/Intergovemmental Authority on Development
NCP -  National Congress Party
NDA -  National Democratic Alliance
NIF -  National Islamic Front
NUP -  National Unionist Party
OAU -  Organization of African Unity
PDF -  Popular Defense Force
PCP -  Popular Congress Party
SANU -  Sudan African National Union
SPLA/M -  Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement
SSDF -  South Sudan Defense Force
SSLM -  Southern Sudan Liberation Movement
SSU -  Sudan Socialist Union
TMC -  Transitional Military Council
WCC/AACC -  World Council of Churches/All Africa Council of Churches
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APPENDIX III: THE ADDIS ABABA AGREEMENT ON THE PROBLEM
OF SOUTHERN SUDAN
DRAFT ORGANIC LAW TO ORGANIZE REGIONAL SELF 
GOVERNMENT IN THE SOUTHERN PROVINCES OF THE DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF SUDAN
CHAPTER I
In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the 
Sudan and in realization of the memorable May Revolution Declaration of June 9th, 1969, 
granting the Southern Provinces of the Sudan Regional Self-Government within a united 
socialist Sudan, and in accordance with the principle of the May Revolution that the 
Sudanese people participate actively in and supervise the decentralized system of the 
government of their country.
It is hereunder enacted:
Article 1:
This law shall be called the law for Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces. It 
shall be called the law for Regional Self Government in the Southern Provinces. It shall 
come into force on a date within a period not exceeding thirty days from the date of the Addis 
Ababa Agreement.
Article 2: This law shall be issued as an organic law which cannot be amended except by a 
three-quarters majority of the People’s National Assembly and confirmed by two-thirds 
majority in a referendum held in the three Southern Provinces of the Sudan.
DEFINITIONS
CHAPTER II
Article 3:
i) Constitution refers to the Republican Order No. 5 or any basic law replacing or amending it.
ii) “President” means the President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan.
iii) “Southern Provinces of the Sudan” means the Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper
Nile in accordance with their boundaries as they stood on January 1st, 1956, and any other 
areas that were culturally and geographically a part of the Southern complex as may be 
decided by a referendum.
iv) “Peoples Regional Assembly” refers to the legislative body for the Southern Region of the Sudan.
v) “High Executive Council” refers to the Executive Council appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council and such body shall 
supervise the administration and direct public affairs in the Southern Region of the Sudan.
vi) “President of the High Executive Council” refers to the person appointed by the President on the
recommendation of the Peoples Regional Assembly to lead and supervise the executive 
organs responsible for the administration of the Southern Provinces.
vii) “Peoples National Assembly” refers to the National Legislative Assembly representing the people
of the Sudan in accordance with the constitution.
viii) “Sudanese” refers to any Sudanese citizens as defined by the Sudanese Nationality Act, 
1957, and any amendments thereof.
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CHAPTER III
Article 4:
The Provinces of Bahr El Ghazal, Equatoria and Upper Nile as defined in Article 3 (iii) shall 
constitute a self-governing Region with the Democratic Republic of the Sudan and shall be 
known as the Southern Region.
Article 5:
The Southern Region shall have legislative and executive organs, the functions and powers of 
which are defined by this law.
Article 6:
Arabic shall be the official language for the Sudan, and English the principle language for the 
Southern Region without prejudice to the use of any other language or languages which may 
serve a practical necessity or the efficient and expeditious discharge of executive and 
administrative functions of the Region.
CHAPTER IV
Article 7:
Neither the Peoples Regional Assembly nor the High Executive Council shall legislate or 
exercise any powers on matters of national nature which are:
i) National Defense.
ii) External Affairs.
iii) Currency and Coinage.
iv) Air and Inter Regional River Transport.
v) Communications and Telecommunications.
vi) Customs and Foreign Trade except for border trade and certain commodities which the Regional
Government may specify with the approval of the Central Government.
vii) Nationality and Immigration. (Emigration).
viii) Planning for Economic and Social Development.
ix) Educational Planning.
x) Public Audit.
LEGISLATURE
CHAPTER V
Article 8:
Regional Legislation in the Southern Region is exercised by a Peoples Regional Assembly 
elected by Sudanese Citizens resident in the Southern Region. The constitution and 
conditions of membership of the Assembly shall be determined by law.
Article 9:
Members of the Peoples Regional Assembly shall be elected by direct secret ballot.
Article 10:
i) For the First Assembly the President may appoint additional members to the People Regional
Assembly where conditions for elections are not conducive to such elections as stipulated in 
Article 9, provided that such appointed members shall not exceed one quarter of the 
Assembly.
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ii) The Peoples Regional Assembly shall regulate the conduct of its business in accordance with
rules of procedures to be laid down by the said Assembly during its first sitting.
iii) The Peoples Regional Assembly shall elect one of its members as a speaker, provided that the
first sitting shall be presided over by the Interim President of the High Executive Council.
Article 11:
The Peoples Regional Assembly shall legislate for the preservation of public order, internal 
security, efficient administration and the development of the Southern Region in cultural, 
economic and social fields and in particular in the following:
i) Promotion and utilization of Regional financial resources for the development and administration
of the Southern Region.
ii) Organization of the machinery for Regional and Local Administration.
iii) Legislation on traditional law and custom within the framework of National Law.
iv) Establishment, maintenance and administration of prisons and reformatory institutions.
v) Establishment, maintenance and administration of Public Schools at all levels in accordance with
National Plans for education and economic and social development.
vi) Promotion of local languages and cultures.
vii) Town and Village planning and the construction of roads in accordance with National Plans and
programmes.
viii) Promotion of trade; establishment of local industries and markets; issue of traders’ 
licences and formation of co-operative societies.
ix) Establishment, maintenance and administration of public hospitals.
x) Administration of environmental health services; maternity care; child welfare; supervision of
markets; combat of epidemic diseases; training of medical assistants and rural midwives; 
establishment of health centers, dispensaries and dressing stations.
xi) Promotion of animal health; control of epidemics and improvement of animal production and
trade.
xii) Promotion of tourism.
xiii) Establishment of zoological gardens, museums, organization of trade and cultural 
exhibitions.
xiv) Mining and quarrying without prejudice to the right of the Central Government in the 
event of the discovery of natural gas and minerals.
xv) Recruitment for, organization and administration of Police and Prison services in accordance with
the national policy and standards.
xvi) Land use in accordance with national laws and plans.
xvii) Control and prevention of pests and plant diseases.
xviii) Development, utilization and protection of forests, crops and pastures in accordance 
with national laws.
xix) Promotion and encouragement of self-help programmes.
xx) All other matters delegated by the President or the Peoples National Assembly for legislation.
Article 12:
The Peoples National Assembly may call for facts and information concerning the conduct of 
administration in the Southern Region.
Article 13:
i) The Peoples Regional Assembly may, by a three-quarters majority and for specified reasons
relating to public interest, request the National President to relieve the President or any 
member of the High Executive Council from office. The President shall accede to such 
request.
ii) In case of vacancy, relief or resignation of the President of the High Executive Council, the entire
body shall be considered as having automatically resigned.
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Article 14:
The Peoples Regional Assembly may, by a two-thirds majority, request the President to 
postpone the coming into force of any law which, in the view of the members, adversely 
affects the welfare and interests of the citizens of the Southern Region. The President may, if 
he thinks fit, accede to such request.
Article 15:
i) The Peoples Regional Assembly may, by a majority of its members, request the President to
withdraw any bill presented to the Peoples National Assembly which, in their view, affects 
adversely the welfare, rights or interests of the citizens in the Southern Region, pending 
communication of the views of the Peoples Regional Assembly.
ii) If the President accedes to such request, the Peoples Regional Assembly shall present its view
within fifteen days from the date of accession to the request.
iii) The President shall communicate any such views to the Peoples National Assembly together with
his own observations if he deems necessary.
Article 16:
The Peoples National Assembly shall communicate all Bills and Acts to the Peoples Regional 
Assembly for their information. The Peoples Regional Assembly shall act similarly.
TIIE EXECUTIVE
CHAPTER VI
Article 17:
The Regional Executive Authority is vested in a High Executive Council which acts on 
behalf of the President.
Article 18:
The High Executive Council shall specify the duties of the various departments in the 
Southern Region provided that on matters relating to Central Government Agencies it shall 
act with the approval of the President.
Article 19:
The President of the High Executive Council shall be appointed and relieved of office by the 
President on the recommendation of the Peoples Regional Assembly.
Article 20:
The High Executive Council shall be composed of members appointed and relieved of office 
by the President on the recommendation of the President of the High Executive Council.
Article 21:
The President of the High Executive Council and its members are responsible to the President 
and to the Peoples Regional Assembly for the efficient administration in the Southern 
Region. They shall take an oath of office before the President.
Article 22:
The President and members of the High Executive Council may attend meetings of the 
Peoples Regional Assembly and participate in its deliberations without the right to vote, 
unless they are also members of the Peoples Regional Assembly.
CHAPTER VII
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Article 23:
The President shall from time to time regulate the relationship between the High Executive 
Council and the central ministries.
Article 24:
The High Executive Council may initiate laws for the creation of a Regional Public Service. 
These laws shall specify the terms and conditions of service for the Regional Public Service.
FINANCE
CHAPTER VIII
Article 25:
The Peoples Regional Assembly may levy Regional duties and taxes in addition to National 
and Local duties and taxes. It may issue legislations and orders to guarantee the collection of 
all public monies at different levels.
Article 26:
a) The source of revenue of the Southern Region shall consist of the following:
i) Direct and indirect regional taxes.
ii) Contributions from Peoples Local Government Councils.
iii) Revenue from commercial, industrial and agricultural projects in the Region in accordance with
the National Plan.
iv) Funds from the National Treasury for established services.
v) Funds voted by the National Assembly in accordance with the requirements of the Region.
vi) The Special Development Budget for the South as presented by the Peoples Regional Assembly
for the acceleration of economic and social advancement of the Southern Region as 
envisaged in the declaration of June 9th, 1969. 
viijSee Appendix B. 
viii) Any other sources.
b) The Regional Executive Council shall prepare a budget to meet the expenditure of regional 
sendees, security, administration and development in accordance with National Plans and 
programmes, and shall submit it to the Peoples Regional Assembly for approval.
CHAPTER IX
Article 27:
i) Citizens of the Southern Region shall constitute a sizeable proportion of the Peoples Armed
Forces in such reasonable numbers as will correspond to the population of the Region.
ii) The use of the Peoples Armed Forces within the Region and outside the framework of national
defense shall be controlled by the President on the advice of the President of the High 
Executive Council.
iii) Temporary arrangements for the composition of units of the Peoples Armed Forces in the
Southern Region are provided for in the Protocol on Interim Arrangements.
Article 28:
The President may veto any Bill which he deems contrary to the Provisions of the National 
Constitution, provided the Peoples Regional Assembly, after receiving the President’s views, 
may reintroduce the Bill.
Article 29:
The President and members of the High Executive Council may initiate laws in the Peoples 
Regional Assembly.
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Article 30:
Any member of the Peoples Regional Assembly may initiate any law provided that financial 
Bills shall not be presented without a sufficient notice to the President of the High Executive 
Council.
Article 31:
The Peoples Regional Assembly shall strive to consolidate the unity of the Sudan and respect 
the spirit of the National Constitution.
Article 32:
All citizens are guaranteed freedom of movement in and out of the Southern Region, 
provided restriction or prohibition of movement may be imposed on a named citizen or 
citizens solely on grounds of public health and order.
Article 33:
i) All citizens resident in the Southern Region are guaranteed equal opportunity of education,
employment, commerce and the practice of any profession.
ii) No law may adversely affect the rights of citizens enumerated in the previous item on the basis of
race, tribal origin, religion, place of birth, or sex.
Article 34:
Juba shall be the capital of the Southern Region, and the seat of the Regional Executive and 
Legislature.
APPENDIX A
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS
The following should be guaranteed by the Constitution of the Democratic Republic of the 
Sudan
1. A Citizen should not be deprived of his citizenship.
2. Equality of citizens.
i) All citizens without distinction based on race, national origin, birth, language, sex, economic or
social status, should have equal rights and duties before the law.
ii) All persons should be equal before the courts of law and should have the right to institute legal
proceedings in order to remove any injustice or declare any right in an open court without 
delay prejudicing their interests.
3. Personal liberty.
i) Penal liability should be personal. Any kind of collective punishment should be prohibited.
ii) The accused should be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
iii) Retrospective Penal Legislation and punishment should be prohibited.
iv) The right of the accused to defend himself personally or through an agent should be guaranteed.
v) No person should be arrested, detained or imprisoned except in accordance with due process of
law, and no person should remain in custody or detention for more than twenty-four hours 
without judicial order.
vi) No accused person should be subjected to inducement, intimidation or torture in order to extract
evidence from him whether in his favor or against him or against any other person, and no 
humiliating punishment should be inflicted on any convicted person.
4. Freedom of religion and conscience.
i) Every person should enjoy freedom of religious opinion, conscience and the right to profess them 
publicly and privately and to establish religious institutions subject to reasonable limitations 
in favor of morality, health or public order as prescribed by law.
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ii) Parents and guardians should be guaranteed the right to educate their children and those under 
their care in accordance wit their choice.
5. Protection of labor.
i) Forced and compulsory labor of any kind should be prohibited except when ordered for military
or civil necessity or pursuant to penal punishment prescribed by law.
ii) The right to equal pay for equal work should be guaranteed.
6. Freedom of minorities to use their languages and develop their culture should be guaranteed.
APPENDIX B
DRAFT ORDINANCE ON ITEMS OF REVENUE AND GRUANTS IN-AID FOR THE
SOUTHERN REGION
1. Profits accruing to the Central Government as a result of exporting products of the Southern
Region.
2. Business Profit Tax of the Southern Region that are at present in the central list of the Ministry of
Treasury.
3. Excise Duties on alcoholic beverages and spirits consumed in the Southern Region.
4. Profits on sugar consumed in the Southern Region.
5. Royalties on forest products of the Southern Region.
6. Royalties on leaf tobacco and cigarettes.
7. Taxation on property other than that provided in the Rales Ordinance.
8. Taxes and Rates on Central and Local Government Projects, (5% of net profits of factories,
cooperative societies, agricultural enterprises and cinemas).
9. Revenue accruing from Central Government activities in the Southern Region provided the
Region shall bear maintenance expenses, e.g. Post Office revenue, land sales, sale of forms 
and documents, stamp duties, and any other item to be specified from time to time.
10. Licenses other than those provided for in the Peoples Local Government Act, 1971.
11. Special Development tax to be paid by Residents in the Southern Region, the rate of which should
be decided by the Peoples Regional Assembly.
12. Income Tax collected from officials and employees serving in the Southern Region both in the
local and national civil services as well as in the Army, Police and Prisons, Judiciary, and 
Political establishment.
13. Corporation Tax on any factory and/or agricultural project established in the Region but not run
by Regional Government, (5% of the initial cost).
14. Contributions from the Central Government for the encouragement of construction and
development; for every agricultural project, industrial project and trading enterprise, (20% of 
the initial cost as assessed by the Central Government).
15. New Social Service Projects to be established by the Region or any of its Local Government
units, and for which funds are allocated, shall receive grants from the National Treasury in 
the following manner:
Educational institutions: 20% of expenses.
Trunk and through Road and Bridges: 25% expenses.
Relief and Social amenities: 15% expenses.
Security: 15% expenses.
Grants for Post Secondary and University education within the Sudan: 20% of grants; outside 
the Sudan: 30% of grants.
Contribution for Research, Scientific Advancement, and Cultural activities: 25% of expenses.
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AGREEMENT ON THE CEASE FIRE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION
Article 1:
This Agreement shall come into force on the date and time specified for the ratification of the 
Addis Ababa Agreement.
Article 2:
There will be an end to all military operations and to all armed action in the Southern Region 
from the time of cease fire.
Article 3:
All combat forces shall remain in the area under their control at the time of the cease fire. 
Article 4:
Both parties agree to forbid any individual or collective acts of violence. Any underground 
activities contrary to public order shall cease.
Article 5;
Movements of individual members of both combat forces outside the areas under their 
control shall be allowed only if these individuals are unarmed and authorized by their 
respective authorities. The plans for stationing of troops from the National Army shall be 
such as to avoid any contact between them and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement 
combat forces.
Article 6:
A Joint-Commission is hereby created for the implementation of all questions related to the 
cease fire including repatriation of refugees. The Joint-Commission shall include members 
from all the countries bordering on the Southern Region, as well as representatives of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, World Council of Churches, All Africa 
Conference of Churches, and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
Article 7:
The Joint-Commission shall propose all measures to be undertaken by both parties in dealing 
with all incidents after a full inquiry on the spot.
Article 8:
Each party shall be represented on the Joint-Commission by one senior military officer and a 
maximum of five other members.
Article 9:
The headquarters of the Joint-Commission shall be located in Juba with provincial branches 
in Juba, Malakal and Wau.
Article 10:
The Joint-Commission shall appoint local commissions in various centers of the Southern 
Region, composed of two members from each party.
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PROTOCOLS ON INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS
CHAPTER I
INTERIM ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS: 
(POLITICAL, LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SERVICE)
Article 1:
The President of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan shall, in consultation with the South 
Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) and branches of the Sudan Socialist Union in the 
Southern Region, appoint the President and members of an Interim High Executive Council.
Article 2:
The Interim High Executive Council shall consist of the President and other members with 
portfolios in:
a) Finance and Economic Planning;
b) Education;
c) Information, Culture and Tourism;
d) Communications and Transport;
e) Agriculture, Animal Production and Fisheries;
f) Public Health;
g) Regional Administration (Local Government, Legal Affairs, Police and Prisons);
h) Housing, Public Works and Utilities;
i) Natural Resources and Rural Development;
j) Public Service and Labor;
k) Minerals and Industry, Trade and Supply.
Article 3:
The Interim High Executive Council shall, in accordance with national laws, establish a 
Regional Civil Service, subject to ratification by the Peoples Regional Assembly.
Article 4:
The President shall, in consultation with the Interim High Executive Council, determine the 
date for the election to the Peoples Regional Assembly, and the Interim High Executive 
Council shall make arrangements for the setting up of this Assembly.
Article 5:
In order to facilitate the placement in and appointment to both central and regional 
institutions, the South Sudan Liberation Movement shall compile and communicate lists of 
citizens of the Southern Region outside the Sudan in accordance with details to be supplied 
by the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative Reform.
Article 6:
The Interim High Executive Council and the Ministry of Public Service and Administrative 
Reform shall undertake to provide necessary financial allocations with effect from 1972-1973 
Budget for such placements and appointments.
Article 7:
The Mandate of the Interim High Executive Council shall not exceed a period of 18 months.
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CHAPTER II
TEMPORARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE COMPOSITION OF UNITS OF THE 
PEOPLES ARMED FORCES IN THE SOUTHERN REGION
Article 1:
These arrangements shall remain in force for a period of five years subject to revision by the 
President of the High Executive Council acting with the consent of the Peoples Regional 
Assembly.
Article 2:
The Peoples Armed Forces in the Southern Region shall consist of a national force called the 
Southern Command, composed of 12,000 officers and men, of whom 6,000 shall be citizens 
from that region and the other 6,000 from outside the Region.
Article 3:
The recruitment and integration of citizens from the Southern Region within the 
aforementioned Forces shall be determined by a Joint Military Commission taking into 
account the need for initial separate deployment of troops with a view to achieve smooth 
integration in the national force. The Commission shall ensure that this deployment shall be 
such that an atmosphere of peace and confidence shall prevail in the Southern Region.
Article 4:
The Joint Military Commission shall be composed of three senior military officers from each 
side. Decisions of the Joint Military Commission shall be taken unanimously. In case of 
disagreement, such matters shall be referred to the respective authorities.
CHAPTER III
AMNESTY AND JUDICIAL ARRANGEMENTS
Article 1:
No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever, civil, or criminal, shall be instituted against 
any person in any Court of law for, or on account of, any act or matter done inside or outside 
the Sudan as from the 18th day of August, 1955, if such act or matter done in connection with 
mutiny, rebellion or sedition in the Southern Region.
Article 2:
If a civil suit in relation to any acts or matters referred to in Article One is instituted before or 
after the date of ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement, such a suit shall be discharged 
and made null and void.
Article 3:
All persons serving terms of prisons or held in detention in respect of offences hereinbefore 
specified in Article One shall be discharged or released within fifteen days from the date of 
ratification of the Addis Ababa Agreement.
Article 4:
The Joint Cease fire Commission shall keep a register of all civilian returnees which register 
shall serve to certify that the persons therein named are considered indemnified within the 
meaning of this Agreement provided that the Commission may delegate such power to the 
Diplomatic Missions of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan in the case of citizens from the 
Southern Region living abroad and to who the provisions of this Agreement apply.
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Article 5:
In the case of armed returnees or those belonging to combat forces, the Joint Military 
Commission shall keep a similar register of those persons who shall be treated in the same 
manner as provided for in Article Four.
Article 6:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles Four and Five above, a Special Tribunal with ad 
hoc judicial powers shall be established to examine and decide on those cases which in the 
estimation of the authorities do not meet the conditions for amnesty specified in Article One 
of this Agreement. The Special Tribunal shall be composed of a President appointed by the 
President of the Republic and not more than four members named by the Cease fire 
Commission.
Article 7:
Cases referred to in Article Six shall be brought to the attention of the Special Tribunal by 
request of the Minister of Justice.
Article 8:
The Amnesty Provisions contained in this Agreement as well as the powers of the Special 
Tribunal shall remain in force until such time as the President after consultation with the 
commissions referred to in this Agreement, decide that they have fulfilled their functions.
CHAPTER IV
REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT COMMISSION
I. REPATRIATION 
Article 1:
There shall be established Special Commissions inside and where required outside the 
Southern Region charged with the responsibility of taking all administrative and other 
measures as may be necessary in order to repatriate all citizens from the Southern Region 
who today are residing in other countries and especially in the neighboring countries. The 
headquarters of the Commission shall be in Juba.
Article 2:
The Commissions shall be composed of, at least, three members including one representative 
of the Central Government, one representative of the Southern Region, and one 
representative of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. For those commissions operating 
outside the Sudan, a representative of the host Government shall be included, plus the central 
Government representative, who shall be the Ambassador of the Sudan or his representative.
Article 3:
The control of repatriation at the borders shall be assumed by the competent border 
authorities in cooperation with the representatives of the Resettlement Commission.
Article 4:
The Repatriation Commission shall work very closely with the Commission for Relief and 
Resettlement to ensure that the operation and timing of the returning of refugees from across 
borders is adequately co-coordinated.
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II. RESETTLEMENT 
Article 1:
There shall be established a Special Commission for Relief and Resettlement under the 
President of the Interim High Executive Council with headquarters in Juba and provincial 
branches in Juba, Malakal and Wau. The Commission, its branches, and whatever units it 
may deem fit to create in other localities in order to facilitate its functions, shall be 
responsible for co-ordination and implementation of all relief services and planning related to 
Resettlement and Rehabilitation of all returnees, that is:
a) Refugees from neighboring countries.
b) Displaced persons resident in the main centers in the Southern Region and other parts of the 
Sudan.
c) Displaced persons including residual Anya-Nya personnel and supporters in the bush.
d) Handicapped and orphans.
Article 2:
Although resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and displaced persons is 
administratively the responsibility of the Regional Government, the present conditions in the 
Southern Region dictate that efforts of the whole nation of the Sudan and International 
Organizations should be pooled to help and rehabilitate persons affected by the conflict. The 
Relief and Resettlement Commission shall co-ordinate activities and resources of the 
Organizations within the country.
Article 3:
The first priority shall be the resettlement of displaced persons within the Sudan in the 
following order:
a) Persons presently residing in overcrowded centers in the Southern Region, and persons 
desirous to return to their original areas and homes.
b) Persons returning from the bush including Anya-Nya supporters.
c) Handicapped persons and orphans.
Article 4:
The second priority shall be given to returnees from the neighboring and other countries 
according to an agreed plan. This plan shall provide for:
a) Adequate reception centers with facilities for shelter, food supplies, medicine and 
medicaments.
b) Transportation to permanent resettlement villages or places of origin.
c) Materials and equipments.
Article 5:
The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall:
a) Appeal to International Organizations and Voluntary agencies to continue assistance for 
students already under their support particularly for students in secondary schools and higher 
institutions until appropriate arrangements are made for their repatriation.
b) Compile adequate information on students and persons in need of financial support from 
the Sudan Government.
Article 6:
The Relief and Resettlement Commission shall arrange for the education of all returnees who 
were attending primary schools.
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This Agreement is hereby concluded on this twenty-seventh day of the month of February in 
the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, A.D. in this City, Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Sudan on the one hand 
and the South Sudan liberation Movement on the other.
It shall come into force on the date and hour fixed for its ratification by the President of the 
Democratic Republic of the Sudan and the leader of the South Sudan Liberation Movement.
It shall be ratified by the said two Leaders in persons or through their respective authorized 
Representatives, in this City, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the twelfth hour at noon, on the 
twelfth day of the month of March, in the year one thousand nine hundred and seventy two, 
A.D.
In witness whereof, We the Representatives of the Government of the Democratic Republic 
of the Sudan and the Representatives of the South Sudan Liberation Movement hereby 
append our signatures in the presence of the Representative of His Imperial Majesty, the 
Emperor of Ethiopia and the Representatives of the World Council of Churches, the All 
Africa Conference of Churches and the Sudan Council of Churches.
For the Government o f the Democratic Republic o f the Sudan
1. Abel Alier-Wal Kuai
Vice President and Minister of State for Southern Affairs.
2. Dr. Mansour Khalid,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.
3. Dr. Jaafar Mohammed Ali Bakheit,
Minister for Local Government.
4. Major General P.S.C. Mohammed El Baghir Ahmed 
Minister of Interior.
5. Abdel Rahman Abdalla,
Minister of Public Service and Administrative Reform.
6. Brigadier P.S.C. Mirgani Suleiman.
7. Colonel Kamal Abasher.
For the South Sudan Liberation Movement:
1. Ezboni Mondiri Gwonza,
Leader of the Delegation.
2. Dr. Lawrence Wol Wol,
Secretary of the Delegation.
3. E. Mading DeGarang,
Spokesman of the Delegation.
4. Colonel Frederick Brian Maggott,
Special Military Representative.
5. Oliver Batali Albino,
Member.
6. Angelo Voga Morjan,
Member.
7. Rev. Paul Puot,
Member.
8. Job Adier de Jok,
Member.
Witnesses:
1. Nabiyelul Kifle,
The Representative of His Imperial Majesty, the Emperor of Ethiopia.
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2. Leopoldo J. Niilus,
Representative of the World Council of Churches.
3. Kodwo E. Ankrah,
Representative of the World Council of Churches.
4. Burgess Carr,
General Secretary, All Africa Conference of Churches.
5. Samuel Athi Bwogo,
Representative of Sudan Council of Churches.
Attestation:
I attest that these signatures are genuine and true.
Burgess Carr, 
Moderator.
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APPENDIX IV: THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND THE 
COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT
IGADD/IGAD DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES 
20 July 1994
We, Representatives of the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (thereinafter referred 
to as the GoS) the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army 
and the Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement/Sudan Peoples' Liberation Army-United 
(thereinafter referred to as the SPLM/A and SPLM/A-United respectively);
Recalling the previous peace talks between the GoS on the one hand, the SPLM/A and 
SPLM/A-united on the other, namely Addis Ababa in August 1989, Nairobi in December 
1989, Abuja in May/July 1992, Abuja in April/May 1993, Nairobi in May 1993, and 
Frankfurt in January 1992;
Cognisant of the importance of the unique opportunity afforded by the IGADD Peace 
Initiative to reach a negotiated peaceful solution to the conflict in the Sudan;
Concerned by the continued human suffering and misery in the war affected areas: Hereby 
agree in the following Declaration of Principles (DoP) that would constitute the basis for 
resolving the conflict in the Sudan:
1. Any comprehensive resolution of the Sudan conflict requires that all parties to the 
conflict fully accept and commit themselves to that position that
1.1 The history and nature of the Sudan conflict demonstrate that a military solution 
cannot bring lasting peace and stability the country
1.2 A peaceful and just political solution must be the common objective of the parties to the 
conflict
2. The right of self-determination of the people of south Sudan to determine their future 
status through a referendum must be affirmed.
3. Maintaining unity of the Sudan must be given priority by all parties provided that the 
following principles are established in the political, legal, economic and social framework 
of the country:
3.1 Sudan is a multi-racial, multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural society. Full 
recognition and accommodation of these diversities must be affirmed.
3.2 Complete political and social equalities of all peoples in the Sudan must be guaranteed 
by law.
3.3 Extensive rights of self-determination on the basis of federation, autonomy, etc, to the 
various peoples of the Sudan must be affirmed.
3.4 A secular and democratic state must be established in the Sudan. Freedom of belief and 
worship and religious practice shall be guaranteed in full to all Sudanese citizens. State and 
religion shall be separated. The basis of personal and family laws can be religion and 
customs.
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3.5 Appropriate and fair sharing of wealth among the various people of the Sudan must be 
realized.
3.6 Human rights as internationally recognized shall form part of this arrangement and shall 
be embodied in constitution.
3.7 The Independence of the Judiciary shall be enshrined in the constitution and laws of the 
Sudan.
4. In the absence of agreement on the above principles referred to in 3.1 to 3.7, the 
respective people will have the option to determining their future including independence 
through a referendum.
5. An interim arrangement shall be agreed upon, the duration and the tasks of which should 
be negotiated by the parties.
6. The parties shall negotiate a ceasefire agreement to enter into force as part of the overall 
settlement of the conflict in the Sudan.
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THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT 
THE MACHAKOS PROTOCOL 
July 20, 2002
WHEREAS the Government of the Republic of the Sudan (GOSS) and the Sudan People's 
Liberation Movement/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLM/A) herein after referred to as 
the Parties, having met in Machakos, Kenya, from 18 June 2002 through 20 July 2002 
WHEREAS the Parties are desirous of resolving the Sudan Conflict in a just and sustainable 
manner by addressing the root causes of the conflict and by establishing a framework for 
governance through which power and wealth shall be equitably shared and human rights 
guaranteed; and
MINDFUL that the conflict in the Sudan is the longest running conflict in Africa, that it has 
caused horrendous loss of life and destroyed the infrastructure of the country, wasted 
economic resources, and has caused untold suffering, particularly with regard to the people of 
South Sudan; and
SENSITIVE to historical injustices and inequalities in development between the different 
regions of the Sudan that need to be redressed; and
RECOGNIZING that the present moment offers a window of opportunity to reach a just 
peace agreement to end the war; and
CONVINCED that the rejuvenated IGAD peace process under the chairmanship of the 
Kenyan President, H.E. Daniel T. arap Moi, provides the means to resolve the conflict and 
reach a just and sustainable peace; and
COMMITTED to a negotiated, peaceful, comprehensive resolution to the conflict based on 
the Declaration of Principles (DOP) for the benefit of all the people of the Sudan;
NOW THEREFORE, the Parties hereto hereby agree as follows:
PART A
Agreed Principles
1.1 That the unity of the Sudan, based on the free will of its people democratic governance, 
accountability, equality, respect, and justice for all citizens of the Sudan is and shall be the 
priority of the parties and that it is possible to redress the grievances of the people of South 
Sudan and to meet their aspirations within such a framework.
1.2 That the people of South Sudan have the right to control and govern affairs in their region 
and participate equitably in the National Government.
1.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a 
referendum to determine their future status.
1.4 That religion, customs, and traditions are a source of moral strength and inspiration for 
the Sudanese people.
1.5 That the people of the Sudan share a common heritage and aspirations and accordingly 
agree to work together to:
1.5.1 Establish a democratic system of governance taking account of the cultural, ethnic, 
racial, religious and linguistic diversity and gender equality of the people of the Sudan.
1.5.2 Find a comprehensive solution that addresses the economic and social deterioration of 
the Sudan and replaces war not just with peace, but also with social, political and economic 
justice which respects the fundamental human and political rights of all the Sudanese people.
1.5.3 Negotiate and implement a comprehensive cease fire to end the suffering and killing of 
the Sudanese people.
1.5.4 Formulate a repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation, reconstruction and development 
plan to address the needs of those areas affected by the war and redress the historical 
imbalances of development and resource allocation.
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1.5.5 Design and implement the Peace Agreement so as to make the unity of the Sudan an 
attractive option especially to the people of South Sudan.
1.5.6 Undertake the challenge by finding a framework by which these common objectives 
can be best realized and expressed for the benefit of all the Sudanese.
PART B
The Transition Process
2.0 There shall be a Pre-Interim Period, the duration of which shall be six (6) months.
2.1 During the Pre-Interim Period:
a) The institutions and mechanisms provided for in the Peace Agreement shall be established;
b) If not already in force, there shall be a cessation of hostilities with appropriate monitoring 
mechanisms established;
c) Mechanisms to implement and monitor the Peace Agreement shall be created;
d) Preparations shall be made for the implementation of a comprehensive cease fire as soon 
as possible;
e) International assistance shall be sought; and
f) A Constitutional Framework for the Peace Agreement and the institutions referred to in
2.1 (a) shall be established.
2.2 The Interim Period will commence at the end of the Pre-Interim Period and shall last for 
six years.
2.3 Throughout the Interim Period:
a) The institutions and mechanisms established during the Pre-Interim Period shall be 
operating in accordance with the arrangements and principles set out in the Peace Agreement.
b) If not already accomplished, the negotiated comprehensive cease fire will be implemented 
and international monitoring mechanisms shall be established and operationalized.
2.4 An independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be established during the 
Pre-Interim Period to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement and conduct a 
mid-term evaluation of the unity arrangements established under the Peace Agreement.
2.4.1 The composition of the Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall consist of equal 
representation from the GOS and the SPLM/A, and not more than two (2) representatives, 
respectively, from each of the following categories:
* Member states of the IGAD Sub-Committee on Sudan (Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Uganda);
* Observer States (Italy, Norway, UK, and US); and
* Any other countries or regional or international bodies to be agreed upon by the parties.
2.4.2 The Parties shall work with the Commission during the Interim Period with a view to 
improving the institutions and arrangements created under the Agreement and making the 
unity of Sudan attractive to the people of South Sudan.
2.5 At the end of the six (6) year Interim Period there shall be an internationally monitored 
referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan 
to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established 
under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.
2.6 The parties shall refrain from any form of unilateral revocation or abrogation of the 
Peace Agreement.
Part C
Structures of Government
To give effect to the agreements set out in Part A, the Parties, within a framework of a 
unified Sudan which recognizes the right to self-determination for the people of Southern 
Sudan, hereby agree that with respect to the division of powers and the structures and 
functions of the different organs of government, the political framework of governance in the 
Sudan shall be structured as follows:
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3.1 Supreme Law
3.1.1 The National Constitution of the Sudan shall be the Supreme Law of the land. All laws 
must comply with the National Constitution. This constitution shall regulate the relations and 
allocate the powers and functions between the different levels of government as well as 
prescribe the wealth sharing arrangements between the same. The National Constitution shall 
guarantee freedom of belief, worship and religious practice in full to all Sudanese citizens.
3.1.2 A representative National Constitutional Review Commission shall be established 
during the Pre-Transition Period which shall have as its first task the drafting of a Legal and 
Constitutional Framework to govern the Interim Period and which incorporates the Peace 
Agreement.
3.1.3 The Framework mentioned above shall be adopted as shall be agreed upon by the 
Parties.
3.1.4 During the Interim Period an inclusive Constitutional Review Process shall be 
undertaken.
3.1.5 The Constitution shall not be amended or repealed except by way of special procedures 
and qualified majorities in order that the provisions of the Peace Agreement are protected.
3.2 National Government
3.2.1 There shall be a National Government which shall exercise such functions and pass 
such laws as must necessarily be exercised by a sovereign state at national level. The 
National Government in all its laws shall take into account the religious and cultural diversity 
of the Sudanese people.
3.2.2 Nationally enacted legislation having effect only in respect of the states outside 
Southern Sudan shall have as its source of legislation Sharia and the consensus of the people.
3.2.3 Nationally enacted legislation applicable to the southern States and/or the Southern 
Region shall have as its source of legislation popular consensus, the values and the customs 
of the people of Sudan including their traditions and religious beliefs, having regard to 
Sudan's diversity).
3.2.4 Where national legislation is currently in operation or is enacted and its source is 
religious or customary law, then a state or region, the majority of whose residents do not 
practice such religion or customs may:
(i) Either introduce legislation so as to allow or provide for institutions or practices in that 
region consistent with their religion or customs, or
(ii) Refer the law to the Council of States for it to approve by a two-thirds majority or initiate 
national legislation which will provide for such necessary alternative institutions as is 
appropriate.
The Right to Self-Determination for the People of South Sudan
3.3 That the people of South Sudan have the right to self-determination, inter alia, through a 
referendum to determine their future status.
3.4 An independent Assessment and Evaluation Commission shall be established during the 
Pre-Transition period to monitor the implementation of the Peace Agreement during the 
Interim Period. This Commission shall conduct a mid-term evaluation of the unity 
arrangements established under the Peace Agreement.
3.5 At the end of the six (6) year interim period there shall be an internationally monitored 
referendum, organized jointly by the GOS and the SPLM/A, for the people of South Sudan 
to: confirm the unity of the Sudan by voting to adopt the system of government established 
under the Peace Agreement; or to vote for secession.
3.6 The Parties shall refrain from any form of unilateral revocation or abrogation of the Peace 
Agreement.
State and Religion
6.1 Religions, customs and beliefs are a source of moral strength and inspiration for the 
Sudanese people.
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6.2 There shall be freedom of belief, worship and conscience for followers of all religions or 
beliefs or customs and no one shall be discriminated against on such grounds.
6.3 Eligibility for public office, including the presidency, public service and the enjoyment of 
all rights and duties shall be based on citizenship and not on religion, beliefs, or customs.
6.4 All personal and family matters including marriage, divorce, inheritance, succession, and 
affiliation may be governed by the personal laws (including Sharia or other religious laws, 
customs, or traditions) of those concerned.
6.5 The Parties agree to respect the following Rights:
6.5.1 To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief and to establish and 
maintain places for these purposes;
6.5.2 To establish and maintain appropriate charitable or humanitarian institutions;
6.5.3 To make, acquire and use to an adequate extent the necessary articles and materials 
related to the rites or customs of a religion or belief;
6.5.4 To write, issue and disseminate relevant publications in these areas;
6.5.5 To teach religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;
6.5.6 To solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and 
institutions;
6.5.7 To train, appoint, elect or designate by succession appropriate leaders called for by the 
requirements and standards of any religion or belief;
6.5.8 To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the 
precepts of one's religious beliefs;
6.5.9 To establish and maintain communications with individuals and communities in matters 
of religion and belief and at the national and international levels;
6.5.10 For avoidance of doubt, no one shall be subject to discrimination by the National 
Government, state, institutions, group of persons or person on grounds of religion or other 
beliefs.
6.6 The Principles enumerated in Section 6.1 through 6.5 shall be reflected in the 
Constitution.
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SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS DURING THE INTERIM PERIOD
25 September 2003
1. Status of the Two Armed Forces:
a. In the context of a united Sudan, and should the result of the referendum on self- 
determination confirm unity, the Parties (the Government of the Sudan and the Sudan 
People's Liberation
Movement and Army) agree to the formation of the future army of Sudan that shall be 
composed from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army 
(SPLA).
b. As part of a peace agreement and in order to end the war, the Parties agree that the two 
forces, the SAF and the SPLA shall remain separate during the Interim Period, and further 
agree that both forces shall be considered and treated equally as Sudan's National Armed 
Forces during the Interim Period taking into consideration 1 (c) below.
c. The parties agree to the principles of proportional downsizing of the forces on both sides, 
at a suitable time, following the completion of the comprehensive ceasefire arrangements.
d. The national Armed Forces shall have no internal law and order mandate except in 
constitutionally specified emergencies.
2. Ceasefire:
The parties agree to an internationally monitored ceasefire which shall come into effect from 
the date of signature of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Details of the Ceasefire 
Agreement shall be worked out by the two parties together with the IGAD mediators and 
international experts.
3. Redeployment:
a. The two forces shall be disengaged, separated, encamped and redeployed as will be 
detailed in the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement.
b. Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of the forces of SAF 
currently deployed in the South shall be redeployed North of the South/North border of 
1/1/1956 under international monitoring and assistance within and up to two and one half 
years (2 1/2) from the beginning of the pre-interim Period.
c. Except for those deployed in the Joint/Integrated Units, the rest of the SPLA forces 
currently deployed in Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile shall be redeployed South of 
the South/North border of 1/1/1956 as soon as the Joint/Integrated Units are formed and 
deployed under international monitoring and assistance.
d. The SPLM/A undertakes that the demobilized Southern Sudanese from those currently 
serving in SAF in Southern Sudan shall be absorbed into various institutions of the 
Government of Southern Sudan along with demobilized SPLA soldiers.
e. The parties agree to implement with the assistance of the international community DDR 
programmes for the benefit of all those who will be affected by the reduction, demobilization 
and downsizing of the forces as agreed in 1(c), 3(d) and 7(b).
4. Joint/Integrated Units:
There shall be formed Joint/Integrated Units consisting of equal numbers from the Sudanese 
Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) during the Interim 
Period. The Joint/Integrated Units shall constitute a nucleus of a post referendum army of 
Sudan, should the result of the referendum confirm unity, otherwise they would be dissolved 
and the component parts integrated into their respective forces.
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4.1 Elaboration On Joint/Integrated Units:
a. Their Character:
They should have a new character based on a common doctrine.
b. Their Functions:
i. They will be a symbol of national unity during the Interim Period.
ii. They will be a symbol of sovereignty during the Interim Period.
iii. They will participate in the defense of the country together with the two forces.
iv. They will provide a nucleus of a post Interim Period future army of the Sudan should the 
vote of referendum confirm unity.
v. They shall be involved in the reconstruction of the country.
c. Size and Deployment:
The size and deployment of the Joint/Integrated Units throughout the Interim Period shall be 
as indicated below:
1. Southern Sudan: twenty four thousands (24,000)
2. Nuba Mountains: six thousands (6,000)
3. Southern Blue Nile: six thousands (6,000)
4. Khartoum: three thousands (3,000)
5. Eastern Sudan:
a. The redeployment of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan to South of the South/North border 
of 1/1/1956 shall be completed within one (1) year from the beginning of the pre-interim 
period.
b. The parties shall discuss the issue of establishing Joint/Integrated Units.
5. Command and Control of the Two Forces:
1. The Parties agree to establish a Joint Defense Board (JDB) under the Presidency, and shall 
be comprised of the chiefs of staff of the two forces, their deputies and any number of senior 
officers to be agreed to by the parties. It shall take its decisions by consensus and it shall be 
chaired alternately by the respective Chiefs of Staff.
2. Functions of JDB:
The JDB shall perform the following functions:
a. Co-ordination between the two forces.
b. Command of the Joint Integrated Units.
6. Common Military Doctrine:
The parties shall develop a common military doctrine as a basis for the Joint/Integrated Units 
as well as a basis for a post Interim Period army of the Sudan, if the referendum vote is in 
favor of unity. The parties shall develop this common doctrine within one year from the 
beginning of the Interim Period. During the Interim Period, the training of the SPLA (in the 
South), the SAF (in the North) and the joint units (in both North and South) will be based on 
this common doctrine.
7. Status of Other Armed Groups In the Country:
1. No armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the two forces.
2. The Parties agree that those mentioned in 7(a) who have the desire and qualify shall be 
incorporated into the organized forces of either Party (Army, Police, Prisons and Wildlife 
forces), while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.
3. The parties agree to address the status of other armed groups in the country with the view 
of achieving comprehensive peace and stability in the country and to realize full 
inclusiveness in the transition process.
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8. National Security Organs and Police forces:
Structures and arrangements affecting all law enforcement organs, especially the Police, and 
National Security Organs shall be dealt with as part of the power sharing arrangements, and 
tied where is necessary to the appropriate level of the executive.
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WEALTH SHARING AGREEMENT 
7 January 2004
1.0 Guiding Principles in Respect of an Equitable Sharing of Common Wealth
1.1 The Parties agree that the guiding principles and provisions below shall be the basis for 
the comprehensive text on Wealth Sharing.
1.2 The wealth of Sudan shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to 
discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.
1.3 The National Government shall also fulfil its obligation to provide transfers to the 
Government of Southern Sudan.
1.4 The sharing and allocation of wealth emanating from the resources of the Sudan shall 
ensure that the quality of life, dignity and living conditions of all the citizens are promoted 
without discrimination on grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, 
language, or region. The sharing and allocation of this wealth shall be based on the premise 
that all parts of Sudan are entitled to development.
1.5 The Parties agree that Southern Sudan faces serious needs to: (i) be able to perform basic 
government functions, (ii) build up the civil administration, and (iii) rehabilitate and 
reconstruct/construct the social and physical infrastructure in a post-conflict Sudan.
1.6 The Parties agree that Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei and other war affected 
areas face serious needs as 1.5 above.
1.7 That Southern Sudan, and those areas in need of construction/reconstruction, shall be 
brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and public services standard as the 
Northern states. For this purpose, two special funds shall be established as provided herein.
1.8 That revenue sharing should reflect a commitment to devolution of power and 
decentralization of decision-making in regard to development, service delivery and 
governance.
1.9 The development of infrastructure, human resources, sustainable economic development 
and the capacity to meet human needs shall be conducted within a framework of transparent 
and accountable government.
1.10 That the best known practices in the sustainable utilization and control of natural 
resources shall be followed.
1.11 This Agreement sets out the respective types of income, revenue, taxes and other 
sources of wealth to which the various levels of government are entitled.
1.12 The Parties recognize that the National Government, during the Interim Period, will 
need to mobilize additional national resources.
1.13 There is a limit on how much additional national resources can be mobilized and part of 
the national needs in a post-conflict Sudan will have to be met by external assistance.
1.14 The National Government shall not withhold an allocation due to a state/region or the 
Government of Southern Sudan. Any level of Government may initiate proceedings in the 
Constitutional Court should any other organ or level withhold monies due to it. The National 
Government shall make transfers to the Government of Southern Sudan based on the 
principles established.
1.15 In agreeing to these wealth sharing arrangements the Parties signal to the international 
community that it will have to play a strong and constructive role in providing post-conflict 
construction/reconstruction assistance to Sudan, especially to Southern Sudan and other war 
affected and least developed areas.
1.16 The National Government shall assist the Government of Southern Sudan, during the 
pre-interim Period, in cooperation with international organizations, to develop and implement 
a program for capacity enhancement in the South.
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2.0 Ownership of Land and Natural Resources
2.1 Without prejudice to the position of the Parties with respect to ownership of land and 
subterranean natural resources, including in Southern Sudan, this Agreement is not intended 
to address the ownership of those resources. The Parties agree to establish a process to 
resolve this issue.
2.2. The Parties agree that the regulation, management, and the process for the sharing of 
wealth from subterranean natural resources are addressed below.
2.3. The Parties record that the regulation of land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land 
is to be a concurrent competency exercised at the appropriate levels of government.
2.4. Rights in land owned by the Government of Sudan shall be exercised through the 
appropriate or designated levels of Government.
2.5. The Parties agree that a process be instituted to progressively develop and amend the 
relevant laws to incorporate customary laws and practices, local heritage and international 
trends and practices.
2.6 Without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts, there shall be established a National Land 
Commission that shall have the following functions:
2.6.1 Arbitrate between willing contending Parties on claims over land, and sort out such 
claims.
2.6.2 The party or group making claims in respect of land may make a claim against the 
relevant government and/or other Parties interested in the land.
2.6.3 The National Land Commission may at its discretion entertain such claims.
2.6.4 The Parties to the arbitration shall be bound by the decision of the National Land 
Commission on mutual consent and upon registration of the award in a court of law.
2.6.5 The National Land Commission shall apply the law applicable in the locality where the 
land is situated or such other law as the Parties to the arbitration agree, including principles of 
equity.
2.6.6 Accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of 
resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government 
concerning land reform policies and recognition of customary land rights and/or law.
2.6.7 Assess appropriate land compensation, which need not be limited to monetary 
compensation.
2.6.8 Advise different levels of government on how to co-ordinate policies on national 
projects.
2.6.9 Study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs.
2.6.10 The National Land Commission shall be representative and independent. The 
composition of the membership and terms of appointment of the National Land Commission 
shall be set by the legislation constituting it. The Chairperson of the National Land 
Commission shall be appointed by the Presidency.
2.6.11 The National Land Commission may conduct hearings and formulate its own rules of 
procedure.
2.6.12 The National Land Commission will have its budget approved by the Presidency and 
will be accountable to the Presidency for the due performance of its functions.
2.7 In accordance with this Agreement and without prejudice to the jurisdiction of courts, 
there shall be established a Southern Sudan Land Commission which shall have the following 
functions:
2.7.1 Arbitrate between willing contending Parties on claims over land, and sort out such 
claims.
2.7.2 The party or group making claims in respect of land may make a claim against the 
relevant government and/or other Parties interested in the land.
2.7.3 The Southern Sudan Land Commission may entertain such claims at its discretion.
2.7.4 The Parties to the arbitration shall be bound by the Southern Sudan Land Commission’s 
decision on mutual consent and upon registration of the award in a court of law.
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2.7.5 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall apply the law applicable in the locality 
where the land is situated or such other law as the Parties to the arbitration agree, including 
principles of equity.
2.7.6 Accept references on request from the relevant government, or in the process of 
resolving claims, and make recommendations to the appropriate levels of government 
concerning land reform policies and recognition of customary land rights and/or law.
2.7.7 Assess appropriate land compensation, which need not be limited to monetary 
compensation, for applicants in the course of arbitration or in the course of a reference from a 
court.
2.7.8 Advise different levels of government on how to co-ordinate policies on GOSS 
projects.
2.7.9 Study and record land use practices in areas where natural resource exploitation occurs.
2.7.10 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall be representative and independent. The 
composition of the membership and terms of appointment of the Southern Sudan Land 
Commission shall be set by the legislation constituting it. The Chairperson of the Southern 
Sudan Land Commission shall be appointed by the President of the Government of Southern 
Sudan.
2.7.11 The Southern Sudan Land Commission may conduct hearings and formulate its own 
rules of procedure.
2.7.12 The Southern Sudan Land Commission shall have its budget approved by the 
Government of Southern Sudan and shall be accountable to the President of the Government 
of Southern Sudan for the performance of its functions.
2.8 The National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission shall co­
operate and co-ordinate their activities so as to use their resources efficiently. Without 
limiting the matters of coordination, the National Land Commission and the Southern Sudan 
Land Commission may agree:
a) to exchange information and decisions of each Commission;
b) that certain functions of the National Land Commission, including collection of data and 
research, may be carried out through the Southern Sudan Land Commission;
c) on the way in which any conflict between the findings or recommendations of each 
Commission may be resolved.
2.9 In the case of conflict between the findings or recommendations of the National Land 
Commission and the Southern Sudan Land Commission, which cannot be resolved by 
agreement, the two Commissions shall reconcile their positions. Failure to reconcile, the 
matter shall be referred to the Constitutional Court.
3.0 Oil Resources
A. Guiding Principles for the management and development of the petroleum sector
3.1 The Parties agree that the basis for an agreed and definitive framework for the 
management of the development of the petroleum sector during the Interim Period shall 
include the following:
3.1.1 Sustainable utilization of oil as a non-renewable natural resource consistent with:
a) the national interest and the public good;
b) the interest of the affected states/regions;
c) the interests of the local population in affected areas;
d) national environmental policies, biodiversity conservation guidelines, and cultural heritage 
protection principles.
3.1.2 Empowerment of the appropriate levels of government to develop and manage, in 
consultation with the relevant communities, the various stages of oil production within the 
overall framework for the management of petroleum development during the Interim Period.
3.1.3 Give due attention to enabling policy environment for the flow of foreign direct 
investment by reducing risks associated with uncertainties regarding the outcome of the 
referendum on self-determination at the end of the Interim Period.
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3.1.4 A stable macroeconomic environment that emphasizes stability of the petroleum sector.
3.1.5 Persons enjoying rights in land shall be consulted and their views shall duly be taken 
into account in respect of decisions to develop subterranean natural resources from the area in 
which they have rights, and shall share in the benefits of that development.
3.1.6 Persons enjoying rights in land are entitled to compensation on just terms arising from 
acquisition or development of land for the extraction of subterranean natural resources from 
the area in respect of which they have rights.
3.1.7 The communities in whose areas development of subterranean natural resources occurs 
have the right to participate, through their respective states/regions, in the negotiation of 
contracts for the development of those resources.
3.1.8 Regardless of the contention over the ownership of land and associated natural 
resources, the Parties agree on a framework for the regulation and management of petroleum 
development in Sudan during the Interim Period.
B. National Petroleum Commission (NPC)
3.2 The Parties agree that an independent National Petroleum Commission (NPC) shall be 
established during the Pre-Interim Period and its decisions shall be by consensus.
3.3 Taking into account the provisions elsewhere in this Agreement, the NPC shall be 
constituted as follows:
a) The President of the Republic and President of the GOSS as Co-chairs and permanent 
members;
b) Four (4) permanent members representing the National Government;
c) Four (4) permanent members representing the GOSS; and
d) Not more than three (3) representatives of an oil producing State/Region in which 
petroleum development is being considered, non-permanent members.
3.4 The NPC shall have the following functions:
3.4.1 Formulate public policies and guidelines in relation to the development and 
management of the petroleum sector consistent with paragraph 3.1.1.
3.4.2 Monitor and assess the implementation of those policies to ensure that they work in the 
best interests of the people of Sudan.
3.4.3 Develop strategies and programs for the petroleum sector.
3.4.4 Negotiate and approve all oil contracts for the exploration and development of oil in the 
Sudan, and ensure they are consistent with the NPC’s principles, policies and guidelines.
3.4.5 Develop its internal regulations and procedures.
3.5 In performing the functions referred to in paragraph 3.4 above, the NPC shall take into 
account relevant considerations, including the following:
3.5.1 The extent to which the contract provides benefits to local communities affected by the 
development.
3.5.2 The extent to which the views of the state/region and the affected groups are 
incorporated in the proposed contracts.
3.5.3 If the NPC decides to approve the contract, persons holding rights in land who are 
aggrieved by the decision shall seek relief through arbitration or in a court of law.
3.5.4 If the non-permanent members of the NPC representing the oil producing State/Region 
collectively disagree with the decision of the NPC to approve the contract related to their 
State/Region, the National Minister of Petroleum shall not sign the contract and shall refer 
the matter to the Council of States/Regions. If the Council of States/Regions rejects the 
objection by two-thirds majority, the National Minister of Petroleum shall sign the contract.
If the Council of States/Regions does not reject the objection by two thirds majority within 24 
sitting days of receiving it, the Council of States/Regions shall remit the objection within that 
period and by two thirds majority to a mechanism established by the Council to arbitrate on 
the objection. The arbitration decision shall be made within six calendar months of referral to 
arbitration. The arbitration decision shall be binding.
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3.5.5. If the NPC approves the contract the National Minister of Petroleum shall sign the 
contract on behalf of the Government of the Sudan.
3.5.6 In performing functions 3.4.1, 3.4.2, 3.4.3, and 3.4.5 of paragraph 3.4, the NPC shall 
include only its permanent members.
3.5.7 In performing function 3.4.4 of paragraph 3.4, the NPC shall include its permanent 
members and representatives of oil producing State/Region in which contracts for the 
exploration and development of the petroleum are being negotiated and considered for 
approval.
4.0 Existing Oil Contracts
4.1 The SPLM shall appoint a limited number of representatives to have access to all existing 
oil contracts. The representatives shall have the right to engage technical experts. All those 
who have access to the contracts will sign confidentiality agreements.
4.2 Contracts shall not be subject to re-negotiation.
4.3 If contracts are deemed to have fundamental social and environmental problems the 
Government of Sudan will implement necessary remedial measures.
4.4 The Parties agree that “existing oil contracts” mean contracts signed before the date of 
signature of the comprehensive Peace Agreement.
4.5 Persons whose rights have been violated by oil contracts are entitled to compensation. On 
the establishment of these violations through due legal process the Parties to the oil contracts 
shall be liable to compensate the affected persons to the extent of the damage caused.
5.0 Guiding Principles for Sharing Oil Revenue
5.1 The Parties agree that the basis for an agreed and definitive framework for the sharing of 
the wealth emanating from oil resources of Southern Sudan shall include the following:
5.1.1 The framework for sharing wealth from the extraction of natural resources should 
balance the needs for national development and reconstruction of Southern Sudan.
5.2 The Parties agree that a formula for sharing the revenue from oil resources shall be as set 
forth in this Agreement.
5.3 For the purposes of this Agreement ‘Net revenue from oil’ shall be the sum of the net 
revenue (i) from exports of government oil and (ii) from deliveries of government oil to the 
refineries.
5.4 An Oil Revenue Stabilization Account shall be established from government oil net 
revenue derived from actual export sales above an agreed benchmark price.
5.5 The Parties agree that at least two percent (2%) of oil revenue shall be allocated to the oil 
producing states/regions in proportion to output produced in such states/regions.
5.6 After the payment to the Oil Revenue Stabilization Account and to the oil producing 
states/regions, fifty percent (50%) of net oil revenue derived from oil producing wells in 
Southern Sudan shall be allocated to the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) as of the 
beginning of the Pre-Interim Period and the remaining fifty percent (50%) to the National 
Government and States in Northern Sudan.
5.7 A Future Generation Fund shall be established once national oil production reaches two 
(2) million barrels per day. This production criterion may, as part of the National 
Government’s normal budget process, be reduced down to one (1) million barrels per day.
5.8 The Parties agree that all funds/special accounts referred to in this Agreement and future 
accounts shall be on-budget operations.
6.0 Sharing of Non-Oil Revenue
6.1 The National Government shall be entitled to legislate, raise and collect the below-listed 
taxes and to collect revenue from these sources:
6.1.1 National Personal Income Tax;
6.1.2 Corporate or Business Profit Tax;
6.1.3 Customs Duties and import taxes; and
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6.1.4 Sea-ports and Airports Revenue;
6.1.5 Service charges;
6.1.6 Oil revenues as set out herein;
6.1.7 National Government Enterprises and projects;
6.1.8 VAT or GST or other retail taxes on goods and services;
6.1.9 Excise Tax;
6.1.10 Any other tax as agreed upon in these negotiations;
6.1.11 Loans, including borrowing from the Central Bank and the public.
6.2 The Government of Southern Sudan shall be entitled to revenue from the following 
sources and to raise and collect the below-listed taxes:
6.2.1 The National revenue allocation to the Government of Southern Sudan and 
States/Regions from the National Revenue Fund as set forth in section 7.0 of this Agreement;
6.2.2 Revenue from any of the sources listed as state/region revenue sources referred to in 
paragraph 6.3 herein;
6.2.3 The Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF);
6.2.4 Oil revenues as is set out in this Agreement;
6.2.5 Southern Sudan Government Taxes, which do not encroach on the exclusive National 
Government taxing powers or which are contemplated in the Power Sharing Protocol;
6.2.6 Service charges of the Government of Southern Sudan;
6.2.7 Government of Southern Sudan enterprises and projects;
6.2.8 Grants in Aid and Foreign Aid;
6.2.9 Taxes and levies on small and medium business;
6.2.10 Excise taxes on goods within the region deemed to be luxury consumables;
6.2.11 Southern Sudan Personal Income Tax;
6.2.12 Any other taxes as may be agreed to from time to time;
6.2.13 Loans and Borrowing in accordance with the Monetary Policy, Banking, Currency and 
Borrowing sections of this Agreement.
6.3 The states/regions shall be entitled to raise and collect the below-listed taxes and revenue 
from the below listed sources:
6.3.1 State/Regional Land and property tax and royalties;
6.3.2 Service charges for state/regional services;
6.3.3 Licences;
6.3.4 State/Regional Personal Income Tax;
6.3.5 Levies on Tourism;
6.3.6 State/Regional share of oil Revenues as is set out in paragraphs 
5.5 and 5.6 of this Agreement;
6.3.7 State/Regional Government projects and state/regional nature parks;
6.3.8 Stamp duties;
6.3.9 Agricultural Taxes;
6.3.10 Grants in Aid and Foreign Aid through the National Government and the GOSS;
6.3.11 Excise taxes;
6.3.12 Border Trade charges or levies in accordance with National 
Legislation;
6.3.13 Other state/region taxes which do not encroach on national or Southern Sudan 
Government taxes;
6.3.14 Any other tax as may be agreed to from time to time; and
6.3.15 Loans and borrowing in accordance with the Monetary Policy, Banking, Currency and 
Borrowing sections of this Agreement.
7.0 Equalization and Allocation to the National, Southern Sudan and State/Regional 
Levels of Government in Respect of Revenue Collected Nationally
7.1. All revenues collected nationally for or by the National Government shall be pooled in a 
National Revenue Fund (NRF) administered by the National Treasury. Such Fund shall
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embrace all accounts and sub-funds into which monies due to the Government are collected, 
reported or deposited.
7.2 All the revenues and expenditures of the Government will be on-budget operations and 
made public.
7.3 Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 5.6, 7.1 and 13.1, the National Government 
shall allocate fifty percent (50%) of the national non-oil revenue collected in Southern Sudan, 
as provided for herein under paragraph 6.1 above, to the GOSS to partially meet the 
development cost and other activities during the Interim Period. The Parties agree to review 
this arrangement, at mid-term of the Interim Period, with the view of the National 
Government allocating additional resources to the Government of Southern Sudan.
7.4 As a result of the allocation arrangements in paragraph 7.3 above, the Parties agree to 
appeal to the international and donor community to help the Government of Southern Sudan 
by providing post-conflict reconstruction assistance especially at the beginning of the 
transition.
7.5 The states/regions and the Government of Southern Sudan shall retain and dispose of 
such other income raised and collected under their own taxing powers.
8.0 Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC)
8.1 To ensure transparency and fairness both in regard to the allocation of nationally 
collected funds to the states/regions and the Government of Southern Sudan, a Fiscal and 
Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission shall be established. This body shall be 
comprised of experts nominated by the various states/'regions, fne Government of Southern 
Sudan and the National Government. Decision making arrangements of the FFAMC shall be 
as agreed to by the Parties.
8.2 The FFAMC shall undertake the following duties and responsibilities:
8.2.1 Monitor and ensure that equalization grants from the National Revenue Fund are 
promptly transferred to respective levels of government;
8.2.2 Ensure appropriate utilization and sharing of financial resources;
8.2.3 Ensure that resources allocated to war affected areas are transferred in accordance with 
agreed upon formulae; and
8.2.4 Ensure transparency and fairness in the allocation of funds to the GOSS and 
states/regions according to established ratios or percentages stipulated in this Agreement.
8.3. The FFAMC shall be composed of representatives from the National Government and 
the Government of Southern Sudan and States/Regions as follows:
a) Three Representatives of the National Government;
b) Three Representatives of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS);
c) All Finance Ministers in all States/Regions of Sudan
8.4 The Chairperson of the FFAMC shall be appointed by the Presidency.
8.5 The FFAMC shall work out its own rules and procedures, which shall be approved by the 
Presidency.
9.0 Interstate Commerce
9.1 There shall be no legal impediment to interstate commerce or the flow of goods and 
services, capital, or labour between the states/regions.
10.0 Government Liabilities
10.1 Any debts/liabilities incurred by any level of government shall be the responsibility of 
that level of government.
11.0 Division of Government Assets
11.1 There shall be a fair and equitable division of government assets. An asset shall in the 
first instance be allocated to the level of government responsible for the function in respect of 
which the asset is related (e.g. school buildings to the level of government responsible for
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education). In the event of a dispute, the Parties agree that such dispute shall be referred to a 
committee comprising a representative of each of the Parties involved in the dispute and a 
mutually agreed expert.
12.0 Accounting Standards and Procedures and Fiscal Accountability
12.1 All levels of government shall comply with generally accepted accounting standards and 
procedures.
12.2 To ensure the effective operation of such institutions, there shall be independent 
National and Southern Sudan Audit Chambers, which shall have responsibility for the 
functions referred to above. The National Audit Chamber shall set auditing standards. 
Appointments to the National Audit Chamber shall be made by the Presidency and confirmed 
by the National Assembly.
12.3 All levels of government shall hold all income and revenue received by it in public 
accounts and subject to public scrutiny and accountability.
13.0 Financing the Transition
13.1 The National Government shall assist, during the Pre-Interim Period to the extent that it 
is able, the SPLM/A in the establishment of the new transitional governments at the 
State/Regional level and the Government of Southern Sudan. The Government of Southern 
Sudan shall meet the direct costs of establishing these levels of government, with the 
assistance from the international community.
13.2. Upon signature of a comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Parties shall establish a Joint 
National Transition Team to undertake the following:
13.2.1 Prepare budget estimates for the establishment of Governments at the National, 
Southern Sudan, and state/regional levels as provided for by the Peace Agreement;
13.2.2 Organize and prepare relevant documents for the donor conference, including the 
agenda of the conference, letters of invitations and be a secretariat to the donors’ conference;
13.2.3 Develop fund raising strategies, and assist in the identification of potential sources of 
funds necessary for a smooth and timely commencement of the Interim Period.
14.0 Monetary Policy, Banking, Currency and Borrowing 
A. Monetary Policy, Banking, and Currency
14.1. The Parties agree, consistent with the Machakos Protocol of 20th July 2002, to have a 
dual banking system in Sudan during the Interim Period. An Islamic banking system shall 
operate in Northern Sudan and a conventional banking system shall operate in Southern 
Sudan.
14.2. The Parties agree that conventional banking facilities are urgently needed in Southern 
Sudan. The Parties therefore agree to establish, during the Pre-Interim period, the Bank of 
Southern Sudan (BOSS) as a branch of Central Bank of Sudan (CBOS) consistent with 
paragraph 14.1 above.
14.3. The Parties agree to restructure, during the Pre-Interim Period, the CBOS so as to 
reflect the duality of the banking system in Sudan. The CBOS shall therefore use and develop 
two sets of banking instruments, one Islamic and the other Conventional, to regulate and 
supervise the implementation of a single monetary policy through: (i) an Islamic financing 
window in Northern Sudan under a deputy governor of CBOS using Islamic financing 
instruments to implement the national monetary policy in Northern Sudan; and (ii) the Bank 
of Southern Sudan (BOSS), headed by a deputy governor of CBOS, to manage the 
conventional window using conventional financing instruments in implementing the same 
national monetary policy in Southern Sudan.
14.4. The CBOS shall be responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. All banking 
institutions shall be subject to the rules and regulations set by the CBOS.
14.5. The primary responsibility and mandate of the CBOS shall be ensuring price stability, 
maintaining stable exchange rate, sound banking system and issuance of currency. The
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monetary policy shall be carried out accordingly relying primarily on market-based 
instruments instead of 
administrative allocation of credit.
14.6. The CBOS shall be fully independent in its pursuit of monetary policy.
14.7. The Governor of CBOS and his/her two deputies shall be appointed by the Presidency. 
The Governor of CBOS shall appoint in consultation with his/her two deputies other senior 
officers within the Central Bank.
14.8. The Parties agree to establish, during the Pre-Interim Period, an independent Board of 
Directors (BOD). Decisions of BOD on matters that may affect adversely the interest of 
either Party to this Agreement shall be by consensus. The BOD shall be responsible to the 
Presidency on the accountability of the CBOS and shall consist of nine (9) members as 
follows:
a) Governor of CBOS ( Chairperson) and his/her two deputies and;
b) Six highly qualified Sudanese to be appointed by the Presidency taking into account the 
agreed formula in the Power Sharing Protocol for the institutions of the National 
Government.
14.9 The CBOS shall adopt a program to issue a new currency as soon as is practical during 
the Interim Period. The design of the new currency shall reflect the cultural diversity of 
Sudan. Until a new currency has been issued with the approval of the Parties on the 
recommendations of the
CBOS, the circulating currencies in Southern Sudan shall be recognised.
14.10 The BOSS shall be responsible for chartering and supervising financial institutions in 
Southern Sudan.
14.11 All financial institutions shall be subject to internationally recognized regulatory and 
prudential standards for Islamic and conventional finance, as set by the CBOS.
14.12 All financial institutions shall be bound to implement monetary policies set by the 
CBOS.
B. Borrowing:
14.13. The Government of Southern Sudan and the states/regions may borrow money based 
on their respective credit worthiness. Neither the National Government nor the CBOS shall 
be required or expected to guarantee borrowing by sub-national governments.
14.14 The GOSS and all sub-national governments shall report financial and fiscal data to the 
relevant National Government bodies for statistical purposes.
14.15 The Government of Southern Sudan and the states/regions may borrow money from 
foreign sources based on their respective credit worthiness.
14.16 Foreign borrowing by all sub-national governments shall be done in a manner that does 
not undermine national macroeconomic policies and shall be consistent with the objective of 
maintaining external financial viability. All sub-national governments’ foreign borrowing 
transactions shall conform to the CBOS specifications.
15.0 Reconstruction and Development Funds
A. Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (SSRDF)
15.1. There shall be established a Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund 
(SSRDF) to solicit, raise and collect funds from domestic and international donors and 
disburse such funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the infrastructure of the 
South, for the resettlement and reintegration of internally and externally displaced persons, 
and to address past imbalances in regional development and infrastructure.
15.2. A monitoring and evaluation system shall be established to ensure accountability, 
transparency, efficiency, equity and fairness in the utilization of resources.
15.3. The Government of Southern Sudan shall be responsible for expenditure from the fund 
and shall be entitled to raise additional funds by way of donation from foreign States, 
multilateral organizations, or other bodies for the purposes of the reconstmction and 
development of the southern states/regions. The Fund shall be transparently administered and
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professionally managed subject to an oversight committee appointed by the Government of 
Southern Sudan but having on it a representative of the National Ministry of Finance and of 
the National Audit Chamber.
B. National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF)
15.4. There shall be established by the Treasury, a National Reconstruction and Development 
Fund (NRDF) having the mission of developing the war affected areas and least developed 
areas outside Southern Sudan and a steering committee with appropriate representation from 
such areas. A member of the Southern Sudan Ministry of Finance shall be a member of the 
Steering Committee. A report on the income, expenditure and the projects supported by the 
fund shall be placed before the National Assembly and the Council of States/Regions, which 
shall exercise oversight over the Fund.
C. Multi-Donor Trust Funds
15.5. The Parties recognize the need to establish, during the Pre-Interim Period, two Multi- 
Donor Trust Funds (MDTFs), one for the National Government and one for the Government 
of Southern Sudan to support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly 
stated criteria of
eligible financing components. The Trust Funds shall be operational for the Pre-Interim 
Period, and shall thereafter be transformed into (i) one MDTF dedicated to the Southern 
Sudan Reconstruction and Development Fund (the “SRRDF”); and (ii) one MDTF dedicated 
to the National
Reconstruction and Development Fund (the “NRDF”).
15.6. The MDTFs shall commence immediately to support, among other things, priority areas 
of capacity building and institutional strengthening and quick start/impact programs 
identified by the Parties.
15.7. Both funds shall support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly 
stated criteria of eligible financing components, and both shall have the right to solicit, raise 
and collect funds from foreign donors.
15.8. All trust funds shall report the flow of funds to the CBOS.
15.9. To ensure proper accountability for funds disbursed through the MDTFs the Parties 
shall cause audits to be performed on funds used within six (6) months of the close of the 
recipient’s financial year.
15.10. During the Pre-Interim as well as the Interim Period, funds may be channelled directly 
to finance activities beneficial to the National Government or the GOSS as the case may be.
15.11. During the Pre-Interim Period, the flow of foreign funds shall be through special 
accounts established in the Bank of Sudan for areas outside Southern Sudan and for Southern 
Sudan in a commercial bank in Southern Sudan until the Bank of Southern Sudan is 
established and operational. For the Interim Period: (i) the flow of foreign funds for the 
National Fund will go through the CBOS; and (ii) for the Southern Fund, the foreign funds 
will be disbursed through a special account at the Bank of Southern Sudan designated for the 
Government of Southern Sudan; or through arrangements as specified in the MDTF.
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POWER SHARING AGREEMENT 
26 May 2004
PARTI
1.0 General Principles
1.1 In accordance with the Machakos Protocol agreed to at Machakos, Kenya, on 20th July, 
2002, the following Protocol on Power Sharing forms an integral part of the overall Peace 
Agreement.
1.2 The Parties reaffirm their acceptance of the Agreed Principles (of Governance) as 
stipulated in the Machakos Protocol of 20th July, 2002. The modalities of implementation of 
these principles are the object of the present Protocol on Power Sharing.
1.3 In accordance with the Machakos Protocol, the structures of governments in the Sudan 
shall be as follows during the Interim Period:
1.3.1 The National level of Government which shall exercise authority so as to protect and 
promote the national sovereignty of Sudan and the welfare of its people;
1.3.2 The Southern Sudan level of Government which shall exercise authority in respect of 
the people and States in the South;
1.3.3 The States throughout Sudan which shall exercise authority at the state level and render 
public services through the level of government close to the people; and
1.3.4 The level of local government throughout the Sudan.
1.4 The Parties agree that the following principles shall guide the distribution of powers and 
the establishment of structures:
1.4.1 Recognition of both the sovereignty of the nation as vested in its people as well as the 
need for autonomy of the Government of Southern Sudan and States throughout the Sudan;
1.4.2 Affirmation of the need for both national as well as state and Southern Sudan norms 
and standards so as to reflect the unity of the country and the diversity of the Sudanese 
people;
1.4.3 Acknowledgement of the need to promote the welfare of the people and protect their 
human rights and fundamental freedoms;
1.4.4 Recognition of the need for the involvement and participation of the people of South 
Sudan at all levels of government and National institutions as an expression of the national 
unity of the country;
1.4.5 Pursuit of good governance, accountability, transparency, democracy, and the rule of 
law at all levels of government to achieve lasting peace;
1.4.6 Recognizing the need to legitimise the arrangements agreed to herein, fair electoral 
laws shall be adopted, including the free establishment of political parties. Elections at all 
levels of government shall be held by universal adult suffrage.
1.5 Principles of Administration and Inter-Governmental Linkages:
1.5.1 In the administration of the Government of National Unity, the following provisions 
shall be respected:
1.5.1.1 There shall be a decentralized system of government with significant devolution of 
powers, having regard to the National, Southern Sudan, State, and Local levels of 
government;
1.5.1.2 The Interim National Constitution, being the legal and constitutional framework text 
adopted as contemplated in paragraph 2.12.6 herein, shall be the Supreme Law of the land 
and the Southern Sudan Constitution, state constitutions, and the laws of all levels of 
government must comply with it;
1.5.1.3 The linkage between the National Government and the states in the Southern Sudan 
shall be through the Government of Southern Sudan, subject to paragraph 1.5.1.4 below, and 
as provided for in the Interim National Constitution and the Southern Sudan Constitution;
1.5.1.4 In their relationships with each other or with other government organs, all levels of 
government and particularly National, Southern Sudan, and State Governments shall:
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(a) Respect each others’ autonomy;
(b) Collaborate rather than compete, in the task of governing and assist each other in 
fulfilling each others’ constitutional obligations;
(c) Perform their functions and exercise their powers in accordance with the provisions of 
this Agreement.
(d) Allow the harmonious and collaborative interaction of the different levels of government 
within the context of national unity and for the achievement of a better quality of life for all.
1.6 Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms:
1.6.1 The Republic of the Sudan, including all levels of Government throughout the country, 
shall comply fully with its obligations under the international human rights treaties to which 
it is or becomes a party. These include the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, the Slavery Convention of 1926, as amended, and the related 
Supplementary Convention, the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment 
of the Crime of Apartheid, the International Convention Against Apartheid in Sports, the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the Related Protocol, and the African 
Charter on Human and People’s Rights. The Republic of the Sudan should endeavor to ratify 
other human rights treaties which it has signed.
1.6.2. The rights and freedoms to be enjoyed under Sudanese law, in accordance with the 
provisions of the treaties referred to above, include in particular the following:
1.6.2.1 Life
Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one 
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his/her life;
1.6.2.2 Personal Liberty
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary 
arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his/her liberty except on such grounds and in 
accordance with such procedures as are established by law;
1.6.2.3 Slavery
No one shall be held in slavery; slavery and the slave trade in all their forms shall be 
prohibited. No one shall be held in servitude or be required to perform forced or compulsory 
labour;
1.6.2.4 Torture
No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment;
1.6.2.5 Fair Trial
Anyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly of the reasons for his/her arrest; everyone 
shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing; everyone shall be presumed innocent until 
proved guilty; no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence which did not constitute an 
offence at the time when it was committed; and everyone shall be entitled to be tried without 
undue delay, in his/her presence and to defend himself/herself.
1.6.2.6 Privacy
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his/her privacy, family,
home or
correspondence;
1.6.2.7 Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;
1.6.2.8 Freedom of Expression
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;
1.6.2.9 Freedom of Assembly and Association 
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.
1.6.2.10 Family and Marriage
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The right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a family shall be 
recognized.
1.6.2.11 Right to Vote
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without distinctions and unreasonable 
restrictions, to vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections, which shall be by 
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free 
expression of the will of the electors;
1.6.2.12 Equality Before the Law
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law;
1.6.2.13 Freedom from Discrimination
The law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status;
1.6.2.14 Freedom of Movement
Everyone has the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his/her residence;
1.6.2.15 The Rights of Children
Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are 
required by his/her status as a minor;
1.6.2.16 Equal Rights of Men and Women
The equal rights of men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights shall be 
ensured.
1.7 Reconciliation:
The Parties agree to initiate a comprehensive process of national reconciliation and healing 
throughout the country as part of the peace building process. Its mechanisms and forms shall 
be worked out by the Government of National Unity.
1.8 Population Census, Elections and Representation:
1.8.1 Population census throughout the Sudan shall be conducted and completed by the end 
of the second year of the Interim Period;
1.8.2 The preparation, planning and organization for the census shall commence as soon as 
the Peace Agreement is signed;
1.8.3 General Elections at all levels of government shall be completed by the end of the third 
year of the Interim Period;
1.8.4 Six months before the end of the periods referred to in Sub-Paragraphs. 1.8.1 and 1.8.3 
the Parties shall meet and review the feasibility of the dates set out in the above-mentioned 
sub-Paragraphs.
1.8.5 Certain considerations, while not conditional upon their completion, should be taken 
into account with respect to the timing of the elections (including, inter alia, resettlement, 
rehabilitation, reconstruction, repatriation, building of structures and institutions, and 
consolidation of the Peace
Agreement);
1.8.6 Whoever runs in any election must respect, abide by, and enforce the Peace Agreement;
1.8.7 International observers shall participate in the observation of elections;
1.8.8 Representation of the north and the south at the National level shall be based on 
population ratio;
1.8.9 The percentages agreed herein are temporary and shall either be confirmed or adjusted 
on the basis of the census results.
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PART II
2.0 Institutions at the National Level:
2.1 During the Interim Period, the Institutions at the National level shall consist of:
2.1.1 The Legislature;
2.1.2 The Executive;
2.1.3 The Judiciary; and
2.1.4 The Institutions and Commissions specified in this Agreement and the Interim National 
Constitution.
2.2. The National Legislature:
2.2.1 There shall be a bicameral National Legislature comprised of:
2.2.1.1 A National Assembly; and
2.2.1.2 A Council of States.
2.2.2. In the establishment of the National Legislature, the following principles shall apply:
2.2.2.1. There shall be equitable representation of the people of South Sudan in both 
legislative chambers; and
2.2.2.2. Relevant considerations shall be taken into account in determining what constitutes 
equitable representation.
2.2.3 The National Legislature shall be structured and operate as follows:
2.2.3.1 The National Assembly shall be elected in accordance with the procedures set forth 
by an impartial and representative Electoral Commission and in accordance with fair 
electoral laws;
2.2.3.2 There shall be a Council of States comprised of two representatives from each state;
2.2.3.3 Free and fair elections for the National Assembly shall be conducted in accordance 
with the Interim National Constitution governing the Interim Period. The date shall be 
determined by the Parties signatory to this Agreement, after consulting with the Electoral 
Commission.
2.2.4 Pending the elections referred to above, the National Assembly shall consist of such 
members representing the Parties to the Agreement, and other forces in the North and South 
so as to promote inclusiveness sand stability, in such proportions to be determined by the 
parties prior to the conclusion of the Peace Agreement.
2.2.5 Prior to the Parliamentary elections, the seats of the National Assembly shall be 
allocated as follows:
(a) National Congress Party (NCP) shall be represented by Fifty Two Per Cent (52%);
(b) Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) shall be represented by Twenty Eight Per 
Cent (28%);
(c) Other Northern political forces shall be represented by Fourteen Per Cent (14%);
(d) Other Southern political forces shall be represented by Six Percent (6%);
2.2.6 Both Chambers of the National Legislature shall approve the allocation of resources and 
revenues, in accordance with the agreement of Wealth Sharing. The National Assembly shall 
approve the annual National budget.
2.2.7 Amendments to the National Constitution shall require:
2.2.7.1 The approval of three-quarters (75%) of all the members of each chamber, both 
chambers sitting separately, and only after introduction of the draft amendment at least two 
months prior to debate;
2.2.7.2 Amendments to the Interim National Constitution affecting the provisions of the 
Peace Agreement may be introduced only with the approval of both Parties signatory to this 
Agreement;
2.2.7.3 A sixty-six and two-thirds percent (66.6%) majority in the Council of States is 
required to pass legislation that affects the interests of the states and a simple majority vote of 
both chambers is required to pass all other legislation.
2.2.8 Any bill duly approved by the National Legislature shall be signed into law by the 
President within thirty (30) days, failing which it shall be deemed to have been so signed.
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Where the President withholds his/her signature, he/she must present reasons for his/her 
refusal to so sign when re-introducing the bill to the National Legislature within the 30-day 
period stated herein. The Bill shall become law if the National Legislature again passes the 
bill by a two-thirds majority of all the members of the respective house or houses and the 
assent of the President shall not be required.
2.2.9. The exclusive legislative powers of the National Legislature shall be in respect of the 
matters set forth in Schedule A, annexed hereto.
2.2.10 The concurrent legislative powers of the National Legislature shall be those matters as 
set forth in Schedule D, read together with Schedule F, annexed hereto.
2.2.11 The residual legislative powers shall be exercised in accordance with Schedule E 
annexed hereto.
2.2.12 Both chambers of the National Legislature shall elect their respective Speakers,
Deputy Speakers and other officers at their first sitting. The two Parties shall be adequately 
represented in these offices.
2.2.13 Both Chambers of the National Legislature shall respectively determine their own 
rules, procedures, committees, and other matters of a similar nature.
2.3. The National Executive:
2.3.1 The National Executive shall consist of the Presidency and a Council of Ministers.
2.3.2 There shall be established the Institution of the Presidency consisting of the President 
and two Vice Presidents.
2.3.3 The functions of the two Vice Presidents shall be clearly defined by the parties to this 
agreement.
2.3.4 There shall be a partnership and collegial decision-making process within the Institution 
of the Presidency in order to safeguard the Peace Agreement.
2.3.5 Until such time as elections are held, the current incumbent President (or his successor) 
shall be the President and Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces {SAF}. The 
current SPLM Chairman (or his successor) shall be the First Vice President and shall at the 
same time hold the posts of President of the Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA).
2.3.6 In respect of the following matters, the President shall take decisions with the consent 
of the First Vice President, namely: the declaration and termination of a state of emergency; 
declaration of war; appointments that the President is required to make according to the 
Peace Agreement (to be specified); and summoning, adjourning or proroguing the National 
Legislature.
2.3.7 The President shall be elected in national elections, the timing of which shall be subject 
to the agreement of the two parties. The President elect shall appoint two Vice Presidents, 
one from the South and the other from the North. If the President-elect is from the North, the 
position of the First Vice President shall be filled by the person who has been elected to the 
post of President of the Government of Southern Sudan, as the President's appointee to the 
said position. In the event that a person from the South wins the Presidential elections, the 
President-elect shall appoint the First Vice President from the North. All the other provisions 
in this agreement relating to the presidency shall continue to apply.
2.3.8 Should the post of the President fall vacant, the functions of the President shall be 
assumed by a Presidential Council comprising of the Speaker of the National Assembly, the 
First Vice President and the Vice President.
2.3.8.1 The Speaker of the National Assembly shall be Chairperson of the Council in the 
period prior to elections, after elections the First Vice President shall be the chairperson of 
the Council;
2.3.8.2 The Presidential Council shall take its decision by consensus;
2.3.8.3 The Vice President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the Sudan Armed Forces {SAF}.
2.3.9 Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period prior to elections, the Office of 
the President shall be filled by the nominee of the National Congress Party within two weeks.
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2.3.10 Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period after the elections, the post 
shall be filled through presidential elections which shall be held within sixty {60} days.
2.3.11 Should the post of the First Vice President fall vacant:
2.3.11.1 Prior to elections, the office of the First Vice President shall be filled by the nominee 
of the SPLM within two weeks;
2.3.11.2 After the elections, the President shall appoint a First Vice President in accordance 
with the Interim National Constitution and the provisions of this Peace Agreement.
2.3. 12 The President shall, within 30 days of the entry into force of the Peace Agreement, 
and in consultation with the First Vice President, establish a Council of Ministers, having due 
regard to the need for inclusiveness and diversity in the establishment of a Government of 
National Unity. The Cabinet Ministers shall be accountable to the President and the National 
Assembly in the performance of their functions and may be removed by a resolution 
supported by two thirds
of all the members of the National Assembly.
2.3. 13 The President, the First Vice President and the Vice President shall be members of the 
Council of Ministers.
2.3. 14 The National Legislature shall be required to approve declarations of war or state of 
emergency, but in either event, there shall be no derogation from the provisions of the Peace 
Agreement, except as may be provided herein.
2.3. 15 Any Executive Orders or other legal acts by the President of the Republic shall be 
discussed with, and adopted by the Council of Ministers.
2.4 National Capital:
2.4.1 Khartoum shall be the Capital of the Republic of the Sudan. The National Capital shall 
be a symbol of national unity that reflects the diversity of Sudan.
2.4.2 The Administration of the National Capital shall be representative; and during the 
Interim Period the two Parties shall be adequately represented in the administration of the 
National Capital.
2.4.3 Human rights and fundamental freedoms as specified in the Machakos Protocol, and in 
the Agreement herein, including respect for all religions, beliefs and customs, shall be 
guaranteed and
enforced in the National Capital, as well as throughout the whole of Sudan, and shall be 
enshrined in the Interim National Constitution.
2.4.4 Law enforcement agencies of the Capital shall be representative of the population of 
Sudan and shall be adequately trained and made sensitive to the cultural, religious and social 
diversity of all Sudanese.
2.4.5 Without prejudice to the competency of any National Institution to promulgate laws, 
Judges and law enforcement agents shall, in dispensing justice and enforcing current laws in 
the National Capital be guided by the following:
2.4.5.1 Tolerance shall be the basis of coexistence between the Sudanese people of different 
cultures, religions and traditions;
2.4.5.2 Behaviour based on cultural practices and traditions which does not disturb public 
order, is not disdainful of other traditions, and not in flagrant disregard of the law or 
disturbing public order shall be deemed in the eyes of the law as an exercise of personal 
freedoms;
2.4.5.3 Personal privacy is inviolable and evidence obtained in violation of such privacy shall 
not be admissible in the court of law;
2.4.5.4 The judicial discretion of courts to impose penalties on non-Muslims shall observe the 
long-established legal {Sharia} principle that non-Muslims are not subject to prescribed 
penalties, and therefore remitted penalties shall apply;
2.4.5.5 Leniency and granting the accused the benefit of doubt are legal principles of 
universal application, especially in the circumstances of a poor society like the Sudan, which 
is just
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emerging from war, characterized by prevalent poverty and subject to massive displacement 
of people.
2.4.6 A special commission shall be appointed by the Presidency to ensure that the rights of 
non-Muslims are protected in accordance with the aforementioned guidelines and not 
adversely affected by the application of Sharia Law in the Capital. The said commission shall 
make its observations and recommendations to the Presidency.
2.4.7 Additionally, a system of mechanisms of guarantees shall be established to 
operationalize the above points, which includes:
2.4.7.1 Judicial circulars to guide the courts as to how to observe the foregoing principles;
2.4.7.2 Establishment of specialized courts; and
2.4.7.3 Establishment of specialized Attorney General circuits to conduct investigations and 
pre-trial proceedings related to offences involving these principles.
2.5. The Government of National Unity:
2.5.1 During the Interim Period, there shall be a Government of National Unity reflecting the 
need for inclusiveness, the promotion of national unity, and the defense of national 
sovereignty, and the respect and implementation of Peace Agreement.
2.5.2 The Presidency and Council of Ministers shall exercise the Executive powers and 
competencies in respect of the matters in Schedules A and D, read together with Schedules E 
and F, and as conferred upon it by this Agreement and the Interim National Constitution.
2.5.3 Cabinet posts and portfolios in all clusters, including the National Sovereignty 
Ministries, shall be shared equitably and qualitatively by the two Parties. The Parties agree to 
cluster the National ministries under the implementation modalities.
2.5.4 Representation of the SPLM and other political forces from the South in each of the 
clusters shall be determined by the Parties Signatory to Agreement prior to the conclusion of 
the Peace
Agreement.
2.5.5 Prior to elections, the seats of the National Executive shall be allocated as follows:
(a) The National Congress Party shall be represented by Fifty Two Percent (52%);
(b) Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) shall be represented by Twenty Eight Per 
Cent (28%);
(c) Other Northern political forces shall be represented by Fourteen Per Cent (14%);
(d) Other Southern political forces shall be represented by Six Percent (6%);
2.5.6 The Government of National Unity shall be responsible for the administration and 
functioning of the State and the formulation and implementation of national policies in 
accordance with the Interim National Constitution.
2.5.7 The Government of National Unity shall be responsible for establishing recruitment 
systems and admission policies to national universities, national institutes, and other 
institutions of higher education based on fair competition, giving equal opportunity to all 
citizens.
2.5.8 The Government of National Unity shall make decisions related to the ongoing or 
future activities of the organizations of the United Nations, bilateral, national, or international 
governmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), with a view toward ensuring 
equitable and transparent distribution of projects, activities, and employment of personnel in 
the whole of Sudan and especially the reconstruction of the war affected areas. There is to be 
an equivalent obligation on all levels of Government.
2.5.9. The Government of National Unity shall implement an information campaign 
throughout Sudan in all national languages in Sudan to popularise the Peace Agreement, and 
to foster national unity, reconciliation and mutual understanding.
2.6 Civil Service:
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2.6.1 The Government of National Unity shall also ensure that the National Civil Service, 
notably at the senior and middle-levels, is representative of the people of Sudan. In so doing, 
the following
principles shall be recognized:
2.6.1.1 Imbalances and disadvantages which exist must be redressed;
2.6.1.2 Merit is important and training is necessary;
2.6.1.3 There must be fair competition for jobs in the National Civil Service;
2.6.1.4 No level of government shall discriminate against any qualified Sudanese citizen on 
the basis of religion, ethnicity, region, gender, or political beliefs;
2.6.1.5 The National Civil Service will fairly represent all the people of the Sudan and will 
utilize affirmative action and job training to achieve equitable targets for representation 
within an agreed time frame;
2.6.1.6 Additional educational opportunities shall be created for war-affected people.
2.6.2 In order to create a sense of national belonging and address imbalances in the National 
Civil Service, a National Civil Service Commission shall be established with the task of:
2.6.2.1 Formulating policies for training and recruitment into the civil service, targeting 
between Twenty -  Thirty Percent (20% - 30%) of the positions, confirmed upon the outcome 
of the census referred to herein, for people of South Sudan who qualify;
2.6.22 Ensuring that not less than Twenty Percent (20%) of the middle and upper level 
positions in the National Civil Service (including the positions of Under Secretaries) are 
filled with qualified persons from the South within the first three years and achieving twenty 
Five Percent (25%) in five years and the final target figure referred to in subparagraph 2.6.2.1 
above, within six years; and
2.6.2.3 Reviewing, after the first three years of the beginning of the Interim Period the 
progress made as a result of the policies and setting new goals and targets as necessary, 
taking into account the census results.
2.7 National Security:
2.7.1 The National Security Council:
2.7.1.1 There shall be at the National level a National Security Council, the composition and 
functions of which shall be determined by the law;
2.7.1.2 The National Security Council shall define the new national security strategy based 
on the analysis of the new security threats.
2.7.2 National Security Service:
2.7.2.1 There shall be one National Security Service. The details of its establishment shall be 
worked out under the implementation modalities;
2.7.2.2 The National Security Service shall be representative of the population and reflect the 
partnership of the negotiating Parties;
2.7.2.3 The South shall be equitably represented in the National Security Service;
2.7.2.4 The National Security Service shall be professional and its mandate shall be advisory 
and focused on information gathering and analysis;
2.7.2.5 There shall be established security committees at the Government of Southern Sudan 
and State levels, their composition and functions shall be determined by the law;
2.7.2.6 The National Security Service shall be anchored in the Presidency;
2.1.2.1 There shall be a National Security Act that shall reflect the mandate of the National 
Security Service and the provisions of this Agreement relating to the National Security;
2.7.2.8 That all the assets of the respective security organs of the two Parties shall accrue to 
the National Security Service.
2.8 Language:
2.8.1 All the indigenous languages are national languages which shall be respected, 
developed and promoted.
2.8.2 Arabic language is the widely spoken national language in the Sudan.
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2.8.3 Arabic, as a major language at the national level, and English shall be the official 
working languages of the National Government business and languages of instruction for 
higher education.
2.8.4 In addition to Arabic and English, the legislature of any sub-national level of 
government may adopt any other national language(s) as additional official working 
language(s) at its level.
2.8.5 The use of either language at any level of government or education shall not be 
discriminated against.
2.9 Foreign Policy:
2.9.1 During the Interim Period, as a matter of principle Sudan's Foreign Policy shall serve 
first and foremost Sudan's national interests to achieve the following objectives:
2.9.1.1 Promotion of international cooperation, especially within the UN and other 
International and Regional Organizations for the consolidation of universal peace, respect of 
international law
and treaty obligations and the promotion of a just world economic order;
2.9.1.2 To achieve the latter, enhancement of South-South and international cooperation;
2.9.1.3 Striving to achieve African and Arab integration, each within the ongoing regional 
plans and forums as well as promoting African and Arab Unity and Afro-Arab cooperation;
2.9.1.4 Non-interference in the affairs of other states and promotion of good-neighbourliness 
and mutual cooperation among all Sudan's neighbours;
2.9.1.5 Combating international and transnational organized crimes and terrorism.
2.10 Other Independent and/or National Institutions to be Established in Accordance 
with the Peace Agreement:
2.10.1 The National Constitutional Review Commission, as detailed in Section 2.12 herein, 
shall also detail the mandate and provide for the appointment and other mechanisms to ensure 
the independence of the following institutions:
2.10.1.1 An impartial and representative National Electoral Commission;
2.10.1.2 A Human Rights Commission;
2.10.1.3 A National Judicial Service Commission;
2.10.1.4 A National Civil Service Commission;
2.10.1.5 An ad hoc Commission to monitor and ensure accuracy, legitimacy, and 
transparency of the Referendum as mentioned in the Machakos Protocol on Self- 
Determination for the People of South Sudan, which shall also include international experts;
2.10.1.6 A Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission;
2.10.1.7 Any other independent commission/institution set forth in the Peace Agreement or as 
agreed upon by the Parties.
2.11 The National Judiciary:
2.11.1 The powers of the Judiciary shall be exercised by Courts and other tribunals. The 
Judiciary shall be independent of the Legislature and the Executive. Its independence shall be 
guaranteed in the Interim National Constitution.
2.11.2. There shall be established at the National Level:
2.11.2.1. A Constitutional Court;
2.11.2.2. A National Supreme Court;
2.11.2.3. National Courts of Appeal; and
2.11.2.4. Any other National Courts or tribunals as deemed necessary to be established by 
law.
2.11.3. The Constitutional Court shall be established in accordance with the provisions of this 
Peace Agreement and the Interim National Constitution. The decisions of the Court shall be 
final and binding.
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2.11.4. The National Supreme Court shall be a court of review and cassation in respect of any 
criminal or civil matter arising out of or under national laws and may establish panels for the 
purposes of considering and deciding appeals on matters requiring special expertise.
2.12 Constitutional Review Process:
2.12.1 The Peace Agreement shall be signed by the leaders of the two Parties.
2.12.2 Upon signature, the Parties shall be bound by the Agreement and shall assume the 
obligations arising there from, more especially the obligations to implement the Agreement 
and to give legal and constitutional effect to the arrangements agreed therein.
2.12.3 Upon signature the Parties commit themselves to ensure that all the organs, 
committees and structures under their control, including their members, shall observe the 
terms of the Agreement.
2.12.4 After the Agreement has been signed:
2.12.4.1 The text thereof shall be forwarded to the National Assembly and the SPLM 
National Liberation Council for approval as is;
2.12.4.2 A representative National Constitutional Review Commission shall be established, 
as is more fully described below, which shall within six (6) weeks of receipt of the 
Agreement prepare a Legal and Constitutional Framework (“The Constitutional Text”);
2.12.4.3 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall be comprised of the NCP, 
SPLM and representatives of such other political forces and civil society as agreed by the 
Parties. Such composition shall be reflected in the final Peace Agreement.
2.12.5 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall have as its first task the 
preparation of a Legal and Constitutional Framework text in the constitutionally appropriate 
form, based on the Peace Agreement and the current Sudan Constitution, for adoption by the 
National Assembly. The same text shall be presented to the SPLM National Liberation 
Council for adoption. In the event of a contradiction, the terms of the Peace Agreement shall 
prevail in so far as that contradiction exists.
2.12.6 Without prejudice to the provisions of 2.12.5 above, the National Constitutional 
Review Commission in the preparation of the Legal and Constitutional Framework Text, 
shall draw upon relevant experiences and documents as may be presented by the Parties.
2.12.7 Upon adoption by the National Assembly and the SPLM National Liberation Council, 
the Constitutional Text shall become the Interim National Constitution for the Sudan during 
the Interim Period.
2.12.8 Pending the adoption of the Constitutional Text, the Parties agree that the legal status 
quo in their respective areas shall remain in force.
2.12.9 The National Constitutional Review Commission shall also be required to prepare 
such other legal instruments as is required to give effect to the Peace Agreement. It shall 
provide in such draft statutes or in the Constitutional Text for the appointment and other 
mechanisms to ensure the independence of such National Institutions as are referred to in 
Section 2.10 herein.
2.12.10 Without prejudice to the provisions of the Peace Agreement, as a subsequent task and 
during the course of the six-year Interim Period, the National Constitutional Review 
Commission shall be responsible for organizing an inclusive Constitutional Review Process. 
The process must provide for political inclusiveness and public participation.
2.12.11 Without prejudice to the functions of the State Legislatures, the National 
Constitutional Review Commission shall prepare model Constitutions for the States, subject 
to compliance with the National Constitution, and, as relevant, the Constitution of Southern 
Sudan.
PART III
3.0 Government of Southern Sudan:
3.1 In respect of the Southern Sudan, there shall be a Government of Southern Sudan 
{GOSS}, as per the borders of 1/1/56, which shall consist of:
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3.1.1 The Legislature of Southern Sudan;
3.1.2 The Executive of Southern Sudan;
3.1.3 The Judiciary of Southern Sudan;
3.2 The Government of Southern Sudan shall function in accordance with a Southern Sudan 
Constitution, which shall be drafted by an inclusive Southern Sudan Constitutional Drafting 
Committee and adopted by the Transitional Assembly of Southern Sudan by a two-thirds 
majority of all members. It shall conform with the Interim National Constitution.
3.3 The powers of the Government of Southern Sudan shall be as set forth in Schedules B 
and D, read together with Schedules E and F, the Interim National Constitution, Southern 
Sudan Constitution, and the Peace Agreement.
3.4 A primary responsibility of the Government of Southern Sudan will be to act as an 
authority in respect of the States of Southern Sudan, to act as a link with the National 
Government and to ensure that the rights and interests of the people of Southern Sudan are 
safeguarded during the Interim Period.
3.5 Legislature of Southern Sudan:
3.5.1 Pending the elections, the First Southern Sudan Assembly shall be an inclusive, 
constituent legislature comprised of:
3.5.1.1 The SPLM shall be represented by Seventy Percent (70%);
3.5.1.2 The NCP shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%);
3.5.1.3 The other Southern political forces shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%).
3.5.2 The Southern Sudan Assembly shall, in accordance with the Constitution adopted by it, 
provide for the election of its Speaker and other office holders.
3.5.3 When enacting the Constitution of Southern Sudan, the Assembly of Southern Sudan 
shall be empowered to assign such powers as set forth in Schedules B and D, read together 
with Schedules E and F, to the Government of Southern Sudan.
3.5.4 The Southern Sudan Constitution shall make provision for the Assembly of Southern 
Sudan to be re-constituted through elections in accordance with the provisions herein related 
to the timing of general elections. The Constitution of the Southern Sudan shall also make 
provision for the election of the President and appointment of the Vice President of the 
Government of Southern Sudan. Such elections shall be in accordance with the provisions set 
forth by the National Electoral Commission specified in sub-paragraph 2.10.1.1 herein.
3.5.5 The Assembly of Southern Sudan may amend the Constitution of the Southern Sudan 
by a two-thirds majority vote of all members.
3.5.6 Apart from applicable national legislation, legislative authority in Southern Sudan shall 
be vested in the Assembly of Southern Sudan. It shall establish its own offices, committees 
and rules of procedure. It shall elect a Speaker and Deputy Speaker and other officers at its 
first meeting.
3.6 The Southern Sudan Executive:
3.6.1 An Executive Council of Ministers appointed by the President of the Government of 
Southern Sudan, in consultation with his/her Vice President and approved by the Assembly 
of Southern Sudan, shall be established in accordance with the Southern Sudan Constitution. 
The Executive Council of Ministers shall be accountable to the President of the Government 
of Southern Sudan and the Southern Sudan Assembly in the performance of their functions 
and may be removed by a motion supported by two-thirds of all the members of the Southern 
Sudan Assembly.
3.6.2 The Executive Authority of Southern Sudan shall establish such independent 
institutions as the Peace Agreement, the Interim National Constitution and the Southern 
Sudan Constitution contemplate. It shall be empowered to establish such further commissions 
and institutions compatible with its powers as it deems necessary to promote the welfare of 
its people, good governance and justice.
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3.6.3 The Government of Southern Sudan shall be established with due regard to the need for 
inclusiveness.
3.6.4 Prior to elections, the Government of Southern Sudan shall be allocated as follows:
3.6.4.1 The SPLM shall be represented by Seventy Percent (70%);
3.6.4.2 The NCP shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%);
3.6.4.3 The other Southern political forces shall be represented by Fifteen Percent (15%).
3.6.5 The Government of Southern Sudan shall discharge its obligations and exercise such 
rights and powers in regard to administration, security, financial, and development issues as 
is set forth in the Southern Sudan Constitution, the Interim National Constitution, the Peace 
Agreement and any other agreement relating to the reconstruction and development of the 
Southern Sudan.
3.6.6 (a) Should the post of the President of GOSS fall vacant, and pending the nomination 
and swearing in of the new President, the functions of the President shall be assumed by the 
Vice President of GOSS;
(b) Should the post of the President of GOSS fall vacant in the period prior to elections, the 
Office of the President of GOSS shall be filled by a nominee of the SPLM within two weeks;
(c) Should the post of the President fall vacant in the period after the elections, the post shall 
be filled through elections which shall be held within sixty (60) days.
3.7 The Judiciary of Southern Sudan:
3.7.1 There shall be at the Southern Sudan Level:
3.7.1.1 A Supreme Court of Southern Sudan;
3.7.1.2 Courts of Appeal; and
3.7.1.3 Any such other courts or tribunals as deemed necessary to be established in 
accordance with the Southern Sudan Constitution and the law.
3.7.2 The Constitution of Southern Sudan shall provide for a Supreme Court for Southern 
Sudan which shall be the highest court in the South and to which appeals may lie from 
Southern state courts or other Courts of Southern Sudan on matters brought under or relating 
to Southern state, Southern Sudan or National law, as may be determined by the Constitution 
of Southern Sudan.
3.7.3 The Southern Sudan Supreme Court shall:
3.7.3.1 Be the court of final judicial instance in respect of any litigation or prosecution under 
Southern State or Southern Sudan law, including statutory and customary law, save that any 
decisions arising under National Laws shall be subject to review and decision by the National 
Supreme Court;
3.7.3.2 Have original jurisdiction to decide on disputes that arise under the Constitution of 
Southern Sudan and the constitutions of Southern Sudan states at the instance of individuals, 
juridical entities or of government;
3.7.3.3 Adjudicate on the constitutionality of laws and set aside or strike down laws or 
provisions of laws that contradict the Constitution of Southern Sudan or the constitutions of 
Southern Sudan states;
3.7.3.4 Be a court of review and cassation in respect of any criminal or civil matter arising 
out or under Southern Sudan Laws;
3.7.3.5 Have criminal jurisdiction over the President and Vice President of the Government 
of Southern Sudan and the Speaker of Southern Sudan Legislature;
3.7.3.6 Review death sentences imposed by Southern Sudan courts in respect of matters 
arising out of or under Southern Sudan Laws;
3.7.3.7 Have such other jurisdictions as determined by Southern Sudan Constitution, the 
Peace Agreement and the Law.
3.7.4 Judges of the Courts of Southern Sudan shall perform their functions without political 
interference, shall be independent, and shall administer the law without fear or favor. The 
provisions of the Southern Sudan Constitution and the Law shall protect their independence.
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3.7.5 Without prejudice to Sub-Para. 2.11.4.4, the Legislature of Southern Sudan shall 
provide for appointments, terms of service and dismissal of Southern Sudan appointed 
Judges.
PART IV
4. Institutions at the State Level
4.1 The Institutions at the State level shall consist of:
4.1.1 The State Legislature;
4.1.2 The State Executive; and
4.1.3 The State Judiciary.
4.2 There shall be legislative, executive, and judicial institutions at state level which shall 
function in accordance with this Agreement, the Interim National Constitution and, in respect 
of the states of Southern Sudan, also with the Constitution of Southern Sudan.
4.3 Local Government is an important level of Government and its election, organization and 
proper functioning shall be the responsibility of the states, in accordance with the relevant 
state constitution.
4.4 The State Legislature:
4.4.1 There shall be a State Legislature comprised of members elected in accordance with the 
electoral provisions herein and as set forth by the National Electoral Commission referred to 
in sub-paragraph 2.10.1.1 herein.
4.4.2 Pending the elections referred to in sub-article 4.4.1 herein, the composition of the state 
legislatures shall be comprised as follows:
4.4.2.1. The NCP is to hold Seventy Percent (70%) in the Northern states, and the SPLM 
Seventy Percent (70%) in the Southern states;
4.4.2.2. The remaining Thirty Percent (30%) in the Northern and the Southern states shall be 
allocated as follows:
(i) Ten Percent (10%) in the Southern states to be filled by the NCP;
(ii) Ten Percent (10%) in the Northern states to be filled by the SPLM; and
(iii) Twenty Percent (20%) in the Northern and Southern states to be filled by representatives 
of other Northern and Southern political forces respectively.
4.4.3. The elections referred to in sub-article 4.4.1. herein shall take place on the same date as 
the elections for the National Assembly referred to in Section 1.8.3.
4.4.4. The state legislatures shall prepare and adopt state constitutions provided that they are 
in conformity with the National Constitution, the Peace Agreement, and for Southern States, 
also in conformity with the Constitution of Southern Sudan.
4.4.5. The State Legislature shall have law-making competency in respect of the functional 
areas listed in Schedules C and D, read together with Schedules E and F.
4.4.6. Members of the State Legislature and the State Council of Ministers, including the 
Governor, shall have such immunities as are provided by law.
4.4.7. The State Legislature shall decide its own rules, procedures, and committees, and elect 
its Speaker and other officers.
4.5 The State Executive:
4.5.1 Prior to elections the state executives shall be allocated as follows:
4.5.1.1 The NCP is to hold Seventy Percent (70%) in the Northern states, and the SPLM 
Seventy Percent (70%) in the Southern states;
4.5.1.2 The remaining Thirty Percent (30%) in the Northern and the Southern states shall be 
allocated as follows:
(i) Ten Percent (10%) in the Southern states to be filled by the NCP;
(ii) Ten Percent (10%) in the Northern states to be filled by the SPLM; and
(iii) Twenty Percent (20%) in the Northern and Southern states to be filled by representatives 
of other Northern and Southern political forces, respectively.
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4.5.2 As part of the Ten Percent (10%) share of the NCP in Southern states the two Parties 
agreed as follows:
(i) The Governor of one Southern State shall be a nominee of the NCP;
(ii) One Deputy Governor in a different Southern State shall be a nominee of the NCP.
4.5.3 The States’ Council of Ministers shall be appointed by the Governor in accordance with 
the State Constitution, having regard to the need for inclusiveness. The State Ministers shall 
be accountable to the Governor and the State Legislature in the performance of their 
functions and may be removed by the Governor on a motion supported by two-thirds of all 
the members of the State Legislature.
4.5.4 The Governor shall, together with the States’ Council of Ministers appointed by 
him/her, exercise the executive powers of the state which shall be in respect of the functional 
areas listed in Schedules C and D, read together with Schedules E and F, and such other 
executive competencies as are conferred upon the State by the Interim National Constitution, 
the Southern Sudan Constitutions, the State Constitutions, and the Peace Agreement.
4.5.5 State Governors must sign any law duly approved by the State Legislature, failing 
which, after thirty (30) days it shall be deemed to have been signed into law by the State 
Governor. Where the State Governor withholds his/her signature, he/she must present reasons 
for his/her refusal to so sign when re-introducing the bill to the State Legislature within the 
30-day period stated within. The Bill shall become law if the State Legislature again passes 
the bill by two-thirds majority of all the members and the assent of the Governor shall not be 
required.
4.6 State Judicial Institutions:
4.6.1 The State Constitutions shall provide for the establishment of such state courts by the 
State Judiciary as necessary.
4.6.2 State legislation must provide for:
4.6.2.1 The appointment and dismissal of State-appointed judges (lay magistrates); and
4.6.2.2 Guarantees of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary and ensure that 
judges shall not be subject to political or other interference.
4.6.3 State Courts shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction in respect of State, Southern 
Sudan, and National Laws, save that a right of appeal shall lie as provided in this Agreement.
4.6.4 Notwithstanding sub-paragraph 4.6.3, the National Legislature shall determine the civil 
and criminal procedures to be followed in respect of litigation or prosecution under National 
laws in accordance with the Interim National Constitution.
4.6.5 The structures and powers of the Courts of the States of Southern Sudan shall be subject 
to the provisions of this Agreement and the Constitution of Southern Sudan.
PART V: SCHEDULES 
SCHEDULE A: National Powers
Exclusive competencies (Legislative and Executive Powers) of the National Government.
1. National Defense and National Security and Protection of the National Borders;
2. Foreign Affairs and International Representation;
3. Nationality and Naturalization;
4. Passports and Visas;
5. Immigration and Aliens;
6. Currency, Coinage and Exchange Control;
7. Constitutional Court and such National Courts responsible for enforcing or applying 
National laws;
8. National Police (including Criminal Investigation Department - CID}, Coordination of 
International, Regional and bilateral Criminal Matters, and Standards and Regulations 
including the standards for training the police in the National Capital);
9. The fixing of and providing for salaries and allowances of civil and other officers of the 
National Government;
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10. Postal Services;
11. Civil Aviation;
12. Maritime shipment;
13. Beacons;
14. Navigation and Shipment;
15. National Lands and National natural resources;
16. Central Bank, the Incorporation of National banks and issuing of paper money;
17. Bills of Exchange and Promissory Notes;
18. Weights, Measures and Standards, Dates and Standards of Time;
19. Meteorology;
20. Establishment and Maintenance of National Prisons;
21. National Institutions as envisaged under the Peace Agreement or as set forth in the 
Interim National Constitution;
22. Customs, Excise and Export Duties;
23. Intellectual Property Rights, including Patents and Copyright;
24. National Flag, National Emblem and National Anthem;
25. Signing of International Treaties on behalf of the Republic of Sudan;
26. National Debt and borrowing on public credit;
27. National Census, National Surveys and National Statistics;
28. National States of Emergency;
29. International and Inter-State Transport, including roads, airports, waterways, harbours 
and railways;
30. National Public Utilities;
31. National Museums and National Heritage Sites;
32. National Economic Policy and Planning;
33. Nile Water Commission, the management of the Nile Waters, trans-boundary waters and 
disputes arising from the management of interstate waters between Northern states and any 
dispute between Northern and Southern states;
34. National information, publications, telecommunications regulations;
35. National Taxation and National Revenue Raising;
36. National Budget;
37. Laws providing for National elections and their supervision by the Electoral Commission;
38. Issuance of National ID Card.
SCHEDULE B: Powers of the Government of Southern Sudan
The exclusive legislative and executive powers of the Government of Southern Sudan shall 
be:
1. The adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the Government of Southern Sudan 
(subject to compliance with the Interim National Constitution);
2. Police, Prisons and Wildlife Services;
3. Security and military forces during the Interim Period (subject to Agreement on Security 
Arrangements);
4. Legislation relating to the Government of Southern Sudan structures for the delivery of 
services at all levels of Government of Southern Sudan;
5. Borrowing of money on the sole credit of the Government of Southern Sudan within the 
national macro-economic policy;
6. Planning for Southern Sudan Government services including health, education, and 
welfare, etc;
7. The appointment, tenure and payment of Government of Southern Sudan (GOSS) officers 
and civil servants;
8. Development of financial resources for the Government of Southern Sudan;
9. The co-ordination of Southern Sudan services or the establishment of minimum Southern 
Sudan standards or the establishment of Southern Sudan uniform norms in respect of any
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matter or service referred to in Schedule C or Schedule D, read together with Schedule E, 
with the exception of Item 1 of Schedule C, including but not limited to, education, health, 
welfare, police (without prejudice to the National Standards and Regulations), prisons, state 
public services, such authority over civil and criminal laws and judicial institutions as is 
specified in the Schedules, lands, reformatories, personal law, intra-state business, commerce 
and trade, tourism, environment, agriculture, disaster intervention, fire and medical 
emergency services, commercial regulation, provision of
electricity, water and waste management services, local Government, animal control and 
veterinary services, consumer protection, and any other matters referred to in the above 
Schedules;
10. Any power that a State or the National Government requests it to exercise on its behalf, 
subject to the agreement of the Government of Southern Sudan or that for reasons of 
efficiency the Government of Southern Sudan itself requests to exercise in Southern Sudan 
and that other level agrees;
11. Referenda in Southern Sudan on matters affecting Southern Sudan as a whole within the 
competencies of Southern Sudan Government;
12. Taxation and revenue raising in Southern Sudan as a whole;
13. Southern Sudan Budget, subject to the agreement on Wealth Sharing;
14. GOSS Public utilities;
15. GOSS flag, emblem;
16. Reconstruction and development of the Southern Sudan as a whole, subject to the 
provisions of the Wealth Sharing Agreement;
17. GOSS information, publications, media and telecommunications utilities;
18. Rehabilitation and benefits to disabled war veterans, orphans, widows and care for the 
dependents of deceased war fallen heroes;
19. Any matter relating to an item referred to in schedule D that cannot be dealt with 
effectively by a single State and requires GOSS legislation or intervention including, but not 
limited to the following:
19.1. Matters relating to businesses, trade licenses and conditions of operation;
19.2. Natural resources and forestry;
19.3. Town and rural planning;
19.4 Disputes arising from the management of interstate waters strictly within Southern 
Sudan;
19.5. Fire fighting and ambulance services;
19.6. GOSS reformatory institutions;
19.7. Firearm licenses within Southern Sudan; and
19.8. GOSS recreation and sports.
20. Such matters relating to taxation, royalties and economic planning as is specified in the 
Agreement on Wealth Sharing as a matter or matters in regard to which the Government of 
Southern Sudan is accorded exclusive authority;
21. Southern Sudan census and statistics within the competence of the Southern Sudan 
Government;
22. Issuance of identity cards within Southern Sudan, driving licenses and other appropriate 
documentation.
SCHEDULE C: Powers of the States
Exclusive executive and legislative competencies of the individual States of Sudan shall be as 
set out hereunder:
1. The Constitution of the State, subject to compliance with the National Constitution, and, as 
relevant, the Constitution of Southern Sudan;
2. State Police, prisons;
3. Local Government;
4. State information, state publications and state media;
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5. Social Welfare including State pensions;
6. The Civil Service at the State level;
7. The State Judiciary and administration of justice at State level including maintenance and 
organization of State Courts, and subject to national norms and standards, civil and criminal 
procedure;
8. State Land and State Natural Resources;
9. Cultural matters within the State;
10. Regulation of religious matters subject to the National Constitution and the Peace 
Agreement;
11. Internal and external borrowing of money on the sole credit of the State within the 
National macro-economic framework;
12. The establishment, tenure, appointment, and payment of State officers;
13. The management, lease and utilization of lands belonging to the State;
14. The establishment, maintenance and management of reformatory institutions;
15. The establishment, regulation, and provision of health care, including hospitals and other 
health institutions;
16. Regulation of businesses, trade licenses, working conditions, hours, and holidays within 
the State;
17. Local works and undertakings;
18. Registration of marriage, divorce, inheritance, births, deaths, adoption and affiliations;
19. Enforcement of State laws;
20. Statutes enacted under the Penal Law power, save for the penalization for the breach of 
National laws relating to the national competencies;
21. The development, conservation and management of State natural resources and State 
forestry resources;
22. Primary and secondary schools and education administration in regard thereto;
23. Laws in relation to Agriculture within the State;
24. Airstrips other than international and national airports within civil aviation regulations;
25. Intrastate public transport and roads;
26. Population policy and family planning;
27. Pollution control;
28. State statistics, and State surveys;
29. State referenda;
30. Charities and endowment;
31. Quarrying regulations, (subject to the Agreement on Wealth Sharing);
32. Town and rural planning;
33. State cultural and heritage sites, State libraries, State museums, and other historical sites;
34. Traditional and customary law;
35. State finances;
36. State irrigation and embankments;
37. State Budget;
38. State archives, antiquities, and monuments;
39. Direct and indirect taxation within the State in order to raise revenue for the State;
40. State public utilities;
4L Vehicle licensing;
42. Fire fighting and ambulance services;
43. Recreation and sport within the State;
44. Firearms Licenses;
45. Flag and emblem.
SCHEDULE D: Concurrent Powers
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The National Government, the Government of Southern Sudan and State Governments, shall 
have legislative and executive competencies on any of the matters listed below during the 
Interim Period:
1. Economic and Social Development in Southern Sudan;
2. Legal and other professions and their associations;
3. Tertiary education, education policy and scientific research;
4. Health policy;
5. Urban development, planning and housing;
6. Trade, commerce, Industry and industrial development;
7. Delivery of public services;
8. Banking and insurance;
9. Bankruptcy and insolvency;
10. Manufacturing licenses;
11. Airports only with respect to the GOSS in accordance with Civil Aviation standards and 
regulations;
12. River transport;
13. Disaster preparedness, management and relief and epidemics control;
14. Traffic regulations;
15. Electricity generation and water and waste management;
16. Information, Publications, Media, Broadcasting and Telecommunications;
17. Environmental management, conservation and protection;
18. Relief, Repatriation, Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction;
19. Without prejudice to the National Regulation, and in the case of Southern States, the 
regulation of Southern Sudan Government, the initiation, negotiation and conclusion of 
International and Regional Agreements on culture, sports, trade, investment, credit, loans, 
grants and technical
assistance with foreign governments and foreign non-governmental organizations;
20. Financial and economic policies and planning;
21. Women’s empowerment;
22. Gender policy;
23. Animal and livestock control, animal diseases, pastures and veterinary services;
24. Consumer safety and protection;
25. Residual powers, subject to schedule E;
26. Mother, Child protection and care;
27. Water Resources other than interstate waters;
28. Notwithstanding Schedules A, B and C, such matters relating to taxation, royalties and 
economic planning as specified in the Agreement on Wealth Sharing;
29. Southern Sudan and State Courts responsible for enforcing or applying National laws;
30. Such matters relating to taxation, royalties and economic planning as is specified in the 
Agreement on Wealth Sharing as a matter or matters in regard to which the Government of 
Southern Sudan is accorded concurrent authority;
31. Human and animal drug quality control.
SCHEDULE E: Residual Powers
The residual powers shall be dealt with according to its nature (e.g., if the power pertains to a 
national matter, requires a national standard, or is a matter which cannot be regulated by a 
single state, it shall be exercised by the National Government. If the power pertains to a 
matter that is usually exercised by the state or local government, it shall be exercised by the 
state). Where a matter is susceptible to Southern Sudan regulation, in respect of the states of 
Southern Sudan, it shall be exercised by the Government of Southern Sudan.
SCHEDULE F: Resolution of Conflicts in Respect of Concurrent Powers:
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If there is a contradiction between the provisions of Southern Sudan law and/or a State law 
and/or a National law, on the matters referred in Schedule D, the law of the level of 
government which shall prevail shall be that which most effectively deals with the subject 
matter of the law, having regard to:
1. The need to recognize the sovereignty of the Nation while accommodating the autonomy 
of Southern Sudan or of the States;
2. Whether there is a need for National or Southern Sudan norms and standards;
3. The principle of subsidiaries;
4. The need to promote the welfare of the people and to protect each person’s human rights 
and fundamental freedoms.
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THE RESOLUTION OF THE ABYEI CONFLICT 
26 May 2004
Principles of Agreement on Abyei
1.1 In General
1.1.1 Abyei is a bridge between the north and the south, linking the people of Sudan;
1.1.2 The territory is defined as the area of the nine Ngok Dinka chiefdoms transferred to 
Kordofan in 1905;
1.1.3 The Misseriya and other nomadic peoples retain their traditional rights to graze cattle 
and move across the territory of Abyei.
1.2 Interim Period:
Upon signing the peace agreement, Abyei will be accorded special administrative status, in 
which:
1.2.1 Residents of Abyei will be citizens of both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal, with 
representation in the legislatures of both states;
1.2.2 Abyei will be administered by a local Executive Council, elected by the residents of 
Abyei. Pending the election of the Executive Council, its initial members will be appointed 
by the Presidency;
1.2.3 Net oil revenues from Abyei will be divided six ways during the Interim Period: the 
National Government (50 percent); the Government of Southern Sudan (42 percent); Bahr el 
Ghazal region (2 percent); Western Kordofan (2 percent); locally with the Ngok Dinka (2 
percent); and locally with the Misseriya people (2 percent);
1.2.4 The National Government will provide Abyei with assistance to improve the lives of 
the peoples of Abyei, including urbanization and development
projects;
1.2.5 International monitors will be deployed to Abyei to ensure full implementation of these 
agreements.
1.3 End of Interim Period:
Simultaneously with the referendum for southern Sudan, the residents of Abyei will cast a 
separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the separate ballot will present the residents of 
Abyei with the following choices, irrespective of the results of the southern referendum:
a. That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north;
b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal.
1.4 The January 1, 1956 line between north and south will be 
inviolate, except as agreed above.
2. ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE:
2.1 Upon signing the Peace Agreement, Abyei Area shall be accorded special administrative 
status under the institution of the Presidency.
2.2 Abyei area shall be administered by a local Executive Council, elected by the residents of 
Abyei. Pending the election of the Executive Council, its initial members shall be appointed 
by the
Presidency.
2.3 The administration of the Abyei Area shall be representative and inclusive of all the 
residents of the area.
2.4 The Executive Council shall be composed of the Chief Administrator, his/her Deputy and 
not more than five heads of departments. Prior to elections, the Chief Administrator and 
his/her Deputy shall be appointed by the Presidency. The Chief Administrator shall make 
recommendations to the Presidency regarding the appointments of the heads of departments.
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2.5 The Executive Council, in exercise of its executive powers, shall:
2.5.1 render necessary services;
2.5.2 supervise and promote security and stability in the area;
2.5.3 Propose development and urbanization projects for the area to both the Abyei Area 
Council and to the Presidency;
2.5.4 Present to the National Government proposals regarding the provision of assistance to 
improve the lives of the peoples of Abyei, including urbanization and development;
2.6 The Presidency, upon the recommendation of the Executive Council, shall determine the 
executive, legislative and financial powers and competencies of the special status of Abyei 
Area, having regard to this protocol, other protocols, agreements, and the Comprehensive 
Peace Agreement.
2.7 In view of the special status of Abyei Area, the Presidency shall apply to the Judiciary to 
establish courts for Abyei Area as deemed appropriate.
3. FINANCIAL RESOURCES:
3.1 Without prejudice to the provisions of the Wealth Sharing Agreement, the net-oil revenue 
from the oil produced in Abyei Area shall be shared during the Interim Period as follows:
3.1.1 Fifty Percent (50%) to the National Government;
3.1.2 Forty Two Percent (42%) to the Government of Southern Sudan;
3.1.3 Two Percent (2%) to Bahr el Ghazal Region;
3.1.4 Two Percent (2%) to Western Kordofan;
3.1.5 Two Percent (2%) locally with the Ngok Dinka;
3.1.6 Two Percent (2%) locally with the Misseriya people.
3.2 In addition to the above financial, resources, Abyei Area shall be entitled to:
3.2.1 The area share of the national revenue as per the Wealth Sharing Agreement;
3.2.2 The revenues raised in the Abyei Area from Income Tax and other taxes and levies;
3.2.3 The share of the Area in the National Reconstruction and Development Fund;
3.2.4 An equitable share of Southern Sudan Development and Reconstruction Fund;
3.2.5 Allocations from the National Government to cover the cost of establishment of the 
new administration, its running and provision of services;
3.2.6 Donations and grants.
3.3 There shall be established, under the Executive Council, Abyei Resettlement, 
Construction and Development Fund to handle relief, repatriation, resettlement, reintegration, 
rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes in the Area. The Fund may establish 
specialized agencies.
3.4 The National Government shall appeal to the international and donor community to 
facilitate the return and resettlement of the residents of Abyei Area.
3.5 The financial resources due to Abyei Area as provided in section 3 herein shall be 
deposited in special accounts, acceptable to the Presidency, from which the administration of 
the Area shall make withdrawals.
4. PUBLIC PARTICIPATION:
4.1 There shall be established Abyei Area Council comprised of not more than twenty 
members.
4.2 Prior to elections, the Presidency shall appoint the members of the Abyei Area Council.
4.3 The Abyei Area Council shall:
4.3.1 Issue local enactments within the powers of local government and on customary 
matters;
4.3.2 Approve the budget of the Area;
4.3.3 Adopt reconstruction, development and urbanization plans for the Area;
4.3.4 If necessary, recommend to the Presidency the relief of the Chief Administrator or 
his/her Deputy;
4.3.5 Participate in the promotion of reconciliation efforts in the Area.
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5. DETERMINATION OF GEOGRAPHIC BOUNDARIES:
5.1 There shall be established by the Presidency, Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) to 
define and demarcate the area of the nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms transferred to Kordofan in 
1905, referred to herein as Abyei Area.
5.2 The composition and timeframe of the Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) shall be 
determined by the Presidency. However, the Commission shall include, inter alia, experts, 
representatives of the local communities and the local administration. The Commission shall 
finish its work within the first two years of the Interim Period.
5.3 The Abyei Boundaries Commission (ABC) shall present its final report to the Presidency 
as soon as it is ready. Upon presentation of the final report, the Presidency shall take 
necessary action to put the special administrative status of Abyei Area into immediate effect.
6. RESIDENTS OF THE AREA:
6.1 The residents of Abyei Area shall be:
(a) The Members of Ngok Dinka community and other Sudanese residing in the area;
(b) The criteria of residence shall be worked out by the Abyei Referendum Commission.
6.2 Residents of Abyei shall be citizens of both Western Kordofan and Bahr el Ghazal with 
representation in the legislatures of both States as determined by the National Electoral 
Commission. However, prior to elections, the Presidency shall determine such representation.
7. SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS:
7.1 There shall be established Abyei Area Security Committee, chaired by the Chief 
Administrator, and shall comprise of the Deputy Chief Administrator, the Army Commander, 
the Police Chief, and the representative of the Security Organ.
7.2 Without prejudice to the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the two Parties shall, 
through the Interim Period form and deploy one joint battalion in the Area.
7.3 International monitors, as shall be agreed in the comprehensive Cease fire Agreement 
shall also be deployed in the Area through the Interim Period.
7.4 International monitors shall be deployed to Abyei to ensure full implementation of these 
Agreements.
8. ABYEI REFERENDUM COMMISSION
8.1 There shall be established by the Presidency an Abyei Referendum Commission to 
conduct Abyei referendum simultaneously with the referendum of Southern Sudan. The 
composition of the Commission shall be determined by the Presidency.
8.2 The residents of Abyei shall cast a separate ballot. The proposition voted on in the 
separate ballot shall present residents of Abyei with the following choices; irrespective of the 
results of the Southern referendum:
a. That Abyei retain its special administrative status in the north;
b. That Abyei be part of Bahr el Ghazal.
8.3 The January 1, 1956 line between north and south shall be inviolate, except as agreed 
above.
9. RECONCILIATION PROCESS
Upon signing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Presidency shall, as a matter of 
urgency, start peace and reconciliation process for Abyei that shall work for harmony and 
peaceful co-existence in the Area.
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THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT IN SOUTHERN KORDOFAN AND
BLUE NILE STATES
26 May 2004
1. General Principles:
The Parties agree on the following, as the basis for political, administrative, economic and 
social solution to the conflict in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile:
1.1. Human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be guaranteed to all individuals in the 
State as prescribed in the Interim National Constitution;
1.2. The diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the population of the State shall be 
developed and protected;
1.3. Development of human resources and infrastructure shall be the main goal of the State. It 
shall be conducted to meet human needs in
2. Definition of the Two Areas:
2.1. The boundaries of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State shall be the same 
boundaries of former Southern Kordofan Province when
Greater Kordofan was sub-divided into two provinces.
2.2. For the purpose of this Protocol, Blue Nile State shall be understood as referring to the 
presently existing Blue Nile State.
3. Popular Consultation:
The Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (the Parties), 
committed to reaching a just, fair and comprehensive peace agreement to end the war in 
Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, agree on the following:
3.1. Popular consultation is a democratic right and mechanism to ascertain the views of the 
people of Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States on the comprehensive 
agreement reached by the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People’s Liberation 
Movement.
3.2. That this comprehensive agreement shall be subjected to the will of the people of the two 
States through their respective democratically elected legislatures.
3.3. That the legislatures of the two States shall each establish a Parliamentary Assessment 
and Evaluation Commission to assess and evaluate the implementation of the agreement in 
each State. The two Commissions shall submit their reports to the legislatures of the two 
States by the fourth year of the signing of the comprehensive Peace Agreement.
3.4. An independent Commission shall be established by the Presidency to assess and 
evaluate the implementation of the comprehensive Peace Agreement in each of the two 
States. The Commission shall submit its reports to the National Government and the 
Governments of the two States who shall use the reports to rectify any procedure that needs 
to be rectified to ensure faithful implementation of the Agreement.
3.5. Once this agreement is endorsed by the people through the legislature of any of the two 
States as meeting their aspirations, then the agreement becomes the final settlement of the 
political conflict in that State.
3.6. Should any of the legislatures of the two States, after reviewing the Agreement, decide to 
rectify, within the framework of the Agreement, any shortcomings in the constitutional, 
political and administrative arrangements of the Agreement, then such legislature shall 
engage in negotiations with the National Government with the view of rectifying these 
shortcomings.
4. Structure of the State Government:
4.1. The State shall have the following structure:
4.2 The State Executive, which shall comprise of:
4.2.1 The State Governor;
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4.2.2 The State Council of Ministers; and
4.2.3 Local Governments.
4.3 The State Legislature (SL).
4.4 The State Judiciary.
5. The State Executive:
5.1. The Governor of the State shall be directly elected by the registered voters of the State in 
a public adult suffrage.
5.2. The Governor shall appoint the ministers and the commissioners of the state in 
accordance with the State Interim Constitution. The State Council of Ministers shall be 
representative.
5.3. The Governor shall, together with the State Council of Ministers, exercise the Executive 
Powers of the State which shall be in respect of the functional areas listed in Schedules A and 
B, read together with Schedule C, attached hereto, and in accordance with the State Interim 
Constitution.
5.4. The State Council of Ministers shall be accountable to the Governor and the State 
Legislature in the performance of their duties.
5.5. The State shall have commissioners and elected local councils. The organization and 
proper functioning of the Local Governments shall be the responsibility of the Government of 
the State.
5.6 There shall be State Security Committee to be chaired by the Governor of the State. The 
Committee shall include, among others, the Military Commander of the area, his Deputy, the 
Director of the State Police and Director of the State National Security Branch.
5.7 Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 5.6 above, the Governor of the State 
may demand the transfer of the Director of the National Security Branch from the State.
5.8 The State Police Service shall adhere to the National standards and regulations as set 
forth by National Police Service.
5.9 Police, Prisons, Wildlife and Fire Brigade Officers shall be recruited by the State Service 
according to the National standards, trained and commissioned nationally and returned to the 
State for service. The other ranks shall be locally recruited to serve within the State. 
Recruitment and training regulations shall be designed and standardized by the National 
Police Service.
5.10 Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 5.9 above, the National Authority may 
agree with the State Authority to transfer any number of police officers from the State police 
to the National Police Service whenever necessary.
5.11 The State Authority may request the National Authority to transfer to the State any 
number of police officers to fill any vacancies in the State.
6. The State Legislature:
6.1. Members of the State Legislature (SL) shall be elected by the registered voters of the 
State in accordance with the State Law and in conformity with the general guidelines as set 
forth by electoral provisions as set forth by the National Electoral Commission.
6.2. The State Legislature shall prepare and adopt the State Constitution, provided that it shall 
conform to the Interim National Constitution.
6.3. The Governor of the State shall sign any law duly approved by the State Legislature, 
failing which, after thirty (30) days it shall be deemed to have been signed into law, unless 
the Governor has submitted the law to the Constitutional Court for a ruling on its 
constitutionality. If the Constitutional Court finds the law constitutional, the Governor shall 
immediately sign such law.
6.4. The State Legislature shall legislate for the state within its legislative powers as 
stipulated in schedule (A) attached herewith.
6.5. State laws currently applicable in the State shall continue until new legislation is duly 
enacted by the SL within its competence.
6.6. The State Legislature shall decide its own rules, procedures, and committees, and elect 
its Speaker and other officers.
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6.7. The State Legislature may relieve the Governor of the State of his/her functions by a 
motion supported by two-thirds of its membership.
6.8. Members of the State Legislature and the State Executive shall have such immunities as 
are provided by law.
7. The State Courts:
7.1. The structures and powers of the courts of the States shall be subject to the Interim 
National Constitution.
7.2. The State Constitution shall provide for the establishment of such state courts as are 
necessary.
7.3. The State Legislature shall provide for the appointment and dismissal of state appointed 
judges, subject to the State Constitution and the approval of the National Judicial Service 
Commission.
7.4. The State legislations shall provide for guarantees for the independence and impartiality 
of the State judiciary and ensures that state judges shall not be subject to political or other 
interference.
7.5. The state courts shall have civil and criminal jurisdiction in respect of State and National 
Laws, save that a right of appeal shall lie to the National Courts in respect of matters brought 
before or heard under National laws.
7.6. The National Legislature shall determine the civil and criminal procedures to be followed 
in respect of litigation or prosecution under National laws in accordance with the Interim 
National Constitution.
8. The State Share in the National Wealth:
8.1. The National wealth shall be shared equitably between different levels of Government so 
as to allow enough resources for each level of Government to exercise its constitutional 
competencies.
8.2. The States shall raise and collect taxes and revenues as listed in Schedule (D), annexed 
herewith.
8.3. Oil producing state is entitled to two percent (2%) of the oil produced in that state, as 
specified in the Wealth Sharing Agreement.
8.4. The state shall be represented in the Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring 
Commission, which shall ensure transparency and fairness in regard to allocation of the share 
due to the state from the Nationally collected revenues and ensure that allocations due to the 
state are not withheld.
8.5. The general objective of the National Reconstruction and Development Fund (NRDF) is 
to develop the war affected areas and least developed areas in the Sudan with the aim of 
bringing these areas to the national average standards and level of development.
8.6. In allocating the funds to the war-affected areas and least developed areas, NRDF shall 
use the effects of war and level of development as the main criteria. The Parties agree to 
allocate seventy-five percent (75%) of the total fund to the war-affected areas, particularly to 
Southern
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States, while the remaining balance shall be 
earmarked to the least developed areas.
8.7. The allocation of funds among the areas affected shall be determined during the Pre- 
Interim Period by the Joint National Transition Team (JNTT) that shall be established as 
agreed to in the Wealth Sharing Agreement, within the agreed percentages as in the above 
paragraph, taking into consideration the actual needs based on the results of Joint Assessment 
Mission.
8.8. The Fiscal and Financial Allocation and Monitoring Commission (FFAMC), as agreed to 
in the Wealth Sharing Agreement, shall allocate current transfers to Southern Kordofan/Nuba 
Mountains, Blue Nile and other war affected areas and least developed areas according to the 
following criteria:
8.8.1. Population;
8.8.2. Minimum expenditure responsibilities;
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8.8.3. Human Development Index / Social Indicators (social 
development factor);
8.8.4. Geographical area (cost disability factor);
8.8.5. Fiscal effort (internal revenue effort); and
8.8.6. The effect of war factor.
8.9. In addition to the budgetary allocations and the two states’ share in the NRDF, the 
President shall allocate an amount of money to each of the two states.
8.10 The Parties agree to appeal to the donor community to provide technical assistance to 
the FFAMC to develop comprehensive equalization criteria.
8.11. The states shall hold all income and revenue received in audited public accounts and 
shall comply with the regulations and auditing standards set by the Chamber of the Auditor 
General, who may audit the state’s accounts.
8.12. There shall be no impediment to interstate commerce or the flow of goods and services, 
capital, or labour to and from the state.
8.13 Any debts/liabilities incurred by any level of government shall be the responsibility of 
that level of government.
8.14 There shall be a fair and equitable division of government assets. An asset shall in the 
first instance be allocated to the level of government responsible for the function in respect of 
which the asset is related (e.g., school buildings to the level of government responsible for 
education). In the event of a dispute, the Parties agree that such dispute shall be referred to a 
committee comprising a representative of each of the Parties involved in the dispute and a 
mutually agreed expert.
8.15 There shall be at the State’s level accounting standards, procedures and fiscal 
accountability institutions operating in accordance with generally accepted accounting 
standards and procedures to ensure that funds are distributed according to the agreed 
Government budget and properly expended having regard to value for money.
9. State Land Commission:
9.1. The regulation of the land tenure, usage and exercise of rights in land shall be a 
concurrent competency exercised by the National and State Governments.
9.2. Rights in land owned by the National Government within the State shall be exercised 
through the appropriate or designated level of government.
9.3. There shall be established a State Land Commission in the State of Southern 
Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile, respectively.
9.4. The State Land Commission shall be composed of persons from the State concerned.
9.5. The State Land Commission shall exercise all the powers of the National Land 
Commission at the State level.
9.6. The State Land Commission shall be competent to review existing land leases and 
contracts and examine the criteria for the present land allocations and recommend to the State 
authority the introduction of such necessary changes, including restitution of land rights or 
compensation.
9.7. The National Land Commission and the State Land Commission shall cooperate and 
coordinate their activities so as to use their resources efficiently. Without limiting the matters 
of coordination, the National Land Commission and the State Land Commission may agree 
as follows:
9.7.1. To exchange information and decisions of each Commission;
9.7.2. That certain functions of the National Land Commission, including collection of data 
and research, may be carried out through the State Land Commission; and
9.7.3. On the way in which any conflict between the findings or recommendations of each 
Commission may be resolved.
9.8. In case of conflict between the findings and recommendations of the National Land 
Commission and the State Land Commission which cannot be resolved by agreement, the
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two Commissions shall reconcile their positions. Failure to reconcile, the matter shall be 
referred to the
Constitutional Court for adjudication.
10. Security Arrangements:
10.1 Without prejudice to the Agreement on the Security Arrangements and the right of Sudan 
Armed Forces (SAF) Command to deploy forces all over North Sudan as it deems fit, SAF 
troop levels in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile during the Interim Period 
shall be determined by the Presidency.
11. Pre-Election Arrangements:
11.1. As part of pre-election arrangements, the Parties agree on the following:
11.1.1. The Executive and Legislature in the two states shall be allocated as follows:
(a) Fifty-five Percent (55%) to the National Congress Party;
(b) Forty-five Percent (45%) to the SPLM.
11.1.2. There shall be rotational governorship in the two states with each Party holding the 
Office of Governor for half of the preelection period in each of the two states.
11.1.3. No one Party is to hold the Governorship in both states at the same time.
11.1.4. The office of Deputy Governor is to be allocated to the Party that is not presently 
occupying the Office of Governor.
11.1.5. The Parties are to decide upon the signature of the comprehensive Peace Agreement 
the time and order in which each party assumes the Governorship in each state.
11.2 Pending general elections, and as part of affirmative action, the Parties agree that 
Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile States shall be adequately represented in 
National Institutions targeting a percentage not less than the ratio of their population size.
SCHEDULES:
Schedule (A)
The Exclusive Executive and Legislative Competencies of the Two States:
1. The drafting, adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the state, subject to 
conformity with the Interim National Constitution;
2. State Police;
3. State Prisons;
4. Local Governments;
5. State information, state publications and state media;
6. Social Welfare, including state pensions;
7. The Civil Service at the state level;
8. The state judiciary and administration of justice at the state level, including maintenance 
and organization of state courts, subject to national norms and standards of civil and criminal 
procedure;
9. Cultural matters within the state;
10. Religious matters, subject to the Interim National Constitution;
11. Internal and external borrowing of money on the sole credit of the state within the 
national macro-economic framework, as set by the Ministry of Finance;
12. The establishment, tenure, appointment, and payment of state civil service officers;
13. The management, lease and utilization of lands belonging to the state;
14. The establishment, maintenance and management of reformatory institutions;
15. The establishment, regulation, and provision of health care, including hospitals and other 
health institutions;
16. Regulation of businesses, trade licenses, working conditions, hours, and holidays within 
the state;
17. Local works and undertakings;
18. Registration of marriage, divorce, inheritance, births, deaths, adoption and affiliations;
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19. Enforcement of state laws;
20. Statutes enacted under the penal law power, save for the penalization for the breach of 
National laws relating to the National competencies;
21. The development, conservation and management of state natural resources and state 
forestry resources;
22. Primary and secondary school and education administration in regard thereto;
23. Laws in relation to agriculture within the state;
24. Airstrips other than international and national airports within civil aviation regulations;
25. Intrastate public transport and roads;
26. Population policy and family planning;
27. Pollution control;
28. State statistics, and state surveys;
29. State referenda, in matters within the state’s competencies;
30. State charities and endowment;
31. Town and rural planning;
32. State cultural and heritage sites, state libraries, state museums, and other historical sites;
33. Traditional and customary law;
34. Recreation and sport within the state;
35. Firearms Licenses;
36. State finances;
37. State irrigation and embankments;
38. State budget;
39. State archives, antiquities, and monuments;
40. Direct and indirect taxation within the state in order to raise revenue for the state;
4L State public utilities;
42. Vehicle licensing;
43. Fire fighting and ambulance services;
44. Flag and Emblem; and
45. Community empowerment.
Schedule (B): Concurrent Powers
The National and State Governments shall have concurrent Legislative and Executive 
competencies on any of the matters listed below:
1. Economic and social development within the state;
2. Legal and other professions and their associations;
3. Tertiary education, educational policy and scientific research;
4. Health policy;
5. Urban development, planning and housing;
6. Trade, commerce, industry and industrial development;
7. Delivery of public services;
8. Banking and insurance;
9. Bankruptcy and insolvency;
10. Manufacturing licenses;
11. Disaster preparedness, management and relief and epidemics;
12. Traffic regulations;
13. Electricity generation and water and waste management;
14. Broadcasting and telecommunications utilities;
15. Environmental management, conservation and protection;
16. Relief, repatriation, resettlement, rehabilitation and reconstruction;
17. The initiation and negotiation of international and regional agreements on culture, trade, 
investment, credit, loans, grants and technical assistance with foreign governments and 
foreign non-governmental organizations;
18. Financial and economic policies and planning;
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19. Gender policy;
20. Women’s empowerment;
21. Animal and livestock control, animal diseases, pastures and veterinary services;
22. Consumer safety and protection;
23. Women welfare and child protection and care;
24. State courts responsible for enforcing or applying national laws; and
25. Rehabilitation and care for disabled war veterans, orphans, widows and their dependants.
Schedule (C): Residual Powers
The residual powers shall be exercised in accordance with its nature and as to whether the 
power pertains to a national matter, requires a national standard or is a matter that cannot be 
regulated by a single state, in which case it shall be exercised by the National Government. If 
the power pertains to a state matter, it shall be exercised by the state.
Schedule (D): State Revenue Sources
The state shall be entitled to raise and collect the taxes and revenues from the sources listed 
hereunder:
1. State land and property tax and royalties;
2. Service charges for state services;
3. Licenses;
4. State personal income tax;
5. Tourism levies;
6. Share of natural resource revenues;
7. State Government projects;
8. Stamp duties;
9. State agricultural taxes;
10. Loans and borrowing in accordance with the national macroeconomic policy framework;
11. Excise taxes;
12. Border trade charges or levies in accordance with National legislation;
13. Other state taxes which do not encroach on National taxes; and
14. Grants in Aid and Foreign Aid through the National Government.
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IMPLEMENTATION MODALITIES DURING THE PRE-INTERIM AND
THE INTERIM PERIODS
31 DECEMBER 2004
PART ONE
The Ceasefire Arrangements 
1. General and Fundamental Provisions
1.1. The Parties agree that the national ownership of the peace process, political will, and 
continuous dialogue are indispensable elements for sustainable peace. They shall collaborate 
to observe and respect the Ceasefire and resort to their own wisdom to contain and solve any 
problem that may arise;
1.2. The Parties shall always refrain from any act or acts that may in any way spoil the peace 
process. They shall unceasingly create and maintain a conducive atmosphere for peace and 
tranquillity;
1.3. The Parties shall abide by good governance, democracy and foster civil society;
1.4. The Parties agree that inclusiveness is of the essence to this agreement and shall engage 
the other armed groups and political forces to become part of the peace process, play a role 
thereto and contribute to the sustenance of this Agreement;
1.5. The Ceasefire Agreement shall ensure clarity by eliminating any room for ambiguity in 
all elements of the Ceasefire Agreement;
1.6. The Ceasefire Agreement shall guarantee the free movement of people, goods and 
services throughout Sudan;
1.7. The Parties shall, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Ceasefire Agreement, provide 
and share information and statistics on their troops strength, arms and military equipment and 
any other relevant information, among themselves and with the UN Peace Support 
Mission;
1.8. The Parties shall commit themselves to immediate release of prisoners of war (POWs) 
and as a gesture of national reconciliation release any other persons detained as a result of the 
war upon the endorsement of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement;
1.9. The Parties shall involve the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in the 
process of arranging the release of POWs and other persons detained as a result of the war;
1.10. The Parties shall commit themselves to render and facilitate humanitarian assistance 
through creation of conditions conducive to the provision of urgent humanitarian assistance 
to displaced persons, refugees and other affected persons and their right to return;
1.11. The Parties agree to inform the rank and file of their armed forces as a way of 
popularising the Ceasefire Agreement;
1.12. The Parties shall commit themselves that all forces, troops under their respective 
command and forces allied and affiliated to them at all levels and rank and file shall fully 
cease fire and stop hostilities;
1.13. The Parties shall endeavor to promote and disseminate peace culture and confidence 
building measures among and between the people as well as their forces as integral part of 
ceasefire arrangements and sustenance of the peace;
1.14. The Parties agree not to arm, train, harbour on their respective areas of control, or 
render any form of support to external subversive elements or internal armed groups;
1.15. Nothing in this agreement shall in any way undermine the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Sudan.
443
2. Entry into Force:
The Ceasefire Agreement (hereinafter referred to as the Agreement or this Agreement) shall 
come into effect from the date of signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (that day 
hereafter referred to as D-Day).
3. Amendment of this Agreement:
This Agreement may only be amended by the Presidency upon recommendation of the 
Ceasefire Political Commission.
4. The Parties of the Agreement:
The Parties to this Agreement shall be:
4.1. The Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), with all its formations and units; and
4.2. The Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), with all its formations and units.
5. Principles of the Ceasefire:
5.1. The Parties agree to a permanent ceasefire among all their forces with the broader 
objective of sustaining the comprehensive peace agreement, promoting peace culture, 
reconciliation and confidence building;
5.2. The ceasefire shall uphold the following principles:
5.2.1 Permanent cessation of hostilities between SAF and SPLA within 
72 hours of the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
5.3. The permanent cessation of hostilities shall include final termination of the following 
activities:
5.3.1. Military activities including movement, reconnaissance, reinforcement, recruitment, 
draft, and military exercises other than those permitted by the Joint Defense Board (JDB). 
The JDB will inform the UN Peace Support Mission of permitted current and future 
activities;
5.3.2. Land, air, and river operations;
5.3.3. Laying of mines and other subversive activities;
5.3.4. Use of force against and abuse of civilians;
5.3.5. Replenishment of ammunition, weapons and other lethal or military equipment;
5.3.6. Hostile propaganda from inside or outside the country;
5.3.7. Occupation of new locations;
5.3.8. Any other actions that may impede the normal progress of the ceasefire process.
6. The Ceasefire Zone:
The scope of the ceasefire shall be:
6.1. Southern Sudan, which shall be subdivided, for all the purposes of ceasefire and 
monitoring activities, into three areas of:
a) Bahr el Ghazal Area;
b) Equatorial Area;
c) Upper Nile Area.
6.2 Nuba Mountains Area;
6.3 Southern Blue Nile Area;
6.4 Abyei Area;
6.5 Eastern Sudan Area (Hamashkoreb, new Rasai, Kotaneb, Tamarat, and Khor Khawaga).
7. Duration and Calendar of Major Ceasefire Activities:
7.1. Duration of the ceasefire shall be divided into four phases:
7.1.1 Phase I: The Pre-interim Period duration 6 months (D-day to D-day + 6 months) 
ceasefire activities shall start (as per attached lists), including the redeployment of SAF from 
the South to the North, the beginning of the Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-integration 
and Reconciliation (DDRR), the redeployment of SPLA forces from Eastern Sudan, the
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formation, co-location in training centers, training of the Joint/Integrated Units (JIUs) and the 
UN monitoring.
7.1.2 Phase II: First half of the Interim Period duration 36 months (D-day+ 6 months to D- 
day + 42 months). This phase shall cover the completion of deployment of the JIUs, 
redeployment of the SPLA forces from the Eastern Sudan to the south, redeployment of the 
SPLA forces from Nuba Mountains and Southern Blue Nile to the south and redeployment of 
SAF from the South to the North. The DDR activities shall continue. The negotiations on 
proportionate downsizing shall also start at this phase.
7.1.3 Phase III: Second half of the Interim Period duration 36 months (D-day + 42 months to 
D-day + 78 months). Continuation of DDR process, training and the monitoring process. 
Development of plans and modalities of transforming the JIUs into integrated ones.
7.1.4 Phase IV: Post Interim Period duration 6 months ( D- day + 78 months to D-day + 84 
months). Formation of Sudan National Armed Forces (SNAF) in case of unity or dissolution 
of JIUs in case of secession.
7.2. The Calendar of major ceasefire activities is agreed by the parties as per Annex 2.
8. Disengagement:
8.1. There shall be lines of disengagement according to the assembly areas, as specified in 
Annex 1, and shall be adjusted by the monitors of the UN Peace Support Mission.
8.2. On the declaration of the ceasefire, the forces of the SAF, inclusive of their allied forces 
and the SPLA, inclusive of their allied forces, shall maintain their current positions.
8.3. All forces shall take defensive positions and be redeployed to assembly points within the 
first three months of the Pre-Interim Period according to the agreed timetable.
8.4. All forces shall be disengaged, separated, encamped in their assembly points, and 
redeployed subject to international monitoring arrangements.
8.5. The parties shall provide maps and sketches showing their current dispositions before the 
declaration of the ceasefire. Such maps and sketches shall include:
8.5.1. Current dispositions including deployment and weapons sites.
8.5.2. All necessary information about roads, tracks, passages, minefields, and command 
posts.
8.6. To safeguard against the menace and hazards posed by landmines and unexploded 
ordnance, the Parties agree that:
8.6.1. The laying of mines, explosive devices or booby traps of whatever type shall be 
prohibited;
8.6.2. The Parties and forces under their control shall promptly provide on D - day to the 
Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) all known information concerning the locations 
and descriptions of all minefields, unexploded ordnance, demolitions, booby traps and any 
other physical or military hazards which could affect the safe movement of persons, within 
the ceasefire zones. The Parties shall also promptly produce a plan to mark and signpost any 
danger areas and initiate this plan according to agreed priorities;
The Parties shall allow and facilitate cross-line de-mining activities, the repair and reopening 
of roads and the removal, dismantling or destruction of mines, unexploded ordnance and all 
other such hazards as described above immediately upon the signature of this agreement;
8.6.3. The Parties and forces under their control shall promptly provide to the CJMC 
information concerning the stockpiles of Anti Personal Mines;
8.6.4. The Parties shall conduct de-mining activities as soon as possible, and in coordination 
with the UN Peace Support Mission with a view to create the conditions necessary for 
deployment of the UN Peace Support Mission and the return of displaced populations;
8.6.5. The UN Peace Support Mission, in conjunction with United Nations Mine Action 
Office, will assist the Parties’ de-mining efforts by providing technical advice and 
coordination. The Parties shall, as necessary, seek additional de-mining assistance and advice 
from the UN Peace Support Mission;
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8.6.6 The Parties shall establish by D Day + 30 Days two determining authorities (Northern 
and Southern) that shall work together and coordinate their de-mining activities and to work 
jointly in close cooperation with UN Mine Action Office;
8.7. Before the declaration of the ceasefire, the Parties shall present detailed lists of size and 
location of their forces in each area to United Nations Advanced Mission in Sudan 
(UNAMIS), subject by verification of the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT) and 
Joint Military Commission (JMC) Nuba Mountains. Such lists shall be attached to the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
8.8. Notwithstanding 8.7 above, the Parties shall present detailed lists of particulars of all 
troops to the Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) or, pending the formation of the 
CJMC, to the
VMT and JMC/Nuba. The lists shall be verified by the CJMC and/or the VMT and JMC, as 
the case may be, immediately after the declaration of the ceasefire.
8.9. The Parties agree and in collaboration with the UN Peace Support Mission to pull back 
all the weapons of effective range fire within the other Party’s assembly areas.
8.10. The Parties shall provide detailed data on their inventories and stocks including 
different weapons and munitions, fuel oil and lubricants, etc., and their exact locations to 
CJMC or the VMT in the ceasefire zone. Such inventories shall be verified immediately after 
the declaration of the ceasefire. The Parties shall agree on ways and means of monitoring 
such stocks and/or stores to make sure that they are no longer accessible to the Parties.
9. Permitted Activities:
In view of negative consequences of war, the key principle that shall underpin permitted 
activities shall be to alleviate the effects of the war on the civilians and war-affected areas 
and to galvanize popular support for peace. Permitted activities shall therefore include:
9.1. De-mining and decommissioning of military hazards (this shall be done in collaboration 
with other bodies referred to in 8.6 herein, according to agreed timetables and mechanisms, 
and under UN monitoring);
9.2. Development activities to include opening of roads, rehabilitation of bridges and 
passages, railways, airports and airstrips, and lines of river navigation etc;
9.3. Humanitarian activities such as securing unimpeded access to humanitarian relief 
according to agreed regulations;
9.4. Socio-economic activities such as assisting free movement of people, goods and services;
9.5. Free movement of unarmed soldiers in plain clothes who are on leave, medical referrals, 
or visiting their families;
9.6. Re-supply of armed forces lethal items as shall be deemed appropriate by the JDB and 
coordinated with UN Mission;
9.7. Supply of non-lethal items (food, water, medicine, fuel oils and lubricants, stationery, 
uniforms, etc.);
9.8. Training and Refresher training.
9.9. During the disengagement of forces, they shall not exercise any military activities except 
the following:
9.9.1. Training and refresher training (UN Mission shall be informed of such training - 
location, duration and type); particularly the field training of platoon level and higher;
9.9.2. Administrative movement (e.g. replenishment with non-lethal supplies or equipments);
9.9.3. Medical evacuation.
10. Violations:
10.1. The following acts shall constitute violations to this Agreement:
10.1.1. Any acts that may contravene this Agreement;
10.1.2. Unauthorized movement of troops;
10.1.3. Unauthorized recruitment, draft and/or mobilization drive;
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10.1.4. Unauthorized replenishment of military equipment and supplies;
10.1.5. Hostile acts that may provoke confrontation;
10.1.6. Violation of human rights, humanitarian law and obstruction of freedom of 
movement;
10.1.7. Hostile propaganda and media warfare;
10.1.8. Espionage, sabotage, and acts of subversion to undermine either party and/or the 
Agreement;
10.1.9. Recruitment of child soldiers.
10.2 In event of any violation to provisions of this Agreement, the CJMC will determine 
appropriate disciplinary measures which may include, where appropriate, the following:
10.2.1. Publicizing or mentioning the parties that took part in the violations;
10.2.2. Exposing or shaming the guilty or recommending severe punishment in event of 
grave violations;
10.2.3. Recommend referral to civil, criminal trial procedures, or court-martial of individual 
or parties involved as applicable;
10.2.4. The Parties agree to follow up on recommendations for disciplinary measures as 
proposed by CJMC.
10.3. The hostile propaganda as provided in sub-section 10.1.7 above shall be 
comprehensively monitored by CJMC as part of the ceasefire monitoring process;
10.4. Without prejudice to the freedom of press and media, the Parties agree to set up a Joint 
Media Committee upon signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement to establish 
guidelines for the
media and press to create an environment conducive for the smooth implementation of the 
ceasefire.
10.5. The Parties agree that any deadlock arising out of the implementation of the ceasefire 
shall be referred, as of last resort, to the Presidency for consideration and action after having 
exhausted all avenues of dispute management at all lower levels;
11. Other Armed Groups:
11.1. In accordance with Article 7 (a) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the 
Parties agree to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied 
to either Party,
into their armed forces, other organized forces, the civil service and civil societal institutions.
11.2. The Parties agree to each setting up “Incorporation and Reintegration Ad Hoc 
Committee” to implement the provision of sub-section 11.1 above.
11.3. In accordance with the Framework Agreement on Security Arrangements during the 
Interim Period, no armed group allied to either party shall be allowed to operate outside the 
two forces. Other Armed Groups (OAGs) who have a desire and qualify shall be incorporated 
into the organized forces of either party (Army, Police, Prisons, and Wildlife Forces), while 
the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service and civil society institutions.
11.4. The Parties agree to adopt a collaborative approach for handling OAGs and to establish 
by D day + 15 days an OAGs Collaborative Committee (CC) which shall comprise equal 
number of representatives from both parties (three each) and an independent observer from 
UN.
11.5. The OAGs CC shall, inter alia, perform the following functions:
11.5.1. Ascertain strength and armament conditions of all OAGs units which shall be verified 
by the VMT until UN monitors take over;
11.5.2. Ensure freedom of choice for all OAGs personnel as to the party they so desire to be 
incorporated in;
11.5.3. Ensure free and fair access of the parties to the OAGs;
11.5.4. Supervise and review incorporation processes of both parties;
11.5.5. Provide a forum for the parties to exchange information and data on the OAGs as well 
as handling complaints that pertain to their incorporation process and their activities;
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11.5.6. Receive regular updates on the progress of the OAGs incorporation;
11.5.7. Keep the Ceasefire Political Committee abreast on the progress of the OAGs 
incorporation;
11.5.8. Monitor the DDR programme for the OAGs.
11.6. DDR programme for the OAGs shall be worked out by Southern Sudan DDR 
Commission (SDDRC) by the end of the Pre-Interim Period with technical assistance from 
international experts. All integration options shall be open in that programme.
11.7. Upon signature of this Agreement, the process of incorporation of individual members 
of all other armed groups, who desire and quality shall start as soon as possible into the ranks 
of either SAF or SPLA or integrated into organized forces (police, prisons and wildlife 
services),
while the rest shall be reintegrated into the civil service or civil society institutions.
11.8. By D Day + 6 months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee after ascertaining the 
strength and armament conditions of OAGs units, shall ensure freedom of choice for all 
OAGs members to join either Party they so desire to be incorporated in, provided that no 
other armed groups shall continue to have a separate existence outside the command of either 
SAF or SPLA.
11.9. By D Day + 12 Months, the OAGs Collaborative Committee shall finish the 
incorporation process of OAGs members who desire and qualify into the armed forces of 
either Party and police, prisons, wildlife service and civil service.
11.10. When the incorporation process of OAGs referred to above in subsection 11.9 is 
completed, the incorporated OAGs members shall not be allowed to decamp from one Party 
to the other nor to change from police, prisons, wildlife and civil service to the military.
11.11. The Parties commit themselves, through OAGs Collaborative Committee and 
Incorporation and Reintegration of Ad Hoc Committees, to jointly brief all the OAGs about 
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and their rights and obligations in the Agreement so as 
to ensure that they adhere to and respect all the provisions of the Agreement.
11.12. The Southern Sudan DDR Commission shall continue the reintegration process of the 
demobilized and disarmed members of OAGs into the civil service and civil society 
institutions in Southern Sudan, with a follow up of the OAGs Collaborative Committee.
11.13. The Parties shall not entertain, encourage, or permit reincorporation/defection of 
groups or individuals who were previously members or associated with any OAGs and have 
been incorporated into either party organized forces. Such act, if committed by either party, 
shall constitute a violation to sub-section 10.1.8 of this Agreement.
12. Foreign Insurgency Groups:
12.1. The parties appreciate the threat and menace that the foreign insurgency groups pose on 
the security and stability of the Sudan and neighbouring countries.
12.2. The parties have resolved to end the presence of the foreign insurgency groups on the 
Sudanese soil;
12.3. The parties shall work together to disarm, repatriate or expel these groups as soon as 
possible.
13. Verification, Monitoring, Complaints and Obligations:
13.1 The structure and levels of monitoring and verification of the implementation of this 
Agreement shall be as follows:
13.1.1. Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC)
13.1.2. Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC)
13.1.3. Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC)
13.1.4. Joint Military Teams (JMTs)
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14. The Ceasefire Political Commission (CPC):
14.1 The CPC shall be answerable to the Presidency;
14.2 The CPC shall be a political decision making body composed of:
14.2.1. One senior political representative from each Party;
14.2.2. One senior officer each from SAF and SPLA;
14.2.3. Special Representative of UN Secretary General or his deputy;
14.2.4. Senior Security officer (after the establishment of National Security Service);
14.2.5. One Legal advisor from each Party;
14.2.6. Representative of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) (observer);
14.2.7. Representative of IGAD Partner’s Forum (IPF) (observer);
14.3. The CPC chair shall be rotational between the Parties;
14.4. The CPC shall reach its decisions by consensus of the Parties;
14.5. The mandate and functions of the CPC shall be to:
14.5.1. supervise, monitor and oversee the implementation of this Agreement;
14.5.2. complete negotiating any operational details as shall be necessary;
14.5.3. sound the Parties to rise up to their obligations in this Agreement;
14.5.4. update the Parties on the progress of the ceasefire implementation;
14.5.5. co-ordinate with other relevant national and international bodies;
14.5.6. settle deadlocks arising out from the ceasefire implementation as reported by the 
CJMC and refer the unresolved ones to the Presidency;
14.5.7. provide disciplinary measures for violations;
14.5.8. provide a political forum for continuous dialogue between the Parties and the 
international community;
14.5.9. foster confidence building between the Parties;
14.5.10. Update the IGAD, IPF, African Union (AU) and the United Nations periodically on 
the process of the ceasefire implementation as deemed necessary;
14.5.11. propose amendments in the Agreement to the Presidency.
14.6. Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC):
14.6.1. The CJMC shall be answerable to the CPC and shall oversee the activities of AJMC;
14.6.2. The CJMC shall be located in Juba;
14.6.3. The CJMC shall be a military decision making body and shall be composed of:
14.6.3.1. The Force Commander of the UN Monitoring Mission (Chair),
14.6.3.2. The Deputy Force Commander from countries acceptable to the Parties. 
Considering that the official working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English;
14.6.3.3. Three officers from SAF with ranks not less than Colonel;
14.6.3.4. Three senior officers from SPLA;
14.6.3.5. Officer in charge of national security at that level;
14.6.3.6. One senior police officer at the level of Southern Sudan.
14.6.4. The CJMC shall reach its decisions by consensus of the Parties and shall establish its 
own internal regulations;
14.6.5. The CJMC shall have the following functions:
14.6.5.1. Oversee compliance of the Parties to their obligations under this Agreement;
14.6.5.2. Coordinate planning, monitoring and verification of the implementation of this 
Agreement;
14.6.5.3. Facilitate liaison between the parties;
14.6.5.4. Coordinate monitoring and verification of disengagement, disarmament and 
redeployment of the forces as agreed upon in this Agreement;
14.6.5.5. Check on the conduct of the military forces;
14.6.5.6. Specification of current locations of troops as of the D day;
14.6.5.7. Monitoring troop strength, stocks of arms, ammunitions and other war-related 
equipment;
14.6.5.8. Coordination and monitoring of permitted military movement and itineraries 
thereof;
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14.6.5.9. Receiving and verifying unresolved violations, disputes and complaints and rule 
on them;
14.6.5.10. Serving as a channel of communication between the parties;
14.6.5.11. Inspection of replenishment of supplies to the forces;
14.6.5.12. Supervision of demining activities, decommissioning of unexploded ordnance 
and other form of military hazards;
14.6.5.13. Dissemination of information about this Agreement;
14.6.5.14. help Parties in disarming and reintegrating armed groups;
14.6.5.15. monitor and verify the disarmament of all Sudanese civilians who are illegally 
armed;
14.6.5.16. be responsible for executing peace support operations in collaboration with VMT, 
JMC
and CPMT, until the deployment of the UN monitors; after which the roles of the latter shall 
cease to exist;
14.6.6. Decisions reached by the CJMC shall be communicated down through the individual 
chains of command and reported up to the CPC.
14.6.7. Subject to the timing of different activities specified in the Agreement on Security 
Arrangements, the CJMC may readjust on practical considerations the timing of activities or 
obligations related to ceasefire including redeployment North and South of the 1956 North- 
South border and activities referred to in sub-section 8.7 herein.
14.6.8. The CJMC shall compile necessary cartographical and mapping references which, 
once agreed to by the Parties, shall be used for the purposes of monitoring the 
implementation of this Agreement. However, such cartographical and mapping references 
shall have no bearing whatsoever on the subsequent delineation of the 1/1/1956 North/South 
border by the ad hoc border commission that the Parties will set up as part of the agreement 
on implementation modalities.
14.6.9. The CJMC shall be entitled to move freely throughout the ceasefire zone.
14.7 Area Joint Military Committee (AJMC):
14.7.1 The AJMC that shall be established in Juba, Malakal, Wau, Kadugli, Abyei, Damazien 
or Kurmuk, and shall be composed as follows:
14.7.1.1 The most senior UN Officer in the Area, Chairperson;
14.7.1.2 Equal number of senior officers from SAF and SPLA;
14.7.1.3 UN monitors.
14.7.2 AJMC shall be established in Kassala or Hamashkoreb in Eastern Sudan to monitor 
and verify the redeployment of SPLA forces as provided in sub-section 4 (c)(v)(a) of 
Agreement on Security Arrangements;
14.7.3 The AJMC shall be charged with the following functions:
14.7.3.1 monitor and verify alleged violations and resolve disputes;
14.7.3.2 report periodically and refer unresolved complaints to CJMC;
14.7.3.3 Liaise and share information with the Security Committee in the designated area;
14.8 Joint Military Teams (JMTs):
14.8.1. JMTs shall be the lowest operating unit of the ceasefire monitoring mechanism;
14.8.2. JMTs shall be established and designated by the AJMC at that level;
14.8.3. A JMT shall be composed of UN senior officer at that level, international monitors, 
equal number of officers from SAF and SPLA.
14.8.4. JMTs shall conduct regular patrols and visits throughout their respective areas to 
prevent violations, preserve the ceasefire, and assist in building confidence.
14.8.5. JMTs shall monitor, verify and report alleged violations to the appropriate AJMC.
15. UN Peace Support Mission
15.1. The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute a lean, effective, 
sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this Agreement 
and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement as provided for 
under Chapter
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VI of the UN Charter;
15.2. The Parties call upon the international community to provide technical and financial 
assistance, given the financial constraints of GOS and particularly the nature and structure of 
SPLA, to expedite the implementation of the ceasefire activities.
15.3. International monitoring shall be carried out by UN, considering that the official 
working languages in Sudan are Arabic and English, who may make the use of the services of 
UN protection unit. The size of the UN Peace Support Mission, including any UN force 
protection element, shall be determined by the UN in consultation with the Parties.
15.4. For the purpose of monitoring activities related to the ceasefire, the international 
monitors shall have unrestricted access in accordance with a Status of Forces Agreement 
(SOFA), which shall be concluded with the United Nations as soon as possible. Such SOFA 
shall contain
the provisions agreed to by the Parties with the United Nations immediately following the 
conclusion of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
15.5. The parties agree that the presence and size of the UN peace support mission shall be 
determined by the implementation time table of this Agreement (disengagement, 
disarmament, redeployment, etc) and shall gradually phase out with successful 
implementation of the time
tables, increased confidence building, and commitment of the parties towards the 
implementation of this Agreement.
15.6. The Parties agree to request the UN to provide cultural orientation to all its members to 
create conducive atmosphere for respect and better understanding of social values and 
cultures so as to ensure effective implementation of this Agreement;
15.7. The Parties undertake to respect the exclusively international nature of the UN Peace 
Support Mission as in terms of flag, vehicle markings, communication, travel and transport, 
privileges and immunities, facilities, provisions, supplies, services, sanitary arrangements, 
recruitment of local personnel, currency, entry, residence, departure, uniform, arms, permits 
and licences, military police, arrest, transfer of custody, mutual assistance, jurisdiction, 
deceased members and
settlement of disputes;
15.8. SAF and SPFA members of AJMCs and JMTs shall have the right to participate in 
verification and monitoring missions, however in case of failure of either or both Parties to 
participate, the mission shall still continue with its verification and monitoring tasks.
15.9. The Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) 
in Nuba Mountains and the Civilian Protection Monitoring Team (CPMT) shall continue 
performing their duties, under operational control of the UN Mission, according to their 
present and/or expanded mandate, fill the gap and carry out duties as shall be entrusted to 
them by the Parties until the UN Mission is operational, after which their roles shall cease to 
exist.
PART TWO
The Armed Forces
16. Military Mission and Mandate
16.1. Without prejudice to the provisions of sub-sections 1 (b) and 4.1(b) of the Agreement 
on Security Arrangements, the mission and mandate for Sudan Armed Forces (SAF), Sudan 
People’s Fiberation Army (SPFA) and the Joint/Integrated Forces within their respective 
areas of deployment during the interim period shall clearly be specified within the first year 
of the interim period by the Joint Defense Board subject to the approval of the Presidency.
16.2. Without prejudice to sub-section 16.1 above, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), the 
Sudan People’s Fiberation Army (SPFA) and the Joint/Integrated Units (JIUs) shall be 
charged with the mission of defending the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan 
during
the interim period.
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16.3. The two Armed Forces and the JIUs shall be regular, professional, and non-partisan 
armed forces. They shall respect the rule of law and civilian government, democracy, basic 
human rights, and the will of the people.
16.4. As per Article (1) (b) and (4) (b) (III) of the Agreement on Security Arrangements, the 
Armed Forces (SAF, SPLA and JIUs) shall undertake the responsibility of the defense of the 
country against threats in their areas of deployment pending appropriate decision from the 
JDB.
16.5. The involvement of the Armed Forces as defined in sub-section 16.4 above, in 
constitutionally specified emergencies, shall be determined in the Interim Constitution.
16.6. The Parties shall jointly develop a code of conduct for the members of all armed forces 
based on the common military doctrine that shall be developed as stipulated for in section 6 
of the Agreement on Security Arrangements.
16.7. The elements of the code of conduct provided for in sub-section 16.6 above shall:
16.7.1. be informed by the provisions of sub-section 16.2 above;
16.7.2. make a clear distinction between the military functions from partisan political 
functions;
16.7.3. make repudiation that such forces can be used as agency of physical intimidation of 
the civilian population;
16.7.4. make a clear distinction between military mandate from the policing mandate during 
cease fire period;
16.7.5. make clear that all members of armed forces shall not be involved in illicit activities 
that may affect the environment and natural resources.
17. The Joint Defense Board (JDB):
17.1. The JDB shall be composed and structured on parity basis and take its decisions by 
consensus. It shall be composed of the Chiefs of Staff of SAF and SPLA, their deputies and 
four senior officers from each party.
17.2. The JDB shall exhibit a characteristic of well-functioning body capable of timely 
response to tasks and situation.
17.3. The JDB shall have a Technical Committee to be formed from four senior officers from 
both sides.
17.4. The Technical Committee shall undertake the duty of coordination between the two 
forces and resolve different problems that may ensue. It shall report regularly to the JDB in 
all ordinary and
extraordinary sessions.
17.5. The two Commanders in Chief shall appoint the Commander and the deputy 
commander of the JIUs who shall be ex officio members of the JDB.
17.6. In the event of any external or internal threat, the JDB shall, subject to section 16.2 
above, decide on how to address the situation. The JDB shall decide whether all forces, the 
JIUs or either force (SAF and SPLA) shall handle the threat alone or collectively. The JDB 
may also decide
on the appropriate support and reinforcements that other forces shall lend to the forces facing 
direct threat and aggression. In a joint operation, JDB shall determine lead HQS for that 
operation.
17.7. The JDB shall be entrusted to work out a comprehensive framework for confidence 
building. Confidence building measures between the SAF and SPLA may include exchanging 
visits, organizing cultural and sport events, convening of joint training courses, and 
participating in
national and religious celebrations and any other activities that shall help in building 
confidence.
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17.8. The JDB shall form a committee to lay down the principles of the future Sudan 
National Armed Forces, should the result of the referendum on self-determination confirm 
unity.
17.9. At the earliest opportunity, appointed representatives of SAF and SPLA will determine, 
taking into account point 17.1 of this agreement, a staff structure in support of JDB 
command. They will calculate a budget and recommend how it is be resourced.
18. Redeployment:
18.1. The line of redeployment of SAF and SPLA shall be South/North Border of 1/1/1956 as 
came in Article 3 (b), in the Agreement on Security Arrangements during the Interim Period 
signed on 25th September, 2003.
18.2. SAF commits to redeploy its forces as per Article 3 (b) of the Agreement on Security 
Arrangements to the North of South/North border of 1/1/1956 beginning from the Pre Interim 
Period according to the following steps:
a) Step I: Reduction by 17% by D-day + 6 months;
b) Step II: Reduction by 14% by D-day +12 months;
c) Step III: Reduction by 19% by D-day + 18 months;
d) Step IV: Reduction by 22 % by D-day + 24 months;
e) Step V: Complete redeployment of the remainder 28% by D-day + 30 months.
18.3. SPLA commits to redeploy its forces pursuant to Article 3 (c) and Article 4 (c) (V) (a) 
of the Agreement on Security Arrangements as detailed below.
18.4. The SPLA forces in the eastern Sudan shall be redeployed to the south of North/South 
border of 1/1/1956 beginning from pre-interim period according to the following steps:
a) Reduction by 30% by D-day + four months.
b) Reduction by 40% by D-day+ 8 months.
c) Complete redeployment of the remainder 30% by D-day 12 months.
18.5. The SPLA shall complete redeployment of its excess forces from Southern Blue Nile 
and Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains within six months of the deployment of the JIUs in 
those areas.
18.6. Without prejudice to the Agreement on the Security Arrangements and the right of 
Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) Command to deploy forces all over North Sudan as it deems fit, 
SAF troop levels in Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile during the Interim 
Period shall
be determined by the Presidency.
18.7. After the JIUs deployment in Abyei, all other forces shall be redeployed outside the 
area. However, the size JIUs Battalion in Abyei shall conform to JIUs organizational 
standards according to the Protocol between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Movement on the Resolution of the Conflict in Abyei Area of 26th May, 
2004.
19. Optimal Size of the Armed Forces:
After the Completion of SAF redeployment to the North the parties shall begin the 
negotiations on proportionate downsizing. Nonetheless, the parties shall allow voluntary 
demobilization, demobilization of nonessentials (child soldiers and elderly, disabled) during 
the first year of 
interim period.
20. The Status of Joint Integrated Units:
20.1. There shall be formed Joint/Integrated Units (hereinafter referred to as JIUs) during the 
pre-interim and the interim period from the SAF and the SPLA. This shall form the nucleus 
of the future Sudanese National Armed Forces (SNAF) should the result of the referendum 
on the right of self-determination for the people of Southern Sudan confirm unity of the 
country.
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20.2. If the result of the referendum is in favor of secession of the South from the North, the 
JIUs shall dissolve with each component reverting to its mother Armed Forces to pave the 
way for the formation of the separate Armed Forces for the emerging states.
20.3. Notwithstanding sub-Sections 20.10.1, 20.10.2, 20.10.3, 20.10.4, and 20.10.5, 
formation, training, tasking and deployment of JIUs formations and sub-formations shall be 
completed not later than D-day + 21 months.
20.4. At the initial stage of the formation of the JIUs, SAF component shall be liable to relief 
“after two years of deployment”. Nonetheless, they shall be locked-in by D-day + 33 
months.
20.5. At the inception, the JIUs shall remain in their joint form. However, the process of full 
integration shall be completed by D-Day + 52 months.
20.6. The JIUs as per Agreement on Security Arrangements shall fall under the command of 
the Joint Defense Board (JDB). Nevertheless, the two Commanders-in-Chief shall appoint 
the commander and deputy commander for the JIUs as the highest level who shall, by virtue 
of their positions, be members of the JDB. They shall oversee routine command matters of 
the JIUs in
accordance to authority conferment by the JDB.
20.7. The JIUs command shall be exercised on parity basis between SAF and the SPLA 
officers with alternation of roles at the uppermost and other levels of command.
20.8. The JIUs personnel shall be treated equally. There shall be uniformity in welfare, 
salaries, emoluments, pensions rights, supplies, armament, and equipment.
20.9. The Parties have further discussed the issue of establishing JIUs in Eastern Sudan and 
have decided to continue discussing the issue during the Interim Period and resolve it as they 
deem fit.
20.10 Training of the Joint Integrated Units:
20.10.1. Both Armed Forces (SAF and SPLA) shall complete selection and organization of 
officers, Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) and men for the JIUs within three months 
from the beginning of the pre-interim period.
20.10.2. Notwithstanding sub-section 20.3 above, the JIUs components from both Parties 
shall be formed within three months from the pre-interim period and co-locate in their 
various training centers to be trained for not less than six months after which they shall be 
tasked and deployed.
20.10.3. There shall be developed as soon as practicable a joint doctrine, code of conduct, as 
well as disciplinary laws, regulations, and standing operating procedures to govern the JIUs 
general training policies, programmes, disciplinary scopes and behavioural patterns.
20.10.4. In view of special status of Khartoum and Juba, the JIUs Command shall allot tasks 
to the JIUs contingents that shall be deployed to these cities by the end of the pre-interim 
period after completion of initial joint training session that shall not exceed three months. 
Nonetheless, the JIUs
command shall organize further training sessions for these contingents in accordance to JIUs 
training policy and programmes.
20.10.5. The parties shall appeal to the international community to render additional 
technical, material and financial support to assist in forming and training the JIUs.
20.11. JIUs Command and Control:
The JIUs Headquarters is under command of JDB and shall be located in Juba. The JIUs 
command shall perform among other things, the following duties and responsibilities:
20.11.1. Command of the JIUs formations and units;
20.11.2. Promotion of mutual cooperation between the JIUs, SAF and SPLA at all command 
levels;
20.11.3. Coordination of supply and replenishments plans with the JDB;
20.11.4. Implementation of the JDB plans, policies, programmes and directives pertaining to 
the JIUs;
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20.11.5. Appointment and transfer of JIUs officers within the discretion of the JIUs 
command;
20.11.6. Create and promote confidence building measures;
20.11.7. Development and execution of training programmes for the JIUs;
20.11.8. Coordination with the CPC;
20.11.9. Resolution of disputes that may arise within the JIUs jurisdiction.
20.12. The JIUs Commanders shall exercise the following authority/responsibility:
20.12.1. Command and control of JIUs in their respective areas of command;
20.12.2. Implementation of and compliance with the directives of the JIUs Higher 
Headquarters;
20.12.3. Implement confidence building policies of the higher headquarters as well as create 
and promote confidence-building measures within their power as shall be desirable;
20.12.4. Development and execution of training programmes within their command 
jurisdiction;
20.12.5. Performance of any other duties that may be conferred upon them by the higher 
headquarters.
20.13. The JIUs Composition and organization:
20.13.1 Composition:
20.13.1.1. The JIUs shall initially be formed from SAF and SPLA, out of their ground forces;
20.13.1.2. By D-Day + 12 months, SPLA nominated personnel shall commence training in 
the service arms of the Air Force, Navy and Air Defense, so as to make available SPLA 
contribution to the JIUs Service Arms which shall be established as per sub-section 20.13.1.3 
below;
20.13.1.3. By D-Day+36 months, the first JIUs service arms unit shall be established, others 
shall follow according to the graduation of qualified SPLA JIUs personnel as determined by 
the JDB, further training may continue according to the needs as may be decided by the JDB;
20.13.1.4. SAF component of the JIUs service anus shall be nominated and assigned as soon 
as the SPLA component of JIUs service arms is trained and graduated;
20.13.1.5. JIUs Service Arms of the Air Force, Navy and Air Defense shall be part of the 
overall number of forces of the JIUs already agreed to by the Parties.
20.13.2 Organization:
20.13.2.1. The higher JIUs formation shall be division (see organizational structure attached 
as annexure 3). Thus, there shall be formed five JIUs division and one independent brigade as 
follows:
a) 1st Infantry Division which shall have a total strength of 9000 officers, NCOs and men and 
shall
be deployed in Equatoria area.
b) 2nd Infantry Division which shall have a total strength of 8000 officers, NCOs and men 
and shall
be deployed in Upper Nile area.
c) 3rd Infantry Division which shall have a total strength of 7000 officers, NCOs and men 
and shall
be deployed in Bahr el Ghazal area.
d) 4th Infantry Division (unlike the other divisions, both 4th and 5th Infantry divisions are 
under strength divisions) which shall have a total strength of 6000 officers, NCOs and men 
and shall
be deployed in southern Blue Nile.
e) 5th Infantry Division which shall have a total strength of 6000 officers, NCOs and men 
and shall
be deployed in southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains.
f) Independent Brigade which shall be deployed in Khartoum with the total strength of 3000 
officers, NCOs and men.
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20.13.2.2. There shall be formed a JIU Infantry Battalion (Inf. Bn.) for Abyei Area whose 
strength shall be in accordance with JIUs standards. It shall be deployed in Abyei area and 
attached to
3rd Infantry Division.
20.13.2.3. Infantry brigades, of not more than 3000 troops each, to compose of:
i. Brigade Command;
ii. Brigade HQ Company;
iii. Two to four infantry Battalions;
iv. Armoured, artillery, engineering, transport, signal and medical corps.
20.13.2.4. The infantry battalion shall compose of:
i. Battalion Command;
ii. Battalion HQ Company;
iii. Two to four infantry companies;
iv. Support Company.
20.13.2.5. JIUs battalion shall be formed of two SAF companies and two SPLA companies, 
whereas the HQs Company and the support company shall be mixed. The size of the forces in 
each locality shall not exceed one infantry battalion.
20.14 JIUs Detailed Deployment:
20.14.1. First JIUs Infantry Division -  Equatoria:
a) Division Headquarters: Juba town.
b) Juba Brigade Headquarters: Juba town.
c) Subunits deployment: Around Juba town.
d) Torit Brigade Headquarter (+) Inf Bn: Torit town.
e) Subunit Deployment: Kapoeta, Yei, and Jabor.
f) Maridi BrigadeHeadquarters (+) Inf Bn: Maridi town.
g) Subunits deployment: Mondari, Yambio, Tombara.
20.14.2. Second Infantry Division - Upper Nile:
a) Division Headquarters: Malakal town.
b) Malakal Brigade Headquarters (+) two Inf Bns: Malakal town.
c) Subunits deployment: Nasir, Bounj and Malut.
d) Bentiu Brigade headquarters (+) Inf Bn: Bentiu town.
e) Subunits deployment: Pariang, and Bor.
20.14.3. Third Infantry Division - Bahr el Ghazal:
a) Division Headquarters: Wau town.
b) Wau Brigade headquarters (+) two Inf Bns: Wau town.
c) Subunits deployment: Tonj, Rumbek, and Shambe
d) Aweil Brigade headquarters (+) two Inf Bns: Aweil town.
e) Subunits deployment: Raja, Gogrial.
f) Abyei Area Independent Battalion attached.
20.14.4. Fourth Infantry Division - Southern Blue Nile:
a) Division Headquarters: Dindiro town.
b) Dindiro Brigade headquarters (+) Bde Hqs (+) one Inf Bn: Dindiro.
c) Subunits deployment: Kurmuk, Geizan, Ulu.
d) Takamul Brigade headquarters (+) one Inf Bn: Takamol.
e) Subunits deployment: Damazin, Umdarfa’a, Menza.
20.14.5. Fifth Infantry Division - Nuba Mountains:
a) Division headquarters (+) one Inf Bn: Kadogli town.
b) Kadugli Brigade headquarters: Heiban.
c) Subunits deployment: Heiban, El Buram, Talodi.
d) Deleng Brigade headquarters (+) one Inf Bn: Deleng town.
e) Subunits deployment: Jebel Eried, Julud, Urn Sirdibba.
20.14.6. Khartoum Independent Brigade:
456
There shall be one JIUs Brigade in Khartoum that shall be deployed with the Republican 
Guard in Soba. The VIP Protection Force is located according to the Presidential Unit, and 
Capital Security Force in Jebel Awlia’a.
20.14.7. The Parties agree that the JIUs shall protect the oilfields as provided in sub-section 
20.14.2 and the oil installations shall be demilitarised. In case of any threat to the oil 
installations, the JDB shall decide on the appropriate and necessary measures.
21. Funding of the Armed Forces:
21.1. During the Interim Period, SAF forces and JIUs shall be funded by the National 
Government, whereas the SPLA forces shall be funded by the Government of Southern 
Sudan, subject to the principle of proportional downsizing as per Security Arrangements 
Protocol and the approval of
Southern Sudan Legislature. To meet this obligation, the Government of Southern Sudan 
shall raise financial resources from both local and foreign sources and seek international 
assistance. These financial resources shall be channelled through the Bank of Southern Sudan 
and managed according to the principles of Wealth Sharing Protocol.
21.2. The elected National Legislature during the Interim Period shall review and finally 
resolve the issue of the funding of the Sudan National Armed Forces (SNAF) so as to make 
unity of the Sudan an attractive choice in the referendum on self-determination by the people 
of Southern Sudan, and to create sound basis for the formation of the future army of the 
Sudan that shall be composed from the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan 
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and the JIUs, should the result of referendum on self- 
determination confirm unity.
22. Policing Issues and Domestic Security
22.1. In order to facilitate the removal and withdrawal of the military and paramilitary forces 
from areas where they were previously located and in order to return societal order and 
harmony, in accordance with the law, in compliance with national and international 
acceptable standards
and with accountability to the Courts and civil Administration, the police at the appropriate 
level during the ceasefire shall:
22.1.1. Maintain law and public order;
22.1.2. Ensure safety and security of all people and their property;
22.1.3. Prevent and detect crimes.
22.1.4. Assist returning refugees, the displaced and other returnees to start a normal, stable 
and safe life in their respective communities;
22.1.5. Provide national service ( such as nationality, civil registry, identity documents (IDs), 
passports etc.) and other police services and make them available to all citizens In their 
locations;
22.1.6. Protect VIPs in collaboration with other security agencies;
22.1.7. Preserve natural resources;
22.1.8. Combat illicit trafficking in narcotics, drugs and illegal trade in firearms and other 
organized and trans-boundary crimes in the area;
22.1.9. Control illegal presence and movement of aliens in the area;
22.1.10. Collect data and information on criminal matters that threaten implementation of the 
peace agreement in the area.
22.1.11. Remove the need for the deployment of military and para-military forces in villages, 
communities and city streets;
22.1.12. Combat corruption at all levels of government and civil society; and
22.2. In order to strengthen the effective implementation of this Agreement, the National 
Police may assist, as required, other police at all levels to establish and promote police 
service at that level;
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22.3. The police shall cooperate and participate in the entire process of ceasefire 
implementation;
22.4. The Parties agree that the police in the territorial jurisdiction of the ceasefire shall 
assume their normal functions and activities, particularly in the areas where military and 
para-military forces had previously assumed their functions;
22.5. The Parties call upon the international community to assist in the areas of training, 
establishment and capacity building of police and other law enforcement agencies for the 
sustenance of peace and rule of law;
22.6. The Parties recognize the need for cooperation and coordination mechanism between 
the national police and other law enforcement agencies at all levels with regards to the 
implementation of this Agreement.
PART THREE
Demobilization, Disarmament, Re-Integration and 
Reconciliation
23. Objectives:
23.1 The overarching objective of the DDR process is to contribute to creating an enabling 
environment to human security and to support post-peace-agreement social stabilization 
across the Sudan, particularly war-affected areas.
23.2 The DDR programme shall take place within a comprehensive process of national 
reconciliation and healing through out the country as part of the peace and confidence 
building measures.
24. Guiding Principles:
24.1 In implementing the DDR programme the Parties agree that the implementing organs 
shall be guided by the following common principles:
24.2. The national ownership of the process and that the capabilities of the National 
Institutions shall be built to effectively lead the overall DDR process; for this purpose 
efficient planning, implementation and supervisory institutions shall be established to operate 
as soon as
possible.
24.3. That the DDR process in the Sudan shall be led by recognized state institutions and 
international partners shall only play a supportive role to these institutions. The process shall 
be sustained through cooperation and coordination with local NGOs and active support from 
the international community by facilitating and extending material and technical assistance 
throughout the entire DDR process and the transition from war to peace.
24.4. That no DDR planning, management or implementation activity shall take place outside 
the framework of the recognized interim and permanent DDR institutions referred to in 
paragraphs 25.1 and 25.2. hereunder.
24.5. Fairness, transparency, equitability and consistency for determining the eligibility of ex­
combatants targeted for assistance.
24.6. Ex-combatants shall be treated equitably irrespective of their previous military 
affiliations; as well, they shall be empowered by provision of training and information to 
voluntarily choose their path to reintegration. The reintegration process shall be community 
based and equally benefits returnees and local communities.
24.7. That the DDR is mostly a civilian process although the military input is vital. While 
disarmament and demobilization are mainly military, the civilian efforts in reintegration are 
paramount, particularly with reference to decisions of methodology and organization. The 
military
will have input but the decisions and implementation of such programmes are the 
responsibility of the relevant institutions created for this purpose.
24.8. The DDR programme shall be gender sensitive and shall encourage the participation of 
the communities and the civil society organizations with the view to strengthening their
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capacities to play their role in improving and sustaining the social and economic reintegration
of former
combatants.
24.9. The demobilization of all child soldiers within six months of the signature of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
24.10. The identification and registration within six months from the signature of the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement of all children separated from their families for family 
tracing and ultimate reunification;
24.11. UNICEF, ICRC and other international organizations are called upon to assist in the 
child component of the DDR in the Sudan;
24.12. That adequate financial and logistical support shall be mobilized by the international 
community including governments, governmental agencies, humanitarian organizations and 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
24.13. The observance of a high level of transparency and accountability with respect to the 
DDR programmes financial management.
24.14. The maintenance of an appropriate and optimal degree of flexibility to respond to the 
emerging needs on the ground in a timely manner.
25. DDR Institutions:
25.1. To realize the best objective of the DDR process in the entire country, and to avoid any 
possibilities of relapsing into war, the Parties state their dedication to undertake timely steps 
to establish the following institutions to plan, manage and implement the DDR programmes:
25.1.1. The National DDR Coordination Council (NDDRCC), with the prime responsibility 
of policy formulation, oversight, review, coordination and evaluation of the progress of the 
Northern
and Southern Sudan DDR commissions referred to in 25.1.2 hereunder. The NDDRCC shall 
be appointed by and accountable to the Presidency.
25.1.2. The Northern Sudan DDR Commission (NDDRC) and the Southern Sudan DDR 
Commission (SDDRC) shall be mandated to design, implement and manage the DDR 
process at the northern and southern sub-national levels respectively.
25.1.3. The State DDR commissions shall be entrusted with the responsibility of 
implementation of the programmes at the state and local levels.
25.2. Until the aforementioned institutions are established the Parties agree to put in place 
Interim DDR bodies to:
25.2.1. Act as bases for the future Sub-National DDR institutions established in 25.1 above.
25.2.2. Coordinate and prepare detailed DDR proposals.
25.2.3. Commence technical discussion with international donors and agencies regarding 
partnership and funding requirements and modalities for the DDR implementation 
programmes.
25.2.4. Coordinate with the UN-DPKO mission on issues pertaining to DDR.
25.2.5. Prepare draft operational proposals for DDR programmes.
25.2.6. Prepare to establish formal DDR capacity building and facilitate training in DDR 
through seminars, workshops and study tours.
25.2.7. Coordinate joint DDR preparatory activities.
25.2.8. Prepare in collaboration with the international actors data collection, including socio­
economic surveys in the areas where the DDR programmes will be implemented and 
undertake needs assessment to provide data on target groups.
26. Previous Contractual Obligations:
Recognizing that both Parties have existing contractual arrangements with international 
organizations and agencies related to DDR, the Parties agree:
26.1. To commence a process of negotiations with these agencies and organizations to close 
down and transfer current DDR-related activities to the incoming DDR institutions.
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26.2. That the interim DDR bodies shall undertake the task of leading and concluding these 
negotiations, and shoulder the operational responsibility of the activities thereafter.
27. Humanitarian and General Provisions
27.1. Upon signature of the comprehensive peace agreement, the Parties shall:
27.1.1. exchange information on Missing in Action and shall trace them to their best efforts;
27.1.2. agree to lifting the state of emergency in the Sudan except in areas where conditions 
do not permit;
27.2. The Parties agree that the issue of the release of all civil political detainees as part of the 
confidence building measures, national healing and reconciliation process shall be discussed 
on and dealt with within the discussions on the implementation modalities.
27.3. Humanitarian law and civil and political rights shall be closely observed.
27.4. Collateral, secondary agreements and legislation shall not contradict this Agreement 
and shall be equally binding on the Parties.
27.5. The Parties shall call upon the governments at all levels, civil societal organizations, 
political forces, national NGOs and international community to assist and facilitate the 
reconciliation
process at grass root levels.
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